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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of establishing a recovery orientation in 
community, non-government, mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand.  It addresses the discursive constructions of key concepts such as madness, 
recovery and community care.  In addition, it examines the wider, societal and 
institutional pressures that influence how important features of a recovery 
discourse, such as empowerment and an ordinary life in community, are articulated 
and enacted within organisational environments.  It also investigates how 
institutional hegemonies are contested, and opportunities identified for 
institutional change and organisational transformation.   
Critical and postmodern perspectives in healthcare provided a rationale for 
utilising the framework for organisational communication research, developed by 
Dennis Mumby and Cynthia Stohl (1996, 2007).  The framework addressed the 
problematics of (1) voice, (2) rationality, (3) the relationship between organisations 
and the state, as well as (4) the problematic of organising itself.   
Critical Appreciative Inquiry (Grant & Humphries, 2006) was the methodology 
used for this project.  Focus groups and interviews facilitated dialogue among 
support workers, team leaders and senior managers from a range of community 
mental health organisations throughout Aotearoa\New Zealand.  These encounters 
encouraged conversations about what worked well in organisations, and how to 
enhance a recovery-orientation, without shying away from a critical analysis of what 
was impeding best practice.  The dialogues also enabled examination of how these 
organisations were situated within the larger socio-political and cultural 
environment.   
The findings of the study showed that organisational stakeholders constructed 
and translated the discourses of madness, illness and recovery very differently.  
Translations reflected the relative power of particular discourse communities, with 
powerful groups able to control meaning systems through their greater social 
legitimacy.  Institutionalised discourses of biomedicine and managerialism proved 
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difficult to “deinstitutionalise”, and institutional agents “translated” recovery 
discourses in ways that ensured little disruption to powerful and privileged 
interests.  In addition, it was apparent that institutions undertook defensive 
institutional work when challenged.  Defensive strategies were primarily discursive, 
e.g. translation, but were important mechanisms through which institutional 
interests subsumed alternative discourses, and maintained power over an 
organisational field. 
This thesis contributes to the field of organisational communication by 
demonstrating that perceptions of organisational, and institutional change, are 
frequently discursive, rather than substantive.  Effective organisational change, 
therefore, needs to challenge institutional structures and systemic relationships of 
power.  Sustained, and sustainable, change requires fundamental shifts in the 
rational bases of institutional logics.  This has important implications for how less 
powerful actors and organisations can establish alternative discourses in 
institutionalised fields, such as mental healthcare.   
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Exhibit D 
Here is my brain 
in a pickling jar. 
Note the tired synapses. 
Observe the threadbare nerves. 
Then tell me, if you will 
where is my love of rain 
my craving for colour 
my vanishing dream? 
Healing is about connection not control  
Julie Leibrich 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Throughout history and across cultures people experiencing serious 
mental and emotional distress have been perceived as troubling for the 
communities in which they lived (Canguilhem, Cohen, & Foucault, 1989; Drake, 
Green, Mueser, & Goldman, 2003; Leibrich, 1998).  “Mad” or “bad” they have 
had their problems defined by the dominant institutions of their contemporary 
social order (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Fisher, 2000; Pearson, 2000; Samson, 
1995; Scull, 1993).  All too frequently they have been alienated from society and 
systematically dehumanised through loss of personhood, human rights, and civil 
protections.  Many have been subjected to a range of social, moral and scientific 
controls and experimentations that have largely been unchecked or ignored by 
other members of their societies (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Foucault, 1963, 
1973; Grob, 1994).  
Over time a variety of explanatory models for serious psychological 
distress have evolved; not only framing the discourses of mental health and 
mental illness but also producing their own preferred approaches to care, 
treatment and support of vulnerable people (Anthony, 1993; Barber, 2005; 
Jacobson & Greenley, 2001; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Pilgrim, 2002; Rapp, 1998; 
Rappaport, 1987).  Scientific, or biomedical, models have become increasingly 
dominant in Western mental health systems over the past two centuries 
(Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).  However, over several 
decades there have been attempts to introduce more humanistic paradigms into 
the field.  These alternative paradigms have shared a belief that a life worth 
living is a fundamentally different goal to the “cure” of mental illness (Deegan, 
1996; Leibrich, 1997, 2000a, 2000b).  The foremost of these, in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand, has been recovery (Anthony, 2003; Banks, Burdett, Burnett, 
Christensen, Crooks, & Edwards, 2004; Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Lapsley & 
Nikora, 2002; O’Hagan, 2004; Pearson, 2004; Platz, 2006).   
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Aotearoa\New Zealand is credited with leading the world in positioning 
the concept of recovery as the rational basis for guiding the development of all 
mental health service policy and delivery (O'Hagan, 1999; Adams, Daniels, & 
Compagni, 2009).  It was this model that underpinned the publication of The 
Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand: How things need to be 
(Mental Health Commission, 1998) based on the assumptions that all people 
have a right to their aspirations for well-being and quality of life, and the 
personal power to make the important decisions about their lives.  In addition, 
the recovery model, affirmed in The Blueprint, acknowledged that all members of 
a community have a right to participate fully in that community and have 
equitable access to its resources and opportunities.   
With the publication of The Blueprint opportunities arose for new subject 
positions in the sector as well as innovative approaches to care and support 
(Banks et al., 2004; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Goldsack et al., 2005; Harrison, 
2010; Larner & Craig, 2005; McMorland et al.,  2008; Peters, 2009, 2010).  In 
particular, formal recognition of recovery provided people with lived experiences 
of serious psychological distress, their families and allies with a voice in various 
forums engaged in the development of the sector.  In other words, recovery had 
political as well as personal implications from its inception in the Aotearoa\New 
Zealand mental health sector (O'Hagan, 2004).   
The Blueprint also acknowledged the important, but currently under-
valued role, of the community non-government organisations (NGOs) (Harrison, 
2010; Mental Health Commission, 1998; Peters, 2010).  These organisations, 
potentially, were advantageously positioned to deliver recovery-oriented 
services that resonated with their constitutions, missions and values.  They 
typically aspired to a more humane and socially equitable society and had their 
own character; one that has not been represented in the domain of corporate 
organisations or well explored within the field of organisational communication 
(Lewis, 2005).   
Creating a robust community sector, therefore, seems to be a logical and 
important step in enhancing people’s capacity to live well in desirable 
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environments (Barber, 2005; Harrison, 2010; Mental Health Advocacy Coalition 
(MHAC), 2008; Peters, 2010).  Guided by strong social values and, more recently, 
the  recovery model, the community mental health non-government 
organisations (NGOs) have, like most publicly funded social services, 
nevertheless been subject to the vicissitudes of the socio-political climate 
(Fougere, 2001; Ganesh, 205; Harrison, 2010; O’Brien, Sanders, & Tennant, 
2009).  Not only vulnerable to socio-cultural and political tides they have been 
financially dependent on, and treated as subordinate to, clinical mental health 
services.   
In addition, ideological and policy shifts over successive governments, 
which led to massive reorganising of the entire Aotearoa\New Zealand health 
system in the 1990s (Ashton, Mays, & Devlin, 2005; Boston, Dalziel, & John, 
1995; Davis & Ashton, 2001), has meant that community NGOs have struggled to 
establish themselves politically as legitimate and credible alternatives to clinical 
care.  These tensions seem to have substantively constrained the capacity of the 
NGOs to engage creatively with, and respond effectively to, changes in their 
internal and external environments, thereby “realising their best intentions” 
(Barber, 2005).  
In Aotearoa\New Zealand, as elsewhere, proponents of recovery, and 
related discourses of strengths-based and solution-focussed practices, have long 
argued for system transformation founded on a robust and clearly articulated 
philosophy and values base of empowerment, community life and 
resourcefulness (Banks et al., 2004; Central Potential, 2008; Chamberlin, 1998; 
Curtis, 1997; Deegan, 1998; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; McCashen, 2005; Mental 
Health Commission, 1998; Rapp, 1998; S. Rose, 2000; Warriner, 2001).  Many 
have been optimistic about the opportunities these approaches have envisaged 
for people living successful and meaningful lives in the communities of their 
choice (Banks et al., 2004; Barber, 2005; Caird, 2001; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; 
Leibrich, 1998).  My own Masters research project It Ain’t Rocket Science (Barber, 
2005), for example, provided some wonderful stories of successful community 
living, great strengths-based and community focused initiatives and identified 
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some very good community practitioners in the sector.  However, it was equally 
apparent that these ways of working were not being formally embedded in 
organisational talk and practice.  In fact, it seemed that these workers were 
practising in recovery-focussed ways, despite their organisational systems and 
practices.   
The rhetoric of service quality and philosophy in Aotearoa\New Zealand 
has conveyed a sense that the mental health system is constructed entirely to 
support a person’s needs, aspirations and rights to self-determination.  However, 
pragmatically, realising these ambitions has been an ongoing struggle in the face 
of other, more powerful, stakeholder interests (Davidson et al., 2007; Kendrick, 
2004; Warriner, 2001, 2010).  Therefore, many are now concerned that the 
mental health sector has not fully engaged with processes of organisational and 
institutional transformation; instead displaying a tendency to merely re-label 
existing services as recovery oriented (Anthony, 2003; O’Hagan, 2004; Pearson, 
2004; Ridgway, 2001). 
Additionally, there appear to be many notable gaps in the research, and 
literature, around what constitutes best practice and effectiveness in a recovery-
oriented mental health system.  Given that Aotearoa\New Zealand is credited 
with being the first country in the Western world to formally adopt recovery as 
policy, these gaps indicated to me that this current project is timely and 
important for the mental health sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand (Barber, 2005; 
Lapsley, 2004; Lehman, 2000; Mental Health Commission, 2011b; O'Hagan, 
Reynolds, & Smith, 2012; Pearson, 2001; Ramon, Healy, & Renouf, 2007).   
First, mental health research has paid scant attention, and even less 
funding, to the social dimensions of recovery and other sociological models 
(Bonney & Stickley, 2008; MHAC , 2008; Minkler, 2000; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; 
Pincus, Henderson, Blackwood, & Dial, 1993; Rappaport, 1990, 1995).  There has 
been a similar paucity in critical research focussed on the social impacts of 
mental disorder, as ideological products of social inequity, which have excluded 
people from society and restricted their lives much more than the symptoms of 
illness.   
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Second, there has also been little scholarly attention paid to the not-for-
profit organisations, of which the NZ community mental health NGOs are 
representative.  Partly this appears to be due to the general political vulnerability 
of organisations associated with low paid, low status and, predominantly, 
women’s work (Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007).  Added to the evidence that mental 
health is usually not politically “sexy”, the contribution of the community sector 
to social well-being has largely been undervalued and its potential untapped. 
In addition, as several critical scholars have noted, ordinary workers have 
typically been removed from the academic gaze (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; 
Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a; Mumby, 2005).  Consequently, there has been little 
recognition of the opportunities for creative struggle and resistance, which might 
indicate pathways for transformation into alternative organisational realities 
(Adams et al., 2009; Laughlin, 1991; Lord, Ochacka, Nelson, & Choma, 2004; 
Shaw, 2002; Trethewey & Ashcraft, 2004).  Equally, there has been little research 
on mechanisms for the disruption, destabilisation and deinstitutionalisation of 
powerful, discursively naturalised and socially legitimised institutions such as 
biomedicine and managerialism (Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; C. Oliver, 1992).  There has been even less research on the defensive work 
that institutions undertake in the face of threat and challenge to their socially 
embedded authority and status (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005).   
It seems important, therefore, that the community mental health 
organisations, as a sector, be able to identify and articulate their own best 
practices in recovery and have a voice in the development of outcome measures 
that capture, meaningfully, the aspirations of people who use their services.  
These objectives required a theoretically critical approach to investigate, and 
interrogate, what constitutes effective organisational practices within the 
community mental health sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand, and, in particular, 
the ways these services are fulfilling expectations that they should be recovery-
oriented within both their organisational practices and their service outcomes.  
These intentions were particularly significant for a non-government organisation 
 6 
sector framed as “alternative” to institutionalised biomedical orthodoxy, and 
embedded in the asymmetrical power relationships of contemporary social 
systems and organisational arrangements.  In particular, it was important to 
cultivate the discourse of academic suspicion about “value free”, “neutral” and 
“objective” positivist science.   
My motivations for this research were threefold.  First, an unintentional 
outcome of my Masters research (Barber, 2005) was a clear frustration, 
expressed by participants from community mental health organisations, with the 
tension between the expressed goals and values of organisations and an 
unwillingness to recognise the logical consequences of that in terms of the 
redistribution of power and resources (Barber, 2005; Labonte, 1996).  
Participants were clearly making a significant and positive difference in the lives 
of service users, but were frequently unsupported by organisational, service and 
policy environments that treated them as inconsequential.  It appeared that 
major systemic and organisational transformation was required in the mental 
health sector for recovery aspirations to become realities for people with 
experiences of serious psychological distress. 
Second, these organisations did not appear to be systematically realising 
the intentions of their mission statements and professed values base despite 
great stories of successful outcomes (Barber, 2005).  Third, these circumstances 
echoed gaps in, and ideas emerging from, the literature - particularly those texts 
authored by people with their own experiences of psychological distress - that 
suggested recovery was proving difficult to achieve in practice, and now risked 
becoming fatally compromised.   
Consequently, I developed a methodological approach that facilitated 
dialogue about what was already working well in terms of recovery-oriented 
organisational talk and practice, and how this could be enhanced, without shying 
away from a critical appraisal and analysis of what was impeding or constraining 
best practice (Grant & Humphries, 2006).  My overriding objective was to better 
understand processes of organisational transformation and the emerging 
identity of the community mental health NGO sector, as it moves towards 
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enacting a paradigm shift, to become effectively recovery-oriented (Lord et al., 
2004; Nelson, Lord, & Ochaka, 2001; Pearson, 2000, 2004).   
To this end, I developed three research questions for this doctoral 
research study.  The first question asked, “In what ways are discourses of 
recovery constructed, negotiated and resisted in everyday practice within non-
government community mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand?”  
This question was concerned with addressing the meanings of recovery and 
related concepts from a variety of perspectives and occupational groups in a 
range of organisations throughout the country.  I was interested to identify and 
conceptualise dissonance, tensions and frustration, and examine how 
participants were managing these.  As well as uncovering how recovery was 
being framed, I was interested in what people and organisations were trying to 
do in terms of recovery, and how it was being transferred into practice.   
My second question was concerned with evidence of the influence of 
other, especially institutional, discourses in participant talk and important texts; 
specifically, “How are institutional dynamics working to construct, constrain or 
contradict organisational practices in terms of becoming recovery-oriented?”  I 
wanted to examine how external, societal pressures were infiltrating 
organisational environments and the extent to which they were directing 
organisational communication and practices.  
Third, I wanted to understand the extent to which participants were 
conscious of multiple discourses of mental health and mental illness, and the 
ways in which they attempted to resolve or resist the tensions between them.  In 
particular, I wanted to identify the ways in which participants might challenge 
powerful discourses, articulate the struggles that were apparent and what 
innovation they considered was possible.  Therefore, the third research question 
asked, “In what ways are institutional dynamics being problematised and 
challenged within these organisations and to what effect?” 
Having outlined the motivations behind this research, and the research 
questions, what follows is a structural outline of the thesis, briefly describing the 
content and purpose of each chapter.   
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Chapter 2, Background and history, is a theoretically literate exposition of 
the Aotearoa\New Zealand experience.  This is grounded in a Foucauldian 
informed narrative of the important historical and socio-cultural influences on 
Western mental healthcare systems generally (Foucault, 1963, 1970, 1972, 
1973).  Specifically, the chapter establishes how normative, political and 
ideological assumptions have woven the fabric in which contemporary mental 
health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand are embedded.   
In Chapter 3, I examine the specific set of theoretical commitments that 
underpin this research and which guides the analysis.  In doing so, I cultivate a 
discourse of academic suspicion about “value-free”, “neutral” and “objective” 
science as it engages with the deeply personal and communal experiences of 
serious psychological distress.  In this chapter, I also discuss the various academic 
fields, such as medical sociology and health communication, which have 
challenged the orthodoxy of mainstream biomedicine and psychiatry.   
Following this theoretical discussion, Chapter 4 provides a critical analysis 
of the literature that underpins how mental health care in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand is organised.  I have structured this review around the four problematics 
for critical organisational communication studies proposed by Dennis Mumby 
and Cynthia Stohl (1996, 2007).  These problematics (namely organising and the 
state, rationality, organising and voice) provided a comprehensive framework for 
exploring the complex weave of societal, rational and organisational factors that 
have historically impacted on the treatment and care of people experiencing 
psychological distress. 
In Chapter 5, I describe the research design and methodology used in the 
project.  Critical Appreciative Inquiry was used to tease apart apparent 
discourses of recovery and related concepts, as well as to discern the relative 
power levels at which they functioned within these organisations.  Participants 
were organised into cohorts, reflecting their organisational roles and 
responsibilities.  Focus groups and interviews were then convened to elicit a 
range of voices and perspectives that offered equal discursive power to each 
cohort.  The processes encouraged the development of a shared understanding 
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among participants and the researcher of what constituted a recovery-
orientation in mental health services.  The method also facilitated reflection on 
what was working effectively in terms of recovery, alongside a critical appraisal 
of how values such as equity, social participation, and self-determination were 
being constructed and preserved through both the organisational talk and the 
structural arrangements to establish these values in practice.   
The chapter also includes a brief discussion of the preliminary findings, 
(and refers the reader to a more comprehensive discussion in Appendices 7 and 
8), that informed the final data analysis strategy and prompted a second review 
of important literature on institutions, institutional disruption and the 
significance of translation in transferring ideas, and shaping discourses, across 
organisational boundaries. 
Chapter 6 is the first analysis chapter: Lost in Translation: Negotiating the 
discourse of recovery.  This draws on evidence from the data to explore the 
problematic realisation that within organisations, and societies, some groups 
have greater control over language, meaning systems and discourse processes.  
This control seems inevitably accompanied by correspondingly greater 
opportunities to represent themselves and dominate communicative processes 
in ways that maintain powerful hierarchies.  In particular, it was evident that 
concepts such as recovery, community and mental illness, were translated 
variously by significant stakeholders such as clinicians, users of mental health 
services, community support workers and ordinary citizens.   
The second analysis chapter, Chapter 7, is entitled Encountering the 
institutions and examines evidence of the ways in which participants participated 
in, and resisted, wider social and institutionalised discourses.  It examines the 
extent to which the “common sense” of the social and political world has 
influenced and penetrated contemporary institutions and organisations.  
Specifically, it identifies how biomedicine and managerialism have determined 
legitimate knowledge, definitions of successful service outcomes, and the nature 
of valid “evidence” in mental health services.  
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The third analysis chapter, Chapter 8, entitled Fighting back: Struggles, 
challenges and innovations, chronicles how participants and their organisations 
problematised and challenged institutional influences, the mechanisms of their 
resistance, and their struggles to remain anchored in strategies for innovation 
and recovery.  It was apparent that, despite their best energy and efforts, these 
endeavours were idiosyncratic rather than systemic. 
In the final discussion chapter, I summarise the analysis of the findings 
and discuss the practical, theoretical and methodological contributions these 
make to scholarly understanding of encounters between alternative paradigms 
and powerfully institutionalised discourses.  I also discuss what this means for 
the expression of an organisation’s best intentions.  I conclude with the possible 
implications of this research for further scholarly activity and the challenges that 
these organisations and the mental health sector still face. 
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Chapter 2: Background and history  
Introduction 
The contemporary arrangements of the mental health sector in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand1 evolved from a variety of earlier forms that were 
themselves shaped from the preoccupations and ideological influences of their 
times.  Inevitably, the early historical and socio-cultural influences on what was 
effectively a colony of the British empire2 , replicated European ideologies in 
systems of healthcare generally, and the treatment of the “insane” specifically.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I tease out the historical threads that, when woven 
together, illuminate the major political, social and cultural precedents from 
which contemporary Western mental health services emerged, and the contexts 
in which they are embedded and enmeshed.  In constructing this account, I 
preview the tensions apparent in the discourses of mental health and mental 
illness; especially as these have continued to underpin, and influence in varying 
degrees, the organising processes, practices and discursive formations of 
contemporary mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand.   
Although the wider social, cultural and political issues for the organisation 
of mental healthcare will be more fully examined in the literature review 
chapter, it is important to describe here the social phenomenon that was called 
“deinstitutionalisation” and examine some important antecedents and 
consequences for the evolution of community mental health services.  It is also 
                                                     
1 I generally use the term Aotearoa\New Zealand, which acknowledges the parallel, and 
sometimes shared, histories of Māori as tangata whenua (indigenous people) in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand as well as Pākeha New Zealanders. However, when discussing what was effectively a 
period of “colonisation” I will use the more common New Zealand as this was a time when Māori 
and their language were systematically discounted.  
2 New Zealand was not formally a British colony due to the Treaty of Waitangi that was signed in 
1840 between Māori and the British Sovereign.  However, most commentators, especially Māori, 
agree that the country was effectively a colony under successive “Settler” governments from 
1852 onwards.  Māori clearly suffered all the devastating impacts of colonisation and the state 
institutions of law, the church, education and systems of healthcare were all  imported from 
Britain. 
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important to discuss significant policy and legislative changes in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand that have contributed to the structure and positioning of community 
NGOs in this country.  
In this chapter, therefore, I discuss the historical establishment of mental 
healthcare organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand and whether these have been 
experienced as beneficial or therapeutic by people with lived experience of 
psychological distress.  In other words, have these organisations tended to serve 
the best interests of individuals and communities or, as many scholars have 
opined, have they acted primarily as agents of social control and been inherently 
coercive in acting for the “greater good” of wider society? (Foucault, 1963, 1973; 
Samson, 1995; Scull, 1979, 1993).   
This discussion leads naturally to an exploration of the rise and 
significance of the service user movement and the role this has played in 
constructing the concept of recovery as policy in the Aotearoa\New Zealand 
mental health sector.  In this way, I establish some historical anchors to the 
emerging discourses of recovery and delineate the trends and issues apparent in 
the current mental health service environment.   
The chapter is structured more or less chronologically with the salient 
features that affect contemporary mental health organisations examined more 
closely as they arose within the socio-political milieu of each era.  I first provide a 
timeline, in table form (Table 1) of anchors in the chronology of significant events 
in the history of Aotearoa\New Zealand  mental health services. In the discussion 
that follows, I contextualise the emergence of the community NGOs as a distinct 
sector and explore the extent to which they have developed an identity and 
niche within the larger configuration of mental health services in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand.  
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand  
Table 1: Chronology of significant events in historical development of mental 
health services in New Zealand 
Key dates  Event Implications 
1840 Pre- asylum era in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
Mentally ill behaviour seen as a law and order 
issue.  The “socially undesirable”, including 
“lunatics” sent to gaol for safekeeping 
alongside, vagabonds, deserters, prostitutes, 
delinquents, waifs & strays, drunkards. 
1846 Lunatics Ordinance is 1st 
Mental Health Act in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
New Zealand Law modelled on British legal 
system emphasising safe custody of the 
“dangerously insane” 
1852 New Zealand Constitution Act Colonial settler government established a 
network of provincial lunatic asylums, based 
on systems of “moral management”.  
However, lack of public interest eventually 
returned these to central government control. 
1850-1880s 
 
Major legislation introduced in 
NZ “shaping colonial identities 
in medicine” (Coleborne, 
2001, p372)   
1st asylum built at Karori and then Sunnyside 
Christchurch, Otago and Auckland.  Features 
of early asylums included spacious rural 
aspects and close interactions with local 
communities.  They generated a degree of 
self-sufficiency and integrated care through 
farming, moral influence and quiet routines. 
1868 Lunatics Act Increased public accountability with 
appointed inspectors and official visitors 
1871 First parliamentary inquiry 
into asylum conditions  
Evidence of cruelty and brutality led to 
removal of administration from lay control 
and returned to medical. 
Continued over leaf 
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates  Event Implications 
1870s Economic depression in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
The halcyon days are over as economic 
depression leads to overcrowding and general 
deterioration in conditions.  
Tensions arise in history of institutional care 
between responsibilities of medical versus lay 
personnel.  Growing emphasis on medically 
trained, psychiatric profession claims that mental 
“illness” a physical disease therefore institutional 
management increasingly devolved. 
1900s to 
1950s:  
The age of the Psychiatric 
Hospital 
Public recognition of post War trauma (PTSD) 
meant more attention given to social and 
environmental factors in diagnoses and 
treatment. 
Developments in treatment including “talking 
therapies” but also experiments in physical 
treatment such as insulin coma, psycho surgery, 
ECT etc. Increased potential for cruelty and 
abuses of power. Offered occupational therapies 
such as art, music etc. but were always 
vulnerable to staffing shortages and patients 
were used as unpaid servants, gardeners, 
assistants etc. for staff 
1950-1970:  The First Wave of 
deinstitutionalisation  
Focus shifted from hospitals e.g. Tokānui, Lake 
Alice etc. to community but really just 
geographical re-location rather than shifts in 
paradigm.  Control maintained by psychiatrists 
using medication, i.e. “chemical straitjacketing” 
and legislative power. 
In addition, all the “easy” patients were re-
located in a great rush into urban environments, 
which left the rural hospitals with the “chronic” 
and “hard” patients. 
Continued over leaf 
  
 15 
A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1950s The Psycho-pharmacological 
revolution 
New psychoactive medications credited with 
initiating first wave of deinstitutionalisation.  
However, now generally agreed economic and 
accommodation pressures were really biggest 
drivers.  
1961 New Zealand Joint 
Commission on Mental Health 
and Illness leads to Mental 
Health Act amendment 
Simplified committal procedures and opened the 
door for treatment outside hospital, but mainly 
because it was cheaper than in-patient stay.  
However, was also early recognition of the 
negative effects of institutionalisation  
1969 Mental Health Act 1969 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
Revised outdated words such as “imbecile” & 
“idiot”.  Simplified the committal process but at 
the expense of human rights. 
Control of mental hospitals devolved to Hospital 
boards 
1970s The Second Wave of 
deinstitutionalisation.  
 
Institutional staff followed employment into 
newer regimes meaning institutional attitudes 
and behaviours became re-established 
Notion of “community” ill-defined and major 
conceptual confusion and dissonance regarding 
“community care”.  Life in “community” 
frequently lonely and hostile for those who had 
been in long-term care in institutions 
1972 Government moratorium on 
institutional expansion in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
Focus to reduce number of inpatients and 
pressure to improve state of care.  However, 
psychiatric hospitals and professionals retained 
huge amount of institutional power. 
1975 
Special Report 47, 
Department of Health  
 
Highlighted systematic neglect and the lack of 
infrastructure to cope with community care and 
support.  Devolution to other social services and 
families, who bear burden with no support or 
financial resources.  However, advice that 
resources for facilities and staff must precede 
discharge goes unheeded. 
Continued over leaf  
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1969-1996 Multiple Public Inquiries in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand.  
More than 70 public inquiries since 1987.  
Identified overuse of seclusion & restraint, 
stigma, over-reliance on drug therapy, 
“Dickensian” facilities, staff shortages and 
underuse of psycho-social therapies. 
However, “ritual cleansing” of mental health 
services (Brunton, 2001) leads to ad hoc, 
localised, fragmented and uncoordinated policy 
shifts.  Hastily conceived, poorly implemented 
protocols around ECT, suicide risk, seclusion etc. 
but no over-arching integrated strategy 
1972-73 Royal Commission on Hospital 
and related services  
19 of 43 submissions received from professional 
interests.  
1980s A growing tide of unrest Criticism of psychiatric theory and practice 
include weak construct validity of diagnostic 
systems and concern about interests of 
pharmaceutical industry in mental health.  This 
provokes defensive reactions from the medical 
fraternity. 
Expose of culture and delivery of mental health 
services in New Zealand through literature, 
music, film and arts.   
1982 Formal closing of the 
institutions begins 
Lack of community care following formal 
deinstitutionalisation creates many social 
problems: Poverty, homelessness, lack of trained 
support and community resources, negative 
community reactions. 
Continued over leaf 
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1984 4th Labour Government in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand   
Introduces Neo-liberal “Rogernomics3” with a 
renewed confidence in the market place as only 
source of social well-being.  Key ideologies 
include: 
 A freely acting individual will best be able 
to pursue their own best interest 
 Foster a wider range of choice to 
consumers because greater competition 
between providers 
1984-1994 Rise of the new non-
government organisations  
 
Overall increase in numbers of community non-
government organisations.  The spectrum is 
broadened but unevenly distributed (Ministry of 
Health 1997). Community services include day-
care, drop-in, recreational, meaningful activity, 
vocational etc. 
1988 1st Mason Inquiry  A response to public anxiety about the 
inadequacies of community services being 
provided in the wake of deinstitutionalization, 
highlighted by the death of a patient  
1988 State Services Act  The health sector is legislated to utilise a generic 
management structure rather than a professions 
based hierarchy. 
1990-1998:  A period of reforms  The last of the psychiatric hospitals shut down in 
1998.  Access to hospital is severely restricted, 
with fewer beds and brief admissions.  A 
“revolving door” syndrome is apparent creating 
great stress for people and their families 
especially.  
Continued over leaf 
  
                                                     
3 Refers to then Finance Minister Roger Douglas 
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1990-1992 National Mental Health 
consortium established1989 
and Aotearoa Network of 
Psychiatric Survivors, 1992 
Interest groups coordinate to develop a political 
voice and particularly mental health service users 
or “consumers”  
1991-1993 Radical restructuring of the 
New Zealand health system 
Promoted health reforms as enhancing freedom 
of “consumers” to choose between providers.  
Introduced managerialism and market driven 
imperatives to health system.   
Funding of health services separated from 
provision meaning hospitals are no longer 
privileged and preferred providers.  This 
increased opportunities for communities, NGOs, 
iwi etc. to deliver healthcare. 
1992 Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment & Treatment ) Act 
Reformed the 1969 Act, largely on human rights 
grounds.  Increased emphasis on rights of 
citizenship attempts to balance rights of 
individual with wider interests of society.  
Introduces notion of “least restrictive’ 
environment” and creates separate pathway for 
judicial review, removing absolute authority of 
psychiatrists. 
1993-1994 Health and Disability 
Commissioners Act and Code 
of Consumer Rights 
Established the rights of consumers of health 
services, including mental health consumers to 
informed choice, appropriate support, to be 
treated with dignity and respect, and to be 
treated within their cultural norms. 
1994 Publication of Looking 
Forward: Strategic Directions 
of the Mental Health Services 
(Ministry of Health)  
Emphasised the need for rapid growth of 
community mental health services and staff, 
focused acute services, an anti-stigma campaign, 
and a large increase in community mental health 
teams, and new community providers for the 
NGO sector. 
But politicians still relying heavily on technical 
expertise of medical professionals with privileged 
place in policy and service development as well 
as resource mobilisation and allocation 
Continued over leaf   
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1990-1998:  A period of reforms  The last of the psychiatric hospitals shut down in 
1998.  Access to hospital is severely restricted, 
with fewer beds and brief admissions.  A 
“revolving door” syndrome is apparent creating 
great stress for people and their families 
especially.  
1996 3rd Mason Inquiry  
 
Findings highlighted "an absence of positive 
innovative leadership in the mental health sector” 
and lack of adequate resourcing for community 
organisations . 
Major recommendations: 
Establishment of Mental Health Commission  
Development of the Blueprint for mental health 
service provision in Aotearoa\New Zealand   
Major increase in funding, especially to 
community sector  
Mental health money to be ring fenced 
1998 Establishment of the 
Mental Health Commission  
“Our vision is for New Zealand to be a place where 
people with mental illness have personal power, 
full participation in their communities and access 
to a fully developed range of recovery-oriented 
services” 
1998 Emergence of Community 
Support Work models  
Service model of Community Support Work 
developed as practice shifts to community 
locations and community ideals.   
1998 Recovery, a new discourse 
Publication of Blueprint for 
Mental Health Services in 
New Zealand, Mental 
Health Commission. 
“A recovery orientation includes an emphasis on 
choice, a concept that encompasses support for 
autonomous action, the requirement that the 
individual have a range of opportunities from 
which to choose and full information about those 
choices”  
Recovery included as integral for all mental health 
services i.e. "organisations whose primary function 
is the provision of care, treatment and support, 
and education for recovery to people with mental 
illness, or mental health problems" (p. 111).   
Continued over leaf  
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
1998 Publication of Blueprint 
(cont.). 
Recognises large shortfalls in funding and 
provision of services including community non-
government organisations. 
1998 Like Minds, Like Mine – 
Anti- stigma and 
discrimination media 
campaign 
Raise awareness and intent to increase social 
acceptance of people with experience of 
psychological distress, counter myths of 
dangerousness and risk and plea for social 
connection rather than segregation.  Strong 
consumer voice being heard, families Māori and PI 
also  
1998 Risk Management 
Guidelines,  Ministry of 
Health 
Seeds of defensive shift back to clinical authority. 
Recognises risk to individual of illness e.g. risk of 
violence, unintentional harm to self, quality of life 
etc.  But stops short of acknowledging iatrogenic 
effects of treatment services and emphasises 
“risk” to organisation and society. 
2000 
Health Funding Authority 
disestablished in favour of 
District Health Boards 
Reinstates hospital based clinical services as both 
funder and preferred provider of services.  
Seriously diminishes the role and voice of 
community non-government organisations in 
sector development and strategy. 
2001 
Public apology from New 
Zealand Government  
 
For those who had received “treatment” in Lake 
Alice’s adolescent unit that included unmediated 
electric shock treatment to the genitals and other 
bizarre and inhumane practices.  Dr. Selwyn Meeks 
is finally de-registered as a psychiatrist in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand but is not brought back 
from Australia to stand trial.  Apology also 
acknowledges the appropriation of patients 
welfare benefits to the tune of millions of dollars 
over 70s and 80s 
Continued over leaf  
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A timeline of the organising of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand (cont.) 
Key dates Event Implications 
2001 
Publication of Recovery 
Competencies for mental 
health workers in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand  
(Mental Health 
Commission)  
Mental Health Commission publishes criteria for a 
competent mental health workforce under 10 key 
areas, with guidelines for assessment of 
competence.   
2003 
4th report of the Mental 
Health Commission on 
progress for implementing 
Blueprint targets 
“Despite increased funds, growth has slowed and 
access to services remains pretty much 
unchanged” 
2004 
Publication of Our Lives in 
2014 
Growing body of New Zealand consumer 
literature, stories of personal journeys, and visions 
for future to increase guidance for service 
development. 
2008 
Publication of Destination 
Recovery (Mental Health 
Advocacy Coalition) 
Multi-disciplinary group advocate for role and 
independence of the non-government 
organisation sector. 
2010 
Removal of requirement 
for at least 1 Mental 
Health Commissioner to be 
a person with experience 
of psychological distress  
Further erodes the voice of people with their own 
experiences of serious psychological distress to 
influence sector strategy and development. 
2012 
Mental Health Commission 
disestablished  
Further erosion of any but clinical voice in strategic 
development of sector.  
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From Bedlam to Tokaanui4: The age of the asylum 
Scholars have shown that the historical “truths” about groups of people, 
their natures and competencies are situated within particular contexts and social 
orders (Foucault, 1973; Oliver, 1996, 1998; Pearson, 2000; Samson, 1995; Turner, 
1995).  This was exemplified in 16th and 17th century Europe, for example, when 
madness came to be seen as the very obverse of reason and rational thought; an 
implicit loss of what it meant to be human, which, in turn, led to the increasingly 
inhumane treatment of such unfortunate people.  This era saw the emergence of 
institutions with special responsibility for deviance and lunacy where, previously, 
care of the insane had been a private affair within families or local communities.  
The creation of asylums, and the various legislative acts that accompanied their 
evolution, initiated a long process of segregation and social control that served 
the powerful interests of the state, church and other social institutions; but 
which rendered the people incarcerated in these institutions utterly powerless 
(Foucault, 1973; Luske, 1990; Melling, 1999; Pearson, 2000; Samson, 1995; Scull, 
1979; Shorter, 1997; Weeks, 1996).  Foucault (1963, 1973) described these 
origins of state control and social exclusion of vulnerable groups as the “Great 
Confinement”. 
The “Great Confinement” 
By the end of the 18th century, the so called Age of Reason in Europe, 
confinement in places like Bedlam5 had further created madness as spectacle; no 
longer an internal experience but something “other”, to be looked at and 
contained, to be objectified, externalised and dehumanised.  This reduction of 
madness to an empty negation of reason invoked only scandal or shame and 
conceded no human value in the experience.  Throughout 19th century, in the 
                                                     
4 Tokaanui Hospital was a psychiatric facility on the outskirts of Te Awamutu in the 
Waikato region of Aotearoa\New Zealand.  It was the last such hospital in the country to 
close, and did so finally in 1998. 
5 “Bedlam” is the colloquial name given to the Royal Hospital of Bethlehem in London, which was 
the first dedicated facility for the treatment of mental illness.  It became notorious as the worst 
expression of madness as public spectacle and degradation.  The term bedlam  is now 
synonymous with  uproar and confusion. 
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Western world, containment and treatment of the insane was controlled by 
medical, moral and scientific discourses (Foucault, 1963, 1973).  This period was 
also referred to as a “great silence”, where marginalised, segregated groups lost 
their voice as well as their freedom (Foucault, 1973).   
In Aotearoa\New Zealand, the first piece of mental health legislation, the 
Lunatics Ordinance Act of 1846, enabled care of the insane to be funded from 
the public purse and be available to all through public hospitals or asylums; 
although, at this time, none had actually been built.  Here, as elsewhere, an 
increasingly medical monopoly over treatment of the “deviant” meant that the 
number and size of asylums increased rapidly (Foucault, 1973; Samson, 1995; 
Scull 1979; Turner, 1995).  Between 1854 and 1872, a network of over a dozen 
provincial, and various other local lunatic asylums was built throughout the 
country (Coleborne & McKinnon, 2006).   
These facilities tended to be located on the outskirts of towns and, when 
economics allowed, offered a degree of self-sufficiency and a homely, rural 
lifestyle.  An assortment of lay and medical staff provided care and it was 
anticipated that “cures” would occur as a natural effect of the moral influence 
and quiet routines (W. Brunton, 2004; Coleborne & Mackinnon, 2006).  As 
elsewhere, these facilities also absorbed paupers, state wards, the intellectually 
disabled and other social outcasts (W. Brunton, 2004; Coleborne & Mackinnon, 
2006).   
By the 1870s, however, these halcyon days were over as New Zealand 
succumbed to economic depression.  Conditions in the asylums rapidly 
deteriorated and in the face of overcrowding and mounting evidence of brutality 
a governmental inquiry led to the state gaining control over the provinces and 
administrative care of the asylums was devolved to the medical profession (W. 
Brunton, 2005; Cheyne, O'Brien, & Belgrave, 2000). 
Maintaining medical authority, ostensibly through the pursuit of rational 
and scientific thought, meant that an extensive range of emotional and mental 
experiences, social attitudes and behaviours were being pathologised as 
“madness” and explicated by medical schema (Foucault, 1965; Jureidini, 2012; 
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Pearson, 2000; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).  In the first published treatise on 
psychiatry, for example, Benjamin Rush (1812) identified and medicalised an 
extensive range of social issues.  These included opposition to the American 
Revolution, atheism, disbelief in the powers of medicine and reactions against 
the increasing cultural diversity in society.  Far from being disparaged, these 
ideas were the forerunners of social Darwinism and theories of eugenics that 
dominated psychiatric theory and practice around mental “defectiveness” until 
the early 20th century.   
In Aotearoa\New Zealand, mental fitness was especially important in 
such a small population; therefore, early identification of delinquency and 
deficiency, even sexual offending, were considered priorities.  Notions of 
hereditary defect were likewise attributed to criminal behaviour, ethnicity and 
general impropriety (Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995).  This set the scene for a wide 
net that would eventually become notorious in facilities such as Lake Alice 
Hospital (W. Brunton, 2004, 2005; Coleborne & McKinnon, 2006; Coleborne, 
2012; Marbrook, 2012; Roper & Pearson, 1999). 
Constructing madness and the rise of clinical medicine 
The epistemological basis of the scientific revolution underpinned the 
burgeoning authority of psychiatry in Western systems, including Aotearoa\New 
Zealand.  In particular, 19th century positivism (Comte, 1856) and “the scientific 
method” in medicine had serious consequences for constructions of madness 
and the treatment of the insane.  A preoccupation with “scientific” psychiatry 
aimed to claim scientific credibility through control over the definitions of mental 
illness and expansion of the psychiatric diagnostic system.  Primarily, scientific 
positivism insisted that authentic, valid knowledge could only be derived by 
empirical methods of investigating and measuring the world, including its human 
subjects.  This environment set the scene for increasing experimentation and 
technological innovation in the advancement of knowledge.   
In addition the ascendancy of a single paradigm of health and illness, 
based on a metaphor of a machine with functioning or dysfunctional parts, 
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heralded an ever-increasing reliance on physical treatments, including 
medication, which was transferred wholesale into the treatment of the “mentally 
ill”.  These so-called advances were precursors to the clinical experimentations 
and physical treatments of the 20th century that included mood altering drugs, 
psycho surgery and electro-convulsive “shock” treatment (Moncrieff & Crawford, 
2001; John Read, Bentall, & Mosher, 2004; D. Rose, Wykes, Leese, Bindman, & 
Fleischmann, 2003; Scull, 1979).   
Experimentation and classification exemplified the triumph of medical 
rationality over superstition and folly (Conrad & Schneider, 1990) and by the end 
of the 19th century, access to a scientific body of knowledge gave doctors 
enormous social prestige and influence (Melling, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).  
Inevitably, these circumstances created, then as now, considerable controversy 
about the ethics, validity and usefulness of constructing, and labelling, painful 
and troubling human experiences as psychiatric disorders (Duncan, Miller & 
Sparks, 2004; Frances, 2013; Jureidini, 2012; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, 1994; 
Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Pilgrim, 2007; Szasz, 1960).   
The history of psychiatry and social control  
The professional organisation of medicine in the Western world began 
about 1800 and in 1847 the American Medical Association was founded to 
promote the science of medicine.  It is necessary to understand these origins in 
order to appreciate the ingress of these preoccupations into Aotearoa\New 
Zealand.   
Perceptions of the superior effectiveness of scientific medicine led 
governments to support this unprecedented monopoly with legislation and the 
professional registration, which limited the rights of practitioners to claim the 
title of doctor (Conrad & Schneider, 1990; Turner, 1995).  In Aotearoa\New 
Zealand, as elsewhere, professional authority was underscored by the evolution 
of legislation that began with the Lunatics Ordinance Act, 1846 and carried 
through to the Mental Health Act, (1969) and the current Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment & Treatment) Act 1992 and its subsequent 
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amendments.  All these statutes embedded professional, psychiatric expertise as 
the final arbiter in judgements of “unreason”.  
Professionalisation and the burgeoning power, prestige and status of 
biomedicine in Western societies were as much a matter of political 
manoeuvring as therapeutic expertise and scientific breakthrough (Oliver, 1998; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995).  Critics noted tensions in 
the ways that privileged groups such as doctors and psychiatrists became agents 
of social control and the implications this had for a “socially impoverished 
underclass” (Scull, 1979, p. 129).  Several scholars highlighted the parallel rise of 
psychiatry and capitalist regimes that regulated social behaviour through 
ideologically based systems of rules and hierarchical arrangements of power 
(Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 1973; Oliver, 1998; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).   
By 1910, medical professionals, throughout the world, had gained a 
cultural and metaphorical mystique as makers of medical miracles (Conrad & 
Schneider, 1990) and this created an unprecedented insulation from critiques 
outside of medicine (Conrad & Schneider, 1990; Freidson, 1970).  Psychiatrists by 
association, and despite the absence of genuine scientific credentials, also 
entered into this era of “unparalleled professional dominance” (Conrad & 
Schneider, 1990, p. 145) and were functionally autonomous as a professional 
group.  Notwithstanding their perceived “Cinderella” status within the larger 
medical fraternity (Bond, 1915), psychiatrists were eager to extend their reach.  
In Aotearoa\New Zealand, as elsewhere, they accepted substantial 
administrative authority from the state to segregate, contain and control the 
perceived threat of socially marginalised groups (Jermier, 1998; Oliver, 1998; 
Samson, 1995; Scull, 1979; Szasz, 1960, 1974; Turner, 1995; U’Ren, 1997).  Over 
time, these came to include the unwanted, the poor and the disabled (W. 
Brunton, 2004, 2005; Coleborne & McKinnon, 2006; Dalley & Tennant, 2004; 
Joseph & Kearns, 1996, 1999).   
Eager to improve their professional credibility and, emboldened by their 
relative isolation in self-sufficient, rural facilities, psychiatrists indulged in a wide 
range of experimentations under the guise of treatment.  These are now widely 
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recognised to have been as much punitive as therapeutic (O’Brien & Golding, 
2003; O’Brien et al., 2009; Pescosolido, Wright, & Sullivan, 1999).  These included 
various coercive techniques, chemical and social “technologies” such as isolation, 
deep-sleep and insulin “therapies” to control behaviour.  Eventually, their 
growing administrative power alongside the increasing dominance of biomedical 
explanations of “mental illness” meant the asylums ceded to hospital type 
settings.  In New Zealand, this transition occurred in 1911, by merely renaming 
the Porirua asylum, Porirua Hospital.  
1900s to 1950s: The age of the psychiatric hospital 
The long history of ad hoc experimentation in psychiatry was the legacy 
of the functional autonomy of psychiatric medicine that began in the asylums of 
the late 18th century.  This occurred despite the science of medicine being based 
on traditions and discourses that proved unreliable and altered markedly over 
time (Foucault, 1963, 1973).  Nevertheless, the psychiatric hospitals were 
dominated by medical professionals and characterised by experimental 
treatments.  Segregated from other social influences this heralded an era of 
unbridled, systemic power where a range of cruelties and brutalities went 
unchecked (W. Brunton, 2005; Coleborne & McKinnon, 2006; Mason, 1988).   
An age of experimentation  
In assuming the mantle of objective, empirical science psychiatrists freely 
undertook a range of medical and technological experiments; nearly all of which 
have been subsequently discredited as ineffectual, harmful and frequently 
macabre (Drake et al., 2003; Melling, 1999; Samson, 1995; Scull, 1994).  The 
phenomenon of shell-shock, first seen during World War I, further encouraged 
psychiatric experimentation as army doctors were pressured to return soldiers as 
fit for active service (Rosenberg & Mueser, 2008).  However, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, as it would come to be recognised, was so endemic it became 
impossible to explain away as personal cowardice (Melling, 1999; Miller & N. 
Rose, 1988; Pilgrim, 2002).  In fact, the experiences of both World Wars exposed 
widespread and unprecedented experiences of psychological trauma that shifted 
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lay perspectives towards an understanding of environmental and social factors in 
the origins of serious distress (Rosenberg & Mueser, 2008; Samson, 1995).   
Nevertheless, experimentation and psychiatric research continued in the 
1920s with the development of a range of “shock” treatments.  These included 
the inducing of comas or convulsions with agents such as insulin and Metrazol as 
well as electro-convulsive shock, psychosurgery and infection with the malaria 
virus (Braslow, 1997; Forman, 1975; Grob, 2004; Melling, 1999; Moncrieff & 
Crawford, 2001; D. Rose et al., 2003).  In New Zealand, effectively a colonial 
outpost for such practices, Janet Frame, one of the country’s most renowned 
authors, documented her experience of such treatments in short stories, novels 
and autobiographical writings (Frame, 1960, 1982, 1985).  Frame famously 
escaped a scheduled lobotomy solely because her first book of short stories was 
accepted for publication, which impressed her doctor enough to cancel the 
surgery (Frame, 1960, 1984).   
Subsequent scholarship, notably renowned Māori psychiatrist Mason 
Durie (1985) and psychiatric survivors such as Mary O’Hagan (1991) would add 
the voices of Māori and other people with lived experience of psychological 
distress to the clamour for change.  However, despite attracting widespread 
critical press in the 1960s and 1970s many of these “treatments” were not 
phased out for decades: nor was the iatrogenic harm or negative impacts of such 
practices acknowledged (Deegan, 1990; Frame, 1960, 1982, 1985; Moncrieff & 
Crawford, 2001; Scull, 1979).  
Paradoxically, many of the psychiatric hospitals in New Zealand offered a 
sense of community, absent in wider society; they frequently provided people 
with a sense of belonging, relationship and a place in the world (W. Brunton, 
2001; Coleborne & Mackinnon, 2006; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Scull, 1979, 1984: 
Yip, 2000).  They aimed to be self-sufficient environments with farms and other 
cottage industries that employed patients as unpaid labour (W. Brunton, 2004; 
Coleborne & Mackinnon, 2006; Fenton & Te Koutua, 2000; Joseph & Kearns, 
1999; Leonard, 1999).  Ideas of moral therapy and the benefits of living a good, 
quiet life were evident in places and were precursors to recovery in their 
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awareness of the humanitarian aspects of care (Coleborne & McKinnon, 2006; 
John Read & Dillon, 2013; Scull, 1993).  However, these approaches never truly 
prevailed in the way that bio-medicine did (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Pilgrim, 
Kinderman, & Tai, 2008; John Read et al., 2004; Szasz, 1960; Thomas et al., 2005).  
Social and psychoanalytical approaches to mental health have been 
widely assumed to rise in importance in the earlier part of the 20th century 
(Braslow, 1997; Grob, 1983; Kendell & Zealley, 1988).  However, as Moncrieff 
and Crawford (2001) demonstrated in their comprehensive review of the British 
Journal of Psychiatry in the 20th century, physical treatments such as electro-
convulsive therapy (ECT) and insulin coma therapy, as well as a large array of 
sedative drugs, were always the mainstay of treatment regimens (Kecmanovic & 
Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2010; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001).  Their findings corresponded 
with other evidence that treatment remained focused on physical procedures 
and psycho-active drugs rather than talking-based, or psychoanalytic, 
therapeutic approaches (Braslow, 1997; Grob, 1983; Moncrieff, 2008).  In fact, 
during the 1950s, despite a slowdown in the scientific “triumphs” of medicine, 
the pharmaceutical industry dramatically increased production of an extremely 
profitable, plethora of psychiatric medications (Chalmers, 2001; Healy, 2002; 
Thomas et al., 2005; Whitaker, 2002).   
Despite their best endeavours, psychiatry remained alienated from the 
general medical professions in the Western world, as a non-scientific 
embarrassment (Bond, 1915; Turner, 1995).  There was still no biological 
evidence for “mental illness” and a lack of effective medical remedies.  This stasis 
encouraged psychiatrists to expand their administrative reach far beyond the 
boundaries of their technical competence into social management (Conrad & 
Schneider, 1990; Foucault, 1973; N. Rose, 2006; Samson, 1995).   
The desire for increased professional legitimacy, alongside a new 
chemical arsenal of mind and mood altering drugs, meant that psychiatrists 
worldwide lobbied successfully for increasing medical intervention in social 
issues such as public health and welfare (Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2012; 
Moncrieff, 2007; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; N. Rose, 2006; Turner, 1995).  The 
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general diminution of the role of human agency (Miller & N. Rose, 1988; Weber, 
1946) and the valorisation of professional expertise led to an increase in the 
“bureaucratic regulation of the whole of social life” (Samson, 1995b, p. 63) and 
facilitated the medicalisation of Western societies. 
The medicalisation of society and social Darwinism 
Foucault (1963), among other scholars (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; John 
Read et al., 2004; Turner, 1995), was concerned that the clinical gaze not only 
conferred unprecedented authority for social management on medical 
professionals but also afforded them considerable social power in defining the 
“reality” of deviance and disorder.  Andrew Scull (1979, 1993a) characterised this 
period as a kind of professional imperialism preoccupied with defining emotional 
and psychological events, whether individual or social, as medical phenomena 
rather than human experiences.  This era, unsurprisingly, extensively broadened 
the definitions of madness and medicalised a wide range of social issues and 
personality characteristics (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1994; Samson, 1995; Scull, 1979, 
1993).  Homosexuality, for example, was only finally removed from classification 
as a psychiatric disorder in 1973 (Spitzer, 1999).   
Throughout this period, in psychiatric hospitals throughout the Western 
world including Aotearoa\New Zealand, state control of the “deviant” became 
extreme (W. Brunton, 2001, 2005; Coleborne, 2012; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; 
Marbrook, 2012; Rose N., 2006).  Legislation provided psychiatrists with both the 
right and the responsibility to detain patients and emphasised coercive, social 
control rather than therapeutic care (Grob, 1991, 1994; Melling, 1999; Porter, 
1991; Rose N., 1996, 1998; Scull, 1979, 1993).  This meant that the power of 
psychiatry became more a set of occupational privileges, reliant on the 
arrangements of political, economic and cultural power, rather than an 
adherence to some trans-historical and invariant properties of biomedical 
science (Foucault, 1963, 1973; Jureidini, 2012; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011; 
Samson, 1995; N. Rose, 2006).   
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Coercion was a natural consequence of the social Darwinism that 
dominated scientific thought in the first decades of the 20th century.  This aspect 
of modernism not only separated the “deviant” from the “normal” but 
constructed patients as worthless, powerless, dangerous and to be removed 
from the gaze of normal society (Foucault, 1963, 1973; Grob, 1991, 1994; 
Melling, 1999; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; Rudge & Morse, 2001; Scull, 1997).  
Administrative power within cloistered environments enabled psychiatrists to 
enforce compliance and regulate the behaviour of the wayward and abnormal, 
including wards of the state, people with intellectual disabilities and others (W. 
Brunton, 2004; Coleborne, 2012; Scull, 1979, 1994).     
Increasingly, the social value and ethic of paid work created an obligation 
for able-bodied people to participate productively in the economy.  This meant 
that health, too, had economic value, and a lack of it meant becoming a de-
valued or “in-valid” person in society (Grob, 1991, 1994; Harter, Scott, Novak, 
Leeman, & Morris, 2006; Oliver, 1998; U’Ren, 1997).  The “mad”, like other 
vulnerable groups, then became further marginalised as unproductive, thereby 
justifying their alienation from community life.  They had no status as citizens; 
the logical repercussion of which was the systemic loss of human rights and civil 
protections (O’Hagan, 1994).  Thus, they were truly dis-abled and set apart, 
geographically as well as socially, from the able bodied, “contributing” members 
of their communities (Harter et al., 2006; Oliver, M., 1998; Scull, 1979).  Social 
technologies, such as hierarchical surveillance in its various forms (Bentham, 
1791; Foucault, 1963, 1973, 1977) further served to normalise the 
depersonalisation, stigma and systematic removal of personal power 
experienced by people subject to state intervention (Deegan, 1990; Fisher, 2000; 
O’Hagan, 1991, 1994; Scull, 1979, 1993).   
Patients, or psychiatric survivors as they came to be called (Adame, 2006; 
Goslyn, 1997; O’Hagan, 1991), increasingly, and vigorously, resisted coercive and 
compulsory treatments.  They experienced them as harmful, painful, frightening 
and ultimately ineffectual in reducing symptoms and distress (Deegan, 1990; D. 
Rose et al., 2003; Samson, 1995; Scull, 1994).  Stories from this era, the accounts 
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of staff, administrators and eventually patients exposed frequent brutality and 
cruelty, as did the scandals that initiated public inquiries such as those into Lake 
Alice Hospital in 1976, 1977 and 2001 (W. Brunton, 2004, 2005; Coleborne, 2012; 
Marbrook, 2012; Mason, 1988, 1996).   
English psychiatrist Russell Barton (1959, 1972) was the first to 
acknowledge publicly the negative impacts of long stay confinements when he 
described “institutionalisation” as iatrogenic illness in 1959.  Despite being 
largely ignored by professional scholars, this signalled a growing social awareness 
of the damage caused by some treatments and other issues surrounding coercive 
practices in psychiatric hospitals.  This was one of several factors that 
contributed to a decline in the material and ideological dominance of the 
“institution” (Anthony, 1993; Deegan, 1990; Fisher, 2000; O’Hagan, 1991, 1994; 
Pearson, 2004).  Psychiatrists in Aotearoa\New Zealand, as elsewhere, were 
realising that being excluded, in facilities located outside populated areas, 
applied equally to the powerful and powerless and they, too, were stigmatised, 
isolated and disconnected from the wider medical fraternity (Pilgrim & Rogers, 
1999, 2005b; Turner, 1995).  Eventually, these pressures, alongside economic 
imperatives, staff shortages and overcrowding led to the beginning of the social 
phenomenon known as “deinstitutionalisation” (W. Brunton, 2001, 2004; Joseph 
& Kearns, 1996, 1999; Leibrich, 1988, 1998; Pilgrim & Roger, 1999; Turner, 1995).   
1950-1970: The social phenomenon of “deinstitutionalisation” and 
being out in the “community” 
“Deinstitutionalisation” in New Zealand followed global trends and 
occurred in two broad waves, the first occurring in the 1950s.  The development 
of new psychotropic medications was widely credited as the catalyst for this, but 
most commentators now accept that economic and other pressures had already 
initiated the movement away from the institution based approach (Grob, 1994; 
Healy, 2002; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Moncrieff, Cohen, & Porter, 2003; Samson, 
1995; Scull, 1979).  These pressures included social and professional disquiet at 
conditions within the psychiatric hospitals. 
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Concurrently, assumptions of the benevolence of institutional care were 
being thoroughly challenged, particularly in new sociological critiques of 
medicine and psychiatry (Dalley, 1988; Grob, 1991, 1995; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, 
2005a, 2005b).  Significant shifts in thinking, from the purely biomedical to social 
theories of the origins of mental illness, became apparent, (Laing, 1960; Samson, 
1995); and it was increasingly recognised that psychological states are complex, 
involving subjective experience and meanings, personal needs and priorities, as 
well as environmental and socio-cultural circumstances (Pilgrim et al., 2008; 
Rappaport, 1987; Treacher & Baruch, 1981).   
Globally, the development of a sociology of medicine turned a critical 
gaze on professional orthodoxy that constructed understandings of illness as a 
purely individual, pathological process (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Miller & N. 
Rose, 1988; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, 2005a, 2005b; Scheff, 1999; Treacher & 
Baruch, 1981; Waitzkin, 1989).  The beginnings of the anti-psychiatry movement 
were evident within psychiatry, initially through the works of Thomas Szasz 
(1960) and R.D. Laing (1960), who challenged the very basis of the biomedical 
construction of mental illness (Treacher & Baruch, 1981).   
Labelling theory also gained traction, articulated by Thomas Scheff (1974, 
1999) among others, which posited that behaviour characterised as deviant 
causes social outrage merely because it is fundamentally non-conformist (Pilgrim 
& Rogers, 1999; Sayce, 2000).  According to these protagonists, the “powerless 
position and low social status of psychiatric patients rendered them both 
unimportant and invisible” (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, p. 125).   
However, the reality of deinstitutionalisation as policy in Western nations 
was fraught and based on the premise that care and treatment could be 
standardised and psychiatric authority maintained (Grob. 1995).  In 
Aotearoa\New Zealand, provisions of the various Mental Health Acts up until the 
major reforms of 1992 (Ministry of Health, 1969, 1992), meant that people could 
be compulsorily treated in the community and non-compliance could invoke 
immediate recall back into an institutional facility (O’Brien et al., 2009).  The real 
power of the “new”, powerfully psychoactive medications, therefore, was social 
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coercion rather than therapeutic aid.  They reduced the need for costly, physical 
containment and enforced “compliance” beyond the hospital gates (Cohen, 
1997; Healy, 2002; Moncrieff, 2007, 2008; Moncrieff et al., 2003).  They did little 
to improve the quality of community life for patients (Cohen, 1997; Leibrich, 
1988; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Samson, 1995; Scull, 1977, 1979; Turner, 1995).  
In Aotearoa\New Zealand, too, widespread assumptions about a new era 
of community care did little to shift the preoccupations of psychiatry in mental 
health services (W. Brunton, 2001; Johns, 2010; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Leibrich, 
1988; Leonard, 1999; Mason, 1988, 1996; Warren, 1997).  Instead, mental health 
services were engaged in reconstructing “the institution” outside the hospital 
environment without posing any substantial challenge to the power, authority or 
treatment modalities of the biomedical model (Curtis & Hodge, 1994; Leibrich, 
1988; Leonard, 1999; S. Rose & Black, 1985; Sullivan, 1992; Warren, 1997).  
Therefore, the first wave of deinstitutionalisation comprised merely a geographic 
relocation of people, and services, into urban neighbourhoods rather than 
engagement with a community “out there” that cared; a psychological 
community of social networks and relationships, resources and opportunities as 
was widely assumed (Dalley, 1988; Durie, 1985, 1999; Grob, 1991, 1995; Joseph 
& Kearns, 1999; Leibrich, 1988: Leonard, 1999).   
Psychiatry and the “new” medications in community care 
Discharging people from the large institutions was not noticeably 
hastened by the medication “miracles” of the 1950s although this continued to 
be a convenient assumption for psychiatrists and a burgeoning pharmaceutical 
industry (Leff, 1997; Melling, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Samson, 1995; 
Whitaker, 2004).  Psychiatrists, also unbound from the asylums and who were 
actively participating in discourses of science that affirmed the physical origins of 
“mental illness”, rationalised the emphasis on physical treatments and the 
chemical control of behaviours (Miller & N. Rose, 1988; Pilgrim, 2007; Pilgrim & 
Bentall, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1994, 1999; Szasz, 1974).  But medication was 
more “chemical straitjacket” than “magic bullet”, and the so-called new 
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medications proved to be a poisoned chalice (Breggin, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Healy, 
2002; Hubble et al., 1999; Moncrieff, 2008; Scull, 1994; Whitaker, 2004).   
Psychiatrists and legislators of this time were primarily concerned with 
the effectiveness of drugs in terms of symptom reduction and behaviour control, 
and they continued to resist evidence of the seriously undesirable, permanent 
and disabling side-effects of medications (Breggin, 1993; P. Brown & Funk, 1986; 
Cohen, 1997; Healy, 2002; Moncrieff et al., 2003; Moncrieff, 2007, 2008; 
Whitaker, 2004).  Stephen Finn and colleagues noted that “psychiatrists saw 
side-effects as significantly less bothersome than symptoms when considering 
costs to society” (Finn et al, 1990, p. 843).  Prescription rates, therefore, 
continued to grow in both dose and frequency (P. Brown & Funk, 1986; Deegan, 
1990) and commentators were increasingly concerned that the need to be seen 
as scientific was closely associated with a mutually beneficial alliance between 
psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry (Chalmers, 2001; Double, 2002, 
2006; Healy, 2002; Jureidini, 2012; Moncrieff et al., 2003; N. Rose, 2003; 
Whitaker, 2004).  David Pilgrim and Anne Rogers (1999) noted that an “over-
reliance on drug treatment [was] inextricably linked to a professional strategy of 
collective upward mobility on the part of psychiatrists” (p. 125).  In other words, 
patient welfare was systematically disregarded in favour of the political 
aspirations of psychiatrists (Baruch & Treacher, 1978; P. Brown & Funk, 1986; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, 2009; N. Rose, 1996; Treacher & Baruch, 1981). 
Managing the effects of medications, and their serious and long term 
side-effects, meant true participation in the community, for example through 
employment and education, was not a realistic aspiration for many people, 
stigma and discrimination aside (Carling, 1995; Chamberlin, 1988; Joseph & 
Kearns, 1999; Keyes, 2002; Leff, 1997; Morgan, C., Burns, Fitzpatrick, Pinfold, & 
Priebe, 2007; Sayce, 2000; Sullivan, 1992).  Julie Leibrich, a founding 
commissioner of the newly formed Mental Health Commission, was to comment 
that the shuffling gaits and glazed eyes of heavily medicated people in the 
community merely reinforced popular stereotypes, and became a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy in terms of their inability to reclaim worthwhile and valued lives 
(Leibrich, 1998).   
Medical sociologists and social psychiatrists, particularly, were the 
foremost critics of biomedical psychiatry and the dominance of medical values 
and professional needs (Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2010; Pilgrim & Rogers, 
2005b; Saleeby, 2002; Scheff, 1999; Turner, 1995).  They were concerned to 
understand the subjective experiences alongside other external and 
environmental influences on a person’s behaviour and emotional state; it was 
from this alliance that the bio-psychosocial model was developed (Abbott & 
Wallace, 1990; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005a, 2005b; John Read, 2005; Pilgrim et al., 
2008).   
The bio-psycho-social model   
The bio-psycho social model of mental healthcare arose in the 1950s and 
has probably been the most widely recognised response, in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand, as elsewhere, to biomedical reductionism.  The model attempted to 
downplay the role of diagnosis, instead seeking to investigate the relationships 
between psychological distress and social contexts (Cook & Wright, 1995; 
Goldberg & Huxley, 1992; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005).  It appealed to mainstream 
clinical professionals because it maintained confidence in positivist notions of 
causality and the reification of mental illness (John Read, 2005; Szasz, 1960, 
1974; Turner, 1995).  However, it also drew criticism from opponents of 
psychiatric theory and practice because it did not reject diagnosis entirely 
(Barker, 2003; Melling, 1999; Pilgrim, 2002; John Read. 2005; Szasz, 1960, 1974).  
In the end, the model was weakened by a seemingly irreconcilable split between 
medical sociologists and biomedical professionals (Clare, 1980; Conrad & 
Schneider, 1990; Fee, 1990; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005a, 2005b).  The 
interdisciplinary void this engendered effectively subsumed the legitimacy of 
scholarship about the socio-cultural aspects of serious psychological distress for 
several decades (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005b).  
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Despite this, the general public believed that the social phenomenon of 
deinstitutionalisation was primarily ideological and focussed on human and civil 
rights.  According to Michael Oliver (1998), those who championed the move 
from the “institutions” to the “community”, naively believed that this move 
towards “normalisation” granted patients greater freedoms (H. Brown & Smith, 
1992; Wolfensberger, 1980).  In reality, mental healthcare reforms remained 
driven largely by professional interests (Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001), while 
legislation and compulsory treatment orders ensured that clinical professionals 
continued to exert control over patients outside the hospital walls.   
1970s: The second wave of deinstitutionalisation 
The public perception in New Zealand was that community care was 
fundamentally different from institutional care; that treatments had become 
more humane and people were now able to live more ordinary lives “in 
community” (Carling, 1995; Drake et al., 2003; Sullivan, 1994; Susser, Conover, & 
Struening, 1990; Turner, 1995; Warriner, 1997).  However, deinstitutionalisation, 
as a social process, did not equate to community care (W. Brunton, 2001; Caird, 
2001; Leff, 1997) and the second wave of deinstitutionalisation was driven by the 
promise of fiscal efficiencies and was, again, merely a physical relocation of 
people into neighbourhood settings (W. Brunton, 2005; Joseph & Kearns, 1996, 
1998; Leonard, 1999; Mason, 1988, 1996; Prior, 1993).  This meant that people 
with diagnoses of mental illnesses were typically in the community but not of it 
(Durie, 1985, 1994; Grob, 1995; Leonard, 1999; Mason, 1996; O'Hagan, 1991). 
Community “care” 
In practical terms community care was just a euphemism for community 
neglect, and New Zealand communities were unprepared for the uncomfortable 
and inconvenient eyesores of poverty, homelessness, alcoholism and untreated 
emotional distress that resulted (Leibrich, 1988, 1998; Ministry of Health, 2003; 
Sayce, 2000).  The critical distinction between care in the community and care by 
the community meant that, for most people leaving the institutions, being in the 
community meant joining the transient underclass of marginalised, impoverished 
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people in society (Durie, 1985, 1994; O’Hagan, 1999; Warren, 1997).  In addition, 
assumptions of a community “out there” that cared also implied the existence of 
social arrangements and relationships where people would willingly be 
responsible for each other (Durie, 1994, 1999; Grob, 1991, 1995; Leff, 1997; 
Mason, 1988).  Unfortunately, and more commonly, social supports tended to 
shrink and relationships fall away (Koegel, Burnam, & Baumohl, 1996).   
Similarly, the presumption that funding would be transferred from the 
institutions into “the community” proved to be misplaced, and resources did not 
follow patients into communities as promised (Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Mason, 
1996; Warren, 1997; Warriner, 2001).  Equity and human rights issues were 
similarly compromised by economic priorities in the deinstitutionalisation 
agenda, amidst unrealistic expectations of, comparatively, non-existent 
community services (W. Brunton, 2001; Durie, 1994; Prior, 1993).  As one 
commentator wryly explained, a “good way of saving money on community care 
is, of course, to provide very little of it” (Leonard, 1999, p. 134) and this 
appeared to be the policy strategy in New Zealand as elsewhere (Leonard, 1997; 
Mason, 1988, 1996; Prior. 1993).  These factors combined to create an illusion of 
social integration where, in fact, people’s inability to adapt to community 
expectations led to social exclusion, stigma and hopelessness (Lapsley & Yee, 
2004; Sayce, 2000, 2001; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004). 
The practical responsibility for “community care” devolved, by default, to 
existing charitable trusts that were already providing generic social services (W. 
Brunton, 2001; Caird, 2001; Joseph & Kearns, 1999).  At this time, they were ill-
prepared to manage the support needs of people who had few skills for coping in 
an alien environment and who exhibited bewildering behaviours and symptoms 
(Carling & Allott, 1999; Leibrich, 1988; Mental Health Commission, 1997; Sayce, 
2000).  Critics highlighted the lack of even a weak policy framework and a 
fragmented, ad hoc approach to the development of community services (W. 
Brunton, 2001; Joseph & Kearns, 1996; Wade, 1999; Warriner, 2001).  Facilities 
were underdeveloped, resources grossly inadequate and the community 
organisations lacked the skills, vision and strategic direction to implement a 
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systematic plan for meeting the broad needs of people to live ordinary lives in 
their community (Mason 1996; Warriner, 2001).   
In addition, biomedical psychiatry and Western worldviews effectively 
colonised New Zealand mental health services (Coleborne & Mackinnon, 2006; 
Durie, 1999, 2001, 2009; Dyall, 1997).  This meant that a disproportionate 
amount of the impacts of deinstitutionalisation policy fell on Māori, for whom 
containment in the institutions had more completely disenfranchised them from 
the support of whānau6, hapū7 and community (Durie, 1994, 2001).  Cultural 
conceptualisations of mental health, psychological distress, and appropriate 
forms of support and treatment were totally ignored (Fenton & Te Koutua, 2000; 
Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Nikora, 1993).  As they were discharged from the large 
psychiatric facilities Māori, more than any other group, were isolated and 
stigmatised.  Statistically Māori and Pacific Island men were shown to be more 
likely to have traumatic, police-involved admissions into in-patient services; they 
also received higher doses of powerful medications, in greater quantities and 
with greater frequency (Abas et al., 2003; Wheeler, Robinson, & Robinson, 
2005).  
Unsurprisingly, these circumstances provoked a long period of 
community backlash, where deinstitutionalisation was decried as an ideological 
failure and a social experiment gone wrong (W. Brunton, 2001, 2004; Grob, 
1995; Leibrich, 1988; Mason, 1988, 1996). 
1980s: The growing tide of unrest 
The last psychiatric hospital in New Zealand did not close its doors until 
1998 and in-patient treatment services continued to receive over 80% of mental 
health funding through the 1980s and into the 1990s (W. Brunton, 2001; Hall & 
Joseph,1988; Johns, 2010; Joseph et al., 2009).  But by the time the hospitals 
finally closed, mental healthcare had been out of the public consciousness for so 
                                                     
6 Whānau is the Māori term for family and includes notions of extended family 
7 Hapu is a Māori term that refers to a sub-tribal group that reside within the same geographical 
region.  Whānau, hapu, iwi are key features of Māori social organisation. 
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long, and the territory so exclusively claimed by the medical profession, that 
there was a critical ignorance about the nature, origins and consequences of 
serious mental and emotional states.  There was also a tragic lack of 
understanding that many of the people who had suffered long-term stays in 
psychiatric hospitals were exhibiting the appearance and behaviours of 
institutionalisation (Scull, 1993) and the side effects of medication rather than 
symptoms of mental illness (Anthony, 2006; Deegan, 1990; Oaks, 2006; N. Rose 
et al., 2006).  Lay understandings of institutions were similarly vague and the 
general public assumed that “institutionalisation” was a thing of the past and 
referred merely to the closure of large rural facilities (Johns, 2010; Prior. 1993; 
Warriner, 2010).  In fact, deinstitutionalisation was a slow process.  
In addition, ambiguous constructions of “community” contributed to the 
backlash commonly referred to as the “NIMBY” (Not in My Backyard) principle 
(Fakhoury & Priebe, 2002; Joseph & Kearns, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 
1997; Sayce, 2000).  Although this phenomenon reflected genuine concerns 
about the capacity of the community to accommodate new members, underlying 
the rejection was the misperception that the problem was the people with 
mental illness rather than a serious, systemic and political issue.  It was not until 
Judge Ken Mason’s first public inquiry in 1988 that the problems of desperately 
inadequate resourcing and capacity were publicly identified as the primary issues 
of community resistance to community care (Mason, 1988).  
Nevertheless the community unrest was countered by a burgeoning 
activism among “psychiatric survivors” (Goslyn, 1998), in conjunction with similar 
social and human rights movements throughout the world.  In Aotearoa\New 
Zealand, the Aotearoa Network of Psychiatric Survivors was formed in the 1980s 
in an attempt to develop a collective, political identity alongside other social 
movements such as Gay Pride, Feminism and various Māori, as well as other 
indigenous peoples, lobby groups (Cohen, 1985; O’Hagan, 1991; Warner, 2004).  
This group endeavoured to enable people with negative experiences of the 
institutions to grow their political voice and reclaim the rights of citizenship as 
well as wider civil protections (Everett, 1994; Oaks, 2006).   
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Social activism and the psychiatric survivor movement 
The Aotearoa Network of Psychiatric Survivors (ANOPS) emerged as a 
new subject position (Goslyn, 1997; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 2005; 
O’Hagan, 1991) in the discourses of mental health treatment and care in this 
country.  They, and similar groups, also facilitated the gathering of personal 
accounts of the experiences of distress, as well as stories of the trauma endured 
as a direct result of treatment services themselves (Anthony, 1993; Deegan, 
1990; O’Hagan, 1994; Leibrich, 2000).  This social activism was reinforced in large 
part through fictionalised and non-fictional accounts of life inside the mental 
hospitals from perspectives of inmates 8 (W. Brunton, 2005; Frame, 1982a, 
1982b, 1984, 1985; Forman, 1975; Kesey, 1962; Nairn, 1999; Scull, 1993).  
Alongside personal narratives and sympathetic accounts, newsworthy incidents, 
revelations and scandals made some of these issues politically sensitive and 
raised a level of public disquiet (W. Brunton, 2005; Dalley & Tennant, 2004; 
Mason, 1988).   
Advocates demanded that society recognise the oppression and 
marginalisation of psychiatric patients and called for the systemic redistribution 
of social and political power as well as individual rights to self-determination 
(Fisher, 1994a; Lord & Dufort, 1996; Jacob Read, 2003b; S. Rose, 2000).  They 
highlighted stigma, discrimination and the disabling impacts of many social 
environments; as well as the systemic structures and policies that presented 
barriers to equitable social participation for people with diagnoses of mental 
illness (Kendrick, 1997; Lapsley & Yee, 2004; Mental Health Commission, 1997; 
Rappaport, 1995; Sayce, 2000).  Disability advocate Michael Oliver (1998) 
described the challenges as: 
[Moving] beyond the personal limitations that impaired 
individuals may face, to social restrictions imposed by an 
                                                     
8 For example, in this country Janet Frame’s autobiographical novel ‘Owls Do Cry’ (1960) and 
subsequent non-fictional trilogy ‘An Angel at my Table’ (1982, 1984, 1985) were the first 
accounts to enter the public domain. Elsewhere populist movies such as ‘One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest’ (Kesey, 1962; Forman, 1975) had exposed cracks in the previously seamless 
narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
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unthinking society.  Disability is understood as a social and 
political issue rather than a medical one, and this leads to 
critical questioning of medical interventions: attempts to 
cure impairments or to restore "normal" bodily functioning 
(p. 1446).  
For most psychiatric survivor/consumer9 activists, there was, 
inevitably, a political as well as personal need to challenge the social contexts 
in which the process of alienation occurred (Chamberlin, 1988, 1998; May, 
2001; Rappaport, 1987; N. Rose, 1996).  Over time, these efforts included 
media campaigns such as Like Minds, Like Mine (Ackroyd & Wyllie, 2002; 
Lapsley & Yee, 2004; Perkins & Repper, 2013; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004) and 
an on-line presence through websites, forums, blogs and support groups10.  All 
these initiatives focussed on managing the damaging impacts of prejudice, 
stigma and low expectations of people who experienced serious psychological 
distress, in contrast to conventional psychiatry’s efforts to determine the 
causes of perceived deficiency or illness.   
Simultaneously, Māoridom was beginning to develop robust 
challenges to the ways that Pākehā (European) New Zealanders were 
interpreting their experiences, and had embedded institutional racism in 
education, health and public services (Barnett & Barnes, 2010; Durie, 1985; 
Ministry Advisory Committee, 1988).  They had begun to develop their own 
models of mental healthcare, led by notable Māori scholar and psychiatrist 
Mason Durie (Durie, 1994, 2009; Dyall, 1997; Ramsden, 1997; Ministerial 
Advisory Committee, 1988; Te Ngaru Learning Systems, 2002).   
However, despite these contributions to a growing body of alternative 
thought in mental healthcare, the orthodox drive in biomedicine did not slow, 
                                                     
9 “Consumer” became a term of self-identification for people with lived experience of 
psychological distress in the early 1990s. This will be discussed further in the section New Acts: 
Changes in NZ policy and legislation, and the  evolution of the language of identification is 
discussed in some depth in The Problematic of Voice section of the literature review. 
10 For example, Openmind.org, Scottish Recovery Network, thelowdown.co.nz among many 
others 
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and was in fact spurred on by vociferous public approbation of technological 
advances in physical medicine and the funding resources these attracted  
(Bennett, 1991; Melling, 1999; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001; Pilgrim, 2002, 
2007; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1994, 1999; Prior, 1993; Scull, 1994).  Critics, including 
“psychiatric survivors”, were deeply concerned that the situated, subjective 
and communal understandings of the experiences of serious distress were 
made invisible and the voices of marginalised peoples unheard (Adame, 2006; 
Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a, 2007b; Fisher, 2000; Foucault, 1963, 1973; 
Weick, 2000).  There was also concern building within psychiatry.   
The “myth” of mental illness 
Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (1960) believed there was a fundamental error 
in reasoning about mental illness and he argued that the notion had outlived any 
usefulness it might have had and was functioning merely as a convenient “myth” 
(Szasz, 1960, 1974).  While he, and others, did not minimise the social and 
psychological distress that many people experienced, they were deeply 
concerned about the consequences of the biomedical explanatory models 
attributed to them (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Breggin, 1993; Laing, 1960; Scheff, 
1974; U’Ren, 1997). 
Orthodox psychiatry, on the other hand, continued to define emotional 
distress in terms of individual, disordered experience.  Social and cultural factors 
were, at best, treated as secondary and not generally taken into account.  This 
intransigence was partly due to most psychiatric encounters still occurring in 
hospitals and clinical services (W. Brunton, 2001, 2004; Bracken & Thomas, 1998, 
1999; Duncan et al., 2004; Joseph & Kearns, 1996).  But, gradually and haltingly, 
the community NGOs began to understand the complex challenges of the 
situation that had arbitrarily devolved to them.  They also began to recognise the 
many shortfalls in the resources available to them.   
As the 1980s came to an end, there was a general unease and foment of 
unrest from many quarters within New Zealand following several scandals in 
mental health services (Boston, Dalziel, & John, 1999; W. Brunton, 2001, 2004, 
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2005).  It was in this climate that the first of three major inquiries was 
commissioned by the Government and led by Judge Ken Mason (1988).  His 
subsequent report was deeply critical of conditions in the psychiatric hospitals 
and the configuration of mental health services.  Despite his findings, the social 
and political power of stakeholders, for whom the control and management of 
large public psychiatric hospitals remained a vested interest (Ashton, 1999; W. 
Brunton, 2005; Joseph & Kearns, 1996, 2008) meant that professional interests 
continued to dominate.  It was psychiatrists who formed the advisory panels, and 
their voices alone were sought in addressing the inquiry’s recommendations (A. 
Brown, 2000, 2004; W. Brunton, 2004, 2005; Nairn, 1999; Prichard, 2005).  As a 
consequence, at this stage, there was no mobilisation of extra resources into 
community services.  However, as the pressures continued to mount, the 
situation became untenable for a variety of reasons.  The next decade would 
witness considerable mental health reform and resulting social change.  
1990-1996: A period of reforms 
Ideological and policy shifts under successive governments resulted in 
continuous reorganisation and restructuring of the New Zealand’s health system 
in the 1990s (Ashton, Mays, & Devlin, 2005; Dalley & Tennant, 2004; Davis & 
Ashton, 2001; Fougere, 2001).  Area Health Boards, convened in the late 1980s, 
were replaced by Regional Health Authorities (RHA) and Crown Health 
Enterprises (CHEs), previously referred to simply as hospitals, in 1993 (W. 
Brunton, 2004; Cheyne et al, 2000).  In this era, for the first time, purchasing was 
separated from the provision of health services; hospitals were, ostensibly at 
least, no longer the privileged and preferred providers (Cheyne et al., 2000).  This 
levelled the playing field significantly and opportunities arose for communities, 
NGOs, and Māori to deliver healthcare according to their own community needs, 
and for more innovative and socially equitable approaches to care and support 
to appear (Barnett & Barnes, 2010; Cheyne et al., 2000; Durie, 1999; Mental 
Health Commission, 1998).   
ANOPS continued to provide a focal point for Aotearoa\New Zealand 
survivors/consumers in this era, drawing on an agenda of human rights and 
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empowerment, and helped to drive change in the organisation of the mental 
health sector (Everett, 1994; O'Hagan, 1991; Pilgrim, 2005).  In addition, the 
traditional preoccupation with professional needs was gradually supplemented 
by a new concern with patient rights, and this began to undermine the autonomy 
of psychiatrists to make purely medical judgments about restricting personal 
freedoms and treating people compulsorily (Grob, 1995; Mental Health 
Commission, 1997).   
This development was largely due to the Cartwright Inquiry into the 
“unfortunate experiment” at National Women’s Hospital (Coney, 1988) where 
Dr. Herbert Green was found guilty of unethical experimentation on women with 
cervical cancer; some of whom subsequently died (Cartwright, 1988; Coney, 
1988).  This inquiry created a wide public unease with the unlimited authority 
and power that had accrued to the medical profession.  The subsequent Health 
and Disability Commissioners Act 1994 and Code of Consumer Rights (Health and 
Disability Commission, 1996) proved to be critically important pieces of 
legislations for mental health service users in this country.   
New Acts: Changes in mental health policy and legislation in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand   
The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 and Code of 
Consumers’ Rights (Health & Disability Commission, 1996) directly challenged the 
paternalistic power of medical professionals and assumptions of professional 
benevolence (Coney, 1988; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Mitchell, 2000).  The Code, 
as the Act’s practical expression, generated unprecedented leverage for users of 
mental health services who had previously been peculiarly powerless as 
“consumers” of health and disability services (Paterson, 2002).  Alongside other 
health consumers, they now had the rights to be treated with dignity, respect 
and cultural appropriateness as well as the right to informed consent processes 
and whānau or other supports when dealing with mental health professionals 
(Mental Health Commission, 1998b; Ministry of Health, 1994).  In addition, the 
Health Information Privacy Code (1994) meant that people were able to access, 
read and annotate all information held about them.  It afforded Aotearoa\New 
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Zealand mental health service users, for the first time, statutory rights in terms 
of the obligations under which health professionals must deliver care (Gawith & 
Abrams, 2006; Mitchell, 2000).  
In addition, the Mental Health Act (1969) was reviewed, and eventually 
replaced, by the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment & Treatment) Act 1992 
(Ministry of Health, 1992).  Submissions to the reform process included, for the 
first time, several hundred from newly formed consumer advocacy groups 
(Barnett & Barnes, 2010; Barwick, 1994; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; O'Hagan, 2004), 
families and other lay stakeholders (W. Brunton, 2004; Cheyne et al., 2000).  The 
Act itself represented a significant shift towards personal freedoms as it 
attempted to balance the needs of wider society with the rights of the individual 
to appropriate care in the least restrictive environment possible (Grob, 1995; 
Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Ministry of Health, 2012; O'Brien et al., 2009).  It also, for 
the first time, provided a legal definition of mental disorder, which effectively 
removed the power of mental health professionals to arbitrarily define mental 
illnesses; at the same time, it increased their accountability for overriding a 
person’s civil rights and treating them compulsorily (Mental Health Commission, 
1997a; Ministry of Health, 1994, 2012).   
However, the shift to more voluntary admissions simultaneously 
disguised fiscal efficiencies as the major new drivers of mental health service 
provision.  These led eventually, and inevitably, to overall reductions in the 
availability of supports and services (W. Brunton, 2001; Cheyne et al., 2000; 
Sarney, 1996).  Mental health professionals were mandated by the Ministry of 
Health to control access to, and exit from, services according to their budgets; 
and this left many people and their families feeling distressed, unsupported and 
powerless to cope in the community.  It also aggravated the so-called revolving 
door syndrome whereby people were discharged from in-patient services only to 
be re-admitted a short time later (Barnett & Barnes, 2010; Durie, 1994, 1999; 
Goldsack, Reet, Lapsley, & Gingel, 2005; World Schizophrenia Fellowship, 1998).   
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Public Scandal and mental health policy reform 
Warwick Brunton (2004, 2005) has described mental health policy in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand as scurries of reform spurred on by the clamour of public 
scandals.  This pattern produced incoherent, fragmented and uncoordinated 
changes within mental health services (Barwick, 1994; Boston et al., 1999; W. 
Brunton, 2004, 2005; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Joseph & Kearns, 1996, 1999).  
These reforms typically withered over time and were “interspersed with long 
periods of stagnation and public indifference” (W. Brunton, 2005, p. 35).   
Public inquiries have sometimes generated legislative change and the 
establishment of new subject positions (Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
This was evident in the mental health reforms in Aotearoa\New Zealand where 
user groups such as ANOPS and Mind & Body emerged, as did family support and 
advocacy groups such as Supporting Families (SF) and People Relying on People 
(PROP).  Perhaps most notably, the Mental Health Commission was formed in 
1996, as a direct result of the third Mason Inquiry, to lead and oversee recovery 
based reform throughout the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector.  
Equally, however, public inquiries have also been vulnerable to the ideological 
predilections of inquiry “sense makers” who interpret and implement the 
findings (A. Brown, 2004; Prichard, 2005; Suchman, 1995).   
Scholars have maintained that many public inquiry recommendations 
come to rest on individual actions, focused on individual “human error” and 
treating events as localised or isolated incidents rather than requiring, or 
initiating, substantive systemic change (Ashton et al., 2005; A. Brown, 2004; 
O’Hagan, 1994, 2004; Prichard, 2005).  These patterns reinforce the perception 
that, no matter the nature and scale of events that provoke inquiries, reform 
ultimately depends on how key stakeholders made sense of and interpret the 
material before them (A. Brown , 2000; W. Brunton, 2001, 2005; Prichard, 2005).   
This criticism was evident in what became known as the three Mason 
Inquiries between 1985 and 1996 (W. Brunton, 2005; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; 
Vaughn & Hansen, 2004).   
 48 
The Mason Inquiries and the Mental Health Commission  
Judge Ken Mason, and others subsequently, maintained that 
interpretation and implementation of inquiry findings by powerful stakeholders 
routinely led to systemic persistence despite apparent policy reforms (Ashton et 
al., 2005; A. Brown, 2000, 2004; Cheyne et al., 2000; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; 
Mason, 1996; Prichard, 2005).  In convening his third Ministerial Inquiry, he 
strongly criticised the processes of deinstitutionalisation for a lack of 
coordination and leadership, and noted the serious underfunding of a 
community sector that was unable to cope with a flood of new service users with 
specialised needs and issues (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Mason, 1996; Vaughn & 
Hansen, 2004).  Judge Mason and his team noted that, while care in the 
community was a policy with considerable popular support, it was compromised 
by the insistence that community organisations should be cheaper than state 
institutions and hospitals (W. Brunton, 2004, 2005; Mason, 1996). 
Mason (1996) and his inquiry team also took the highly unusual step of 
making their own submission on the Mental Health Commission Bill (1996) in 
protest at the way their recommendations had been diluted by the 
Government’s lukewarm response to the inquiry report (W. Brunton, 2001, 2004, 
2005; Sarney, 1996).  In the end, the inquiry team could not be ignored entirely 
and their intervention led to the establishment of the Mental Health Commission 
with a mandate to lead coordination of the sector and to undertake a stock take 
of existing services that would ultimately underpin the development of the 
document: The Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand (Mental 
Health Commission, 1998).   
Despite the Inquiry team’s frustration at the government retaining 
control of funding, the Commission was able to ring-fence a funding stream, 
dubbed the “Mason money”, which initiated systemic training and resourcing of 
the community sector (Ashton, 1999; Barnett & Newbury, 2002; Caird, 2001; 
Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Warriner, 2001).  In the years that followed, the 
Commission also published, and invited publications from, a wide range of 
commentators.  These publications represented a major source of authorship 
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from outside mainstream psychiatry, made particularly compelling by some 
authors being not only mental health professionals, but also identifying as having 
experienced extreme, and distressing, mental states (Leibrich, 2000).  
In the meantime, Aotearoa\New Zealand also undertook radical reforms 
of the whole health sector in the 1990s.  These reforms were an attempt to 
devolve health services to the “market” and brought with them a discourse of 
managerialism to replace professional authority in health and mental health 
(Ashton, 1999; Ashton et al., 2005; Cheyne et al., 2000; Joseph & Kearns, 1996; 
Reay & Hinings, 2005).  Discourses of health outcomes were subjugated to issues 
of public expenditure, productivity and cost effectiveness meaning that “the 
principles of deinstitutionalisation became subsumed within the neoliberal logic 
of restructuring” (Joseph, Kearns, & Moon, 2008, p. 79).  Overall, the reforms of 
the 1990s were characterised by conflicting impulses, with some significant 
intersections and unanticipated consequences.   
Managerialism, consumerism and paradox in health service reform  
The New Zealand health reforms became renowned internationally as 
trend-setting within a politically right wing, capitalist agenda (Ashton, 1999; 
Ashton et al., 2005; W. Brunton, 2004, 2005; Cheyne et al., 2000).  The adoption 
of an overtly managerialist approach to healthcare and the promotion of state 
contracting for health service provision seriously affected mental health services 
(Boston, 1996; Platform Trust, 2008).  The primary focus on “taking care of 
business” led inevitably to corporate style practices and management models. 
These were evident in the establishment of the Crown Health Enterprises (CHE) 
which operated under the governance of the Regional Health Authorities (RHA) 
(Ashton, 1999; Ashton et al., 2005; Barnett & Newbury, 2002).  These changed 
the nature of, and accountability for, health service provision from health 
outcomes for service users to maximising investment for owners and 
shareholders (Reay & Hinings, 2005).   
Most importantly, this restructuring institutionalised the shift from the 
government as funder of health services to purchaser of health services, which 
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engendered a separation between funding and service provision intended to 
promote better financial management, greater efficiencies and accountabilities 
(Ashton, 1999; Boston et al., 1999; Fougere, 2001; Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996).  
However, this also created considerable tension between new discourses of 
accountability to funders and taxpayers at the expense of accountability to 
actual health service users (Fougere, 2001).  In addition, corporate management 
models were frequently in conflict with therapeutic approaches, and competitive 
funding, intended to drive down the costs of services, created an environment of 
mistrust between service providers and a lack of coordination throughout the 
sector (Ashton et al., 2005; Fougere, 2001).  The quality of services necessarily 
suffered, particularly in the community and NGO sector, which already struggled 
for funding and credibility.  In the event, no financial gains were ever observed 
(Ashton, 1999; Ashton et al., 2005; Boston, 1999).   
However, the introduction of the quasi-market language of 
“consumerism” in health provided an unexpected opportunity for psychiatric 
survivors who were clamouring for participation and voice in the ideological 
development of mental health service configuration (O’Hagan, 1991, 2004; 
Paterson, 2002).  The different ideo-political positions shared an emphasis on 
consumer rights, albeit from very diverse discourses, which resonated 
sufficiently with the Government to enshrine into law a Code of Consumer Rights 
(Health and Disability Commission, 2009) that effectively gave mental health 
service users unprecedented rights to be involved in decisions about their 
treatment and care. 
Ultimately, the corporatisation of health and the creation of health 
“consumers” in Aotearoa\New Zealand failed as a political experiment but left a 
legacy of purchasing and contracting models in the administration of healthcare, 
including mental health (Boston et al., 1999; Fougere, 2001; Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 
1996; Tennant, O’Brien, & Saunders, 2008).  Nevertheless, new ways of thinking 
about mental health services meant that the voices of service users, families and 
Māori were somewhat strengthened in the development of service definitions 
and outcome evaluation.  In addition, new conceptual models such as recovery, 
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Te Whare Tapa Wha (Durie, 1985, 1994) and the Strengths model (McCashen, 
2005; Rapp, 1998; Saleeby, 2002) became instrumental in developing service 
delivery frameworks that created some space for the agency, aspiration and 
resourcefulness of service users (Anthony, 1993; Copeland, 1997; Deegan, 1988, 
1996; Harter et al., 2006; Jacobson & Greenley, 2001; O’Hagan, 1999).  
1996- 2000: Recovery, a new discourse emerges  
The gradual emergence of recovery as a significant new paradigm in 
mental health services accompanied a growing social awareness that psychiatry 
could no longer claim a privileged understanding of mental illness or 
psychological distress (Bracken & Thomas, 1998).  The development, and 
eventual publication, of the document, The Blueprint for mental health services 
in New Zealand: The way things need to be (1998), was unique for mental health 
policy in Aotearoa\New Zealand because it incorporated the perspectives of 
people with lived experiences of psychological distress, their families, and Māori, 
all of whom had been disregarded previously in the development of mental 
health services (O’Hagan, 2004; Durie, 1999; Mental Health Commission, 1998; 
Ministry of Health, 1994).   
Adopting recovery into national policy represented the first rational basis 
for coordinating the development and delivery of mental health services and 
care in this country.  As it was defined in The Blueprint (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998), this recovery discourse was underpinned by certain explicit 
assumptions.  First, it affirmed the rights of all people to their own aspirations for 
well-being and a satisfying quality of life.  Second, it supported people’s right to a 
sense of personal power in making the important decisions in their life, and 
third, that all members of a community have a right to participate fully in that 
community with equitable access to its resources and opportunities (Mental 
Health Commission, 1998, 1999; Ministry of Health, 1997).   
The definition of recovery used in the introduction was based on 
definitions offered by Laurie Curtis (1997) and Patricia Deegan (1988). Central to 
this construction was that: 
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Services must empower consumers, assure their rights, get 
the best outcomes, increase their control over their mental 
health and well-being, and enable them to fully participate in 
society.  This focus on recovery reflects the shift of thinking 
which is happening throughout the sector (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998, p. vii) 
However, controversially, and reflecting the clinical professional 
influences within the Commission, the reification of mental illness was 
naturalised throughout the text, despite other constructions or health beliefs 
being acknowledged (Mental Health Commission, 1998).  
Recovery was neither a new, nor a unique, concept.  However, from its 
inception the concept of recovery in mental health was plagued by ambiguity 
and controversy.  
History of recovery discourse 
Adoption of a discourse of recovery in the Blueprint (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998) was controversial.  Although Aotearoa\New Zealand was the 
first country in the world to incorporate recovery into national policy, contested 
uses of the term meant its inclusion was only reluctantly agreed to by the users 
of mental health service at that time (Adams et al., 2009; O’Hagan, 2004, 2009).  
They had serious reservations about multiple discourses of recovery, which 
appear prophetic over 15 years later (Central Potential, 2008; Coleman, 1999; 
Davidson, O'Connell, Tondora, Styron, & Kangas, 2006; O’Hagan, 2004; Wallcraft, 
2009).   
At the time, stakeholders were concerned about the colloquial uses of 
the term “recovery”, as well as its construction in the Alcohol & Drug field, where 
the underpinning principles of a disease model were unacceptable to many 
mental health service users (Coleman, 1999; Deegan, 1988; Leibrich, 2000a; 
Pearson, 2004).  Mary O’Hagan (2004), at this time, said that doubts about the 
word recovery were mostly directed at the North American version that 
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emphasised the personal, and ultimately more individualistic, journey of 
recovery.   
In contrast, Aotearoa\New Zealand stakeholders were determined to 
incorporate the social, economic and political dimensions of their experience; 
and to replace the biomedical, deficits approach with an explicit platform of self-
determination.  New Zealand “consumers” also believed that service users 
should lead recovery, not professionals (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Mitchell, 2000; 
O’Hagan, 1999, 2004, 2009c; Pearson, 2001, 2004; Jacob Read, 2003a).  With no 
generally accepted definition, recovery remained a contested, and controversial, 
concept (Coleman, 1999; O'Hagan, Reynolds, & Smith, 2012).   
The two major discourses of recovery emanated from significantly 
distinct sources.  The bio-psycho-social, or rehabilitation, model of recovery 
tended to be championed by the “other” mental health professionals such as 
psychiatric nurses, occupational therapists and social workers (Barber, 2005; 
Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2011; O’Hagan, 2004; O’Hagan et al., 2012; Pilgrim, 
2002).  These groups, while eager to distance themselves from a purely 
biomedical stance, were still “insiders” of the prevailing orthodoxy and tended to 
remain faithful to reified constructions of mental illness and diagnoses.  They 
defined recovery as rehabilitation, or the restoration of “normal” health and 
functioning.  This version had implications not only for the evolution of recovery 
discourses but also served to maintain privileged interests and relationships of 
power in the mental health sector.  
In contrast, the New Zealand “consumer” discourse of recovery rejected 
outright a biomedical discourse of deficits, symptoms and problems and 
emphasised the social, political and cultural aspects of recovery.  These groups 
maintained that “recovery is happening when people can live well in the 
presence or absence of their mental illness and the many losses that may come 
in its wake, such as isolation, poverty, unemployment, and discrimination” 
(Mental Health Commission, 1998, p. 1).  This discourse also required a major 
paradigm shift in how mental health service workers perceived their roles and 
how services and contracting processes should be configured, and outcomes 
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measured (Banks et al., 2004; Barber, 2005; Central Potential, 2008; Pearson, 
2002; Warriner, 1997, 2001).  
The recovery discourse that emerged through the personal narratives of 
psychiatric survivors\consumers stated clearly that professional intervention 
must be experienced as beneficial, not harmful, for it to be warranted.  For many 
who had been through the psychiatric systems of most Western nations, the 
opposite had almost inevitably been the case (Adame, 2006; Gawith & Abrams, 
2006; Leibrich, 2000; O’Hagan, 1994, 1999; O’Hagan et al., 2012).  Advocates of 
this subjective, experiential discourse positioned the ordinary community, rather 
than mental health services, as the appropriate setting for people to regain their 
rights of citizenship and reconnect with social networks that enhanced their 
sense of belonging (Agnew et al., 2004; Barber, 2005; Blundo, 2001; Durie, 1985; 
McCashen, 2005; Warriner, 2001).  Prominent commentator Patricia Deegan 
(1988, 1996), among others, took issue with the politics of “inclusion” where this 
conferred power on the “community” to define the rules for social participation 
(Carling, 1995; Leibrich & Carson, 2012; Oliver, 1998; Perkins & Repper, 2003; 
Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).   
As time went on it became more difficult to discern an authentic recovery 
discourse in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health organisations.  Professional 
and other stakeholder groups endeavoured to claim their own versions of 
recovery in order to rationalise their existing service provision and practice 
approaches (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Davidson et al., 2006; Lehman, 2000; 
Mancini, Hardiman, & Lawson, 2005; Mental Health Commission, 2011b; 
Wallcraft, 2009).  This had serious implications for the development of recovery-
oriented community organisations and mental health services generally.  The 
organising of recovery will be discussed in the literature review following but 
suffice to say at this point that several commentators began to refer to the 
colonisation of recovery (Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009a; Ridgeway, 2001 
Wallcraft, 2009). 
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Emerging discourses challenge biomedical constructions of madness  
Despite these tensions, the concept of recovery resisted the biomedical 
discourse in many ways.  First, it challenged the categorisation of experience; not 
merely the negative impacts of diagnostic labelling and the systemic 
classification of deeply personal experiences but, more generally, the 
pathologising of human distress (Carson, 1997; Jureidini, 2012; Leibrich, 1997; 
O’Hagan, 2010; Pilgrim, 2007; Scheff, 1974).  Second, people with lived 
experience of psychological distress were vociferous about their right to define 
and name their own experience (Deegan, 1990; Fisher, 2000; Leibrich, 2000; 
O’Hagan, 2010); particularly after decades of dealing with the “removal of their 
competence and power” (O’Hagan, 1994).  For them, creating a life worth living 
was a fundamentally different goal to the “cure” of mental “illness”.  Similarly, 
these commentators challenged the over-emphasis, in services, on personal 
change to the neglect of social systems change (Deegan, 1996; Foucault, 1973; 
Lord, Ochacka, Czarny, & MacGillivary, 1998).   
Over time, the language of recovery evolved in important ways.  This was 
evident in new authorship and subject positions as well as being reflected in the 
changing dynamics of the socio-political environment (Anthony, 1993; Becker et 
al., 1998; Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Carling, Allott, Smith, & Coleman, 1999; 
Torrey, 1997, 2000).  For example, the identification language of the psychiatric 
survivor of mental health services became absorbed by the discourse of 
consumers and then service users in health services (O’Hagan, 2012) with many 
finally preferring the expression people with lived experience of extreme distress.  
In New Zealand, culturally embracing terms such as tangata whaiora11 reflected 
the adoption of indigenous, holistic frameworks of health and well-being such as 
Te Whare Tapa Wha (Durie, 1985, 1999) and Fonofale (Agnew et al., 2004; 
Pulotu-Endemann,2001).  In contrast, professionals and services increasingly 
referred to users of their services as clients (Anthony, 1993; Duncan et al., 2000; 
                                                     
11 Tangata whaiora is a Maori phrase, literally ‘person following wellness’ 
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Torrey, 1997, 2011) indicative of the encroachment of managerialism in health.  
Each iteration, therefore, expressed a distinct voice and perspective. 
Meanwhile, orthodox psychiatry tended to react defensively to these 
challenges (Craddock et al., 2008; Kendell, 2000; Mountain & Shah, 2008; Torrey, 
1997) and the formal introduction of recovery into national policy was not, in 
itself, sufficient to remove the legal, coercive and conventional treatment 
aspects of service provision and development (Barker, 2003; O’Brien & Golding, 
2003; O’Brien et al., 2009; O'Hagan, 2004; Wallcraft, 2009).   
In New Zealand the Like Minds, Like Mine media campaign (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998b) sought to raise public awareness about how people’s 
identities, sense of self and perception of their social value were shaped by their 
encounters with the community.  The campaign emphasised that stigma became 
a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy for people with lived experience of psychological 
distress (Luske, 1990; Oliver, 1996; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).  Through such 
campaigns it became more widely accepted that there was a need for social, as 
well as individual change, and that recovery could not take place in 
environments where people were isolated from meaningful connections to their 
communities (Carling, 1995; Sayce, 2000; Spandler, 2007; Sullivan, 1992; 
Warriner, 1999, 2001).  In general, media initiatives appeared to be more 
influential than policy change in shifting public awareness and attitudes that 
limited people’s participation in their communities (Ackroyd & Wyllie, 2002; 
Gawith & Abram, 2006; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).    
By the year 2000, in the aftermath of “deinstitutionalisation”, mental 
health services, policy makers and the community alike were confronted with the 
uncomfortable reality that people need more than symptom relief to regain an 
ordinary life in their community (Anthony, 1993; Barber, 2005; Deegan, 1996; 
Jacobson, 2001; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Leibrich, 1998, 2000; O’Hagan, 1999; 
Pescosolido et al., 1995).  People recovering from the disorienting impacts of 
their experiences needed environments and supports, including services, that 
enabled them to re-establish, reconstruct and manage their lives within the 
communities of their choice. 
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The community comes into its own 
The separation of funding from the provision of services in the RHA and 
HFA era of the late 1990s had provided a more level playing field for community 
NGOs.  New models of community care and community support work emerged 
as the focus shifted to community locations and community ideals (Caird, 2001; 
Durie, 1998, 2001, 2009; Dyall, 1997; Kukler et al., 1998; Roen, 1999; Wade, 
1999; Warriner, 1999).  More flexible funding arrangements and the so-called 
Mason money meant the community organisations were able to engage in 
training and professional development, and a new qualification, the National 
Certificate in Mental Health Support Work, was developed.  Riding a wave of 
“consumer” rights meant that individuals, communities and the NGOs could 
negotiate resources for local solutions, community initiatives and even consumer 
driven service provision (Joseph et al, 2009).  It was an era propitious for 
innovative service development. 
For the first time, there was also direct funding of “consumer” or 
“psychiatric survivor” led organisations, which were then able to establish 
themselves and flourish (Barber, 2005; Caird, 2001; Central Potential, 2008; 
O’Hagan, 1991; Wade, 1999).  Other new organisations were founded by 
occupational groups such as psychiatric nurses and occupational therapists, who 
needed new employment post-“deinstitutionalisation”.  These NGOs foresaw 
opportunities to respond actively and positively to policy shifts and establish 
alternatives to hospital-based treatment. They were typically informed by more 
psychosocial approaches (Harrison, 2010; Kukler, 1999; Sanders, O’Brien, 
Tennant, Sokolowski, & Salamon, 2008; Warriner, 1999, 2001).   
The strengthening community sector was also able to advocate for, and 
articulate, a role for community support work (Barber, 2005; Caird, 2001; Pulotu-
Endemann, 2001; Kukler, 1999; Roen, 1999; Wade, 1999; Warriner, 2001).  
However, there was tension between models of community support work 
developed in organisations established by allied professionals and the nature of 
effective support identified by the consumer movement (Leibrich, 1998; 
O’Hagan, 1999; Pearson, 2000, 2002).  This tension had important implications 
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for the values, vision and practices of the community organisations (Barber, 
2005; Caird, 2001; Kukler et al., 1998; Wade, 1999).  In particular, the former 
tended to emphasise a rehabilitation approach that focussed on coping skills, 
stress management, relapse prevention and the development of functional social 
competence (Caird, 2001; Ministry of Health, 2001b; O’Hagan, 2001).  
In contrast, organisations influenced by consumer experience of 
psychological distress and clinical treatment services, were focussed on 
supporting people’s aspirations in education, employment, relationships and 
service leadership.  They were also concerned with addressing stigma, in both 
mental health services and the wider community, and advocating for social 
change (Central Potential, 2008; Chamberlin, 1998; Clark & Krupa, 2002; Gawith 
& Abrams, 2006; Pearson, 2000).  
These circumstances led Rob Warriner, among others, to warn that 
mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand lacked an explicit vision and 
coherent philosophical framework.  In particular, he argued that “the 
development of community-based mental health services in this country is 
lacking core values, an explicit set of shared beliefs and philosophical 
foundations upon which they can be built” (Warriner, 2001, p. 15).  In addition, 
and despite the rapid evolution and growth of the community sector, the 
contribution of the NGOs remained largely undervalued and their potential 
untapped (Health & Disability Commission Working Group, 2010; MHAC, 2008; 
Ministry of Social Development, 2001).  All of this meant that these 
organisations, despite being acknowledged as innovative and proactive in 
promoting recovery outcomes (Mental Health Commission, 2007b; Warriner, 
2001; Peters, 2010; MHAC, 2008; Harrison, 2010), struggled to establish a unique 
identity, or niche, as politically legitimate and credible alternatives to more 
dominant systems and ideological forces (Barnett & Newbury, 2002; Kukler, 
1999; Ministry of Health, 2001; Ministry of Social Development, 2001).     
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2000-2014: Recent issues and important trends 
By the beginning of the new millennium in Aotearoa\New Zealand, the 
HFA, RHAs and CHEs had all become historical acronyms.  This meant that, 
despite remaining formal policy, the halcyon era for developing recovery 
oriented mental health organisations effectively came to an end with the 
establishment of regional District Health Boards (DHBs) in 2000 (Ashton, 1999; 
Ashton et al., 2005; W. Brunton, 2005; Cheyne et al., 2000; Warriner, 2001, 
2010).  This new arrangement meant that DHBs, as both funder and providers of 
services, were able to determine, unilaterally, the configuration of all mental 
health services within their region (Ashton et al., 2005; W. Brunton, 2005; 
Tennant et al., 2008).  This reconfiguration did little to suppress neoliberal 
ideologies, i.e. “the best service at the best price”, and the elevation of private 
interests over public good, continued to underpin healthcare generally (Dutta, 
2015; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Joseph et al., 2009; Kearns et al., 2003).   
The “new right” ideological stance, which underpinned the controversial 
contracting environment, was accompanied by a return to risk-aversive 
management practices (Harrison, 2010; Mental Health Commission, 2004b; 
Platform Trust, 2008; Sawyer, 2005) and a renewed increase in clinical oversight 
of community services.  Together these trends further reinforced the 
commodification of health and disability (Barnett & Newbury, 2002; Kendrick, 
2012; Oliver, 1998).   
In addition, as Warriner (2001) argued, “the underlying and potentially 
destructive tension [that] exists between the medical model and more recent, 
contemporary models of mental health service delivery has been an outcome of 
the lack of a clear, underlying and shared philosophical ethos” (p. 21).  Julie 
Leibrich argued further, that the current system has made it impossible for 
people with lived experience of psychological distress to live normal lives, and 
then labelled them ab-normal (Leibrich, 1998).  She, and other commentators, 
have remained critical of mental health services that have systematically 
disempowered people and then accused them of not taking charge of their lives; 
refused to give them work but then declared them unemployable; prevented 
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them from living in nice places but then stigmatised them for living in squalor 
(Leibrich, 1998).  
Recovery and the institutions in the Aotearoa\New Zealand context  
Despite the discourses of recovery being explicit in organisational 
missions, strategies and national policy, many things worked against its 
expression in organisational practices.  The contracting parameters and 
accountabilities for NGOs increasingly reflected managerialist and biomedical 
preoccupations.  This created significant tensions between the values and 
philosophies of the community organisations in terms of their constitutions and 
Trust deeds with those of DHB clinical provider and funder arms.  Several 
commentators, including those from within psychiatry, were further concerned 
that some mental health services simply relabelled themselves as recovery-
oriented but did not fully engage with the challenge of organisational 
transformation, and the fundamental shifts in paradigm, structure and 
organisation that this required (Davidson et al., 2007; O’Hagan, 2004, 2009c, 
2012; Pearson, 2004; Leibrich & Carson, 2012).  Others highlighted the tendency 
to adopt the language of recovery but to recreate the institutions, and their 
operational paradigms, within community settings (Barber, 2005; Barker, 2003; 
Warriner, 2001, 2010; Wallcraft, 2009).   
Many attributed the dilution of recovery, in national policy documents 
(Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006; Platform Trust, 2007), to the ascendancy of 
managerialism in health and the renewed emphasis on biomedicine in the 1990s, 
dubbed the “decade of the brain” by US Congressional Resolution in 1991 
(Anthony, 1993; Craddock et al, 2008; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Pilgrim, 
2002; Torrey, 2011).  In addition, resourcing for mental health services was no 
longer ring-fenced within DHB operational budgets, leaving the community NGOs 
more vulnerable than ever.  This returned the community organisations to an 
explicitly subordinate position; competing for funding in an environment where 
the single funder was also responsible for the provision of clinical services 
(Harrison, 2010; Peters, 2010; Platform Trust, 2008; Warriner, 2010).  
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Growth in the community sector was also constrained by service 
contracts that included an increasing insistence on risk aversion and clinical 
oversight (Harrison, 2010).  Heightened government scrutiny, demands for 
accountability, and increased competition for contracts and resources 
accompanied a managerialist emphasis on “professionalism” (Boston et al., 1999; 
Chetkovich & Frumkin, 2003; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Platform Trust, 
2008).  So even through innovation continued in the community organisations, 
they became increasingly vulnerable to arbitrary decision making by DHB clinical 
and funding teams (Harrison, 2010; Peters, 2009; McMorland et al., 2008; 
Warriner, 2001). 
The re-organising of mental health services and the contracting environment 
in Aotearoa\New Zealand 
Despite managerialist assumptions of better financial management, 
greater efficiency and accountability in a contracting environment (Barnett & 
Newbury, 2002; Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996), the expected gains and cost 
reductions were never realised (Ashton et al., 2005; Cheyne et al., 2000; 
Harrison, 2010; Platform Trust, 2008; Tennant et al., 2008).  In fact there was 
evidence that service performance actually declined and commentators noted 
that despite surface changes the system eventually re-established itself into 
familiar patterns of power (Ashton et al., 2005; Barnett & Newbury, 2002; A. 
Brown , 2004; Prichard, 2005).   
Criticisms of the contracting environment included the lack of 
collaboration in strategic service development, as well as the diminishing 
independence of the NGOs in their relationships with the DHBs and the 
Government (Harrison, 2010; Warriner, 2010).  There were also concerns that 
contracting processes varied from region to region and, in some DHB regions, the 
contracting environment was actively hostile to community providers (Harrison, 
2010; Platform Trust, 2008).  This engendered a culture of compliance rather 
than collaboration in organisational relationships and reinforced the 
relationships of power between clinical services and the community sector 
(Argyle, 2005; McMorland, et al., 2008; Peters, 2009).   
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Non-government sector forums such as Platform Trust were established, 
and endeavoured to coordinate research, advocacy and lobbying efforts in order 
to provide a voice for NGOs and their role in service delivery (Harrison, 2010; 
Peters, 2010; Platform Trust, 2007, 2008).  But these had variable efficacy and a 
systematic devaluation of these groups became apparent over time (Harrison, 
2010; Larner & Craig, 2005; McMorland et al., 2008; Ministry of Social 
Development, 2001).  Nevertheless, the sector continued in their attempts to 
articulate a unique niche within the spectrum of Aotearoa\New Zealand mental 
health services.  Initiatives were supported by the Mental Health Commission, 
which noted that a well-defined, articulate community non-government sector 
was key to the growth of the mental health system in this country (Mental 
Health Commission, 2004; Warriner, 2010).   
Various innovative service models were established in some organisations 
and regions (Central Potential, 2008; Ley et al., 2010; Mead et al., 2001; Peters, 
2009).  These included intentional peer support services (Mead, 2005); peer 
support teams within NGOs (Scott et al., 2011; Repper & Carter, 2011) and peer 
run acute and respite services (Peters, 2009; Scott et al., 2011).  Collaborative 
ventures with clinical services were undertaken in Counties Manukau 
(McMorland et al., 2008; MHAC, 2008; Peters, 2010) and several exciting 
initiatives were trialled in Wellington (Peters, 2009).  Unfortunately, these 
opportunities were not possible in all areas and tended to be isolated instances 
rather than indications of systemic change (MHAC, 2008; Peters, 2010).  
Over time, devaluing the role of NGOs was accompanied by similar 
demotion of other sector stakeholders, most notably the Mental Health 
Commission.  The Commission originally comprised three commissioners, at least 
one of whom was required to be a person with lived experience of psychological 
distress (Mental Health Commission, 1998).  Dr. Julie Leibrich, Mary O’Hagan and 
Arana Pearson, all leading figures and authors in New Zealand's consumer 
movement have taken up this role over the years.  However, this requirement 
was removed in 2010, shortly before the National Government disestablished 
the Commission itself in 2012.  
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In addition, Aotearoa\New Zealand has followed global trends, driven 
largely by private health insurers in the USA, and increased the emphases on 
risk-management and evidence-based practices in services (Anthony, Rogers, & 
Farkas, 2003; Manderscheid, 2006; Thomas et al., 2005).  This has contributed to 
a fundamental tension between the recovery outcomes identified by service 
users and those of other stakeholders (Anthony et al., 2003; Bond et al., 2001; 
Duncan et al., 2005; Farkas, Gagne, Anthony, & Chamberlin, 2005; Salyers & 
Macy, 2005; Torrey, Rapp, Van Tosh, McNabb, & Ralph, 2005).   
Furthermore, the symbiotic relationship between pharmaceutical 
companies and medical prescribers, established mainly through industry-funded 
research has caused much concern, even within psychiatry (Moncrieff, 2007; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005).  Commentators have warned that commercial pressures 
and marketing strategies, rather than progress toward some new biomedical 
truth, are guiding prescribing practices.  Unfortunately, medication has remained 
a cheaper, more “efficient” treatment option, and talking-based therapies, crisis 
interventions, intensive family supports and other psychosocial programmes 
remain limited and variable in their availability throughout the country.   
Recovery outcomes valued by service users, such as therapeutic supports, 
quality of life and community connectedness, have been notoriously difficult to 
measure and attribute to specific organisational practices, making them less easy 
to monitor than so-called scientific measures (Anthony et al., 2003; Frese, 
Stanley, Kress, & Vogel-Scibilia, 2003; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Torrey et 
al., 2005).  Critics have countered that being less measureable does not 
necessarily mean less valuable; but these arguments have held little sway 
(Duncan et al., 2005; Hubble et al., 1999).  Instead, DHB requirements for 
statistical evidence have become an increasing, administrative burden for the 
NGOs and severely curtailed their endeavours to be innovative, responsive, and, 
ultimately, recovery-oriented (Kanter & Summers, 1994; Lewis, Passmore, & 
Cantore, 2005).  
Despite ostensible gains in more holistic approaches to treatment and 
support, including recovery, service users and others have continued to criticise 
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the mental health services and have begun to refer to recovery as fatally 
compromised (Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009a; Ridgeway, 2001; Wallcraft, 2009).  
Some have adopted a new discourse of “well-being” in an attempt to control the 
discourse and subjective meanings of their experience (Ganesh & McAllum, 
2010; O’Hagan, 2009; Sointu, 2005, 2006).  Mary O’Hagan (2009a) has stated 
that the discussions about replacing recovery with well-being promotion, are not 
because it is necessarily conceptually more advanced, but because she and 
others believe that recovery has been “diluted and colonised to fit a system that 
continues to be deficits based, over clinical, over controlling, and ghettoised” (p. 
20).   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have brought together the wide range of influences that 
have woven the backdrop to contemporary mental health organisations in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand.  In particular, it is very apparent that, historically, the 
treatment of madness has always been peculiarly vulnerable to political, 
ideological and socio-economic circumstances.  These have not only driven the 
discourses of mental health and illness, but have also been the shifting sands 
upon which mental healthcare organisations have struggled to establish a stable 
footing.   
Unsurprisingly, there have been inevitable tensions among the social 
control function of mental health services, therapeutic care and individual 
human rights.  Typically, these organisations have been socially and legally 
mandated to focus on the “normalisation” of difference and deviance and the 
imperative to serve the wider interests of the community has generally been 
more compelling than protection of rights of citizenship.  Despite recent global 
shifts, towards more humane and socially constructed conceptualisations of the 
meanings of extreme emotional experiences, a strong tendency to endorse the 
bio-medical model as received truth has remained, and this has determined the 
orthodoxy, and defined the discourses, of mental illness and its treatments in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand as throughout the Western world.  It has also directed 
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and dominated research, policy and strategy in the organisation of mental health 
systems for over a century.   
Over the last few decades, other social forces became persuasive in re-
orienting paradigms of care and support.  This initiated the slow devolution of 
mental health services to community settings; a process commonly referred to as 
“deinstitutionalisation”.  Gradual reforms saw the eventual closing of the large, 
psychiatric “institutions” on the presumption that “seriously mentally ill persons” 
would transition to community life with appropriate supports.  However, the 
psychiatric professions maintained their authority throughout, and their 
definition of “community” led to an overemphasis on geographical location and 
“normal” functioning as the principle features of “community care”; rather than 
disruption of the discourses or activities of biomedical psychiatry. 
The phenomenon of deinstitutionalisation, therefore, has remained 
discursively complex, as has the notion of community care.  For many mental 
health service users, in Aotearoa\New Zealand as elsewhere, a rich sense of the 
lived experience of community remained just a glimpse through the looking 
glass, mediated by economic and political circumstances and characterised by 
poverty, transience and powerlessness.  Additionally, despite the rhetoric of 
most mental health services that they exist solely to benefit a person’s 
aspirations and well-being, pragmatically, the needs, priorities and interests of 
service users have always struggled in the face of more powerful voices and 
interests. 
The last twenty years has witnessed the evolution and growth of the 
community NGOs into a loosely federated sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  This 
has occurred alongside a growth in service user advocacy groups and the 
introduction and evolution of new subject positions in the mental health sector 
generally.  In particular, the personal narratives of psychiatric survivors, and 
others with personal experience of psychological distress have gradually 
strengthened the voices, and political identities, of service users, their families, 
and allies in the development of conceptual models for organisational practice, 
service definitions and outcome evaluations.  These accounts provided 
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alternative explanatory models to better understand and share their experiences 
of madness and not only challenged traditional paradigms of diagnosis and 
treatment but led to the establishment of peer support services, primarily in the 
NGOs, and advocated for leadership roles in the transformation of mental health 
organisations towards a recovery orientation.   
Most commentators have agreed that a recovery orientation in the 
configuration of mental health service organisations would look very different 
from those that narrowly define successful outcomes as symptom control or 
functional, coping skills.  The community mental health NGOs have appeared to 
be uniquely positioned to provide innovative service models, being typically 
mandated by their trust deeds and constitutions to provide a range of social 
supports intended to facilitate their access to the resources and opportunities of 
ordinary community living.  However, despite a national policy mandate of 
recovery in the development and delivery of the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental 
health sector, this has appeared difficult to achieve in practice.  Many 
commentators believe that, while the language of recovery has been adopted in 
policy reforms and service descriptions, it has been assimilated into other 
discourses rather than becoming a powerfully constructed and effective 
alternative paradigm guiding service development, policy and practice.   
Worldwide, mental health services have demonstrated historical patterns 
of being underfunded, under-resourced, catchall services and sufferers have 
typically existed on the margins of society.  Equally, mental health policy, 
strategy and service development have not captured public interest for long and 
have been characterised by intermittent public scandals followed by brief 
periods of reform; all of which reinforces the importance of undertaking this 
current investigation into the nature and communication efficacy of the 
community NGOs in Aotearoa\New Zealand, and their capacity to realise their 
best intentions to become recovery-oriented.  
In the next chapters, therefore, I first map the theoretical terrain of 
critical approaches to the communication and organisation of mental healthcare, 
especially in Aotearoa\New Zealand although, inevitably, this draws on 
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discourses prevalent in the Western world generally.  This then provides the 
grounds for Chapter 4, which is a critical examination of the literature that 
underpins the constitution of mental health service delivery in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand, and in particular the community NGOs.   
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Chapter 3: The theoretical terrain 
Introduction  
Many scholars have been critical of positivist orthodoxy in healthcare 
(Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Harter, Japp, & Beck, 2005; Harter, Patterson, & 
Gerbensky-Kerber, 2010; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Rappaport, 1990) particularly 
as it is applied to mental health services (Jureidini, 2012; Nelson et al., 2001; 
John Read et al., 2004; Szasz, 1960, 1974).  However, most of these critiques 
have occurred outside biomedicine and psychiatry.  Therefore, in this chapter I 
proceed by first outlining the fields of scholarly interest in the organisational 
communication of mental healthcare, and the rationale for a critical approach to 
this subject that, in turn, guides the review of literature that follows.  
Fields of interest 
The fields from which this thesis draws, in addition to organisational 
communication, include medical sociology (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, 2005a, 
2005b), health communication (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Zoller & Kline, 2008), 
psychology (Duncan et al., 2004; Hubble et al., 2009; John Read, 2005) and social 
work (Rapp, 1998; Rappaport, 1987, 1990, 1995; S. Rose, 2000; S. Rose & Black, 
1985; Saleeby, 2002).  There has also been a growing body of recovery literature, 
much of it originating from people who themselves have experiences of serious 
psychological distress (Copeland, 1997; Curtis & Hodge, 1994; Deegan, 1988, 
1998; Fisher, 2000; Jacobson, 2001; Leibrich, 2000b; O’Hagan, 2004; Pearson, 
2002, among many others) 
Medical sociology has been especially concerned to scrutinise the close 
relationship between power and knowledge in healthcare (Pilgrim & Rogers, 
2005a, 2005b) as well as the societal organisation of healthcare and its 
relationship to the state and political economy (Foucault, 1963, 1970, 1972, 
1973; Oliver, 1996, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; S. Rose, 2000; Turner, 1995; 
U’Ren, 1997).  Scholars in this field have critically examined the increasing 
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medicalisation of social issues (Foucault, 1963, 1972; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; 
Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995) and the rise of medical power (Conrad & Schneider, 
1990; Frances, 2013; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; N. Rose, 1999; Samson, 1995; 
Turner, 1995), the role of medical professionals as agents of social control 
(Foucault, 1963; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005c; Scott, 2008; 
Waitzkin, 1989, among others), as well as socio-political phenomena such as 
“deinstitutionalisation” (W. Brunton, 2001; Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Fakhoury 
& Priebe, 2002, 2007; Grob, 1995; Joseph & Kearns, 1996; Sawyer, 2005). 
The field of health communication has been similarly concerned with the 
tensions among subjective experience, situated meaning formations, and the 
communicative relationships between laypersons, professionals and the public.  
These scholars are interested in how health knowledge is constructed, 
embedded and organised within generalised discourses that underpin and 
express society and social life (Babrow & Mattson, 2003; Dutta & Zoller, 2008; 
Harter et al., 2005; Lammers, Barbour, & Duggan, 2003; Zoller, 2011, 2012; Zoller 
& Dutta, 2008; Zoller & Kline, 2008). 
Complementing these approaches, critical organisation theory has further 
developed scholarly understanding of organisational phenomena with reference 
to the explicit and dynamic relationship between organisations and the societies 
to which they are inextricably linked (Deetz & Kersten, 1983; Mumby & Stohl, 
1996, 2007); through boundaries that are inevitably “permeable and in flux” 
(Mumby & Stohl, 1996, p. 65).  Critical management (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; 
Alvesson & Willmot, 1992) and organisational communication scholars (Deetz, 
1992a, 1992b; Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Ganesh, 2008, 2010; Mumby, 1988, 2008; 
Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) have examined how discourses become socially 
legitimate and powerful (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1980; Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009).  They have also been interested in how ideas, and ideologies, 
transfer across organisational boundaries (S. Brown, 2002; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Venuti, 1992, 2004; Zilber, 2002, 2006) and how these privilege some 
groups while marginalising others; constructing identities that are more or less 
powerful and valued in their social world (Alvesson, Ashcraft, & Thomas, 2008; 
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Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Honneth, 2002; Schneider 
& Remillard, 2013; Trethewey, 1997; Ward, 2009).  
Institutional theorists, too, have explored the mechanisms by which 
institutions, such as biomedicine and managerialism, persist (Barbour & 
Lammers, 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Frumkin& Galaskiewicz, 2004; 
Lammers, 2011; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2001) and change (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Fakhoury & 
Priebe, 2007; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992).  Although many of these 
studies appear to ignore critical issues of power within institutional systems 
(Mumby, 1998, 1997, 2005) and are more interested in how these maintain and 
reproduce themselves over time, nevertheless, they point the way to 
understanding more about mechanisms for institutional disruption and 
destabilisation (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Zilber, 2002, 2006). 
All of this scholarship is of value for researchers interested in social 
constructions of mental health, mental illness and related concepts such as 
recovery, community and empowerment.  For these researchers, the mechanics 
of destabilising biomedical orthodoxy and establishing alternative discourses in 
mental health systems is paramount (Duncan et al., 2004; Durie, 2009; 
Rappaport, 1995, 2002; N. Rose, 1996, 2006; S. Rose, 2000; S. Rose & Black, 
1985).  Many of these scholars represent a burgeoning group, from within the 
mental health sector, who identify as “consumers” of services, or people with 
lived experience of serious psychological distress.  They have added their 
personal accounts of mental “illness” and the treatment they received in services 
to the literature (Deegan, 1988; Fisher, 1994a, 1994b, 2000; Leibrich, 1998, 
2000a; O’Hagan, 1994, 1999; Pearson, 2004; Ridgway, 2001 among many 
others).  
These emerging scholars have had support from two important 
movements over several decades: anti-psychiatry in the 1960s (Breggin, 1993; 
Laing, 1960; Szasz, 1974; Warner, 2004) and the more recent critical, or “post”-
psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Frances, 2013; Jureidini, 2012; Mosher & 
Boyle, 2004; Rudegeair, 2003; Treacher & Baruch, 1981).  These critiques have 
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centred on the constructions of mental illness and the “unexplanations” 
(Jureidini, 2012) of psychiatry's primary classification tool the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)12 (American Psychological 
Association, 2013), as well as the relationship, or alliance, between psychiatry 
and the commercial pharmaceutical companies (Breggin, 1993; Double, 2006; 
Frances, 2013; Healy, 2002; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Moncrieff, 2008; N. Rose, 
2003; Whitaker, 2002).  
However, these potential disruptions have appeared to have little effect 
in challenging the powerful, socially legitimated institution of biomedicine, as the 
plethora of journals inviting positivist scholarship indicates (Bonney & Stickley, 
2008; Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2010; Koenig, 2000; 
Pincus et al., 1993).  For this reason I foreground a critical gaze against a 
postmodern background, in search of a polyphony of voices (Broadfoot & 
Munshi, 2007), in order to more closely examine the dynamics that underpin the 
persistence of biomedical orthodoxy in mental health services.  Below, I 
elaborate on the theoretical perspective that underpins this, and take a 
perspective on the socio-political and cultural stances towards “madness” that 
stand outside positivist scholarship, which has dominated the sense-making in 
biomedicine and psychiatry, and perpetuated inequitable and unjust social 
arrangements for people with experiences of serious psychological distress.  This 
dominance has not only been ideological, hegemonic and embedded discursively 
in systems of social control, but has been at the expense of a plurality of voices, 
and has, therefore, created barriers to the establishment of alternative 
interpretations of experience.   
The critical gaze on healthcare  
Critical scholars, among them Foucault (1970, 1972, 1973), Deetz (1992) 
and Mumby (1988), have encouraged examinations of the social, political and 
historical processes through which wider social discourses have influenced and 
                                                     
12 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is commonly referred to as the DSM  
This provides the bases for all psychiatric diagnoses in the USA, New Zealand and Australia with 
the ICD [Internationale Classification of Disorders being more commonly used in Europe. 
 73 
penetrated contemporary institutions and social systems, including medicine and 
psychiatry (U’Ren, 1997), and created asymmetrical relationships of power 
among social groups.  Unlike functionalists, who assume society to be well-
functioning, benign and unified (Grob, 1991, 1994; Oliver, 1998, 1999; Parsons, 
1975), critical scholars have regarded the barriers and problems of marginalised 
groups such as those with disabilities or “mental illness” explicitly as products of 
an unequal society (Oliver, 1998; Rappaport, 1984; N. Rose, 1998, 2006b; S. 
Rose, 1972; Turner, 1995; U’Ren, 1997).  Thus, these scholars have regarded 
society as a perpetual struggle among more or less powerful groups competing 
for finite amounts of power and resources (Alvesson et al., 2008; Borch, 2005; 
Deetz, 1992; McCashen, 2005; Mumby, 1988; Rapp, Kisthardt, Gowdy, & Hansen, 
1991; Rappaport, 1990; Zoller & Dutta, 2008).   
A central distinction between a functionalist positivist perspective and a 
critical one, is the former’s emphasis on social control and maintaining the status 
quo, which contrasts with a critical emphasis on social and organisational 
transformation that is intended to disrupt current distributions of power and 
resources (Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1980; Honneth, 2002; Oliver, 1998; N. Rose, 
1999).  Adopting a critical stance in organisational communication scholarship, 
therefore, has enabled examination of how organisational interests become 
structured, not only within organisations themselves, but also within the larger 
socio-political and cultural environment in which they are situated.   
Unlike positivism, critical scholarship has intended to reveal what is 
rhetorical, or ideological and persuasive, in health literature (Babrow & Mattson, 
2003). It has taken an overtly political approach; questioning the values of 
biomedicine and focusing on the identification of “political, economic, and 
historical factors that shape a culture’s responses to and concepts of health, 
disease, and treatment issues” (Lupton, 1994, p. 58).  Such approaches, for 
example, have treated the social impacts of mental disorder as ideological 
products of social inequity, which exclude people from society and restrict 
people's lives, as far more important than merely the symptoms of illness 
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(Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Carling, 1995; Oliver, 1998, 1999; Ware, Hopper, 
Tugenberg, Dickey, & Fisher, 2008).   
In addition, a critical approach has been vital for understanding the issues 
of both institutional persistence and institutional change.  Until recently, 
institutional theorists tended only to examine the mechanisms through which 
institutions, biomedicine and managerialism, for example, have remained stable, 
legitimate and authoritative throughout organisational fields over time (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1991).  In contrast, critical scholarship has begun to attend to 
the challenges of institutional disruption and change, as well as the mechanisms 
through which institutions endeavour to contain change and react to perceived 
threats (Caronna, 2004; Colomy, 1998; Lounsbury, 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Mumby, 2008; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  These 
perspectives have addressed the struggles for voice of individuals, groups and 
organisations systemically disempowered by institutional logics; as well as the 
issues involved in attempting to introduce and establish credible, alternative 
rationalities and worldviews in both discourse and practice (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Mumby, 1998, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2005). 
Both critical and postmodern approaches have been important 
foundations for this thesis (Deetz & Kersten, 1983; Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Ganesh, 
2008).  Mental healthcare has, historically, been peculiarly vulnerable to socio-
political shifts and both these forms of inquiry have drawn attention to the 
blurred boundaries between organisations, wider societal norms and public 
dialogues (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) while providing platforms from which to 
challenge socially privileged interests and the distribution of power within social 
systems (Lord & Dufort, 1996; Lord et al., 2004; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; 
Rappaport, 1995, 2002).  In addition, postmodern scholars have challenged the 
certainties of earlier eras; rejecting the idea that any group, or methodological 
approach, had a universal claim to “truth” (Foucault, 1970, 1972; Pilgrim & 
Rogers, 1999).   
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Critical scholarship and the postmodern turn: Making sense of power, 
inequity and social justice 
Both critical and postmodern scholarship assume society, culture and 
organisations to be inextricably and reciprocally bound (Foucault, 1963, 1973; 
Warriner, 2010); underpinned by interacting sets of discourses and ideas that 
form the distinctive perspectives of social groups (Waitzkin, 1991).  These 
scholars have explored the tensions between the “common sense” of the social 
world and the cultural and historical contexts that influence the establishment 
and maintenance of social orders and institutions such as healthcare, 
biomedicine and psychiatry (Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1973; Oliver, 1996, 1999; N. 
Rose 1998; N. Rose et al., 2006; Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995; U’Ren, 1997).  For 
example, in Madness and Civilisation, Foucault (1973) was concerned to 
challenge the perspective of scientific reason about madness, which treated it as 
a constant, negative, objective fact.  Instead, he and others claimed that 
specialised discourses such as biomedicine and psychiatry do not refer to “real” 
entities such as madness or mental illness; but, rather, that these concepts are 
socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Foucault, 1973; Jureidini, 2012; 
Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011; Morrison, 2006; O’Hagan, 1994; John Read, 
2004; N. Rose et al., 2006; Szasz, 1974). 
Critical scholars, especially, have been interested in how culturally 
embedded ideologies, defined as a coherent set of shared social beliefs, have 
functioned to create social reality (S. Rose, 2000), concealing social 
contradictions, sustaining privileged interests and naturalising these in the 
“interests of all” (Alvesson et al., 2008; McNay, 1992; Mumby, 1988).  These 
perspectives have been particularly useful in the field of health communication 
(Dutta, 2008).  Critical studies of media, for example, have illustrated how 
ideologies of health and illness produce social knowledge that reflects dominant 
constructions and legitimise power relationships (Lupton, 1994), and also 
highlighted how media and communication strategies may resist or alter those 
power relationships (Ackroyd & Wyllie, 2002; Cutcliffe & Hannigan, 2001; Kline, 
2006; Mental Health Commission, 1997; Nairn, Coverdale, S., & Coverdale, J., 
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2011; Philo, 1996; Seale, 2004; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).  Together, critical and 
postmodern scholarship has been influential in turning away from reductionist 
constructions of health and illness to understanding the social production of 
knowledge and the distribution of social power (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Pilgrim & 
Bentall, 1999; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1994, 1999; Zoller & Kline, 2008). 
Postmodernists have shared with critical scholars a focus on the dynamics 
of power, the former being more concerned with dialectical tensions, specifically 
the mechanisms with which truth and power are intertwined and articulated.  
These scholars posit multiple, situated perspectives and “realities”, constructed 
through language and communication by groups engaged in struggles for control 
of the discourses within organisations and societies (Foucault, 1970, 1972; 
Ganesh, 2008).  They assert that all “truths” mask, and/or serve, particular 
interests, and that the truths produced within a society have a normalising and 
regulatory function (Alvesson et al., 2008).  Alongside critical theorists, 
postmodern scholars acknowledge that inequity is embedded in knowledge 
claims and are characteristic of the power of any group to determine meaning 
(Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, & Ganesh, 2004).  
The postmodern turn positioned societies as fragmented and complex 
social structures in which discourses of social difference, such as gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality and disability, are apparent (Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; 
Ashforth & Mael, 2004, Oliver, 1998; Durie, 1999, 2001).  These wider discourses 
have enabled scholars to explore how people and communities represent their 
experiences and how they develop social identities in relation to socially 
dominant or marginalised meaning systems (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Ganesh, 
2008).  Their efforts have meant that postmodern sensibilities have been able to 
infiltrate, previously mainstream, critical concepts such as ideology, hegemony, 
praxis and the potential for social transformation (Deetz & Mumby, 1990; 
Mumby, 1988) which, in turn, has implications for exposing the ideological 
foundations of health discourses and undermining “normal” or legitimate ways 
of organising healthcare (Conrad & McIntush, 2003; Kendrick, 1997; Mumby, 
1987, 1988; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000).   
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Ideology and hegemony: Systems of control 
In contemporary capitalist societies, managerial and professional 
perspectives, embedded in similarly functionalist and positivist medical and 
business schools, have assumed taken-for-granted status and become 
hegemonic (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999; Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001).  Hegemonies serve to 
naturalise the asymmetry inherent in relationships and distributions of power.  
They create powerful elites and establish cultures that instil ideological practices 
and systems of belief (De Cock, 1998; Gramsci, 1971; Mumby, 1997).  The 
concept of hegemony describes processes by which people “participate actively 
in the construction of the discursive systems and structures of their own 
subordination” (Mumby, 2005, p. 358).  In particular, the biomedical model, 
positioned as authoritative, has naturalised the way healthcare, including mental 
healthcare is structured (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 
2010; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).   
A major concern for scholars has been the hegemonic equation of “taken 
for granted” common sense with acquiescence to dominant socio-cultural norms 
that limit people’s awareness of inequity and foster a sense of stability and 
inevitability without challenging, or changing, the material or structural 
circumstances of the social order (Alinsky, 1991; Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Freire, 
1970; Gramsci, 1971).  Under these conditions, subjugated groups frequently 
perceive their inferior status as natural and inevitable (Jermier, 1998; Mumby, 
1988, 1997; U’Ren, 1997); meaning that wise resignation or “rational 
submission” (Comte, 1856) has been the naturalised response to structural and 
systemic inequity in society (Jermier, 1998).   
Foucault (1970, 1972, 1973) was especially concerned with the 
naturalised rationality, or scientific reason, of the psychiatric perspective, the 
role of professional power and “governmentality” (N. Rose, 1998) in constituting, 
classifying and regulating madness in society. He argued that these enabled 
social controls to be established unobtrusively, without overt use of coercion or 
conflict (Jermier, 1998).  In addition, and historically, bureaucratic organisational 
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forms became social tools that centralised and legitimised power and control 
over the many, by a privileged few, while simultaneously disguising that 
centralisation (Jermier, 1998; Perrow, 1986).  This was significant because overt 
exercises of power tended to sit uneasily alongside ideologies of democratic 
governance and a free market that promoted basic capitalist values of individual 
freedoms, economic growth and the accumulation of wealth and its privileges 
(Jermier, 1998; Perrow, 1986).  This has had important implications, over time, 
for the organising of Western mental health systems, which have been especially 
vulnerable to bureaucratic and institutional administrative power (Foucault, 
1963, 1976; Johns, 2010; Lammers et al., 2003; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; U’Ren, 
1998).  
Anchoring these systems of control have been the language and meaning 
systems in which knowledge, concepts and beliefs have been conceived and 
communicated.  The linguistic turn in social scholarship (Alvesson & Karreman, 
2000; Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972; Mumby, 1988; 
Mumby & Stohl, 1991; Reed, 1998) has similarly acknowledged the role of 
language in the management of knowledge claims; how these come to be 
naturalised and, in turn, have demarcated the boundaries between privileged 
and marginalised groups such as medical professionals and “mental patients” 
(Fee, 1999; Nairn, 1999; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; Waitzkin, 1989, 1991; Weeks, 
1996). 
Language, communication and discourse: The constructions of “madness” 
Discourses are inherent aspects of sociocultural practices: embedded in 
their contexts, culturally conditioned and socially constitutive (Fairclough, 1997; 
Cheney et al., 2004).  Critical and postmodern scholars have maintained that 
systemically embedded practices of language, that are validated by a particular 
community or discourse do not merely identify objects, but actively constitute 
and legitimate the objects of which they speak (Foucault, 1972: De Cock, 1998).  
However, not only have these constructive processes been obscured and 
naturalised within social groups, organisations, communities and societies 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Foucault, 1972; Gergen, 2001), but discourse has 
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become real to the extent that it “participates in the development, enactment 
and reproduction of material practices” (Holmer-Nadesan, 1996, p. 52).   
Foucault (1972, 1980), in particular, focussed on how the legitimacy of 
knowledge has been constituted for a particular group or society; where the 
discourses that have created meaning systems and shaped social realities have 
excluded other perspectives as ir-rational, un-natural and alternative to the 
dominant orthodoxy (Fairclough, 1992, 1993; Fee, 1999; Foucault, 1972, 1980).  
Thus, social legitimacy, enclosed in discourse, has deflected, or excluded, other 
paradigmatic perspectives by being effectively blind to concepts outside the 
boundaries of the dominant worldview (Deetz, 1992; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).   
Such normalised discourses have enabled the power inherent in 
legitimating institutions, such as the medical profession, to persist by defining 
the language and practices that allow professional and powerful groups to 
advance particular arguments and knowledge claims.  For example, Foucault 
(1963, 1973) contended that the separation of reason and unreason became 
complete through psychiatric language that defined its own terms, categories 
and identities e.g. the patient identity that diminished personhood and 
contrasted the professional, expert identity (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Grob, 
2004; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Saleeby, 2001).  He described 
a scientific “monologue of reason about madness” (Bracken & Thomas, 2005, p. 
2) that reconstructed subjective experiences as social failure and then subjected 
them to reasoned care and treatment.  Unfortunately, such reasonable practices 
systematically depersonalised, stigmatised and diminished a person’s sense of 
valued identity and personal power (Anthony, 1993; O’Hagan, 1994).  This has 
meant that the routine use of the DSM in orthodox biopsychiatry, despite being 
severely criticised as seriously flawed and lacking in construct validity (Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992, 1994; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Duncan et al., 2004), has remained 
authoritative in orienting the discourses about mental “illnesses” and their 
treatments (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Grob, 2004; Jureidini, 2012; John Read et 
al., 2004; Saleeby, 2001).  
 80 
However, discursive fields (Foucault, 1972), including psychiatry, 
inevitably contain a number of competing discourses and subject positions to 
give meaning to, and organise, social institutions and processes.  Although no 
single discourse exhausts the meaning of concepts and practices, discourses 
often act in conjunction.  Biomedical and legal discourses, for example, construct 
madness from distinct perspectives, yet they share regularities, or sets of rules, 
that reinforce each institution and their relationships with each other.  Similarly, 
the discourses of patriarchy and capitalism, science and capitalism (Ganesh, 
2005; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996) and biomedicine and capitalism (Frances, 2013; 
Healy, 2002; Mosher, 2004; U’Ren, 1997) have also reinforced each other 
through shared paradigmatic and ideological bases such as individualism, 
functionalist rationality and notions of expertise (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007; 
Cooren 2004; Foucault, 1973, 1980; Oliver, 1998; U’Ren, 1997).   
Critical communicative approaches have exposed on-going struggles 
between multiple interest groups for the power to define, construct and 
challenge organisational realities such as organisational identity, values and the 
nature of organisational outcomes (Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Fairhurst & Putnam, 
2004; Mumby, 2008).  Drawing from Foucault (1970, 1972), other researchers 
have been interested in how institutionally powerful groups accumulated and 
safeguarded their interests.  They conclude, for example, that the capacity to 
define the terms of a discourse also determined who might legitimately 
participate, whose voices were heard, or ignored while simultaneously 
controlling access to specialised knowledge and information (Cheney et al., 2004; 
Deetz, 1992; Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  Social order, therefore, is determined 
by the groups that prevail in the discursive struggle.   
So saying, discursive fields also offered alternative modes of subjectivity 
(Weedon, 1987) and thereby created sites of potential resistance (Mumby, 2005) 
and new spaces for social action and change (Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Trethewey, 
1997).  Critical and postmodern scholarship, therefore, has challenged elite 
definitions of social issues and engaged in struggles for legitimate representation 
of the exploited and oppressed (Freire, 1970; Horkheimer, 1972).  Critical and 
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postmodern scholars have also sought to privilege the voices and perspectives of 
marginalised groups (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Horkheimer, 1972) in order to allow 
these groups to define their own experience and create legitimate, subjective 
identities (Chamberlin, 1988; Gillespie, 2001; Morrison, 2006).  Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999), for example, contended that a critical lens addresses "the 
removal of workers from the academic gaze” (p. 161) and counters the 
managerial perspectives dominant in organisational studies and business schools 
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Babrow & Mattson, 2003; Hwang & Powell, 2009; 
Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001).  By working 
to disrupt dominant, closed systems of meaning these scholars have sought to 
provide possibilities for social action and organisational transformation (Dutta & 
Zoller, 2008).   
Imagining alternative ways of organising and investigating possibilities for 
transformation  
Critical and postmodern scholarship in healthcare has moved beyond 
critiques of social relations (Waitzkin 1991) with the intention of uniting theory 
with social change (Alvesson et al., 2008).  As Dennis Mumby (1988) has argued, 
“Critical theory is far less interested in predicting the future than in making it” (p. 
104).  It has also been important not merely to address isolated instances of 
inequity but to recognise, challenge and ultimately break mutually reinforcing 
systems of social injustice (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a; Horkheimer, 1972; 
Jermier, 1998).  New, or alternative, discourses, such as recovery have offered 
sites where hegemonic practices can be contested, challenged and resisted 
(Freire, 1970; O’Hagan, 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 2008; Ramon, 
Healy, & Renouf, 2007).   
However, inevitably, emerging perspectives engage with, and are 
constructed with reference to, the social contexts and dominant discourses that 
already exist.  This has meant that being framed as alternative has generally 
been accompanied by a corresponding lack of credibility, legitimacy and power 
to effect change.  Social change efforts for marginalised groups within 
hegemonic social systems, therefore, have been especially fraught.  In the 
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mental health field, disrupting the social legitimacy of the biomedical paradigm 
has been especially problematic because discourses of madness have, 
historically, been more socio-culturally and ideo-politically constructed than 
physical disability or illness (Barker, 2003; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2010; 
O’Hagan, 2004, 2009; S. Rose, 2000; Wallcraft, 2009).  The first issue has been 
the relative invisibility of the mechanisms by which hegemonies are sustained.  It 
has been difficult for marginalised groups even to envisage social change let 
alone imagining how to effect it (Freire, 1970).   
The second issue, for advocates of social change, has been the difficulty 
in finding allies who are not compromised, or challenged, by that prospective 
change.  For example, delivering “quality” mental health care as a social service 
has inevitably confronted the commercial imperative to purchase the cheapest 
goods and services (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988, 1995; Eisenberg, 1984; Zorn et 
al., 2011, and others).  Similarly societal mistrust of difference has routinely 
overridden the human rights of users of mental health services; while their 
subjective expertise has been undermined by hegemonic and hierarchical 
systems of medical power and professional expertise (Anspach, 1979; Cresswell, 
2009; Everett, 1994; Morrison, 2006; Oliver, 1998; Tilly, 1996).  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, critical and postmodern scholarship has particular 
significance for all fields of health and mental healthcare where a positivist, 
biomedical model is dominant (Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-
Pavlovic, 2010; Pilgrim, 2007; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2003; John Read, 2005).  For 
marginalised groups, such as the “mentally ill”, who have typically been both 
voiceless and powerless about their experiences and the terms of their 
“containment” in mental health services, critical and postmodern approaches 
have provided critiques of the status quo alongside a desire for action and social 
transformation.   
These critical and postmodern perspectives provide a rationale for 
utilising the framework of problematics for organisational communication 
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research developed by Mumby and Stohl (1996, 2007).  The framework 
structures the critical review of the literature that follows, which addresses the 
issues from which my research questions arise.  In the next chapter, therefore, I 
utilise this framework to critically examine the wide range of external influences, 
social norms and dominant rationalities that have impacted on the evolution of 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health organisations.  I also use the literature to 
analyse some tensions and challenges that community organisations face in 
endeavouring to adopt a recovery orientation in their organisational practices 
within the context of powerful institutional discourses such as biomedicine and 
managerialism.   
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Chapter 4: Literature review  
Introduction 
The previous chapters established three warrants for this review of the 
literature.  First, over the last sixty years mental health systems and 
organisations have been undergoing significant reform internationally.  The 
progress of this reform has been influenced, and sometimes constrained, by a 
complex inter-relationship of contributory factors, all of which have impacted on 
the everyday practices and organisational realities of the community 
organisations.  These factors have included the introduction of a recovery 
philosophy that has worked in conjunction with growing civil rights movements; 
but remained in tension with biomedical psychiatry and managerialist intrusions 
into healthcare (Adame, 2006; Anspach, 1979; Cresswell, 2009; Everett, 1994; 
Morrill, Zald, & Rao, 2003; Morrison, 2006).  This creates the foundation for my 
first research question, which asks: In what ways are discourses of recovery 
constructed, negotiated and resisted in everyday practice within non-
government community mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand? 
Second, constructions of mental illness and its treatments have largely 
been institutionalised by biomedicine and naturalised by the hegemonic status of 
the “scientific method” in Western societies.  Within this framework, the lived 
experience of people diagnosed with mental illness, and their own sense-making, 
has been systematically devalued and dismissed (Deegan, 1988; Leibrich, 1998; 
O’Hagan, 1994; John Read et al., 2004).  However, alternative explanatory 
models, treatment responses and strategies for recovery have begun to be 
elaborated; grounded in the narrative accounts of people with lived experience 
of psychological distress (Jacobson & Greenley, 2001; Leibrich, 2000; O’Hagan, 
1998, 2004; Ridgeway, 2001).  From this context, I address my second research 
question: How are institutional dynamics working to construct, constrain or 
contradict organisational practices in terms of becoming recovery-oriented? 
Third, a philosophy of recovery, introduced as formal policy in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services over a decade ago, has 
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represented ways of constructing the subjective, human experience of serious 
psychological distress that have directly challenged the prevailing orthodoxy of 
biomedicine and the reification of mental illnesses.  However, it is by no means 
certain that this discourse has effectively disrupted the institutional structures 
and practices of biomedicine and managerialism in the organisation of mental 
health care in this country.  Therefore, my third research question asks: In what 
ways are institutional dynamics being problematised and challenged within the 
community NGOs and to what effect? 
Given these questions, this review explores literature that has 
documented and underpinned the discourses of mental health, mental illness 
and recovery in contemporary Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health 
organisations.  In doing so, it considers the contexts and socio-political 
circumstances in which recovery has been constructed, negotiated and resisted 
within the mental health sector, and which have shaped organisational practices 
and communications, particularly in the community NGOs.  The approach sets 
the stage for detailed discussion of studies in communication, health and 
organising, which inform an analysis of what constitutes effective organisational 
practices within the community mental health sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  
Similarly, examination of this literature underpins the stated objective of this 
thesis (p. 5); in other words, the ways that these organisations are fulfilling 
expectations of becoming recovery-oriented.   
I structure this discussion in terms of the four problematics for critical 
organisation communication scholarship outlined by Mumby and Stohl (1996, 
2007): (1) The problematic of rationality, (2) the problematic for organising and 
society, (3) the problematic of organising, and (4) the problematic of voice.  This 
framework enables me to consolidate various critiques of institutional, and 
other, rationalities and discourses that have influenced contemporary 
organisation of the mental health sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  In doing so, I 
further highlight the significance of my research questions and rationalise the 
design and methodology of the project. 
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The first problematic of rationality is critically concerned with what seems 
reasonable within the paradigmatic, social and historical circumstances from 
which it arises.  In other words, what may be logically coherent in a social system 
is necessarily inextricable from the discourses and practices that have shaped 
that social reality and will inevitably be self-referential (Broadfoot & Munshi, 
2007a; Knights & Morgan, 1991; Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  The second 
problematic is concerned explicitly with the relationship been organisations and 
societies.  In particular it focuses on the social, political and ideological 
production of knowledge and how this influences organisational forms, 
discourses and practices.  The third problematic attends directly to the 
configuration of the mental health sector and the ways that institutional features 
influence the communication of discourses and ideas across organisational 
boundaries that in turn govern everyday organisational practices.  The 
problematic of voice in critical and postmodern scholarship has been focussed on 
who speaks and who is listened to within organisational and social systems.  This 
raises issues of identity, marginalisation and naturalised rules about who can 
legitimately construct organisational and social knowledge.  
The problematic of rationality in mental health and psychiatry   
Foucault (1973) observed that a scientific discourse, like any other, is a 
community practice (Calsamiglia, 2003).  In other words, scientific rationality is 
no more than a set of metaphors and narrative conventions around which ideas 
of reality and truth are contrived.  These, then, guide the interpretation of 
experience towards particular outcomes.  Therefore, in this section, I explicitly 
examine the problematic of rationality (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007; Mumby & 
Stohl, 1996, 2007) in Western mental health systems, and specifically the nature, 
power and reach of the rationalities that underpin both biomedical and recovery 
discourses, as these are applied in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health 
organisations.  First, I outline the key principles of the positivist or reductionist 
scientific method and the effect this has on the legitimacy of knowledge and the 
nature of evidence.  I then examine the implications this rationality has for the 
development of treatments and the ways that outcomes are defined and 
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measured in Western mental health systems.  I then critique these ways of 
thinking and knowing about the world with respect to alternative explanatory 
models, specifically recovery, and the significance of these tensions for people 
with lived experience of serious  psychological distress.  I conclude with a 
discussion of what people themselves say are effective supports and the 
limitations of technological solutions.  
The rationality of Western science and the scientific effect   
In the Background chapter, I discussed the influence of positivism on the 
growth of medical knowledge in Western mental health systems.  Here I 
investigate how that has paralleled the increasing dominance of a scientific 
rationality as the authoritative source of legitimate knowledge in Western 
societies at large (Alderson, 1998; Canguilhem et al., 1989; Foucault, 1970; 
Thomas et al., 2005).  In particular, the techno-scientific framework has 
purported to render human consciousness and behaviour understandable 
through a scientific vocabulary and world-view that accounts for the world “as it 
really is” (Bracken, & Thomas, 1999, 2001).   
Increasingly, therefore, human experience has come to be regarded as 
the rightful concern of psychological experts and scientific psychiatry, and human 
agency has been reduced to mere compliance with expert direction (Bracken & 
Thomas, 1999; Oliver, 1998).  Psychiatry's promise to control madness through 
medical science, therefore, has resonated with social acceptance of “scientific” 
explanatory models to the extent that academic psychiatrists Patrick Bracken 
and Philip Thomas have commented that “it is now almost heretical to question 
this paradigm” (Bracken & Thomas, 2001, p. 725).   
The rationality of the scientific method is construed as a series of 
principles that constitute, reflect and express reality as stable pre-existing 
patterns logically connected to general laws.  Naturalisation of this rationality 
has valorised objectivity, prediction and control over subjective meaning and 
experience (Bracken & Thomas, 1999) and infused the social imagination with a 
type of scientific determinism that has conditioned people to the inevitability of 
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techno-scientific advance as the “natural” order of human progress (Postman, 
1993; N. Rose & Miller, 2008; Swingewood, 2000).  Knowledge generated by this 
epistemology is assumed to evolve as more and more of this reality is 
“discovered” by scientific observation and measurement (Knights & Morgan, 
1991; Mumby & Stohl, 1991).  However, the credibility of a techno-scientific 
paradigm in the realm of human activity ultimately depends on its “adequacy in 
describing experience; its ability to explain experience, and its potential to 
transform experience” (Oliver, 1998, p. 163).   
In adopting a techno-scientific biomedical model, psychiatrists exchanged 
subjective, social and experiential understandings of human distress with the 
assumptions of Cartesian dualism and a Newtonian metaphor of the body as 
machine (W. Brunton, 2001; Nettleton, 1995).  They embarked, therefore, on a 
quest for the identification and measurement of supposedly “universal” 
symptoms or behaviours.  They assumed that using statistical models and 
epidemiological populations would eventually, and inevitably, lead to general 
laws and “absolute truths” about the causes, diagnoses and prognoses of mental 
illnesses (Canguilhem et al., 1989; Foucault, 1963, 1970; Guze, 1989; Kuhn, 1970; 
Nelson et al., 1987; Thomas et al., 2005).  The production of these “truths”, 
including the recent surge to evidence-based practices in medicine and 
psychiatry (Jacobson & Greenley, 2001; Oliver, 1998), has so thoroughly 
pervaded Western cultures that claims of “clinically proven” and “scientifically 
tested” have been used to promote everything from toothpaste to shoe design. 
Intriguingly, psychiatry has never really existed comfortably within a 
generic scientific model and despite adherence to a positivist rationality, many 
bio-psychiatric hypotheses and treatments have been subsequently discredited; 
as well as many practices that would be considered repellent in contemporary 
societies (Bracken & Thomas, 1999, 2001; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Moncrieff & 
Crawford, 2001; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2009; Samson, 1995; Szasz, 1960).  Perhaps 
the most substantial consequence of the biomedical model in psychiatry has 
been the reification of mental illnesses, and its major accomplishment the 
diagnostic classification system DSM; in which clusters of observable symptoms 
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have been arranged into pre-determined categories from which diagnosis is 
made and “appropriate” physical treatment prescribed (Aldhous, 2009; American 
Psychological Association, 2013; Frances, 2013; Kendell & Zablansky, 2003; Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992, 1994).   However, as Thomas Szasz (1960) noted, there is a 
significant conceptual distinction between a disease of the mind and a disease of 
the brain (Szasz, 1960).  He famously described psychiatric diagnosis as a “covert 
comparison of a person's own ideas, concepts, or beliefs with those of the 
observer and the society in which they live” p. 114).  This suggests that scientific 
psychiatry, far from having legitimate claims to privileged truths where new 
discoveries are built on previous theory, has been as a much a product of its 
socio-normative, political and cultural environment as it is of empirical rationality 
(Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a; Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).   
Scientific conventions have provided psychiatric orthodoxy with its 
language, vocabulary and self-referential systems of academic scholarship (van 
Dijk, 1993, 2001).  Alternative perspectives, unfortunately, appear to have done 
little to challenge the predominant biological paradigm (Moncrieff & Crawford, 
2001).  Moncrieff and Crawford (2001), in their comprehensive review of the 
British Journal of Psychiatry throughout the 20th century, concluded that there 
have been no major shifts in the explanatory paradigms utilised by psychiatry, 
and the emphasis on biological psychiatry, in fact, is a continuation of a long-
standing inclination.  They maintained that the disproportionate attention paid 
to clinical neuroscience has meant a paucity of academic scholarship that deals 
with the human aspects of therapeutic encounters in the field of mental health 
(Bracken & Thomas, 1998).  Their review supported earlier findings (Grob, 1983; 
Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001; Pincus et al., 1993; Scull, 1979).   
However, unlike physical medicine, psychiatric symptoms do not have 
determinate signs (Jureidini, 2012; John Read et al., 2004) and rely on 
interpretations of the boundaries between “normal” and ab-normal human 
functioning; they do not specify unique disorders or disease.  Szasz (1960), and 
those that followed him, argued that treating “complex psychosocial behaviour, 
consisting of communications about ourselves and the world about us, as mere 
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symptoms” (p. 114) was an epistemological flaw; not merely an error in 
observation or reasoning, but a fault in how knowledge is framed, organised and 
expressed (Szasz, 1960, 1974; Foucault, 1963, 1973; Pilgrim, 2007; Read et al., 
2004).   
In addition, the naturalised positioning of biomedicine as a higher order 
of discourse (Foucault, 1970, 1972) created discursive closure around other, 
“lower order” kinds of evidence such as subjective experience (Deetz, 1992; 
Foucault, 1970, 1972).  This made it easier to reference notions of scientific 
scrutiny and demonstrated effectiveness without further clarification or 
explanation (Torrey et al., 2005).  This chain of linguistic reasoning has also 
enabled clinical professionals to normalise symptom control as the only valid 
measure of treatment outcome.  In the next section, I extend this discussion of 
scientific rationality to frame recent concerns about the emphasis on evidence-
based practices that has grown alongside technological advances in all areas of 
medicine, including psychiatry (Anthony, 2003; Anthony et al., 2003; Salyers & 
Macy, 2005; Torrey et al., 2005).   
Evidence based practice: The nature of evidence, treatment and outcomes 
Evidence based practice has been optimistically defined as “the 
integration of best researched evidence and clinical expertise with patient 
values” (Institute of Medicine, 2001, p. 147).  However, many scholars have 
warned that simply measuring that which readily lends itself to measurement, 
has grossly oversimplified the extremely complex nature of psychological distress 
and therapeutic responses (Bracken & Thomas, 1999, 2001; Greenhalgh, 1999; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 2009; John Read et al., 2004).  Other commentators have 
protested the application of statistical and population based modelling to 
experiences that are ultimately subjective, such as therapeutic relationships and 
psychosocial interventions (Bracken & Thomas, 1998; Duncan et al., 2004; 
Hubble et al., 1999).  In addition, narrow, quantitative definitions of what 
constitutes valid evidence have tended to support treatments in medicine and 
psychiatry that have been research funded and subjected to random controlled 
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trials (RCTs) (Bracken & Thomas, 1998, 2001; Duncan et al., 2004; Torrey et al., 
2005).   
However, as Mark Hubble and his colleagues (1999) warned, more than 
50 years of “increasingly sophisticated outcomes research” (Hubble et al., 1999, 
p. 435) has produced little empirical support for the efficacy of psychiatric 
diagnoses in determining appropriate treatment regimens.  Nor has it 
demonstrated the superiority of medications over other forms of treatment 
(Hubble et al., 1999; N. Rose, 2003).  In addition, many scholars have questioned 
the validity and the ethical, as well as ideological, bases for commissioning of 
some of these studies; including the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical 
giants (Chalmers, 2001; Duncan et al., 2004; Frances, 2013; Healy, 2002; Kutchins 
& Kirk, 1997; Moncrieff, 2007, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the narrow focus of the evidence-based approach has 
generated a body of knowledge that has excluded the wider social and subjective 
factors that influence a person’s individual experience of treatment responses.  
Scholars have noted that, as evidence-based practices (EBP) have been 
developed, described and replicated (Torrey et al., 2005), important 
philosophical elements and the values of a practice, as well as the person’s own 
explanatory system, have been routinely omitted.  These elements have been 
dismissed because they are not empirically linked to traditional outcomes such 
as reduced symptomology, reduced hospitalisation, or improved employment 
rates (Drake et al., 2001).  However, critics have argued that EBP has focussed on 
particular treatments as if they are isolated from the most powerful factors that 
contribute to change, i.e. the person’s own resources, perceptions and 
participation (Anthony, 2003; Duncan et al., 2004; Salyers & Macy, 2005).  Others 
have gone as far as to assert that “evidence based practice is the empirically 
bankrupt notion that for a particular problem, there is a specific treatment that is 
best” (Duncan et al., 2004, p. 38).   
Current evidence based research has, therefore, not acknowledged or 
been engaged with the rich and insightful learning that can be gleaned from 
qualitative and subjective approaches (Anthony et al., 2003).  Typically, it has 
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been conceived without reference to the experience of people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress, or the emergence of the recovery 
concept (Anthony et al., 2003).  Consequently, there have been few 
conscientious attempts to explicate how recovery values might be translated into 
specific service dimensions (Farkas et al., 2005).   
Furthermore, “scientific” evidence-based research does not capture the 
subjective, interpersonal and environmental factors that significantly affect a 
person’s experience of treatment, services and the process of their recovery 
(Anthony, 2001; Anthony et al., 2003; Farkas et al., 2005).  This has led Anthony 
(1993), among others, to claim that: 
Recovery as a concept is by no means fully understood.  
Much research, both qualitative and quantitative, still needs 
to be done.  Paramount to the recovery concept were the 
attempts to understand the experience of recovery from 
mental illness from those who are experiencing it 
themselves.  Qualitative research would seem particularly 
important in this regard (p. 533).  
Similarly, critics have suggested that evidence-based research has 
contributed little to understanding recovery outcomes, identified by people with 
lived experience of psychological distress, as being meaningful or useful in their 
lives (Chadwick, 2002; Farkas et al., 2005; Frese et al., 2001; Salyers & Macy, 
2005).  Although most clinical practitioners would acknowledge that 
interventions, indicative of recovery for one person, may be different for another 
(Deegan, 1988; Spaniol, Koehler, & Hutchinson, 1994), commentators have 
criticised the claims of the DSM to precisely define disorders that have 
encouraged clinicians to mandate the treatments people receive and the level to 
which these are funded (Double, 2002; Carson, 1997; Chalmers, 2001; Hubble et 
al., 1999; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, 1994).   
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Effective treatment and the limitations of technical solutions  
Measurement of psychological distress, as well as treatment efficacy, has 
been problematic because of the ill-defined but universal assumption of a 
baseline “normal” to which all aspects of human psychology, emotional states 
and behaviour can supposedly be referred (Canguilhem et al., 1989; Duncan et 
al., 2004; Hubble et al., 1999; Kirk & Kutchins, 1994b; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; 
Zoller & Kline, 2008).  Critics have claimed that the underlying functionalist 
ideology of biomedicine, in valorising efficiency and conformity, has produced a 
professional imperative to maintain the “normal” functioning of individuals and 
society (Canguilhem et al., 1989; Foucault, 1973; Oliver, 1999; Wolfensberger, 
1980).  In addition, commentators have noted that limiting treatment responses 
to purely scientific measurement has inevitably excluded a range of healing 
experiences from examination and research.  This has resulted in a tautological 
situation whereby therapies not “proved” successful have consequently not been 
funded (Leibrich, 1998; O’Hagan, 2001).   
The pursuit of targeted, physical treatments that correspond with 
increasing specificity to the systematic classification of mental disorders (Bracken 
& Thomas, 2001; Jureidini, 2012; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997) 
has generated a long and horrific history of treatments that have included 
various forms of physical restraint, systemic shocks including electro-convulsive 
therapy, psycho surgery (e.g. lobotomy) and, of course, a variety of psycho-active 
chemicals or medications (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Grob, 2004; Melling, 1999; 
Porter, 1991; Pearson, 2000; Samson, 1995; Scull, 1979).  Increasingly, critics 
have voiced scepticism about medications being advanced as “magic bullets” 
(Frances, 2013; Kamens, 2011; Kirk & Kutchins, 1994b; Spitzer, 1999), and more 
than one psychiatrist has commented that “if we are seen as mere pill pushers 
and employees of the pharmaceutical industry, our credibility as a profession is 
compromised” (John Read, 2005, p. 3).   
Considerable unease about the commercial interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry has been accompanied by criticisms, from within 
psychiatry, that neuroleptic medications do little more than control behaviour by 
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suppressing responsivity and levelling mood (Chalmers, 2001; Frances, 2013; 
Moncrieff, 2007, 2008).  Scholars who have undertaken research with broader 
parameters have seriously questioned these purely techno-scientific responses.  
For example, Mark Hubble and his colleagues (1999) found that the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship, irrespective of treatment modality, was the most 
predictive of beneficial outcomes.  Similarly, psychiatrist Jon Jureidini declared 
that “if the benefits of the therapeutic relationship between prescriber and 
patient are ignored, most drugs do little more than take the edge off suffering” 
(Jureidini, 2012, p. 190).  He argued that this was equivalent to saying that an 
anaesthetic could cure a broken leg.  
Clinical outcomes, characterised by symptom reduction and behaviour 
control, have therefore been in tension with outcome measures that are 
subjectively meaningful to people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress (Anthony, 1993; Banks et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2007; Deegan, 1988; 
Lapsley, 2004; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Lehman, 2000; Mental Health 
Commission, 2011b; Onken et al., 2000).  Academic psychiatrists Pat Bracken and 
Philip Thomas (1999) have argued that many professionals have failed to engage 
with mental health service users as “full human beings who have lives as well as 
symptoms” (p. 11).   
Other critical and postmodern scholars have maintained that the 
scientific stance has produced impoverished notions of human knowledge, 
community and the possibilities for social transformation (Mumby, 1988; 
Habermas, 1987).  These scholars have warned against privileging technical 
forms of rationality over practical and emancipatory reality (Broadfoot & Munshi, 
2007a; Mumby, 2008); instead, they have championed multiple ways of coming 
to “know” that are dynamic, situated and contextualised (Bracken & Thomas, 
2005; Eisenberg, Murphy, Sutcliffe, Wears, Schenkel, 2005; Fee, 1999; Ganesh, 
2008).   
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Alternative explanatory models and the nature of outcomes  
Foucault (1973), in examining the social conditions that made the field of 
psychiatry possible, concluded that the great confinement of the mad was 
neither the necessary nor inevitable consequence of the growth of “truth” or 
knowledge; nor did madness represent a “flagrant contempt for logic and 
systematic thought” (Turner, 1995, p. 56).  Nevertheless, the evolution of the 
field has had many disturbing implications, and presented real difficulties, for 
vulnerable people.   
First, biomedical psychiatry has not been able to identify, or measure, 
indicators of distress directly or objectively.  Instead, a person’s state of mind has 
only ever been inferred through observations of their behaviour and talk, filtered 
through the psychiatrist’s own scientific lens.  Second, critical commentators 
have noted that the predominant focus of psychiatric training and practice has 
been on pain and functioning at the expense of relationship and meaning.  They 
have argued that, in so doing, the profession has risked “providing analgesia at 
the expense of understanding” (Jureidini, 2012, p. 190).   
Although many have argued that there is a “lack of knowledge about the 
interventions and services that will help people recover from severe mental 
illnesses” (Farkas et al., 2005), mental health service development has remained 
heavily influenced by assumptions that people do not recover.  Commentators 
agree that recovery is conceptually difficult to measure; but have argued it is 
possible to describe significant aspects of, and provide evidence for, what is 
efficacious for a particular person in terms of reclaiming a meaningful, 
purposeful life in the settings of their choice (Mental Health Commission, 2011b; 
Onken, Dumont, Ridgway, Dorman, & Ralph, 2000; Perkins, 1999; Turner-
Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002).  These scholars have advocated for qualitative 
measures of recovery values, such as opportunities for successful living and 
positive engagement with their communities of choice; rather than conventional 
systems of treatment outcomes concerned with stability, functional maintenance 
and behavioural control (Banks et al., 2004; Barber, 2005; Central Potential, 
2008; Warriner, 2001). 
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Recovery, and related approaches such as strengths-based practices, has 
always been more concerned with human flourishing than symptom control 
(Barber, 2005; McCashen, 2005; Rapp, 1998; Saleeby, 2001, 2002).  Generic 
accounts of successful recovery outcomes by those with experiences of distress 
have invariably referred to a renewed sense of identity, self-determination and 
the right to live an ordinary life in community with equitable access to resources 
and opportunities.  Unfortunately, the various attempts to measure recovery 
(Campbell-Orde, Chamberlin, Carpenter, & Leff, 2005) have had little impact on 
the design and delivery of mental health services; unlike clinical measures such 
as Health of the Nations Outcome Scale (HONOS13) (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
2010).  This has led service users and others, including the community NGOs to 
call for expanded notions of mental health service outcomes to include 
dimensions such as quality of life, self-esteem, empowerment, satisfaction, and 
well-being (Anthony, 2003; Bond et al., 2001; Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Salyers & 
Macy, 2005). 
Despite being ignored by many practitioners (Slade, 2009) service user 
conceptualisations of recovery outcomes have inevitably challenged the 
fundamental rationality and drivers of the mental health system such as the 
reification of mental illness, a deficits framework and the notion of force and 
compulsion in treatment (Kisely, Smith, Preston, & Xiao, 2005; Minkowitz, 2006; 
O’Hagan, 2008, 2009; Slade, 2009).  Service users and others have also objected 
to the serious, harmful and long-term effects of powerful psychotropic drugs 
(O’Hagan, 1994; Leibrich, 1997; Moncrieff, 2007, 2008; N. Rose, 2003), especially 
where the effectiveness of these medications is doubtful and the long-term 
damage so unclear (Breggin, 1993; Healy, 2002; Moncrieff, 2007, 2008; Mosher, 
1999; Mosher & Vallone, 1995; N. Rose, 2003; Whitaker, 2004).  Many critics 
have protested that little research has been undertaken, or funded, to attend to 
these effects or to user views in general (Fisher & Greenburg, 1997; Healy, 2002; 
                                                     
13  HONOS is the Health of the Nation Outcomes Scale promoted by Te Pou as a universal national 
measure of service outcomes. This tool is necessarily administered by a ‘clinician’ further 
increasing clinical involvement in NGOs 
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Whitaker, 2004).  Service user accounts of services, where these are gathered at 
all, have typically been used to measure the success or otherwise of a service, 
rather than inform meaningful change in a person’s own well-being or social 
circumstances (Bell & Lindley, 2005; Kendrick, 2012; Kendrick, Petty, Bezanson, & 
Jones, 2006; Kent & John Read, 1998; Lord et al., 1998; O’Brien & Sullivan, 2005; 
S. Rose, 2000).   
These issues suggest that an alternative rationality, or explanatory model, 
of recovery has done little to disrupt the positivist, techno-scientific rationality 
that has dominated the construction of what counts as valid knowledge in 
mental healthcare.  This circumstance has significant implications for people, 
who have experienced serious psychological distress, and the conduct of their 
lives within their communities.  In the section that follows, I discuss further the 
implications of the normalisation of biomedical science and its relationships 
within Western societies and other socio-political institutions.  In particular, I 
attend to the powerful effects that constructions of mental health and mental 
illness have in constituting social norms and the relationships between powerful 
groups, such as health professionals, and others who are marginalised and 
comparatively powerless within a social system. 
The problematic of the relationship between mental health 
organisations and society  
As a rule, societies have willingly and with some relief, surrendered the 
authority for explaining and responding to the unintelligible and frightening in 
their midst, to the social institutions of their time, and have typically been the 
church, the law and the medical profession (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Pearson, 
2000).  This has meant that the arrangements of institutions and organisations 
established to treat and contain those who have “lost” their reason have 
inevitably reflected the interests of wider, contemporary society and the bias of 
contemporary societal norms.  Systems of care, therefore, have tended to be 
focussed on the “normalisation” of difference and deviance (H. Brown & Smith, 
1992; Canguilhem et al., 1989; Oliver, 1998b; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999).  These 
issues are especially important for addressing my second and third research 
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questions because they underpin an understanding of how social and 
institutional norms become embedded, and powerful, in discourse and practice 
thereby governing organisational forms and the relationships among them.  
In this section, I expand the earlier discussion, and scholarly scrutiny, of 
the close relationship between power and the social production of knowledge in 
order to attend to the societal organisation of healthcare and its relationship to 
the state.  In particular, I shift the focus to the political and ideological structures 
that underpin the organisation of mental health care in Western societies.  First, I 
examine political economies, specifically capitalism in Western societies, and 
show how their ideological bases create hegemonic positions of power and 
privilege within society that, in turn, define and normalise particular notions of 
health.  I then look at how professional identities and alliances maintain and 
reproduce power, privilege and the social status of dominant groups.  Inevitably, 
this discussion leads to the ways that some groups, such as those with 
experience of serious psychological distress, become marginalised and 
powerless.  I then critically examine the roles of social norms and social policy in 
constructing and maintaining notions of normality and deviance that have led to 
stigma, discrimination and social exclusion for vulnerable groups such as those 
diagnosed with mental illness.  Finally, I attend to scholarly concerns about 
individualism, and the focus on personal responsibility, which in healthcare has 
been a cornerstone of ensuring the continuing legitimacy of the status quo.  
Capitalism and the commodification of health 
Political economies establish the junctions and interactions among 
governments, economic systems and the status of groups within society (Ashton, 
1999; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Oliver, 1999; U’Ren, 1997).  These 
relationships have enormous influence, structuring the lives of individuals, 
groups and communities and effectively become a “closed universe of meaning, 
tied to social structures as organised patterns of roles and rules, and sustained 
by a rationalising ideology” (S. Rose, 2000, p. 409).  The capitalism of Western 
societies is one such, highly rationalised, system that has provided some groups 
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with considerable power to compel the behaviour of individuals and 
organisations and control the distribution of resources (Ashton et al., 2005).   
However, many believe that the structure of capitalist societies goes 
largely unexamined; as does the crucial role it plays in people’s experiences of 
health and illness (Harter et al., 2006; Jermier, 1998; Oliver, 1999; U’Ren, 1997).  
They have observed that capitalism is a pervasive system (Foucault, 1980; 
Gramsci, 1971; Mumby, 1988, 1997) that has justified inequities in access to 
healthcare (Albrecht, 1992; Garfield, 1994; Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958) and 
contributed to significant disparities in health outcomes (Jermier, 1998; Oliver, 
1998, 1999; U’Ren, 1997).  A plethora of scholarly evidence, over many decades, 
has demonstrated that those in lower economic classes have been more likely to 
receive treatments grounded in administrative logic (Foucault, 1986), such as 
increased hospitalisation with greater rates of prescribed and tranquillising 
medications, and have had significantly less access to other, more genuinely 
therapeutic, responses such as talking-based or relational therapies, respite and 
retreat care, private psychiatrists, psychotherapists and psychologists  (Abas et 
al., 2003; Duncan et al., 2004; Oliver, 1998, 1999; Mosher, 1999).  This has meant 
that the quality of healthcare, like other goods and services, is distributed 
unevenly in a capitalist society and is dependent upon the ability to pay (U’Ren, 
1997). 
The capitalist “value” of health has inevitably been tied to the rationale of 
economic enterprise and people’s capacity, or incapacity to work.,  This has led 
to perceptions of illness as being socially unacceptable or personally 
irresponsible (M. Brunton, 2000; Harter et al., 2006; Pierret, 1993; Zoller, 2003).  
The medicalisation of madness and segregation of the mad, therefore, was as 
much for the economic good health of society as it was for the individual (N. 
Rose, 1996, 1998; Jermier, 1998).  Separating the able bodied from the dis-abled, 
by placing people in institutions, resulted in a non-productive group of people 
who were unable to participate in capitalism, as producers, products or even 
consumers in a competitive market (Scull, 1979).   
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The subsequent monopoly and control over psychiatric services has, in 
turn, provided powerful disincentives for the mental health “market” to re-
organise itself (Jermier, 1998; Moncrieff, 2007; Oliver, 1999; U’Ren, 1997; 
Whitaker, 2004).  Similarly, tensions in ideological concerns between notions of 
providing services and producing goods (Ashton, 1999; Oliver, 1999; Reay & 
Hinings, 2005) have prompted commentators to maintain that the modern 
health professions are “not simply the dominant or most important providers of 
a particular service; instead they effectively monopolise a service market” 
(Samson, 1995, p. 129).   
However, there have been some serious repercussions of a market 
approach to healthcare.  Importantly, it has reinforced the ethos of evidence-
based practice, whereby funders of health care have prioritised administrative 
and fiscal efficiencies, rather than clinical effectiveness, in treatment decisions 
(Ashton, 1999; Duncan et al., 2004; Hubble et al., 1999; N. Rose, 1996; Sawyer, 
2005).  This has also been indicative of the rise of managerialism in health and 
mental health services including the community NGOs (Hwang & Powell, 2009; 
Zoller, 2003). 
Managerialism and consumerism 
Initially, the professionalisation of organised medicine, including 
psychiatry, enabled it to resist the encroachment of corporate managerialism in 
healthcare.  As discussed in the Background chapter, the medical professions 
enjoyed almost autonomous control over the conditions and conduct of their 
work.  Specifically, they were not required to engage with considerations of cost 
efficiencies and market share (O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2005; 
Scott, 2008; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; U’Ren, 1997).   
Notwithstanding, and despite tensions between professional interests 
and managerial values and priorities, scholars generally agree that corporate 
managerialism has now become thoroughly naturalised and institutionalised in 
Western healthcare systems (Fougere, 2001; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Reay & 
Hinings, 2005; Zoller, 2003).  Discourses more appropriate to a business, such as 
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efficient management practices, fiscal responsibility for the public purse and 
providing value-for-money have systematically replaced traditional health 
concepts of care, cooperation and trust (Ashton et al., 2005; Boston et al., 1999; 
Fougere, 2001; Knights & Morgan, 1991).  Similarly, managerial indicators of 
success and service outcomes have been routinely reduced to the achievement 
of instrumental goals such as service access, exit and bed occupancy (Hwang & 
Powell, 2009; Harrison, 2010).   
Managerial perspectives in healthcare, sustained by the same functional 
rationality underpinning both medical and business practice, have emphasised a 
quest to maximise gains in fiscal efficiencies and service outputs, and minimise 
costs and concessions to other stakeholders (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Hwang & 
Powell, 2009; Mumby, 1998).  This has further advanced the commodification of 
health and reinforced hierarchical patterns of roles, relationships and regulatory 
practices in the organising of healthcare (Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007; S. Rose, 2000; 
Scott et al., 2000; Sillence, 2001).  As a consequence, organisational practices of 
review and evaluation have been reduced to a mere concern with organisational 
effectiveness and productivity (Stohl & Cheney, 2001) rather than critical 
examinations of issues of social justice, equity and change (McCashen, 2005; 
Ochaka, Nelson, & Lord, 1999; Sullivan, 1994; Warriner, 2001).  
In many Western health systems, including Aotearoa\New Zealand, the 
introduction of capitalist imperatives of fiscal retrenchment, alongside a 
managerialist discourse, were presented as increases in consumer choice and 
consumer satisfaction (Reay & Hinings, 2005).  In mental healthcare, policies, 
including recovery, implied that consumers of all kinds would be better informed 
about their healthcare, have higher expectations of service outcomes and, 
therefore, be enabled to have greater control in shaping services (W. Brunton, 
2004; Central Potential, 2008; Davis & Ashton, 2001; O’Hagan, 1999).  The Health 
and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 and the Code of Consumers’ Rights (Health 
& Disability Commission, 1996), for example, formally endorsed the rights of 
mental health consumers to some of the dignity, informed consent and rights of 
review that the rest of society enjoyed (Cresswell, 2009; Everett, 1994).   
 103 
But these shifts in the discourse exemplified tensions between notions of 
consumers as people with apparent power to determine the ways their health 
needs were met, and the notion of health and healthcare as marketable 
commodities, concerned with money and even profit (Davis & Ashton, 2001; 
Fougere, 2001; Tilly, 1996).  In reality, there was no significant change in the 
distribution of power or mobilisation of resources in mental health organisations 
(Ashton et al., 2005; Harrison, 2010; Labonte, 1996; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  In 
fact, several commentators claimed that market-driven mental health reforms 
converted the notion of community care into a cruel euphemism for community 
neglect (W. Brunton, 2004; Durie, 1994; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Mason, 1996; 
Mental Health Foundation, 1987).   
Managerialism and consumerism, as discussed in the Background 
chapter, contributed significantly to the commodification of health and 
healthcare (Reay & Hinings, 2005), and conferred power and advantage to some 
groups while disempowering others.  Specifically, structural and conceptual 
hierarchies within Western health systems naturalised the domination of 
professional identities and disguised the effects on those made vulnerable by the 
inequities of the capitalist state (Albrecht, 1992; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Knights 
& Morgan, 1991; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; N. Rose, 1998; Samson, 1995; Scott, 
2008; Turner, 1995).  Internal frictions notwithstanding, alliances between 
socially powerful professionals have made it more difficult to introduce other 
perspectives, or make systemic change.   
Professionalism and power  
Professional status is inseparable from public perceptions of social 
legitimacy and credibility (Mumby, 1988; Hwang & Powell, 2009; O’Reilly & Reed, 
2011; Scott, 2008).  Rob Warriner (2010) has described the relationships among 
biomedical professionals and society as follows: 
For a long time, there has existed an unspoken covenant 
between medicine, community and the State.  The State 
supported the right to medical care, medicine delivered 
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treatments to professionally agreed standards, and both 
gained the respect of an approving community, which [in 
completing the loop] secured the political and social 
legitimacy of health.  The success of this arrangement was 
underpinned by unquestioned trust in the integrity of the 
medical professions (p. 76). 
Professional credentials are achieved only after years of specialised 
training (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995) and unsurprisingly, 
those so accredited have sought to preserve their higher social status by defining 
and controlling access to specialist knowledge and expertise (Cheney & Ashcraft, 
2007; Foucault, 1963, 1973).  In turn, the socially rationalised perception of the 
need for technical and specialist expertise has underscored the belief in 
professional power, and led inevitably to professionally controlled systems of 
health and welfare services (Hwang & Powell, 2009; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; Scott 
et al., 2008; Turner, 1995).  
Constructions of professionalism, embedded in the ideological bases of 
biomedicine and managerialism, have created an almost impenetrable alliance in 
the organisation of healthcare (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Hwang & Powell, 2002; 
Scott et al., 2000).  Increasingly, professional and managerialist interests, 
through their greater ability to influence strategy and policy, have reproduced 
and legitimated their preferred models of service design and practice, including 
the community sector (Ashton et al., 2005; Davis & Ashton, 2001; Frumkin & 
Andre-Clark, 2001; Harrison, 2010; O'Hagan, 2009c; Reay & Hinings, 2005). 
Western health systems have, traditionally, been based on patriarchal 
relationships between an authoritative, but benign, expert and a willing, 
compliant and inexpert “patient” (Alderson, 1998; Reay & Hinings, 2005; 
Waitzkin, 1991).  However, critical scholars have argued that “medical 
dominance is not a trans-historical and invariant property of the medical 
profession” (Samson, 1995, p. 55), but an expression of situated social, political 
and cultural arrangements that have conferred authority, privilege and power 
(Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Turner, 1995).   
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Equally, these scholars have disparaged functionalist assumptions that 
doctors and patients are equally subject in the same social system (Oliver, 1998; 
Parsons, 1975), claiming that such perspectives have ignored the power 
relationships inherent in such social orders (Foucault, 1963, 1980; Jermier, 1998).  
Stephen Rose (2000), for example, has described the professionalised system for 
the diagnosis and treatment of psychological distress as “a form of ownership of 
the power to define the reality of the other, to control and contain the other’s 
meaning by interpretation of their experience” (p. 404).  The privileged position 
of this “expertise” has significant implications; not least of which is that 
consumers are offered, and receive, only the treatments and professional 
responses in which the practitioner is “expert” (Duncan et al., 2004; Hubble et 
al., 1999; S. Rose, 2000; S. Rose & Black, 1985).  
Foucault and others have been critical of the ways that the normalisation 
of biomedicine, as well as alliances among professional groups, has determined 
the ways in which deviance has been constructed, classified and regulated 
(Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007; Conrad & Schneider, 1990; Fee, 1999; Foucault, 1963, 
1973, 1980; N. Rose, 1998; Scull, 1977; Turner, 1995).  Similarly, functionalist 
valorisation of conformity and compliance has driven professional efforts to 
concentrate on either reforming deviancy or excluding it from society (Foucault, 
1973; Frances, 2013; Habermas, 1987; Oliver, 1999; N. Rose, 1998; Scull, 1977). 
Social norms, social policy and constructions of deviance 
Every society produces its own truths and these become the “common 
sense” of the social imagination and are embedded in its social institutions.  The 
normalising and regulatory consequences of these social processes underpin 
organisational communication, organisational forms and organisational practices 
(Alvesson et al., 2008).  In Western societies, for example, the perceived 
superiority of scientific methods has led to bio-psychiatry becoming socially 
normative and legitimated (Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Dutta & Zoller, 2008; 
Foucault, 1963, 1973; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Samson, 1995; Turner, 1995).  
However social constructions of normality have simultaneously constructed 
discourses of deviance, and this has been problematic for people who have 
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experiences of serious psychological distress because psychological norms and 
psychosocial deviations are culturally situated, and not measurable by objective, 
scientific indicators (Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Oliver, 
1998; John Read, 2004; Sayce, 2000; Szasz, 1974). 
Instead of perceiving “deviants” as a minority of outsiders, and doctors as 
universally principled and benign, critical  scholars have sought to demonstrate 
that people, characterised only by their dissimilarity from social norms, have 
been constructed as inadequate or disabled (Coleman, 1999; Oliver, 1996; 
Pearson, 2000; Sayce, 2000).  In addition, societies have tended to respond to 
madness very differently from other “normal”, but overwhelming, experiences 
such as grief, war, natural disaster and other forms of trauma (MHAC, 2008).  
Instead, discourses of deviance have led to marginalisation and powerlessness 
for groups whose behaviour has caused social indignation merely because it is 
fundamentally non-conformist (N. Rose, 1998; Scheff, 1974). 
Notions of normal and the theory (Wolfensberger 1980, 1983), ideology 
(Dalley, 1988) and practice of normalisation have been strongly contested 
(Canguilhem et al., 1989; Oliver, 1998, 1999).  However, Western health and 
disability systems have tended to accept, uncritically, the valorisation of the 
normalisation principle (H. Brown & Smith, 1992; Dalley, 1992; Oliver, 1998, 
1999; Wolfensberger, 1980, 1983).  
Normalisation, as a principle of medical practice, has relied on 
professional judgements of an individual’s behaviour, their “functional” 
independence (Waghorn, Chant, & King, 2007; Ware et al., 2007) and their 
capacity to conform (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Dellar, Lesley, Watson, & Curtis, 
2000; Foucault, 1973; Grob, 1995; Warner, 2004).  These professional 
constructions of normality have generally overlooked “the extent to which 
people are able to exercise their rights and participate, by choice, in the ordinary 
activities of citizens” (Mental Health Commission, 2009, p. 1).   
Michael Oliver (1998, 1999), an outspoken critic of normalisation theory 
and practice, has advocated for acceptance of the “different”, or “deviant” 
participating in their communities.  He, and others, have contended that the 
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normalisation discourse has pressured marginalised groups to be submissive, 
uncomplaining, compliant and dependent in order to conform to notions of 
appropriate behaviour (Carling & Allott, 1999; Dalley, 1992; Oliver, 1996; Sayce, 
2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007).  They have argued further, that conforming to 
others’ expectations of behaviour does not lead to transformation of the 
circumstances of people’s lives, which continued to be economically and socially 
deprived (Deegan, 1996; Oliver, 1998, 1999; Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007).  
These circumstances have been exacerbated, rather than relieved, by a 
persistent and explicit tension between a social imperative to defend the wider 
interests of the normal community and the less compelling mandate to 
safeguard the rights of citizenship for those on the margins of society (Carling, 
1995; Chamberlin, 1998; Lord & Dufort, 1998; Rappaport, 1987).  Thus, there 
have been significant tensions within communities, resulting in social backlash, 
stigma and discrimination, poverty and homelessness (Anspach, 1979; Schneider, 
2010; Mental Health Commission, 1998; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).   
People diagnosed with mental illness have typically experienced a quality 
of life inferior to the rest of the population (Leibrich, 1998; Mental Health 
Commission, 1998; Sayce, 2001; Spandler, 2007).  Critics have argued that the 
secondary impacts of mental disorder, i.e. social inequity and social exclusion, 
have restricted people's lives much more than the symptoms of so-called illness 
(Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007; Sullivan, 1992; Ware et al., 2008).  These 
circumstances have not only led to individual alienation, low social status, 
despair and hostility, but have excluded people from the social participation that 
is central to recovery discourses (Banks et al., 2004; Sullivan, 1992; Ware et al., 
2008; Warriner, 2001, 2010).   
The belief that madness is an entirely negative and valueless experience 
has also justified the coercion of people into environments and treatments they 
have not wanted (Barker, 2003, 2011; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; Pescosolido et 
al., 1999; Jacob Read, 2003a).  In fact, diagnostic labels themselves have proved 
to be stigmatising within both hospitals and general society (Carson, 1997; 
Kamens, 2011; Pilgrim, 2007; Saleeby, 2001).  David Pilgrim and Anne Rogers 
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(1999) have described the phenomenon of diagnosis as a “degradation ritual” (p. 
113) that relentlessly strips away a person’s identity and sense of self.  Others 
have argued the pathologising of human experience has reinforced social 
stereotypes and encouraged depersonalisation (Anspach, 1979; Canguilhem et 
al., 1989; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005c; Schneider & Remillard, 2013).  Aotearoa\New 
Zealand psychologist John Read (2005) has further contended that the 
promotion of “mental illness as an illness like any other” (p. 596) in 
destigmatisation campaigns has generated fear and prejudice through 
“destructive pessimism” about a person’s chances of recovery (Chalmers, 2001; 
Moncrieff, 2008; John Read et al., 2005; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004).  
Studies show clearly that social assumptions, expectations and beliefs 
about groups of people determine what others see in their behaviour (Luske, 
1990; van Hoof, van Weeghel, & Kroon, 2000; Vaughan & Hansen, 2004; Ward, 
2009).  Therefore, stigmatised identities have frequently become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, and people, with experiences of psychological distress, come to 
believe that they are chronically disabled and valueless (Ackroyd & Wyllie, 2002; 
Anspach, 1979; Oliver, 1998; Scheff, 1974; Schneider, 2010; Schneider & 
Remillard, 2013).   
Critical scholars make an important distinction between discourses of 
social exclusion and social inclusion; although these are frequently used as 
unproblematic opposites by the lay public (Morgan, Burns, Fitzpatrick, Pinfold, & 
Priebe., 2007; Oliver, 1998; Perkins & Repper, 2013; Spandler, 2007).  The 
concept of social exclusion has been a key discursive feature of social models of 
disability and mental health (Harter et al., 2006; Morgan et al., 2007; Powell, 
2011; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Ware et al., 2007).  These models emphasise the 
disabling nature of societal and environmental structures and systems, beyond 
individual problems, that form barriers to people’s full participation in 
community life (Oliver, 1996, 1998; Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007; Warriner, 
2001).  It also refers to the institutionalised discrimination experienced by people 
with diagnoses of mental illness when attempting to participate in education, 
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employment and other aspects of civil society (Lapsley & Yee, 2004; Perkins & 
Repper, 2013; Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007; Ward, 2009).   
In contrast, several scholars note a subtle shift to a discourse of social  
inclusion that has threatened to obscure, rather than remove, the social 
structures that have generated and sustained exclusion (Harter et al., 2006; 
Morgan et al., 2007; Sayce, 2001; Spandler, 2007; Ward, 2009).  Ideas of social 
inclusion, alongside notions of normalisation, have emphasised the need for 
individuals to “fit in”, rather than pressuring communities to become more 
accepting of difference.  The inclusion discourses have implied that social and 
political change is the gift of the powerful to be bestowed on the powerless.  
Presumptions of a desire to be “included” have “become important ways of 
ensuring that the marginalised and excluded feel they have a stake in the 
modern social order” (Spandler, 2007, p. 10) and are, therefore, invested in their 
own compliance and conformity (Sayce, 2001;).   
Critics have also challenged assumptions that the efforts of exclusionary 
agents, (e.g. communities, institutions and markets), to include vulnerable 
groups, are self-evidently benign rather than systematic and coercive (Mancini et 
al., 2005; Oliver, 1999; Spandler, 2007; Ward, 2009).  As Heather Zoller (2005, 
2012) has noted, there are few examples where privileged and powerful social 
groups have willingly given up power to others.  Instead, these scholars have 
claimed, proponents have used the language of inclusion to confer limited 
equality on marginalised groups once they have achieved an “acceptable” degree 
of insight and behaviour; but have not challenged the legitimacy of the status 
quo (Dalley, 1992).  Therefore, as Rob Warriner (2010) has commented:  “Social 
inclusion and integration have become common mantras of service 
development, [yet] exclusion and un-integration remain the common experience 
for people using mental health services” (p. 74).   
Organisational and national discourses, policies and strategies of inclusion 
have also perpetuated a focus on individual efforts, rather than environmental 
constraints that pervade the settings in which vulnerable people live and act 
(Deegan, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 2011; Ministry of Health, 2006, 
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2012b; Spandler, 2007; Warriner, 2010).  In the mental health sector, these 
discourses have tended to dilute important concepts. For example,  an 
empowering notion such as self-determination has been limited to consumer 
choice; service user leadership reduced to service user involvement, and human 
rights, personal power and organisational responsibilities diminished by an 
emphasis on self-responsibility and independence (Kendrick, 1997; O’Hagan, 
2009c; Spandler, 2007; Warriner, 2009, 2010).  These policy directions have 
occurred despite research showing that people, groups and communities are less 
vulnerable to illness and distress when they have personal power over their life 
circumstances. (Daniels, Kennedy, & Kawachi, 1999; Zoller, 2011).   
Despite appearances of political and ideological change, social policy and 
social reform seldom alters the dynamics of power or challenges the legitimacy 
of knowledge constituting interests (Ashton et al., 2005; A. Brown, 2004; 
Mumby, 1988, 2008; Prichard, 2009; N. Rose et al., 2006).  Typically, social policy 
has preserved inequitable arrangements and materialised these in 
institutionalised practices that have prioritised individual responsibilities for well-
being rather than systemic analysis and change (Kendrick, 1997, 2012; Oliver, 
1999; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; Pilgrim, 2005; Warriner, 2010).  Publicly funded 
organisations, such as mental health services, are peculiarly vulnerable to the, 
frequently tacit, ideological shifts and normative fluctuations that influence 
national policy (W. Brunton, 2005; Davis & Ashton, 2001; Fougere, 2001).   
Rob Warriner (2010), among others, has noted, that when alternative 
discourses such as recovery have emerged to challenge mental health policy, 
powerful interests have routinely outflanked other perspectives with the rhetoric 
of traditional discourses and traditional disciplines, and ensured there is little 
substantial change (Ashton et al., 2005; A. Brown, 2004; Oliver, 1999; N. Rose, 
1998; S. Rose, 2000).  The situation has been further  exacerbated by the mass-
mediated promotion of scientific research in mental health (Cutcliffe & 
Hannigan, 2001; Gerbner, 1980; Kline, 2006; Nairn et al., 2011; Philo, 1996; 
Seale, 2004).  Therefore, despite apparent discursive shifts (O’Hagan, 2004, 
2009a; Venuti, 1992), the experience of many stakeholders in mental health 
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services has been very much “business as usual” (Ashton et al., 2005; Barber, 
2005; Barker, 2003; Pearson, 2004; Warriner, 2010) .   
Similarly, individualised constructions of health and illness have 
effectively deflected public and political attention away from systemic problems, 
social conditions, and the environment.  Individualism in Western contexts has  
made health a purely personal responsibility; thus emphasising self-change at 
the expense of social change.  In the section that follows, I elaborate on the 
implications of individualism on maintaining inequitable social systems and the 
marginalisation of vulnerable populations (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a). 
The effects of individualism in healthcare 
The naturalisation of an individualist perspective has been an 
indispensable characteristic of capitalist logic, epitomised under neoliberalism 
and a largely Western managerialist approach to organising (Dutta, 2015; Hwang 
& Powell, 2009; Jermier, 1998; Oliver, 1999; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011).  This has led 
many neo-liberal scholars to disregard social, moral and ethical challenges that 
might impede the generation of wealth (Ashton, 2005; Boston et al., 1999; 
Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Mumby, 1988; U’Ren, 1997).  In other words, 
social analyses that address complex and interactive socio-political factors, 
including discrimination based on social categories such as gender, race and 
disability, have been relegated to the background (Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; 
Oliver, 1998, 1999; Trethewey, 1997; Warner, 2004).  
Unfortunately, ideological valorisation of individual effort and the 
“entrepreneurial endeavour” (M. Brunton, 2000; Gill, 2011) has led to individual 
lifestyle theories which have shifted responsibility for the health of both the 
“self” and society on to individuals, making success a function of individual effort 
and hence “failure” a personal responsibility.  This has encouraged the 
development of the “individual defect” paradigm in health and mental health 
discourses that have continued to attribute problems to individual failure, 
defects and poor choice-making (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; S. Rose, 2000; Zoller, 
2003, 2011) at the expense of addressing important social, political and 
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contextual factors (McCashen, 2005; Mental Health Commission, 2007b; John 
Read et al., 2004; S. Rose, 2000; Rappaport, 1995).  This has meant that personal 
life circumstances, including trauma, have not typically been addressed in any 
psychological, political or pragmatic sense (Jureidini, 2012; Oliver, 1999; S. Rose, 
2000; U’Ren, 1997).  
Scholars have also argued that psychiatry has absorbed the modern 
obsession with life as an “enterprise of oneself” and, in isolating the individual, 
has left genuine social problems and conflicts untouched (Anthony, 1993).  
Although cultural, economic and socially systemic issues may be considered 
stressors, it is only individual emotional and psychological symptoms that have 
been considered of medical significance (U’Ren, 1997).  Thus, the “self” has 
become a personal project to be continually and actively assessed, managed, 
worked and improved upon (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Bracken & Thomas, 
2010; Lupton, 1995; Petersen, 1996, 1997; N. Rose, 1990, 1998)  
The communication of self-responsibility for good health starts early in 
Western societies (M. Brunton, 2000; Zoller, 2003) and normalised accounts 
have generally ignored factors outside an individual’s control (M. Brunton, 2000; 
Durie, 1999, 2001; Labonte, 1997; Pierret, 1993; Pulotu-Endemann, 2001).  This 
has further reinforced and justified the social production of “mediated and 
interpersonal prevention messages aimed at self-discipline” (Zoller, 2010, p. 484) 
as if these were independent from the social, political, and structural contexts 
that constrain or enable good health decisions (M. Brunton, 2000; N. Rose, 1990; 
Zoller, 2010).  Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1988) have further argued that it is 
the intent of governments to secure socio-political objectives by regulating the 
lives of individuals and populations.  This has not only made the conduct of 
personal life crucial to the exercise of political and managerial power, but has 
also constructed the vocabularies of “social well-being” and the “public good” to 
rationalise political strategies such as the persistent quest for profit and gain.  
This governmentality has also encouraged the assumption of managerial 
authority over the workplace and organisational lives of individuals (Miller & N. 
Rose, 1988; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Zoller, 2003).   
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In addition, the importance of paid work, or “gainful” employment, and 
the capacity to consume goods and services have underpinned measures of 
social well-being and “the means through which good character is expressed and 
success achieved” (U’Ren, 1997, p. 3).  For users of mental health services, 
unable to find or maintain work, this has further discriminated against them and 
worked against alternative understandings of well-being (Chamberlin, 1998; 
Leibrich, 1998; Yee & Lapsley, 2004).  Stephen Rose (1988), among others, has 
highlighted how harsh social circumstances have been dismissed as individual or 
cultural deficits, and minimised social inequities and discounted the need for 
social change (Prichard, 2009; S. Rose, 2000; Schneider, 2010).   
Critical scholars have contended that fragmenting communities into 
collections of individuals acts in favour of privileged discourses by discouraging 
collective action (Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006; Larner & Craig, 2005; S. Rose, 
1972; Zoller, 2005, 2011).  Similarly, in the field of health communication, 
scholars have advocated health promotion models, including many indigenous 
models, which incorporate a range of important social and environmental 
factors, identified as prerequisites for mental health and well-being (Carling & 
Allot, 1999; Mental Health Commission, 1998; Sayce, 2000; World Health 
Organisation, 2005).  These models recognise that individual well-being is 
inseparable from the contexts of people’s families, communities, cultures and 
the socio-political circumstances that affect them (Durie, 1994, 1998, 2001; 
Labonte, 1997; Ministry of Health, 2001b; World Health Organisation, 2005; 
Zoller, 2011).  Similarly, recovery and other social models of well-being have 
emphasised the personal, rather than constructing the individual.  William 
Anthony (1993), for example has described recovery as a “deeply personal 
mission of living” and developing new meaning and purpose in life after growing 
“beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness” (p. 15). 
Ironically, while socio-political influences have located “problems” within 
individuals, the “solutions” have remained within the purview of specialist 
expertise and the intellectual technologies of social order (Foucault, 1980; 
Lupton, 1994; Miller & N. Rose, 1990).  Therefore, although treatment responses 
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are based on professional expertise, a “failure to respond” to treatment is still 
considered evidence of an individual’s intransigence rather than a flawed 
practice model (Duncan et al., 2004; Hubble et al., 1999; S. Rose, 2000; Zoller, 
2011).  This has led to mental health service users being further stigmatised by 
being labelled “unmotivated”, “treatment resistant” or “non-compliant”.  Such 
arbitrary judgements have not been accompanied by corresponding expectations 
for practitioners to be critically self-reflective, or accountable, outside their 
professional responsibility.    
In addition, while health issues may be treated as individual, there has 
been little legitimate space for individual participation in healthcare (Clark & 
Krupa, 2002; Fitzsimons & Fuller, 2002; Lord et al., 2004; O’Hagan, 2009c; 
Rappaport, 2002; Waitzkin, 1991).  Most scholars agree that personal agency and 
empowerment are critical to managing health and well-being, and have disputed 
the equivalence of personal agency and individualism (Carey, 2005; Perkins, 
1999; Jacob Read, 2003a; S. Rose, 2000; Zoller, 2011).  Nevertheless, this 
boundary remains conveniently blurred in managerial and biomedical 
perspectives that have institutionalised individualist approaches and worked 
against collective social action and community responsibility for care of the 
vulnerable (Anspach, 1979; Dalley, 1988; Larner & Craig, 2005; Zoller, 2005).   
In the next section, I investigate the organisation of mental health care 
through the lens of the third problematic described by Mumby and Stohl (1996, 
2007).  In particular, I examine the effects of organisational configurations on the 
introduction of alternative models and practice such as recovery.  I also examine 
the identity, role and niche the community NGOs have inhabited within mental 
health systems, as well as the opportunities for organisational transformation in 
the face of powerful institutions.  These discussions frame the literary 
background to my second research question, which seeks to answer how 
institutional dynamics are constructing, constraining or contradicting 
organisational practices in terms of becoming recovery-oriented. 
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The problematic of organising of mental health care  
In the previous chapter, I outlined the organisational arrangements of the 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health system within its social-political context.  It 
was apparent from that discussion that cultural and political constructions of 
madness, as well as the shifts and vicissitudes in social discourses over time, have 
inevitably affected the establishment, structure and configuration of the mental 
health sector (W. Brunton, 2001, 2004; Foucault, 1973a, 1973b; Samson, 1995; 
Turner, 1995).  How values and practices are constructed and preserved through 
organisational talk, and the organisational arrangements that enable or constrain 
action (Cheney, 1999), have serious implications for organising the mental health 
sector as recovery-oriented in Aotearoa\New Zealand.   
Barbour and Lammers (2007) have described how “enduring beliefs and 
practices both transcend and shape particular organisations and organising” (p. 
201).  In other words, how discourses of mental health, which are naturalised in 
everyday conversation, social policy and organisational communication practices, 
influence the organisational arrangements and management of mental health 
resources (Zoller, 2011).  These issues are particularly significant for less 
powerful organisations, such as community NGOs, when considering their ability 
to preserve the integrity of their founding ideals and manage the inevitable 
fluctuations in both the internal and external environments, while 
simultaneously engaging responsively with the larger community (Cheney, 1999, 
2002). 
These circumstances have led several commentators to question whether 
apparent shifts in the organising of mental health care, specifically to a recovery 
orientation and the move to community care, have been accompanied by 
substantive changes in the distribution of power and the re-mobilisation of 
resources (Ashton et al., 2005; Clark & Krupa, 2002; S. Rose & Black, 1985; 
Townsend, 1998).  Therefore, I examine literature, through the critical lens of the 
problematic of organising (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007), that addresses the ways 
in which mental health services have generated, managed, or resisted 
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inequalities in mental healthcare, and specifically community NGOs (Zoller & 
Harter, 2010).   
Community and non-government organisations 
Organisational scholars have agreed that NGOs have become increasingly 
visible and active in various sectors of social life and have their own character, 
outside the environment of competitive, commercial organisations.  Yet they 
have not been adequately represented or explored in the field of organisational 
communication (Ganesh, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Harrison 2010; O’Brien et al., 2009).  
Several scholars have argued that not only has the “third” sector been under-
represented in critical organisational studies (Ganesh, 2003), but that ordinary 
organisational members and workers have typically been outside the academic 
gaze (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a; Mumby, 2005).   
As previously discussed, the community based NGOs in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand emerged from a long history of politically determined, and publicly 
funded, approaches to the care and treatment of the “mentally ill” (W. Brunton, 
2005; Health and Disability Commission Working Group, 2010; O’Brien et al., 
2009; Tennant et al., 2008).  Therefore, they have been vulnerable to 
fluctuations in societal and political norms and subordinate in their 
organisational relationships with clinical services (Harrison, 2010; Warriner, 
2001).   
Politicisation and conflict: The non-government organisation sector in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand  
As was evident in Chapter 2, the reorganisation of the health sector in 
2000 was intended to increase community involvement in health planning and 
address the inequities in access to healthcare (Ashton, 1999; Ashton et al., 2005; 
Fougere, 2001; Platform Trust, 2008).  However, very few rigorous studies have 
been undertaken to determine the merit or otherwise of these arrangements 
(Boston, 1996).  In addition, the mechanistic and individualist approach of 
Western healthcare systems has been particularly amenable to largely 
bureaucratic forms of organising such as the functional hierarchies of the DHBs in 
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Aotearoa\New Zealand (Deetz, 1992a, 1992b; McPhee, 1985; Mumby, 1988; 
Perrow, 1986).  These arrangements have exemplified the concerns of critical 
scholars that theoretical preoccupations with the stories and perspectives of the 
powerful in organisations has afforded some groups greater opportunities to 
represent themselves and institutionalise their preferred organisational practices 
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Cheney & Cloud, 2006; Deetz, 1992; Harter et al., 
2010; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Trethewey, 1997).   
Studies of “community care” and social interventions provided by non-
government mental health services have been rare throughout 20th century 
(Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001).  In addition, as Angela Trethewey (1997) has 
maintained, organisational communication and management scholars have, 
historically, privileged the rational, public and goal-directed nature of 
organisations, and this has resulted in a marginalisation of organisations 
concerned with “women’s work” (Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007; Holmer-Nadesan, 
1996; Trethewey, 1997).  This systemic devaluation of human service 
organisations, coupled with low legitimacy and chronic underfunding, has also 
further marginalised the poor, the displaced and those diagnosed with mental 
illness (Oliver, 1996; Sayce, 2000, 2001; Spandler, 2007). 
Global changes to systems of healthcare, such as the widespread 
valorisation of information communication technologies, and the effects of 
market economics have also had consequences for the economic survival, 
credibility and social legitimacy of the community sector (Fougere, 2001; Ganesh, 
2003, 2005; Harrison, 2010; Lewis, 2005; Platform Trust, 2006; Sanders, O’Brien, 
Tennant, Sokolowski, & Salamon, 2008; Zorn et al., 2011).  In addition, other 
sector groups frame the work that NGOs do, and the issues they are trying to 
address, very differently (Ganesh, 2005; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Trethewey, 
1997).   
This has created pressure on the community organisations to frame their 
organisational discourses, practices and issues as “fiscal efficiency”, “risk 
management” or technological deficits (Beck, 1992; O’Brien et al., 2009; N. Rose, 
1998; Sawyer, 2005; Zorn et al., 2011), rather than social inequity and systemic 
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exclusion in order to preserve organisational credibility (A. Brown, 2004; 
Czarniawska-Joerges & Joerges, 1988; Prichard, 2009).  It has also meant that 
organisational energy and attention has had to prioritise technological solutions 
to issues, contract driven practices and administration (Davis & Ashton, 2001; 
Ganesh, 2003; Ganesh & Barber, 2009; Harrison, 2010; O’Brien et al., 2009; Zorn 
et al., 2011).   
The nature of service outcomes and measures of effectiveness has been 
of particular concern for the community NGOs, and are typically accountable to 
multiple stakeholders and vulnerable to environmental pressures (Ganesh, 2005; 
Harrison, 2010; Zorn, 2011).  The importance of remaining accountable to their 
mission statements, constitutional values and service users has frequently been 
in opposition to financial and contracting accountabilities (Cheney, 1999, 2002; 
Fougere, 2001; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Ganesh, 2003; Zorn, 2011).  This, in 
turn, has created issues of organisational survival that have led to some 
organisations becoming “more concerned with justifying [their] own existence 
than in serving the public good” (Ganesh, 2003, p. 568).  Contracting and funding 
arrangements have also restricted organisational responsiveness and innovation 
(Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). 
Stephen Rose (2000), in his observations of the implementation of the 
empowerment agenda in a community action programme concluded that mental 
health services remained a “provider-driven, delivery based universe” (p. 409).  
He argued that most organisations operated under the illusory assumption that 
whatever services were provided would automatically be beneficial to “clients”. 
He criticised the measurement of service outputs such as access and availability, 
when outcomes,  indicative of the appropriateness or efficacy of a service in 
actually meeting people’s needs, were ignored.  Rose concluded that, 
disappointingly, the higher the level of service agency involvement in a person’s 
life the more likely that an “individual defect explanatory paradigm would 
prevail” (p. 410) and that service delivery systems would be protected (Kendrick, 
1997; S. Rose, 2000).   
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Similarly, the naturalised dynamics of socio-political power have not only 
determined how choices are made in social policy, but have also constructed 
notions of “worthiness” and “deservedness” (Schneider, 2010), and established 
the values link between the recipients of policy resources and the way these 
resources are provided (Davis & Ashton, 2001; Labonte, 1996; Leclercq-
Vandelannoitte, 2011; Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  In other social discourses, for 
example, the unemployed, the “mentally ill” and other “beneficiaries” have been 
positioned as less deserving than, say, the elderly (Powell, 2011; Repper & 
Perkins, 1995; S. Rose, 1972; Schneider, 2010; Stewart, 2007).  Consequently, 
organisations associated with marginalised groups have also had their 
opportunities to influence social policy or control resources similarly reduced, 
leaving them more likely to be on the receiving end of disabling policies and 
disempowering administrative arrangements (Oliver, 1998; Powell, 2011; 
Stewart, 2007).  This has, in turn, reduced organisational accountabilities to 
service users, and their expressed ideals of living good lives in the community of 
choice (MHAC, 2008; Mental Health Commission, 2011) in favour of more 
powerful interests and priorities (Ashton et al., 2005; Ganesh, 2005; Harrison, 
2010; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; McKnight, 1983; Oliver, 1999; Powell, 2011). 
While most social observers have assumed that the NGOs have provided 
community care, scholarly commentators have agreed that the ideas sustaining 
mental healthcare delivery have continued to be supported by pathology-based 
funding that has rationalised the dominance of clinical services (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2005, 2010; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Powell, 2011; S. Rose, 2000).   
Although shifting mental health services to the “community” has, to some 
extent, challenged the dominance of biomedical psychiatry, no coherent, 
coordinated system of alternative ways of organising the sector has yet been 
established to replace it (Durie, 1994; Mason, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 
1998; Warriner, 1999).  Other socio-political issues, such as the ethics of doing 
something to people, or for people, “for their own good”, alongside the use of 
coercion, have also largely gone unexplored (Anthony, 2006; Chamberlin, 1998; 
Minkowitz, 2006; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; Pearson, 2002).  All of which has 
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meant that, in their endeavours to realise their best intentions (Barber, 2005; 
Ganesh, 2007; Townsend, 1998) the community NGOs have needed to become 
politically active and astute (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Harrison, 2010; O’Brien et 
al., 2009; Trethewey, 1997).   
However, the NGO sector has typically struggled for voice in the medico-
centric dominance of key national forums, and the reluctance of government to 
engage with the sector effectively (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Joseph & Kearns, 
1999; Ministry of Social Development, 2001).  Therefore, representation of these 
organisations and their contribution as a source of innovative, cost -effective 
services has seriously diminished (Harrison, 2010; McMorland et al., 2008; 
O’Brien et al., 2009; Peters, 2010; van Hoof et al., 2000).  This has meant that the 
community organisations have continued to struggle to establish themselves 
politically as legitimate and credible alternatives to clinical services (Curtis & 
Hodge, 1994; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Grob, 1995; O’Brien et al., 2001; Ministry 
of Health, 2001a; Ministry of Social Development, 2001; van Hoof et al., 2000; 
Warriner, 1999, 2001).  
Defining community care  
Community service models emerged as the focus shifted to community 
locations and community ideals (Kukler et al., 1998; Roen, 1999; ) and ostensibly 
moved the focus of mental health service provision away from institutional 
facilities and ideologies towards the ordinary world of social practice (Joseph & 
Kearns, 1999; Ministry of Health, 2001; Sanders et al., 2008; Warriner, 2001).  
Service user literature, and much mental health policy, has emphasised the 
transformative power of community as a prerequisite for successful, competent 
living.  However, considerable ambiguity about the term community care has 
remained; as well as the goals of such a policy in mental health service provision 
(O’Hagan, 2009b; Pilgrim & Rogers 1999; Pinfold, 2000; Powell, 2011; Torrey & 
Wyzik, 2000; Van Hoof et al., 2000; Warren, 1995; Warriner, 2001; Yip, 2000).  
Kam- Shing Yip (2000) in his analysis of the evolution of community care in 
Britain and the USA has even referred to the third and current stage of 
community care as re-institutionalisation. 
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Critics have argued that, to be effective, mental health services need to 
support people to be not only in the community but of it.  As Kennedy, Horner 
and Newton (1989) expressed it: “Social contacts are at the heart of community 
integration; without repeated social contacts an individual has little chance of 
gaining acceptance by members of a community” (p. 58).  In other words, 
“whatever a person is doing now needs to be connected in some meaningful and 
motivating” (Warriner, 2001, p. 21) way with social practices that promote 
participation, contribution and the opportunity to make changes in their life and 
circumstances (Carling & Allot, 1999; Carling et al.,1999; Coleman, 1999; Lapsley, 
2002; Sayce, 2000; Spandler, 2007).   
The recovery vision for Aotearoa\New Zealand described a society where 
“people with mental illness have personal power, full participation in their 
communities and access to a fully developed range of recovery-oriented 
services” (Gawith & Abrams, 2006, p. 142).  However, little research has been 
undertaken on the effectiveness of efforts to implement a recovery orientation 
into organisational practice (Anthony et al., 2003; Barber, 2005; Bonney & 
Stickley, 2008; Davidson et al., 2006).   
The construction of recovery oriented organisations: Organisational 
transformation  
Scholars and commentators have emphasised that a recovery orientation 
in services would require fundamental shifts in how psychiatric disorders are 
understood, and in the mission, design, and delivery of mental health 
organisations (Anthony, 1993; Central Potential, 2008; Goldsack et al., 2005; 
Jacobson & Curtis, 2000; Onken et al., 2000).  Many have argued that key to a 
shift towards a recovery orientation would be the increased visibility of people 
with lived experience of serious psychological distress as collaborators and 
leaders in service design and delivery (Central Potential, 2008; Chamberlin, 1988, 
2004; Goldsack et al., 2005; O’Hagan, 2009c; Pearson, 2000, 2004; Jacob Read, 
2003a; Warriner, 2009).   
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How recovery is constructed and expressed in everyday organisational 
realities is the key that connects my research questions.  Jan Wallcraft (2009) has 
recently commented that, by now, it should be “uncontroversial that recovery is 
possible and desirable, and should be the main purpose of mental health 
services”.  However, she and others go on to caution that the reality of service 
delivery has continued to emphasise functional maintenance rather than 
recovery (O’Hagan, 2009; Turner-Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002; Wallcraft, 2009) 
and, in general, treatment responses have continued to demonstrate 
professional preferences rather than user choice (Duncan et al., 2004; Gawith & 
Abrams, 2006; Hubble et al., 1999; O’Hagan, 2009c; Warriner, 2009).   
Recent literature identified common themes for recovery discourses; 
particularly the nature of what is helpful, or not, in mental health organisations 
(Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Mancini et al., 2005; O’Hagan et al., 2012; Onken et al., 
2000; Turner-Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002).  Bonney and Stickley (2008), for 
example, undertook a meta-analysis of all British literature related to recovery in 
mental health services over the 20th century.  They compared all relevant texts 
produced by three distinct stakeholder groups: service users, health care 
providers and policy makers.   
From their analysis, they determined six broad domains of recovery in 
service provision: (1) identity; (2) the service provision agenda; (3) the social 
domain; (4) power and control; (5) hope and optimism, and (6) risk and 
responsibility.  However, stakeholders differed significantly in how they defined 
recovery and experienced these domains.  In particular, there were major 
distinctions between constructions of a recovery orientation, as envisaged by 
service users, with those of more powerful stakeholders (Bonney & Stickley, 
2008; Davidson et al., 2006; O’Hagan, 2009; Swarbrick, 2006; Wallcraft, 2009).   
Nevertheless, some consensus about the characteristics of a recovery 
orientation in mental health services emerged, and provided an important 
counter to biomedical orthodoxy (Farkas, et al., 2005; Jacobson & Curtis, 2000; 
Lapsley, 2004; Onken et al., 2002; Salyers, Tsai, & Stultz, 2007).  In New Zealand, 
these are documented in several texts authored by service users (Banks et al., 
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2004; Central Potential, 2008; Leibrich, 1998, 2000; O’Hagan, 1999, 2001) and 
some in collaboration with others in the field (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Goldsack 
et al., 2005; MHAC, 2008).  All these texts describe a recovery-orientation in 
services that is characterised by a hopeful, optimistic and holistic approach to 
care and support.  This construction prioritised the enhancement of personal and 
environmental well-being and encouraged the involvement of friends, families 
and natural supports in the community (Banks et al., 2004; Central Potential, 
2008; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Goldsack et al., 2005; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; 
Lapsley, 2004).  In addition, these authors promoted a range of flexible service 
models within robust community networks related to employment, housing, and 
social participation (Banks et al., 2004; Barber, 2005; Central Potential, 2008; 
Farkas et al., 2007; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002).   
Service user authors, and their allies, emphasised recovery approaches 
that acknowledged the unique circumstances of each person rather than the one 
size fits all service response that has generated the most resistance and 
frustration (Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2005; Central Potential, 2008; Coleman, 
1999; Leibrich, 2000; O’Hagan, 1994).  Proponents also anticipated that recovery 
oriented services would be delivered in a range of environments including 
ordinary community settings (MHAC, 2008; Warriner, 2001).  They also insisted 
that a recovery-orientation requires multiple, navigable and negotiated 
pathways into services rather than compulsive, coercive and trauma based 
access that has remained the norm (Chamberlin, 1998; Goldsack et al., 2005; 
Minkowitz, 2006; O’Hagan, 1999; Onken et al., 2000; Pearson, 2000; Rogers, 
Pilgrim, & Lacey, 1993; Slade, 2009). 
Commentators generally agreed that recovery requires a range of 
treatment responses.  Pilgrim and Rogers (1999) have described a “broad and 
unresolved tension” (p. 121) between physical treatments such as medication 
and talking-based or conversational therapies.  Others, too, have advocated for 
responses that encourage people to reframe their stories in more helpful ways 
and allow them to “get on with [their] lives” (Central Potential, 2008, p. 24).  
These tensions have persisted despite service users’ unequivocal assertion that 
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social support, including peer support and counselling, are essential to recovery 
(Central Potential, 2008; Leibrich, 2000; Mosher & Vallone, 1995; O’Hagan, 1999; 
Pearson, 2004; Peters, 2009).  Specifically, service users have called for a renewal 
of “the art and skill of providing attentive support to people in crisis” (Central 
Potential, 2008, p. 21) so that they may feel secure within accepting 
environments at times of extreme vulnerability.   
In general, the existence of supportive relationships, meaningful activities 
and effective traditional and alternative treatments were identified as influential 
in facilitating recovery (Banks et al., 2004; Central Potential, 2008; MHAC, 2008; 
among many others).  Commentators argued, therefore, that not only should 
mental health services be redesigned but professionals should be retrained to 
more effectively communicate hopefulness and support people’s efforts to get 
on with life beyond illness (Banks et al., 2004; Beck, 1992; Central Potential, 
2008; Goldsack et al., 2005; O’Hagan, 2001, 2004 Slade, 2009; Torrey & Wyzik, 
2000).   
Service users have claimed that their participation in service design, 
delivery and organisational transformation has been dependent on how 
removed they are from active care and treatment in clinical services (Read, S. 
Rose, 2000).  Alongside a shift in professional responses, therefore, they have 
argued for the establishment of a range of peer support models to be available 
within services including crisis response (Gawith & Abrams, 2006; Goldsack et al., 
2005; O’Hagan, 2009c; Mosher & Boyle, 2004; Peters, 2009; Repper & Carter, 
2011).   
In general, service user authors and others have actively rejected many of 
the defining features of most contemporary mental health services, and most 
have noted that current mental health service environments and common 
practices actually constrain recovery (Anthony, 1993; Mancini et al., 2005; Onken 
et al., 2000; Rapp, 1998; Turner-Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002).  In addition, the 
contribution of the community sector to recovery and social well-being has 
largely been undervalued and its potential untapped (Harrison, 2010; Ministry of 
Social Development, 2001; Peters, 2010; Warriner, 2001, 2010).  These 
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circumstances have maintained despite commentators clearly articulating the 
values and features of organisational discourses and practices that would 
support recovery (Turner-Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002).   
The significance of values in organisational practices  
Organisational values are embedded in all aspects of organisational 
communicative practices, systems and structures including recruitment, training, 
performance management and service delivery (Cheney, 1999, 2002; Frumkin & 
Andre-Clark, 2000; Stewart, 2007).  The critical service outcomes and values of 
the community organisations, expressed in their mission and vision statements, 
have largely included enhancing peoples’ capacity to live well in desirable 
environments and to support their transitions into ordinary life within a 
community; all of which are part of health and social policy (Ministry of Health, 
2005; MHAC, 2008).  In other words, they have intended to enact the values of a 
recovery orientation in their service delivery, as well as aspiring to a more 
enriched, humane and socially equitable society where larger social values are 
enacted and ideals made liveable (Ganesh, 2007; MHAC, 2008; Warriner, 2010).  
However, the ways in which organisational values are expressed through 
mission statements and Trust Deeds, have frequently been in conflict with less 
explicit, underlying and extra-organisational expressions such as policy frames 
that have prioritised some goals and constrained others (Cheney, 2002; Ganesh, 
2003, 2005; Frumkin & Andre-Clark,2000; Zorn et al., 2011).  These conflicts have 
also been evident in the relationships among the NGOs, the DHBs, and the 
Government (Harrison, 2010; Platform Trust, 2008).   
The implementation of national and sector policy has generally 
determined the perspectives and interests that have privileged some values over 
others and some populations over others (Repper & Perkins, 1995; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993; Stewart, 2007).  A significant example has been the imposition of 
managerial paradigms and a market model on community organisations 
(Lammers et al., 2003; Lewis, 2005; Platform Trust, 2008; Stewart, 2007).  The 
associated values of efficiency, competition and performance, have contrasted, 
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and often conflicted with, more traditional community paradigms, which have 
stressed cooperation and trust; as well as more contemporary social service 
values such as consumer rights, cultural appropriateness, and service 
responsiveness (Central Potential, 2008; Durie, 1985; O’Hagan, 1999; Schneider 
& Ingram 1993).  These values conflicts have meant that community NGOs have 
struggled to establish a niche and identity, distinct from the more dominant 
clinical services, in order to become recovery-oriented (MHAC, 2008; Warriner, 
2001). 
Developing an identity and niche for the community non-government 
organisations  
Researchers have described organisational identity in terms of both 
“continuity and essence” (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 109).  While accepting this 
fluidity, organisational identity is typically anchored to how organisations make 
sense of themselves and how others perceive them; it involves what is core, 
distinctive, and enduring about an organisation’s character (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001; Cheney et al., 2004; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1994; Dey & 
Teasdale, 2013).  Therefore, identity not only expresses the preferred values of 
an organisation, but is also a determinant of how organisational members act, 
interpret, negotiate and construct their organisational reality and relationships 
with the external, social world (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).   
Some commentators have noted that the emergence of a distinct 
identity, niche and unique subject position for the community NGOs has been 
made difficult because the development of the sector has lacked a robust 
definition of “core values, an explicit set of shared beliefs and philosophical 
foundations upon which they can be built” (Warriner, 2010, p. 15).  In addition, 
these organisations have inevitably been situated within the larger framework of 
service organisations, including the history and traditions of relationships with 
other organisations, government agencies, funding bodies and local 
communities; all of which have had significant influence over the evolution of the 
sector (Davis & Ashton, 2001; Harrison, 2010; MHAC, 2008; Mental Health 
Commission, 1998; O’Brien et al., 2009; Warriner, 2010).   
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As mentioned previously, recent policy efforts, including a greater 
emphasis on responsiveness to service users, their well-being and aspirations 
(Central Potential, 2008; Ministry of Health, 2005; Mental Health Commission, 
2007b), appeared to signal the need for organisational change in the mental 
health sector.  On the surface, these would appear to have heralded a unique 
niche for the community NGOs.  But just how such a sector transformation might 
be achieved has generated considerable debate, in which community 
organisations have had to navigate powerful expectations and priorities imposed 
by funders and clinical service providers (Frumkin & Clark, 2000; Harrison, 2010; 
Platform Trust, 2008; Warriner, 2001, 2010).  Inevitably, these pressures have 
required considerable manoeuvring as the NGOs have struggled to avoid 
compromising their own ideals (Ganesh, 2003, 2005).  This, in turn, has affected 
the capacity and direction of organisational change, the enacting of a valued 
identity and the establishment of a unique niche for the community sector.  
Barriers to recovery-oriented services, organisational change and sector 
transformation 
Scholars and other commentators have identified many barriers to 
recovery within current mental health services (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Lapsley 
& Nikora, 2002; O’Hagan, 1999; Perkins & Repper, 2013; S. Rose, 2000).  These 
have included paternalistic and coercive treatment systems (Edgley, Stickley & 
Masterson, 2006; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; Pescosolido et al., 1999; Mancini et 
al., 2005); indifferent professionals and the negative side effects of medication 
(Chamberlin, 1998; Mancini et al., 2005), and widespread stigma evident in both 
services and communities (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Central Potential, 2008; 
Chamberlin, 1998, 2004; Sayce, 2000; Salyers, 2007).  Furthermore, the systemic 
decontextualisation of people’s experiences within services, especially clinical 
services, has not only increased their vulnerability to psychological distress, but 
also their susceptibility to “physical illness, a shorter lifespan, under-
employment, poor relationships and lower psychological resilience” (Central 
Potential, 2008, p. 11).   
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In addition, Mary O’Hagan (2004, 2009b) has noted that multiple versions 
of recovery discourses have been operating within mental health systems 
worldwide.  She, and others, commentators have referred to the equation of 
rehabilitation with recovery as the watered-down version, and has confined 
organisational practices to ameliorating symptoms and helping people overcome 
functional limitations despite their disability (Curtis, 1997; Deegan, 1988; 
O’Hagan, 2008, 2009b; Pearson, 2000; Swarbrick, 2006).  This version has 
focussed on individuals learning to manage stress more effectively, become less 
vulnerable to illness and better able to cope through developing social 
competence or “independence” (Curtis, 1997; Fisher, 1994; Jacobson & Curtis, 
2000; O’Hagan, 2004, 209b, Swarbrick, 2006).   
Many advocacy groups have also expressed alarm about the 
incompatibility between the recovery vision, and acceptance of the use of force 
in treatment services (Anthony, 2006; Lord & Dufort, 1996; Minkowitz, 2006; 
O’Brien & Golding, 2003).  They been angered that, despite widespread concern 
about all forms of coercion in psychiatry, the legitimation and authority of the 
medical model has provided an agenda for coercive treatment (Anthony, 2006; 
Chamberlin, 1998; Golding, 2003; Lord & Dufort, 1996; Minkowitz, 2006; O’Brien 
et al., 2003; Pescosolido et al., 1999).  Although, Anthony (2006), among others, 
has argued that there can be no such thing as "forced recovery" the professional 
literature has rarely acknowledged the issue of iatrogenic harm and compulsory 
treatment has remained a feature of Western mental health systems (Anthony, 
2006; Breggin, 1993; Chamberlin, 1998; Edgley et al., 2006; Grob, 2004; 
Minkowitz, 2006; Pescosolido et al., 1999).    
However, perhaps the most important, barrier to establishing a recovery 
orientation in organisational practices has been the inevitable influence of extra-
organisational forces, which transcend organisational boundaries and facilitate 
the transfer of ideas, rationalities and norms throughout an organisational field 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Lammers, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Scott, 
1991).  These constructions become embedded in organisational realities and 
display discursive and regulatory continuity over time and space (Creed et al., 
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2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Foucault, 1978; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
2001).  Scholars have referred to this process of creeping uniformity, the spread 
of particular ideas and practices throughout an organisational field, as 
institutionalisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Issues of institutionalisation, and institutional change, underpin my 
second and third research questions because the degree to which mental health 
organisations participate in, and identify with, naturalised discourses may be 
significant barriers in their efforts to become recovery oriented.  In the next 
section, I examine evidence that suggests the mental health sector has been, and 
continues to be, institutionalised and the implications this has had for 
embedding a recovery-orientation in mental health organisations.  
Institutions: Persistence, legitimacy and change  
Institutional logics can be seen as the critical link between organisational 
communications and practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Lammers, 2011; Reay & 
Hinings, 2005).  This has been particularly important for the community 
organisations, where there are explicit tensions between organisational ideals 
and values with the expectations of society, and more powerful organisational 
arrangements (Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004).  A 
critical discussion of institutional dynamics is included here, rather than in the 
problematic of organising and society, because institutionalised discourse and 
practices are expressed in organisational rationalities, stories and 
communication practices (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a, 2007b; Creed et al., 2002; 
Mumby, 1987; Weick, 1995, 2005).  It is through these processes that dominant 
ways of thinking and acting become established, naturalised and persistent 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Lammers et al., 2003; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
2001; Suddaby, 2006).  It is this everyday ordinariness that is most relevant to 
this research question.  However, it is also in everyday, organisational practice 
that the spaces for resistance, disruption and the destabilisation of institutional 
authority emerge (Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 2005; Trethewey, 1997).  
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Much previous scholarship on institutional work has focussed on the 
establishment and maintenance of institutional legitimacy (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Philips et al., 2004; Scott, 2001), rather than a 
critical examination of how alternative discourses, new actors and new subject 
positions might emerge to bring about organisational or systemic change (Deetz 
& Mumby, 1990; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Seo & Creed, 
2002).  The conventional body of institutional literature has produced many 
descriptive accounts of institutionalised behaviours and how these are 
embedded and have endured across organisations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Baum 
& Oliver, 1996; Douglas, 1986; Jepperson, 1991; Lammers, 2011; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1994).  But, this scholarship doesn’t appear 
to have taken the next, critical step and investigated the ways in which 
institutions represent powerful and privileged interests that have worked to 
resist challenges and disruptive practices that might destabilise that power 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 1988) .   
Critical scholars, therefore, have gone beyond mere descriptions of 
institutionalised practices as habits and routines, and explored how these have 
been instrumental in maintaining and privileging the interests of some groups 
and generally determining “the way things are done around here” (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Latour, 1987; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 2008; N. Rose & 
Miller 1992).   
The fundamental characteristics of institutions  
The basis of institutionalism is the proposition that under certain 
circumstances organisations will come to resemble one another in their 
structures and practices due to a host of pressures acting on them collectively.  
This is referred to as institutional isomorphism (Barbour & Lammers, 2007; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).  
New institutional theory has emphasised the quest for organisational legitimacy 
as the basis of such organisational behaviour (Ganesh, 2003; Golant & Sillence, 
2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2008) rather than simple resource 
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dependency as the driver of conformity for organisations within an 
organisational field (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
John Lammers (2011) has argued that institutional logics function as 
patterns of rules that provide the conceptual and empirical link between the 
“predominantly macro world of institutions and the micro world of 
organisational communication” (p. 154).  In addition, scholars have been 
concerned to incorporate within the notion of institutions, “all of the buildings, 
technologies, social arrangements, as well as the range of discursive practices 
accessed by those within a particular field” (Deetz, 1992, p. 126).  The distinction 
is important, especially for the mental health field where, typically, institutions 
have been thought of as primarily material i.e. large facilities or hospitals on the 
outskirts of towns.  
In other words, commentators other than institutional scholars are now 
recognising that “institutionalisation is not only about the buildings and 
locations; it is about how things are done, how support is provided, who gets to 
choose and who has the power” (Johns, 2010, p. iv).  They represent, therefore, 
powerful mechanisms for social control and have proved to be much more 
persistent, “insidious and pervasive than mere buildings” (Johns, 2010, p. iv).   
Defined in terms of both their material and symbolic formations, 
institutions share several important features.  First, they advantage people who 
are already powerful in society and enable them to control access to roles and 
positions that place them in inequitably strong positions to influence the 
construction of organisational realities (Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Deetz, 1992; 
Hwang & Powell, 2009; Scott, 2008).  This has been achieved largely through 
institutional control of professional training and accreditation.  
Second, through their professional bases and presence in academic 
inquiry, institutions produce and control the legitimate “body of knowledge” for 
an organisational field (Scott, 2008).  This has meant that alternative ways of 
knowing or explanatory models have struggled to gain traction (Broadfoot & 
Munshi, 2007a).  Third institutions have powerful implications for organisational 
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behaviour and conformity (Barbour & Lammers, 2007; Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Di 
Maggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Treichler, 1987; Zorn et al., 2011).  
Reay and Hinings (2005) have noted that, central to institutional theory, 
are the powerful mechanisms through which institutions act to maintain the 
status quo, and to restore stability to perturbations in an institutional field.  In 
particular, organisations experience pressure to conform to institutional beliefs 
and practices because there are significant costs for non-compliance (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1991; Selznick, 1984, 1996).  This has 
enabled institutions to establish relationships of dependence, among groups 
with differing goals and interests, who are competing for access to finite 
resources (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Davis & Ashton, 2001).   
According to Maguire and Hardy (2009), the persistence of an institution 
relies on the interconnected stability of three interlocking aspects or pillars 
“through which legitimacy is established and conformity secured” (p. 149).  
These constitute the regulatory, cognitive and normative components of 
organisational life (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992; Scott, 2001, 2008).  
Whether working separately, or in conjunction, the pillars of institutionalisation 
represent environmental pressures that work to produce homogeneity across 
organisations (Hoffman, 1999; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008; Wicks, 
2001).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who described this process of 
homogenisation as isomorphism, argued that it is not a rational pursuit but 
rather a perceived need for political or social legitimacy.  
Therefore, despite being downplayed by subsequent institutional scholars 
(Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), DiMaggio and Powell, (1983, 1991) recognised from the 
first, that the exploitation of power, or coercion, is a critical aspect of 
isomorphism and organisational control.  It is only recently, however, that a 
critical lens has been applied to the study of institutional dynamics, particularly 
the destabilisation of institutional power and legitimacy (Caronna, 2004; 
Lawrence et al., 2011; Lounsbury, 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999; Mumby, 2008; Phillips et al., 2004).  
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Institutional persistence and the institutional pillars  
Most contemporary scholars agree that institutional persistence, and the 
similarity of organisational forms, behaviour and communicative practices is less 
about the rational pursuit of operational efficiency, and more about the adoption 
of institutional strategies, structures, and processes to ensure organisational 
credibility and survival (Barbour & Lammers 2007; Ganesh, 2003; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977,1991; Noir & Walsham, 2007; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).   
Organisational behaviours may be subject to the authority of one institutional 
pillar (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2001, 2008); or involve the interaction of all three at 
a given place and time (Wicks, 2001).    
The legislative pillar of an institution refers to the various regulatory 
frameworks that confer authority on specified agents (including organisations, 
administrative agencies and government bodies) to formally constrain behaviour, 
establish rules, police conformity and, if necessary, coerce compliance (Caronna, 
2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1991; Scott, 2001).  For 
example, regulatory pressures have increased standardisation in mental health 
NGOs who are required to adopt institutionalised discourses, rules and 
procedures in order to preserve their legitimacy and funding streams (Golant & 
Sillence, 2007; Scott, 2008; O’Brien et al, 2009; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; 
Ganesh, 2003).  Legislation and regulation have, therefore, directly shaped 
organisational forms, and their accountability to other stakeholders (Zorn et al., 
2011), and seriously compromised the capacity of these organisations to 
determine and manage their own affairs and develop a unique and independent 
identity (Ganesh, 2003; O’Brien et al, 2009).   
Regulation, however, is founded on rationales that draw on particular, 
and legitimised, bodies of knowledge; articulating the vocabularies in which 
issues can be reasoned and argued about (Latour, 1987; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; 
Miller & N. Rose, 1988; S. Rose & Black, 1985, 1988).  These, then, form the 
interwoven discursive arrangements of bodies of knowledge, which form the 
cognitive pillar of an institution (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Nelson Phillips and his 
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colleagues (2004) noted that it is these discursive aspects that bind institutional 
knowledge, structures and action into conventions that become self-policing.  
The strength of the cognitive pillar refers to the coherence of its 
knowledge bases and discourses (Fairclough, 1993; Caronna, 2004; Oliver, 1992; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  In other words, the capacity of an institution to endure 
is less dependent on the mere accumulation of its texts, but rather the extent to 
which these texts and discourses present a structurally unified perspective that 
then becomes reified and taken for granted (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips et 
al., 2004).  In this way, the orthodoxies of rationalities and meanings are created 
from interdependent collections of texts, produced and distributed by particular, 
and powerful, discourse communities (Phillips et al., 2004; Fairclough, 1992; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009).   
Texts produced by professionals, and shaped by their institutional 
repertoires, represent an “order of discourse” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 135); they 
reinforce dominant rationalities and claims of expertise through referencing the 
“archaeology” of this knowledge (Foucault, 1972; Mumby, 1988; Phillips et al., 
2004).  Accumulated texts create a coherent body of institutional knowledge 
when they converge in their descriptions and explanations of social “realities” 
such as mental illness (Phillip et al., 2004).  Similarly, organisational and 
professional practices are reproduced when institutional texts draw on and 
reinforce each other in well-established ways.   
Institutional control of dominant discourses, through the production of 
texts, has therefore determined the prevailing orthodoxy (Hoffman, 1999; 
Phillips et al., 2004; Scott, 2001).  Biomedicine, for example, has created a highly 
structured and coherent body of knowledge because the biomedical professions 
control the production of, and access to, expertise and knowledge (Bracken & 
Thomas, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 1988).  In addition, the 
professions and associated groups have built common vocabularies, concepts 
and terms of reference that have maintained and privileged their perspectives of 
the world, while excluding others outside the professional enclave (Fairclough, 
1992; Foucault, 1970, 1972; Koenig, 2000; Lord & Dufort, 1996; O’Hagan, 1994, 
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1999; Pearson, 2004).  As Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1988) contended, the 
“mental lives of citizens, their emotions, capacities and propensities have 
become subject to new forms of expert knowledge and professional engineers of 
the soul”(p. 171). 
Critical scholars have noted that the routine transfer of institutional 
discourses and practices throughout an organisational field, such as mental 
health, has enabled control at a distance of organisational communication and 
practices (Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2002; Mumby, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 
2005; Scott, 2008).  In this way, normative institutional pressures have 
established the behaviour of organisations through the naturalisation of societal 
expectations, norms and moral obligations (Deetz & Mumby, 1990; Foucault, 
1973a; Mumby, 1997; Sillence, 2001).  The normative pillar of an institution, 
therefore, has encouraged conformity by determining and monitoring what is 
considered appropriate practice (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Wicks, 2001; Caronna, 
2004; Hoffman et al., 2002; Scott, 2001; Wicks, 2001).   
Normalised discourses and conceptual frameworks are embedded in 
organisational and national policy frameworks, strategic plans and service 
specifications (Cheney et al., 2004; Kline, 2006; Philo, 1996).  People employed in 
an organisational field are formally socialised into normative discourses and 
practices through training in their profession, orientation into organisational 
cultures, or more informally through professional associations, conferences, and 
publications (Ganesh, 2003; Greenwood et al., 2002; Zorn et al., 2011).  
Historically, in mental health organisations, normative institutional power, as 
well as legislative power, has mandated professional standardisation.  This has 
led to the naturalised assumption that “professionals know best” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2006; Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Foucault, 1972, 1973; Scott, 2008).   
Globally, particular configurations of organisational knowledge and 
practices in mental health services have prioritised certain organisational 
activities; while others, that might support alternative discourses such as 
recovery, have been precluded or devalued (Alvesson & Willmott, 2006; Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992; Philips et al., 2004).  The growth of institutionalised 
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managerialism, for example, in healthcare environments has promulgated the 
spread of evaluative and normative standards such as an insistence on 
accountability and outcomes measurement (Alvesson & Willmott 2006; Hwang & 
Powell, 2009; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).  Other managerialist values such as 
“efficiency” and “quality” management have, also, increasingly permeated 
organisational cultures and discursive practices in public health systems 
(Lammers et al., 2003; Zorn et al., 2011).   
Many critics have warned, however, that these forms of “accounting” 
have reduced knowledge and practices to standardised actions, the efficacy of 
which then becomes unquestioned (Scott, 2008; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001).  
An important consequence has been the increasing propensity of market-based 
discourses and rationale in health services alongside correspondingly narrow 
expectations of market based solutions to organisational issues (Ganesh, 2003).   
The institutions and non-government organisations: The costs of non-
compliance   
Institutions have well developed mechanisms, routines and ritualised 
responses that associate non-conformity with increased “costs” in different ways 
(Jepperson, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  These represent various forms of 
generalised, defensive work that institutions employ as they adjust to and absorb 
perturbations in the organisational field.  Non-compliance has generally created 
significant economic risk for organisations, not only directly in terms of resources 
but also in terms of reduced legitimacy and access to the resources that come 
with legitimacy (Ganesh, 2003; Philips et al., 2004).  Publicly funded 
organisations have tended to be especially susceptible to institutional pressures, 
and this vulnerability has limited their ability, for example, to act as advocates for 
social or policy change.  Therefore the notion of their organisational 
independence has largely been a “myth” (Ganesh, 2005).  
There are also costs for non-compliance with the cognitive pillar of 
institutional authority.  This has meant that establishing and championing 
alternative discourses and practices, creating new ways of thinking and 
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“publishing” new texts has required considerable, strategic effort (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Sillence, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002).  These difficulties have also 
contributed to the naturalisation of organisational talk and behaviours that 
express narrative coherence, rather than more maverick reflections of 
organisational reality.  Alternative narratives and explanatory models are thus 
obscured or made to seem implausible (Prichard, 2005).   
Managing issues of compliance and competing accountabilities, have 
been particularly difficult for healthcare organisations positioned as subordinate 
to, and dependent on, institutionally powerful clinical services.  Their ability to 
remain accountable to their constituents, demonstrate their effectiveness and 
advocate for alternative approaches, has frequently been compromised by the 
expectations and requirements of these more powerful organisations (Ganesh, 
2003; Stewart, 2007).  In many cases, subordinate organisations have struggled 
to command alternative discourses, such as recovery, and have had to make 
strategic compromises such as the adoption of market, managerial and clinical 
vocabularies, rather than resist or challenge these (Ganesh, 2003, 2005; MHAC, 
2008; Stewart, 2007; Tennant et al., 2008).  This has frequently led to these 
organisations becoming “more concerned with justifying [their] own existence 
than in serving the public good” (Ganesh, 2003, p. 568). 
Institutional literature has tended to be preoccupied with how 
communications and behaviours are embedded and endure across 
organisational fields (Barley & Tolbert, 1997).  In contrast, institutional change 
requires significant disruption of institutional thinking and practices before 
alternative explanatory models, meanings, discourses and texts can become 
established (Colomy, 1998; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992; Scott et al., 
2000; Seo & Creed, 2002).  Destabilising institutional arrangements requires 
concerted and strategic challenges by multiple stakeholders, in order to be 
effective and sustainable (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Scott et al., 2000; Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Sillence, 2001; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
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Institutional disruption and destabilising the institutions  
Instigating transformative, sustained institutional change is difficult 
(Freire, 1970; C. Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Little scholarly attention 
has focussed on the conditions or processes of deinstitutionalisation (Clemente 
& Roulet, 2015; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Lawrence & Hardy, 2004; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Scott et al., 2000).  Typically, it has been 
less powerful, or marginalised, groups whose interests are misaligned with 
existing rules, structures and practices that have attempted to disrupt 
institutional arrangements.  But there has been even less academic focus on 
what happens when institutional outsiders attempt to establish alternative 
discourses and bring about organisational and social change (Cooren, 2001; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  In addition, there has been little research, theoretical 
or empirical, that has investigated how institutions respond to alternative 
discourses and engage in defensive institutional work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Oliver, C., 1992).  
The first challenge for destabilisation of the institutional pillars, therefore, 
has been to problematise current institutional practices, meanings and 
interpretative closure (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 1997, 2005, 2008; 
Oliver, 1992; Prichard, 2005; Zorn et al., 2000).  Second, a major contextual or 
environmental change (Freire, 1970; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Zoller, 2011) such 
as a public inquiry can be influential in initiating disruption of institutionalised 
practices and thinking.   
However, causal links between public inquiries, institutional change and 
social policy reform have been notoriously difficult to attribute and, in general, 
government inquiries have tended to “support the legitimacy of social 
institutions and extend the hegemony of prevailing system supportive 
ideologies” (A. Brown, 2000, p. 48).  Other scholars have described them as last 
resort ceremonies (Emerson, 1981) and ritual cleansings (Prichard, 2005), which 
have reinforced dominant perspectives by offering ideologically acceptable 
interpretations of events that reassert the legitimacy of social institutions (A. 
Brown, 2000, 2004; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Prichard, 2005; Suchman, 1995).  
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All of this has meant that the most significant issue for institutional, and 
thereby organisational, transformation has been making the discourses of 
change “stick”.  Embedding systemic organisational change means new 
discourses have to, not only successfully compete with more dominant 
discourses, but become stable and normalised at a social level (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Zald & Berger, 1978; Zoller, 2005; Zoller & Fairhurst, 
2007).   
These difficulties have meant that organisational change efforts, have 
typically been local, situated and framed as resistance (Cheney et al., 2004; 
Cheney & Cloud, 2006; Mumby, 1997).  Through such efforts, less powerful 
groups have endeavoured to create organisational spaces where meanings 
become contestable and alternative possibilities for action emerge (Alvesson et 
al., 2008; Cheney et al., 2004; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Morrill et al., 2003; 
Mumby, 2005).   
However, the efficacy of resistance efforts has been contingent on the 
capacity of individuals, or groups, to engage strategically with alternative 
discourses, establish new subject positions and produce new texts  that 
challenge the privileged position of stakeholders in the dominant system 
(Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Mumby, 2005; Zoller & Fairhurst, 2007).  Dennis 
Mumby (2005), for example, has warned that many acts of resistance become 
mere reactivity when no alternative explanatory models are framed or explored.   
Maguire and Hardy (2009) made a useful distinction between insider and 
outsider initiated change efforts in order to explain the apparent lack of 
effective, substantive institutional change.  They defined insiders as 
organisational actors who are embedded within a field and who, therefore, have 
limited agency but who also, at least to some extent, would be threatened by the 
abandonment of existing institutional knowledge or practices (Colomy, 1998; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Morrill et al., 2003).  In contrast, outsiders were 
defined as those for whom the status quo represented a threat or problem, and 
who are, therefore, more engaged with the benefits of change (Everett, 1994; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009).   
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These distinctions are particularly important for people with lived 
experiences of serious psychological distress who have been relentlessly outside 
the dominant discourses of mental health and mental illness.  Similarly, the 
community NGOs are also frequently in this position as they continue to 
advocate for their own niche, legitimacy and identity within the sector.   
Insider-initiated change efforts  
Changing systems from within has tended to favour gradual evolution 
rather than revolution and resulted in organisations being “restructured” rather 
than re-constructed, or transformed (Colomy, 1998; Everett, 1994; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009).  Therefore, these efforts have typically resulted in changes that are 
elaborative rather than reconstructive (Colomy, 1998).  Institutional features 
such as knowledge bases, arrangements of power and privileged interests have 
remained intact (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).   
Where such change efforts have been instigated they have generally 
been motivated by economic advantage, and powerful actors in privileged 
subject positions, who may do things differently or even shift roles, have 
remained dominant (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  In other words, insider efforts at institutional change 
have usually been framed merely as system improvements and have left 
powerful professionals as key policy and service change agents (Ashton et al., 
2005; O’Hagan, 2009).   
This kind of restructuring has been evident in Western mental health 
reforms over several decades, particularly with the shift to community-based 
services (Durie, 1999; Joseph & Kearns, 1999; Mason, 1996; Sullivan, 1994; van 
Hoof et al., 2000; Warren, 1997).  The formal adoption of a recovery philosophy 
in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services also demonstrated some classic 
features of insider change efforts (O’Hagan, 2004, 2012; Pearson, 2002, 2004; 
Warriner, 2010).  This has been particularly notable in the ways which the 
discourse of recovery has been implemented in service development and policy 
(Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009; Pearson, 2000, 2004).   
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Similarly, Jan Wallcraft (2009), commented that proposed changes to the 
English system, and the drive to accommodate various interests has resulted in a 
diluted version of recovery that was limited to the ways in which mental health 
services could be improved and updated, but did not seriously challenge medical 
diagnostic and treatment concepts nor the systems and structures that 
supported their institutionalisation (Anthony, 1993; Banks et al., 2004; Barker, 
2003; Becker et al., 1998; O’Hagan, 1999, 2004).   
Notwithstanding the limited efficacy of insider change efforts (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) psychiatric orthodoxy has faced 
challenges to its legitimacy from “mavericks” inside psychiatry. As previously 
discussed, these insider activists have included, the anti-, critical- and post-
psychiatry movements (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Foucault, 1973a, 1973b; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 2009).  These mavericks have contested the authoritative 
legacy of theory and practice in mental healthcare worldwide (Frances, 2013; 
Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Jureidini, 2012; Moncrieff, 2008; Mosher & Boyle, 2004).  
Bracken and Thomas (2001, 2010), important proponents of the post-psychiatry 
movement, commented that “by challenging the notion that psychiatric theory is 
neutral, objective, and disinterested, post-psychiatry [has weakened] the case 
for medical control of the process” (p. 726).  This has led other academic 
psychiatrists to conclude that psychiatry can no longer claim a privileged position 
in mental health care (Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Pilgrim, 2007).   
However, in practice, this claim seems to be premature (Argyle, 2005; 
Frances, 2013; Mountain & Shah, 2008; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2008; Pilgrim, 
2007). Many scholars, concerned that insider reforms typically leave powerful 
interests in place, have noted the risks in attempting to enable social change by 
engaging with what already exists (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 2005).  
Heather Zoller (2011), among others, has been wary of challenges to health 
discourses that have failed to address the social and political roots of health 
disparities and have tended to protect vested interests.  Reay and Hinings (2005) 
have also argued that insider efforts may disrupt the coherence of a discourse; 
but with no change in institutional structures, frequently leave the same actors 
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guiding policy and strategy (A. Brown, 2000, 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Prichard, 2009).   
Therefore, champions of marginalised, vulnerable and dis-abled groups 
throughout the world have called, not for improvements in existing services, but 
changes in control and leadership leading to organisational transformation 
(Chamberlin, 2004; Deegan, 1996; O’Hagan, 2009c; Oliver, 1998; Pearson, 2002; 
Warriner, 2009).  These aspirations are typical of outsider change initiatives. 
Outsider-initiated change efforts  
Outsiders to institutionalised paradigms in mental health systems, have 
included service users, people with experiences of psychological distress, activist 
groups such as the psychiatric survivor movement (Chamberlin, 1988; O’Hagan, 
1991; Warner, 2004) and, more widely, the community NGOs (Harrison, 2010; 
McMorland et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2009; Warriner, 2001).  These have all 
been positioned as, both, outsiders and potential change agents (Everett, 1994; 
Freire, 1970; Morrison, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002).  Although there has been 
limited scholarly attention to outsider efforts at institutional change, 
commentators have agreed that outsider driven disruption has more potential 
for organisational transformation because the proponents are more engaged 
with the possible outcomes (Chamberlin, 2004; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; O’Hagan, 2009c; Seo & Creed, 2002).   
Maguire & Hardy (2009) have described outsider change efforts as 
strategies for problematising and disrupting institutional discourses in the 
attempt to establish distinct, alternative explanatory models (Farjoun, 2002; 
Lounsbury, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips et al., 2004; Zilber, 2002).  
These outsider driven efforts have also been characterised by the emergence of 
new subject positions where people speak out and act in support of 
problematisations that challenge the discourses about institutionalised practices 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002).   
Outsider change efforts have, typically, relied on the breakdown of both 
the structure and coherence of institutional arrangements so that existing 
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practices are no longer “taken for granted” and become negotiable.  
Subsequently, if successful, outsider discourses offer credible alternatives to the 
status quo and are absorbed, coherently into new texts.  In successful 
“deinstitutionalisation”, the problematisations have become normalised in new 
bodies of scientific, lay, and legal knowledge.  Within the international mental 
health sector, for example, service user groups and organisations, such as ANOPS 
in this country, created new texts.  These were initially based on personal 
accounts and narrative resistance (Warner, 2004; Weick et al., 2005) and 
eventually became an alternative discourse of recovery that, in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand at least, has been formally incorporated into national policy (Mental 
Health Commission, 1998).  Similarly, new subject positions, the cause as well as 
the consequence of collective activism (Morrill et al., 2003; Zoller, 2005), have 
emerged; the most significant in this country being the establishment of the 
Mental Health Commission (Leibrich, 1998; Mason, 1996; Mental Health 
Commission, 1998; O’Hagan, 1991, 1999)  
Scholars have generally correlated the efficacy and sustainability of 
outsider change efforts with the degree to which they have been able to 
establish and defend alternative discourse and practices from criticism and 
derision (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Sillence, 2001).  This has meant that the 
legitimacy and sustainability of alternative models has depended on the 
“publishing” of accounts that support problematisations and offer credible 
alternatives.  Their effectiveness depended on such factors as the editorial 
policies of academic journal editors (Craddock et al., 2008; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-
Pavlovic, 2010; Koenig, 2000; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2008; Pincus et al., 1993) 
and the mainstream media (Nairn, 1999; Philo, 1996).  Outsiders have also had 
much greater difficulties gaining access to research funding (Duncan et al., 2004).  
In summary, unless an alternative discourse is established and reinforced, 
systems inevitably revert to the status quo (Czarniawska & Wolff, 1998; Hinings 
& Greenwood, 1988; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992).    
Some scholars have noted that the ways that institutions have typically 
worked against change and responded to threats to their status and legitimacy 
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has been under researched (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suchman, 1995).  
Maguire and Hardy (2009) have referred to these efforts as defensive 
institutional work, and they distinguished between generalised, insider 
engagements with the “routines and rituals of reproduction” (p. 169) and more 
direct and particular forms of defence.  They noted that the disruptive efforts of 
outsiders have typically provoked defensive reactions from institutional insiders 
with the resources, networks and social sanctions to mount strategic and forceful 
counter challenges (see also, Czarniawska-Joerges & Wolff, 1998; Mumby, 1997; 
Seo & Creed, 2002).   
Velvet gloves and iron fists: Defensive institutional work  
Substantive organisational change is difficult to embed and institutional 
defensive work helps explain the continuing influence of previously dominant 
institutional logics (Reay & Hinings, 2005). It is probably the major barrier to 
organisational transformation, in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services, 
as elsewhere (Barber, 2005; Fougere, 2001; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; O’Hagan, 
2009; Pearson, 2004; Wallcraft, 2009).  Understanding defensive institutional 
work therefore, is important for investigating both the adoption of new 
organisational practices and the abandonment of old ones (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009).  
Radical institutional change requires disruption to both the structure and 
coherence of institutional logics (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005). 
Although the problematisations and disruptions, typical of insider change efforts, 
may lead to changes in the coherence of discourses, they do not necessarily 
affect the material or structural arrangements of institutions.  Therefore, the 
system invariably restores itself to some form of the status quo (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  Reay & Hinings (2005) have maintained 
that, despite the concept of isomorphism being central to institutional theory, 
little attention has been paid to this recomposition phase of institutional change.   
Defensive institutional work, for the purposes of analysis, can be usefully 
separated into two types; one the more generalised, habituated institutional 
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responses to organisational non-conformity and the other more direct, 
particularised reactivity to perceived threats to institutional authority.  The 
former, for example, might include discursive accommodations such as the 
translation and absorption of alternative discourses, a theme that will be 
developed in the next section.  Particular defensive counter challenges to 
perceived threat, however, can be overt and strategic.  For example, these often 
include attacking the credibility and “reasonableness” of opponents (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Weaver, 2010), or are somewhat subtle: like an increasing focus on 
“dangerousness” and “risk” (N. Rose, 1998; Sawyer, 2005; Szmukler & N. Rose, 
2013; Zoller, 2012).  Other strategies have been evident in a clinical “backlash” to 
recovery in mental health.  For example, there have been frequent appeals to 
the “responsibility of clinicians” (Argyle, 2005; Craddock et al., 2008; Mountain & 
Shah, 2008), the “expectations of the community”, and “public safety” (Edgley et 
al., 2006; Fisher, 1994; Grob, 1995; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; N. Rose, 1998).   
Particularised defensive institutional work: Reacting to threat  
Maguire and Hardy (2009) have maintained that particular defensive 
institutional work is typically directed at outsider-initiated acts of dissent and 
disruption.  Defensive efforts, therefore, have tended to be directed at 
countering assertions of the negative impacts of institutional practices, disputing 
problematisations and claims of unethical, undesirable and inappropriate 
behaviours while vigorously challenging the need for institutional or professional 
regulation.  
Systemic change has been thwarted by a, perhaps predictable, backlash 
from orthodox psychiatry, with many scholars vigorously defending the 
professional authority and status of psychiatry (Argyle, 2005; Craddock et al., 
2008; Holloway, 2008; Koenig, 2000; Mountain & Shah, 2008; Oyebode, 2008).  
Despite the many documented failures of biomedical psychiatry, Craddock and 
colleagues (2008), for example, documented widespread professional anxiety 
about the “creeping devaluation of medicine” which, they claimed, was “very 
damaging to both the standing and understanding of psychiatry in the minds of 
the public” (p. 6).  And yet, as Moncrieff and Crawford’s (2001) study of 20th 
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century British Psychiatry demonstrated, alternative models of treatment and 
care have actually made few inroads into biomedical dominance; in fact, there 
appears to be an increased engagement with conventional scientific pursuits 
such as psychopharmacology, biotechnology and behavioural genetics has 
actively worked against change (Drake et al., 2003; Rogers, 2009; Pilgrim, 2007; 
Shorter, 1997).   
Similarly, these cognitive defensive tactics have also ensured that 
professional “experts” have also directed the research agenda through control of 
the allocation of resources, the determination of what constitutes legitimate 
inquiry, the capacity to interpret research findings and the authority to influence 
how these are acted on (Reay & Hinings, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
mental health research has continued to favour biomedicine and “evidence 
based” practices (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Farkas et al., 2005; Manderscheid, 
2006) while the editorial policies of academic journals can be seen to have 
encouraged the continuous, systemic production and reproduction of biomedical 
bodies of knowledge (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 
2010; Moncrieff & Crawford, 2008; Pincus et al., 1993).  Similarly, clinical 
professionals have largely informed the development of mental health policy, 
and this has resulted in changes that have ultimately been “system confirming 
rather than system changing” (Prichard, 2005, p. 108). 
Exploitation of the tactics of power associated with non-compliance is 
perhaps the most overt defensive mechanisms employed by institutional agents 
within an organisational field (Scott, 1990; Seo & Creed, 2002).  For example, in 
the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector, powerful interests have been 
able to manipulate funding vulnerabilities embedded in contracting processes 
and service specifications, thereby further decreasing the viability and legitimacy 
of the NGO sector (Harrison, 2010; McMorland et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2009; 
Warriner, 2010).   
An increasingly evident defensive institutional strategy in the mental 
health field, as elsewhere, has been the establishment of the discourses of “risk”.  
Pilgrim and Rogers (2005) have cautioned that risk has become a socio-cultural 
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referent that has “peculiar expression in the mental health field” (p. xiv) and has 
enabled negative representations of serious psychological distress and myths of 
dangerousness to be perpetuated (Nairn, 1999; Robertson, 2000; N. Rose, 1998; 
Szmukler & N. Rose, 2013).  Increasingly, established managerial discourses of 
organisational risk (Beck, 1992; Hamilton et al., 2007; Zorn et al., 2000) have 
combined with notions of clinical risk to re-gather the spectrum of mental health 
organisations under institutional control (MHAC, 2008; N. Rose, 1998; Sawyer, 
2005; Shepherd, Boardman, & Slade, 2008; Szmukler & N. Rose, 2013).  Nikolas 
Rose (1998) has argued that, in becoming central to discourses about the health 
of individuals, groups and communities, the organisational practices associated 
with risk have meant that “care and control have become inextricably linked in 
the community” (p. 179).   
Orthodox risk assessment models, however, have typically ignored the 
political constructions of risk issues (A. Brown, 2004; Hwang & Powell, 2009; 
Zoller, 2011) and reinforced relationships of power through formally assigning 
the responsibility and accountability for managing risk to biomedical and 
managerial “experts”.  This has, simultaneously, naturalised one-way 
communication from experts to lay citizens and excluded non-“experts” from the 
assessment and decision making around risk (A. Brown, 2000, 2004; P. Brown, 
2007; Kinsella, 2004; N. Rose, 1998; Sawyer, 2005; Zoller, 2003).   
Most significantly, the communication of risk within public forums, 
media, social policy and institutional texts has limited concerns to the “risks” 
mental health service users pose for others, and has ignored the very real risk to 
service users of treatment services themselves (N. Rose, 1998; Simpson, 
McKenna, Moskowitz, Skipworth, & Barry-Walsh, 2003; Szmukler & N. Rose, 
2013; Teplin, 1985; Wilson, Nairn, Coverdale, & Panapa, 1999).  Similarly there 
has been little scholarly attention, other than from those with lived experience of 
psychological distress, paid to people’s risks of victimisation, childhood trauma, 
and discrimination in the community (British Psychological Society, 2000; Lapsley 
& Yee, 2004; Leibrich & Carson, 2012; John Read, 2005). 
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All these phenomena make it important to understand how ideas, values 
and practices transfer discursively through an organisational field such as mental 
health, and whether these reinforce or challenge organisational legitimacy 
(Cooren, 2001; Creed et al., 2002; Golant & Sillence, 2007; Venuti, 2004; Zilber, 
2002, 2006).  Broad interpretative diversity (Zorn et al., 2000) and 
communicative strategies such as translation (Boxenbaum, 2006; Ganesh, 2010; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Venuti, 2004; Weaver, 2010) and strategic ambiguity 
(Davenport & Leitch, 2005; Eisenberg, 1984; Jarzabkowski, Sillence, & Shaw, 
2009; Markham, 1996) have arguably been the most influential in defensive 
institutional work.   
In particular, it is the use of translation as a defensive institutional 
strategy that has most concerned commentators in the mental health field.  As 
Mary O'Hagan (2009a) has argued, this has demonstrated “the power of mental 
health professionals and systems to colonise a concept so pervasively that the 
original owners of that concept are left invisible” (p. 20).   
Generalised defensive institutional work: Translation, strategic ambiguity 
and other discursive strategies 
Translation has increasingly replaced earlier notions of diffusion as an 
explanation of how ideas are transferred throughout an institutional field and as 
a mechanism for institutional defence work (Ganesh, 2010; Strang & Meyer, 
1993; Venuti, 2004; Zilber, 2002, 2006).  Maguire & Hardy (2009) have 
contended that the translation and re-translation of important concepts has 
been, perhaps, the most influential stratagem for maintaining control of 
institutional and organisational discourses in the face of challenge from 
institutional outsiders.  This will be examined more fully in the problematic of 
voice, but what is important here is how the appropriation of important concepts 
from emerging discourses, such as recovery, creates new meanings and values 
that successfully resist any loss of institutional authority.  In addition, as Reay 
and Hinings (2005) have argued, even where new institutional logics may arise, 
previously dominant logics will continue to be significant and influential, 
especially throughout the processes of translation (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).   
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Scholars have argued that alternative ideas are translated and re-
translated by dominant groups; thereby becoming socially constructed as new 
knowledge according to prevailing orthodoxies and dominant perspectives 
(Cheney, 2000; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Venuti, 2004).  
Translations are then disseminated and systematically reproduced in institutional 
and organisational texts and practices (Cheney, 2000; Cronin, 2005; Venuti, 
2004).  Commentators have protested further that translation has meant that 
alternative discourses risk losing the conceptual energy with which they were 
infused by the people for whom they were originally of the greatest concern 
(Barker, 2003; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; O’Hagan, 2009; Wallcraft, 2009). 
Additionally, the institutions of mental health have been able to maintain 
normative control of the discourses through the media, which has tended to 
privilege the opinions of dominant “experts” (Hazelton, 1997; Joseph & Kearns, 
1999; Nairn, 1999; Philo, 1996; Seale, 2004).  Such institutionalised expertism has 
also enabled institutions to avoid engaging with economic, social and political 
processes in favour of discrete, individualised interventions with readily 
measurable outcomes (Kendrick, 2012; Zoller, 2011).   
As well as translation, other discursive strategies such as strategic 
ambiguity and discursive closure (Deetz, 1992), have exposed important texts to 
multiple interpretations and been seen to do generalised, defensive institutional 
work.  Ambiguity has allowed convenient fictions about a unified view of social 
reality to be maintained.  Multiple translations have been able to coexist and this 
has led to unintended, as well as deliberate, control of the discourses through 
strategic ambiguity (Cheney, 1999; Davenport & Leitch, 2005; Eisenberg, 1984; 
Markham, 1996; Mumby, 1997).  For example, managerialist discourses have 
served as powerful rhetorical resources and organisations have been coerced 
into arguing for their legitimacy through the naturalised rationales of “value for 
money”, “organisational quality”, “cost effectiveness”, “operational efficiencies” 
and other claims of the discursive territory (Alvesson & Willmott, 1996; Deetz, 
1992; Harrison, 2010; Platform Trust, 2007, 2008; Warriner, 2010; Zorn et al., 
2000).  However, as Zorn et al. (2000) have commented, ubiquitous 
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managerialist “mantras” have been “simultaneously packed with and devoid of 
meaning” (p. 523).  Similarly, in the mental health field “layers of subsidiary 
discourses” (Zorn et al., 2000, p. 518) such as “evidence-based”, “client-centred”, 
“recovery-oriented” and the quest for “independence” have become the guiding 
assumptions underpinning mental health discourses despite their conceptual 
ambiguity.   
In the next section, I attend to the experiences of these people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress, who have typically been the voices 
on the margins.  Not only have they been excluded, as outsiders, from 
participation in the discourses of mental health and recovery but also the 
processes of citizenship (Chamberlin, 1998; Spandler, 2007; Sullivan, 1992; Ward, 
2009; Ware et al., 2007).  Their voices and subject positions, as institutional 
outsiders, are privileged here because they have generated the greatest 
potential for organisational transformation and the enactment of recovery in 
mental health services.  
The problematic of voice in mental health organising  
The problematic of voice, or the “crisis of representation” (Mumby & 
Stohl, 1996, 2007) has been particularly pertinent for people who are, or have 
been, users of mental health services and who have historically been unheard 
and excluded from participation in the decisions most affecting their lives 
(Carling & Allot, 1999; Carling et al., 1999; Rappaport, 1984, 1987, 1995, 2002; 
Sayce, 2000; S. Rose, 2000).  Critical and postmodern scholarship has been intent 
to facilitate a wider range of voices and challenge the naturalised rules about 
who can legitimately construct organisational and social knowledge (Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2000; De Cock, 1998; Foucault 1982; Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  
These scholars have endeavoured to deconstruct inherent socio-cultural biases 
and extend theoretical reach in order to include and valorise perspectives other 
than those of dominant and powerful groups (Boje & Dennehy, 1993; Deetz, 
2001; Cheney et al., 1996; Foucault, 1972; Ganesh, 2008).  This problematic 
underpins the first and second of my research questions in examining which 
voices are heard in the construction of recovery discourses that influence 
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organisational communication and practices in the Aotearoa\New Zealand 
mental health sector. 
Here I examine critical and postmodern scholarship that explores how 
ideas are transferred in social, organisational and institutional environments 
(Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 1996; Venuti, 1992, 2004; Zilber, 2002, 2006) and how 
some voices are heard and others coerced or silenced (Broadfoot & Munshi, 
2007a, 2007b; Gramsci, 1971; Mumby, 1997).  The challenge for these scholars 
has been to circumvent dominant ways of seeing and thinking by including 
“voices on the margins” such as those of people with lived experience of 
psychological distress, their families and allies (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; 
Deegan, 1998; Leibrich, 2000a, 2000b; Mental Health Commission, 1996).   
The crisis of representation  
Researchers have argued that although the subjective knowledge of 
subjugated groups is not necessarily more true, these groups have been 
systematically voiceless and unheard (Deetz, 1992; Deetz & Mumby, 1990; 
Foucault. 1970, 1972; Mumby, 1988).  The critical perspective, therefore, has 
been less concerned with defining what is, or is not, mental illness, and more 
about challenging the legitimacy of any group that claims to speak with exclusive 
authority about the truth of madness and distress (Bracken & Thomas, 2001, 
2010; Foucault, 1973). 
The socially and historically situated nature of language and power has 
been evident through the discursive history or “archaeology” (Foucault, 1972) of 
terms used to describe those designated or diagnosed with mental health 
problems.  Powerful groups, such as psychiatrists have not only been able to 
label and define the terms of dominant discourses about mental health and 
distress, but they have also determined who can participate through control of 
access to information and the use of technical language that excludes non-
members of their knowledge “class” (Cheney et al., 2004; Deetz, 1992; Rudge & 
Morse, 2001).  It was not until the rise of the psychiatric survivor movement 
(Adame, 2006; Chamberlin, 1988; Cresswell, 2009; Everett, 1994; Morrison, 
 152 
2006; O’Hagan, 1991), and popular, fictionalised and non-fictional accounts of 
life inside psychiatric hospitals and asylums (Frame, 1982, 1984; Kesey, 1962; 
Leibrich, 1997; O’Hagan, 1994), that unease about professional interpretative 
power surfaced in the social imagination.   
Such accounts have also increased awareness of the significance of 
language use in reflecting the values and assumptions of social groups and the 
organisations they establish (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007b; Cheney, 2002; Gergen, 
2001; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  In the mental health field, many have echoed a 
Foucauldian stance in claiming that systems of representation and particular 
ways of specifying knowledge and truth go beyond the mere vocabularies of 
language use but, rather, become embedded and naturalised within social and 
organisational realities (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; MHAC, 2008; Mumby, 
2008).  There has been growing unease, for example, with the use of professional 
language such as “non-compliant”, “lacking insight”, “inappropriate”, or 
“manipulative” within the context of relationships between people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress and mental health workers (Ridgway, 
2001).  Groups such as the Mental Health Advocacy Coalition (MHAC) in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand (2008) have called for a new language for mental health; 
one that is not limited to expanding understandings of psychological distress, but 
also reflects people’s own explanatory models of their experience and 
anticipates their active participation as agents in their own recovery (Cresswell, 
2009; Jacobson & Curtis 2000; MHAC 2008).   
Working against change, however, have been social constructions of 
normality and deviance exacerbated by media representations that produce and 
reproduce overarching social narratives (Dutta & Zoller, 2008; Gwyn, 2002; Kline, 
2003; Nairn, 1999; Seale, 2004).  Most fictionalised accounts of “madness” have 
continued to be influential in constructing portraits of alienated freaks and 
villains (Seale, 2004; Wilson et al., 1999) and perpetuated myths of violence and 
unpredictability (Coleman, 1999; Leibrich, 1998; Nairn, 1999; Seale ,2004; Wilson 
et al., 1999).   
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Voices on the margins 
Arana Pearson (2002), among others who have their own experiences of 
psychological distress, have highlighted the paucity of positive representation 
and their subsequent invisibility and powerlessness.  Mental health “consumer” 
culture has filtered into the arts sector over time, with movies, literature, visual 
and performing arts becoming avenues for expression (Dellar et al., 2000; Frame, 
1982, 1984; Kesey, 1962; Leibrich, 1997, 2000; Pearson, 2002); but Pearson and 
others have noted that people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress are still not visible as community opinion leaders, nor meaningfully 
engaged with civic society,  the business and media sectors (Central Potential, 
2008; Chamberlin, 2004; O’Hagan, 2009c; Pearson, 2002; Warriner, 2009).   
In addition, inequitable arrangements among discourse communities 
have limited the capacity of minority groups to set public agendas and frame 
debates (Zoller & Dutta, 2008; Zoller & Kline 2008).  Such groups, for example 
the psychiatric survivor or consumer movements, have advocated strongly for 
their right to control the microphone and the importance of building a 
community of peers through the collective power of their stories (Adame, 2006; 
Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Leibrich, 2000; Morrison, 2006; Warner, 2004).  These 
endeavours to change the dominant discourse have, not only aimed at validating 
personal experience, but at creating the momentum and political power to 
change their social circumstances (McKnight, 1988; Zoller & Dutta 2008).  In 
doing so these groups have endeavoured to win the public debates rather than 
engage with the medical or scientific ones (P. Brown et al., 2004; Zoller, 2012).   
Advocates have championed the creation of alternative discursive spaces 
that facilitate empowering dialogue and allow marginalised groups and 
communities to articulate their own explanatory models of health and well-being 
(Adame, 2006; Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a, 2007b; Rapp et al., 1991).  In health 
promotion, for example, this has involved a sharp deviation from the traditional, 
top-down approach of public health campaigns towards the provision of spaces 
for marginalised groups to identify their own needs and formulate solutions to 
the issues they face (Alinsky, 1971; Dutta, 2007, Minkler, 1990; Rappaport 1995).  
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In addition, these groups have called for the transformation of service practices 
(Duncan et al., 2004; Central Potential, 2008; Kendrick et al., 2006; Ochaka et al., 
1999; O’Hagan, 1999) to enhance people’s capacity to determine their own life 
strategies according to their own understanding of their experience and health 
priorities (Dutta, 2007; Jacobson & Curtis, 2000; Rappaport, 1984, 1995; Zoller & 
Kline, 2008).   
Despite these efforts, however, control of the discourses of health and 
illness have remained with medical professionals and orthodox biomedical 
science who have retained “naming rights” through the power to define and 
label experiences of “madness” through the processes of clinical diagnosis.  This 
has meant that these experiences have continued to be represented as a wholly 
negative, deficit based experience with no legitimacy; valueless, demoralising, 
despairing, hopeless, chronic and dangerous (Leibrich, 1998; Mead, Hilton, & 
Curtis, 2001; O’Hagan 2009b; Read et al., 2004; Szasz, 1974).   
The power of naming 
Ludema, Wilmot, and Srivastva (1997) have argued that as professional 
disciplines emerged to diagnose and cure illness, the categorisation of illness and 
vocabularies of deficit were absorbed into the common language of everyday 
people.  They have maintained, therefore, that the wider culture is taught how to 
be ill, how to recognise “illness”; speak about it and how to behave towards 
themselves and others in particular ways (Gergen & Thatchenkery, 1996; Ludema 
et al., 1997; Parsons, 1975).  For example, Trudy Rudge and Kristi Morse (2001) 
demonstrated how orthodox discourses constructed schizophrenia and recovery 
in ways that silenced the subjective and embodied experience of patients and 
reinforced the inequity of their relationships with professionals (Waitzkin, 1989).   
In contrast, academic psychiatrists Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas (1998) 
have suggested that “madness” may be an authentic response to intolerable 
stress; part of a human experience constantly haunted by contradiction and 
material conditions that are unresolvable.  They have argued that, for many 
people, such circumstances have alienated them from their social environment 
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and a sense of self.  Other commentators, such as Michel Foucault (1973a) and 
psychologist Louis Sass (1994), have described madness as a kind of hyper-
awareness; a confrontation with the social world that only “lives” through artistic 
expression and is visible through the art of van Gogh, Munch and others (Sass, 
1994; Greenberg, 1968; O’Hagan, 2010; Leibrich 1997; Leibrich & Carson, 2012).  
This representational perspective has been echoed by many people with their 
own experiences of extreme psychological states (Leibrich, 1997; O’Hagan, 2010; 
Roper & Pearson, 1999).  These perspectives have reinforced the recovery 
philosophy in endeavouring to disrupt traditional attitudes to madness by giving 
it meaning, full human status and a pathway to a better life (O’Hagan, 2009b).  
However, scholars have maintained that the establishment of socially 
legitimate categories of identity creates the power to warrant voice (Bourdieu, 
1990).  Therefore, a lack of visibility and positive representation has had serious 
impacts on the subjectivity and construction of social identities for people with 
lived experience of serious psychological distress.  The attribution of illness 
identities, such as “mental patient”, has significantly affected the experience of 
that illness and frequently produced shame, stigma and voicelessness (Anspach, 
1979; Lapsley & Yee, 2004; Mental Health Commission, 1997; Jacob Read, 2003a; 
Sontag, 1977).  As Rudge and Morse (2001) discovered, people who experienced 
“schizophrenia” strongly resisted the scientific and “sanitising” (p. 68) 
constructions of their experience and struggled to disrupt the linguistic 
boundaries in order to create social identities and niches not limited by the 
“technologies of scientific knowledge” (p.74). 
Broader societal discourses and institutional frameworks have also 
produced vocabularies of identity that reinforce narratives about appropriate 
roles, behaviour and relationships; some of which enjoy stronger institutional 
and material support than others (Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Harter, Patterson, & 
Gerbensky-Kerber, 2010).  Historically people with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress have found it extremely difficult to disrupt socially ascribed 
identities embedded in normalised social structures and processes of 
identification (Cheney, 1991).  Therefore, reclaiming valued identities and 
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subject positions has been a key focus for activist movements such as Mad Pride 
(Dellar et al., 2000; Warner, 2004) alongside the construction and establishment 
of validating and more empowering discourses (Anspach, 1979; Ashcraft & 
Pacanowsky, 1996; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Tretheway,1997; Ward, 2009).  As 
discussed previously, the discursive struggles for new subject positions and the 
evolution of discourses of recovery have been evident in the changing identity 
claims and linguistic evolution of those who have been users of mental health 
services (Cresswell, 2009; Everett, 1994; Morrison 2006) 
However, a person’s official clinical history has typically recorded only the 
unilateral, biomedical patient identity and the authoritative psychiatric discourse 
has demarcated boundaries of the relationship between professional and patient 
(Adame, 2006; Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007; Morrison, 2006; Trethewey, 1997).   
Power, participation and the patient-professional relationship  
Perhaps no site has more clearly illuminated the relationships of power 
and voice in health systems than the context of the patient and professional 
relationship (Edson, 1999; Sontag, 1977; Waitzkin, 1991).  Normalised and 
hegemonic patterns of communication have been characterised by top down 
information transfer, where medical professionals “talk to rather than with their 
patients” (M. Brunton, 2000, p. 65).  Thus, the assumption of superior knowledge 
and benign authority on the part of medical professionals has also suppressed 
dialogues that might facilitate alternative understandings and created tensions 
between ordinary, lay citizens and health professionals (Jureidini, 2012; Waitzkin, 
1991).  It has also radically restricted the layperson's participation in decision 
making about their health and well-being and limited the role of the patient to 
one of willing compliance with technical expertise (Barker, 2003; Geist & Dreyer, 
1993; Waitzkin, 1991; Zoller & Harter, 2010).  
Critics have maintained that health professionals have not only adopted 
roles as knowledgeable experts but have been able to determine both the 
environment and the agenda for the encounter (Waitzkin, 1991).  “Patients” 
have typically been constrained from telling their own stories in their own 
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language, have had their emotional concerns re-directed as questions about 
physical symptoms and have been positioned as incapable of competent 
participation due to an apparent lack of the requisite knowledge and 
“understanding” (Geist & Dreyer, 1993; Harter et al., 2010; Waitzkin, 1991).  
Consequently, members of the lay public have become increasing uncertain 
about the value and validity of their own expertise and interpretations of their 
life experience (Adame, 2006; Deegan, 1988; Geist & Dreyer, 1993; Kinsella, 
2004; Oliver, 1998).  This has been particularly the case in mental health service 
settings where a discourse of dependency and reliance on others for the ordinary 
management of their lives has been perpetuated (Deegan, 1996; Oliver, 1998; S. 
Rose, 2000; Saleeby, 2001).  
Emerging models of holistic and participatory healthcare, in contrast, 
have emphasised the importance of approaching people’s experiences through 
their own worldviews and providing them with an authentic voice in 
conversations about their health and well-being (Leibrich, 2000; Silverman & 
Bloor, 1990; Zoller & Dutta, 2008).  From this perspective patients contribute 
vital knowledge to the medical encounter.  They are considered expert about 
their self, their motivations, their experience and their wider social contexts; all 
are essential to diagnosis and negotiations about treatment response (M. 
Brunton, 2000).  Academic psychiatrists Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas (1999) 
have asserted that the psychiatric role should be to provide a safe, validating and 
potentially transformative environment so that people can develop their own 
authentic account of their circumstances and determine what needs to be 
accepted and what must be changed (Duncan et al., 2004; Jureidini, 2012).  They 
have called for “professionals to maintain a sense of wonder” (Bracken & 
Thomas, 1999, p. 11) in order to help people come to terms with the pain of their 
distress, rather than simply seeking to get rid of it.   
For those invested in deconstructing the dominant discourses of mental 
illness, first person recovery narratives have become important source materials 
(Leibrich, 2000b; O'Hagan, 1991, 2010; Ridgeway, 2001).  These accounts have 
not only challenged the pathologising and deficit based constructions of their 
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psychological states but have simultaneously revealed people’s inherent 
strengths and resourcefulness (Banks et al., 2004; Carey, 2005; Coleman, 
Goodman, & Smith, 2003; Leibrich, 2000b).  Personal stories have proved to be 
disruptive to constructions of chronicity and hopelessness (Bracken & Thomas, 
2004; Harter et al., 2006; Ludema et al., 1997; McGinley, 2005; Turner, 2002). 
The role of personal stories   
Foucault (1980) claimed that just expressing marginalised voices 
confronted a great silence, and was in itself a form of resistance.  Other 
commentators have suggested that when such disqualified voices are 
acknowledged, previously submerged issues of justice, power and abuse of 
privilege are exposed (Daniels et al., 1999; Foucault, 1980; Morrison, 2006; 
White & Epston, 1990).  Sharing personal narratives, therefore, has been 
important for the creation of a collective illness experience (P. Brown, 2007), and 
the development of politicised identities such as “psychiatric survivor" and 
“consumer” have been better positioned to contest stereotypes and construct 
alternative, persuasive discourses (Adame, 2006; Deegan, 1998; Everett, 1994; 
Morrison, 2006; O’Hagan, 1997; Ridgway, 2001).   
People with lived experience of serious psychological distress, like other 
marginalised and activist groups, have frequently drawn from their personal, 
embodied and biographical histories in order to explain their experiences in 
terms of their social, cultural and lay perceptions (Adame, 2006; H. Brown, 1992; 
Harter et al., 2010; Zoller, 2012).  Likewise, critical scholars have argued that 
dominant voices and official stories have repressed alternative perspectives and 
created the impression that one voice speaks for all others (Boje & Dennehy, 
1993; Weick, A., 2000).  They have argued that personal accounts of individual 
lives contradict, and have sometimes served to overturn, the grand narratives 
(Boje, 2001; Foucault, 1980; Harter et al., 2010; Morrison, 2006; Saleeby, 2001) 
and stereotypical accounts that have stigmatised and marginalised some groups 
(Mental Health Commission, 1998; Saleeby, 2001; White & Epston, 1990).   
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Personal narratives of recovery have been concerned to reframe the 
discourse to living with as opposed to suffering from the symptoms of extreme 
experiences (Banks et al., 2004; Central Potential, 2008; Copeland, 1997; Deegan, 
1988, 1996; MHAC, 2008).  Ridgway (2001), among others, has argued that 
recovery has meant a shift in perspective from viewing oneself as primarily a 
person with a psychiatric disorder to reclaiming a renewed sense of self and a 
transformation from alienation to a sense of meaning and purpose.  Personal 
accounts, therefore, have validated and encouraged a shift to engagement and 
active healing (Buckingham, 2001; Burnet 2005; Deegan, 2001; Repper & Perkins 
2003) rather than mere passive adjustment to chronic and inevitable 
circumstance (Copeland, 1997; Fisher, 2000; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Ridgway, 
2001).  These new authors have argued, without romanticising or denying the 
challenges, that it has been crucial to learn how to navigate the psychotic 
landscape and understand what has happened to them (Chadwick, 2002; Gould, 
DeSouza, & Rebeiro-Gruhl, 2005; Martyn, 2002; Mosher & Vallone, 1995; 
O’Hagan, 2010).   
The on-going discursive tensions around recovery have made it difficult to 
describe an authentic recovery discourse.  Scholars and other stakeholders, in 
recognising the historical marginalisation and powerlessness of stigmatised 
groups, have advocated for a privileged voice for people who have had extreme 
experiences of psychological distress (Adame, 2006; Banks et al., 2004; Deegan, 
1988; Foucault, 1973a, 1973b; O’Hagan, 2004; Jacob Read, 2003).  
The many voices of recovery  
As discussed previously, recovery discourses have been indicative of the 
paradigmatic stance and interests of particular discourse communities (Bonney & 
Stickley 2008; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Ramon et al., 2007).  Patricia Ridgway 
(2001) has stated that “until recently, the fact that people who experience 
prolonged psychiatric disability can grow beyond the limits of their condition and 
reclaim full lives was rarely mentioned in professional literature, perhaps 
because the idea of recovery is heretical within the dominant biomedical model” 
(p. 335).  The Bonney and Stickley (2008) study, a thematic analysis of over 170 
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recovery texts in the UK, found that stakeholders conceptualised and 
constructed recovery and recovery orientated service delivery very differently.   
Bonney & Stickley (2008) showed that people with lived experience of 
psychological distress described a far more subjective, contextualised and 
process-oriented view of recovery than mental healthcare providers who 
generally centred on symptom reduction and social functionality (Adame, 2006; 
Bradstreet & Connor, 2005; S. Rose, 2000; Slade, 2009; Sowers, 2005).  This 
reinforced assertions from other commentators that people with lived 
experience of psychological distress, in speaking of their recovery, generally 
resisted an illness identity and were not typically concerned with being “cured” 
by medical intervention (Adame, 2006; Bradstreet & Connor, 2005; Carey, 2005; 
Fisher, 2000; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002; Mancini et al., 2005; Ridgway, 2001).  They 
were also less interested in debating causes or being maintained and resisted 
suggestions of chronicity and hopelessness (Bracken & Thomas, 2004; Ludema et 
al., 1997; McGinley, 2005; Turner, 2002). 
Service user authors described recovery as moving away from a negative 
mental health system of diagnosis and treatment to reclaiming an ordinary life, 
which may or may not include the abatement of symptoms (Bradstreet & 
Connor, 2005; Coleman, 1999; Martyn 2002; Mayers, 2000; Platz, 2006; Roberts 
& Wolfson, 2004).  Their accounts challenged the orthodoxy of treatment 
responses, the expansion of classes of mental disorders (Duncan et al., 2004; 
Jureidini, 2012; Morrison, 2006), the proliferation of powerful psychoactive 
medications (Double, 2001, 2006) and the discursive closure around iatrogenic 
harm (Leibrich, 1997; O’Hagan, 1994; Pilgrim, 2005; Jacob Read, 2003b).  They 
produced narratives and explanatory models of psychological distress that 
addressed more fully the complexity of a person’s experience and constructed it 
as intrinsically valuable and meaningful (Bracken & Thomas, 1999, 2005; 
Jureidini, 2012; Leibrich, 2000; John Read, et al., 2004).   
Although these accounts were deeply personal, they also demonstrated a 
repertoire of common themes such as fear, pain and loss that has better enabled 
a wider, lay audience to understand and empathise with the deeply human bases 
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of these experiences (Banks et al., 2004; Jureidini, 2012; Leibrich, 2000b).  There 
was also consensus among these authors about primarily social outcomes for 
recovery that were consistent with those sought by most people: safe homes, 
good health, adequate resources and meaningful roles and relationships (Banks 
et al., 2004; Bradstreet & Connor, 2005; Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Lapsley & 
Nikora, 2002; MHAC, 2008; Torrey et al., 2005).   
All these commentators were more concerned with external and 
environmental barriers to good mental health and recovery, than internal and 
personal deficits (O’Hagan, 2002; Onken et al., 2002; Turner-Crowson & 
Wallcraft, 2002).  Stigma, discrimination (Carling, 1995; Mental Health 
Commission, 1997, 1998; Ministry of Health, 2003; Sayce, 2000; Vaughan & 
Hansen, 2004), trauma (Rosenberg & Mueser, 2002), homelessness (Koegel et 
al., 1996; Schneider, 2010; Susser et al., 1990) and poverty (Leibrich, 2000; Polak 
& Warner, 1996; Schneider et al., 2004; Schneider, 2010) were all cited as 
evidence of situational factors that impacted on mental health and well-being 
both before and after serious episodes of psychological distress (Bonney & 
Stickley, 2008; Chamberlin, 1988; Leibrich, 1998).   
Likewise, service user authored literature was far more likely to refer to 
societal or community recovery in terms of the enhancement of civil and human 
rights, social justice and equity (Everett, 1994; Cresswell, 2009; Morrison, 2006; 
Pearson, 2004).  They invariably described recovery as a transformative process 
in which people have needed to recognise themselves as active agents in their 
own lives; people who possessed skills, strengths and resources despite being 
embedded within contexts that have variously supported or hindered their 
capacity for well-being (Rapp, 1998; Saleeby, 2001, 2002; Slade, 2009; Weick, 
Rapp, Sullivan, & Kisthardt, 1989).   
Policy makers in the Bonnie and Stickley (2008) study tended to echo the 
themes and priorities expressed by service users about what worked in recovery, 
such as personal power, real choices and increased influence on service 
development.  Notably however, in these texts, themes were couched in more 
general, ambivalent and ambiguous terms that were nevertheless revealing.  For 
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example, some referred to services being not just clinical (p. 47) as opposed to 
the more confronting service user led.  Similarly, they agreed that service users 
should be pivotal in the planning and delivery of flexible, personalised and 
responsive services rather than a system organised around professional priorities 
(S. Rose, 2000) but were far less clear how this could be achieved in terms of 
outcomes and a redistribution of power and resources.  
Bonney and Stickley (2008) highlighted important contrasts between 
service user discussions of recovery and those of mental health professionals or 
healthcare providers.  Service user accounts of recovery generally downplayed 
the role of professionals.  Many believed that health care practitioners should be 
engaged by invitation only (Martyn, 2002; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Turner & 
Frak, 2001) and that hospitalisation was unhelpful and unnecessary (Coleman et 
al., 2003; Mosher & Vallone, 1995; Mosher & Boyle, 2004; Peters, 2009; 
Warriner, 2001).  They were also very concerned with issues of compulsion and 
coercion in treatment responses and the corresponding loss of control over their 
lives (Kisely et al., 2005; Minkowitz, 2006; O’Brien & Golding, 2003; Jacob Read, 
2003b).  These authors emphasised the critical importance of staff attitudes and 
behaviours at times of crisis where choice and control were often arbitrarily 
removed (Campbell, 2001; Coleman, 1999; Fisher, 2000; Martyn, 2002; May, 
2001; Repper & Perkins, 2003).   
Professionals and providers, on the other hand, reified mental “illness” 
and were far more likely to frame psychological distress as a chronic lifelong 
condition that required “stabilisation”, and therefore concluded that discussions 
of recovery could be viewed as promoting false hopes (Roberts & Wolfson, 
2004).  Similarly, some providers referred to the integration of illness into the self 
rather than the more empowering notion of self-acceptance (Ahern & Fisher, 
2001; Chalmers, 2001; Kendell, 2000; Travis, Peters, Kerwin & Institute of 
Psychiatry, 2001; Turner, 2002).  Such perspectives conveyed the sense of 
hopelessness and perpetuated the notion of a life sentence that was so 
vigorously resisted by service users (Barker, 2003; Gould et al., 2005; Kelly & 
Gamble, 2005; MacKay, 2005; Turner, 2002).  Significantly, the acknowledgement 
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of iatrogenic harm was also poorly represented in the clinical or provider 
responses (Bonney & Stickley, 2008).    
Professionals and health care providers in the Bonney and Stickley (2008) 
study tended to dilute the voices and centrality of service users’ concepts of 
recovery.  They used euphemistic, one-word generalisations and generalities that 
were difficult to associate with observable actions, behaviour and organisational 
practices.  For instance, here as elsewhere, professionals and providers referred 
to “incorporating choice” rather than the more full-bodied call for “self-
determination” and “service user leadership” that was characteristic of people 
with lived experience of serious psychological distress (Central Potential, 2008; 
Mental Health Commission, 2011; O’Hagan, 2009c; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005, 2009; 
Warriner, 2009).  Some professionals used the terms recovery and rehabilitation 
interchangeably, although no service users used this term, and these emphasised 
interventions intended to restore “normal” personal and social functioning as 
well as the development of “coping” skills (British Psychological Society, 2000; 
Holloway, 2002; Romme & Escher, 2000; Travis et al., 2001).   
Here, as elsewhere, representations of a pathway to recovery were 
framed in terms of accurate diagnosis leading to “effective treatment” (Frese et 
al., 2001; Harrison et al., 2001; Rudge & Morse, 2001 citing McAllister & 
Chatterton, 1996).  Unsurprisingly then, texts authored by professionals and 
providers promoted compliance, motivation and adherence to medication 
regimes as essential aspects of recovery (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Travis et al., 
2001).  This stance inevitably reinforced the power relationships between 
professionals and service users where unsuccessful outcomes were routinely 
described as “failure to respond adequately” to medication (Travis et al., 2001).  
These stakeholders also anticipated closer links to medicine and biology in future 
(Kendall, 2000).  
Texts authored by policy makers also identified the language of chronicity 
and hopelessness, stigma and low expectations as barriers to recovery, and 
acknowledged that these were as much features of mental health services as 
aspects of wider community attitudes (S. Rose, 2000; Sayce, 2000; World Health 
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Organisation, 2005).  However, their continued reference to the importance of 
functional maintenance echoed the perspectives of professionals and service 
providers (Department of Health, 1999) and perpetuated claims of the superior 
efficacy of medication as treatment (Bonnie & Stickley, 2008; Moncrieff, 2008; 
Travis et al., 2001). 
Stakeholder distinctions in discursive constructions of “risk” and “safety” 
were also apparent (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Robertson, 2001).  Some policy 
makers acknowledged that an overemphasis on safety, whether of service users 
or the wider community, were barriers to recovery and resulted in greater 
stigma (Fakhoury & Priebe, 2002, 2007; Gould, 2005; Turner, 2002).  They 
supported service user authors in endeavouring to destigmatise and reframe risk 
as adventure and a catalyst for change (Keyes, 2002, 2007; Mayers, 2000; 
Leibrich, 2000a; Ware et al., 2008; Young, 2006).  However, other policy makers 
defended mental health service providers in their requirement to anticipate and 
prevent crisis as well as reduce risk (Bonney & Stickley, 2008).   
Many authors in the study expressed concern that people with lived 
experience of psychological distress were not seen to be leading the discourse on 
recovery (Bonney & Stickley, 2008; O'Hagan, 2009c; Pearson 2001) despite this 
being mental health policy in Aotearoa\New Zealand (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998; Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006).  Bonney and Stickley (2008) 
concluded that while the personal perspectives of service users were 
“highlighted within policy rhetoric” they appeared to become “diluted as the 
practicalities of service provision are meted out” (p. 149).   
In addition to the differing perspectives and discourses of these 
stakeholders, ambiguities also appeared to allow the co-existence of multiple 
interpretations or translations (p. 139) of key concepts, and these impacted 
significantly on the everyday practices of recovery in mental health services 
(O'Hagan, 2009a, 2010; Wallcraft, 2009).  These disparities have pointed to the 
vulnerability of a recovery discourse to translation by wider and more powerful 
discourses such as biomedicine and managerialism.  All of which contributed to 
the perception, especially among those with personal experience of 
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psychological distress, that “recovery is slipping from view” (O’Hagan, 2010) and 
has been fatally compromised, even colonised, before it has had a chance to 
flourish (Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009a; Ridgway, 2001; Wallcraft, 2009).   
Battles at the boundaries: Translations and the transfer of ideas 
Organisational studies and communication scholars have long been 
intrigued by what happens at the boundaries of discourse communities, where 
different discourses intersect, interact and across which ideas are transferred.  
Conventional institutional and management theory has generally assumed 
organisational communication to be the “linear transmission of information 
along relatively stable organisational channels” (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, p. 62).  
This has led to unproblematic acceptance of a diffusion model for the transfer of 
ideas; one that assumes the simple transmission of concepts across discourse 
boundaries that is neutral in its effects (Creed et al., 2002; Zilber, 2001, 2006).  
However, recently it has become apparent that there are significant limitations 
with this model and discursive concepts and meanings do not transmit intact 
across discursive boundaries (A. Brown, 2000, 2004; Ganesh, 2010; Venuti, 1992, 
2004; Zilber, 2006).  In the Problematic of organising (pp. 139-140), I discussed 
how translation has been identified as a discursive strategy of institutional 
defensive work, whereby institutional arrangements of power and legitimacy 
withstand perceived threats.  In the next section, I examine some of the 
communication processes, including translation, which occur when ideas are 
transferred across discursive boundaries.  I pay particular attention to how 
concepts such as recovery have been negotiated and used by different “voices” 
and the effects these have on the discourse and practices within mental health 
services.  . 
As mentioned earlier (p. 139), scholars have opined that, typically, there 
is no genuine correspondence at the boundaries between discourse 
communities, and therefore no shared language that might adequately and 
faithfully translate concepts from one discourse to another (Chavez, 2009; 
Cheney, 2000; Ganesh, 2010).  Translation theorists have maintained that people 
and their social communities interpret and adapt ideas, fashioning them into 
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legitimating accounts in local, situated settings (Boxenbaum, 2005, 2006; Chavez, 
2009; Cronin, 2005; Cooren, 2001; Ganesh, 2010; Zilber, 2002, 2006).  Venuti 
(1992, 2004) and S. Brown (2002) have argued further that translations always 
favour the privileged interests and legitimacy of the translating culture thereby 
ensuring the maintenance of power relationships and the authority of dominant 
groups.  In other words, translated accounts perpetuate socially legitimised 
systems, which have further justified the participation or exclusion of certain 
groups from the discourse (A. Brown , 2000; Cheney, 2000).  
As Ganesh (2010) points out, translation dissolves notions of authenticity.  
The language of ideas is unable to move entire from one discursive location to 
another; something is always lost in translation (Cronin, 2005).  Whenever 
meanings are absorbed into a new discourse, they have inevitably been 
transformed, and “in the act of transforming a breaking of fidelity towards the 
original is necessarily involved” (S. Brown , 2002, p. 7).  This has meant that the 
transference of ideas across organisational boundaries, and throughout 
organisational fields, is necessarily a series of “negotiated” and evolving 
interactions (Ganesh, 2010) that shift the discourses through which people and 
groups make sense of their world.   
This has meant that no matter how persuasive less powerful interest 
groups are, nor how concerned they are to manage the meanings of concepts 
and practices, they can never control how others will translate their concepts, 
problematisations or discourses in subsequent texts (A. Brown , 2000, 2004; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Prichard, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Venuti, 2004).  For 
example, scholars have noted how psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals have appropriated and translated the discursive resources of 
recovery in ways that have cemented their position as authoritative (Craddock et 
al., 2008; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Wallcraft, 2009).   
David Pilgrim (2008) noted that there are three particular translations of 
recovery evident in academic scholarship.  First he observed recovery translated 
as the successful treatment of mental disorders and second, as the successful 
rehabilitation of those impaired by mental disorders.  Third, recovery was 
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translated as the successful survival of social invalidation (Pilgrim, 2008; Pilgrim 
& Rogers, 2009).  Each of these translations framed mental health problems in 
ways that privilege particular discourse communities.  The first represents, and 
has maintained, the position of biomedical psychiatry and the status quo 
(Craddock et al., 2008) while the second accommodates the bio-psychosocial and 
“rehabilitation” perspective (Barker 2002; Ranz & Mancini 2008; Stromwall & 
Hurdle, 2003).  Both of these translations of recovery have continued to 
emphasise the necessity and technical achievements of professionals.  The third, 
and contrasting version, expressed a social and existential state of recovery; one 
achieved by people themselves from within, rather than from, their experience 
(Pilgrim, 2008; O’Hagan, 2010; Read et al., 2004).  However, the differences in 
legitimacy and authority among these groups has meant that the less powerful 
have not been able to control how others have utilised or manipulated their 
worldview through language.  
Margaret Brunton (2000) has commented that such translations are 
particularly significant in health and mental health environments where they 
have produced silo effects with professionals naturally aligning with colleagues 
who participate in the same speech community (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; 
Hazelton, 1997; Nairn, 1999; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011; Scott, 2008).  These 
institutionally powerful groups have built common vocabularies, concepts and 
terms of reference that have led to ways of speaking that have privileged some 
members and excluded others in ways that are rarely equitable.  For example, 
medical sociologists Pilgrim and Rogers (2005) were highly critical of an anti-
stigma campaign commissioned by the Royal College of Psychiatry in Britain 
(1998) that used words such as “de-mythologise” to reinforce the belief that 
psychiatrists already, and solely, possessed the expertise to educate and 
enlighten general society.  They concluded that the meta-objective of this study, 
ostensibly that “people suffering from mental disorders will be enabled optimally 
to contribute towards their own recovery” was purely an expression of 
“therapeutic paternalism” (p. 2548).  Other scholars have argued further that 
recovery, despite having broad policy consensus internationally, has been 
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constrained by competing imperatives such as “risk minimisation” that shape 
everyday organisational communication and decision making (Anthony 1993; 
Pilgrim & Rogers, 2009; N. Rose, 1996, 1998).  
Similarly, ambiguity has also been employed to allow communication 
between different discourse communities, where the imprecision of the 
discursive boundaries has provided a reassuring sense of common ground 
(Davenport & Leitch, 2005).  However, Ganesh (2010), Alvesson and Karreman 
(2000), and others, have noted that reproducing particular vocabularies does not 
in itself constitute a subject position, and that drawing on multiple discourses, 
with the resultant ambiguity, is the communicative norm rather than the 
exception.  Provisional use of language and “the ability to manipulate a whole 
variety of symbols without being tied to or identifying with any of them” (Jackall, 
1988, p. 137) has illuminated the ways that individuals or groups with high 
status, in an institutionally powerful community, are active agents in the 
maintenance and reproduction of the discourses that sustain them.  Alvesson 
and Karreman (2000) have referred to these acts as “telling the right kinds of 
stories to the right audiences at the right moment” (p. 1132).   
Conclusion   
This literature review has sought to unpack the important socio-cultural 
dimensions and contextual domains that influence the introduction and 
establishment of alternative meaning systems into conventional, and powerful, 
paradigmatic environments.  Several areas appear to be under-researched; 
some, which are pertinent to this project, have informed my research questions.  
First, most institutional scholarship has focussed on the ways that institutions are 
maintained and reproduced as socially legitimate.  However, little research has 
been undertaken to investigate how institutional discourses and organisational 
practices might be disrupted or destabilised so that alternative discourses and 
explanatory models might be established.  Second, and relatedly, little scholarly 
attention has been paid to ways in which institutions undertake defensive 
institutional work, and the mechanisms and strategies by which they respond to 
challenge and threat.  One such mechanism, which is significant for this project, 
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is translation, and the effect this has on emerging discourses and their discourse 
communities.  
Critical and postmodern scholarship has encouraged challenges of the 
orthodoxy of dominant, taken-for-granted assumptions about the organisation 
of healthcare and, in particular, the positivist methodologies and scientific 
discourses that have underpinned Western mental health systems.  Most of this 
scholarship, in the mental health field, has originated outside the professional 
bio-medical disciplines, from a range of related fields such as medical sociology, 
health communication and health promotion, psychology and social work.  There 
has also been an increasing number of narrative accounts written by people with 
experiences of serious psychological distress.  Together these bodies of literature 
have identified and investigated sites of struggles for the control of the meanings 
of socially constructed phenomena such as mental health and illness and 
underlined the need for social and organisational transformation. 
The framework of problematics for critical organisational communication 
(Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) has enabled a critique of the variety of issues 
underpinning the relationships and tensions among established and emerging 
discourses.  It has also allowed me to draw together disparate threads from 
among a wide range of literature and structure an examination of theoretically 
pertinent constructs.  It has been particularly useful for identifying the 
communicative practices, organisational structures and sites of social legitimacy 
that establish and preserve orthodoxy, while also identifying alternative spaces 
for action and the opportunities for transformation and social change.     
In my analysis of the first problematic of rationality, I examined a range of 
literature that seriously questioned the rationality, and production, of scientific 
knowledge as unequivocal “fact”.  These scholars argued that this socio-cultural 
legitimacy of western science has not only embedded techno-scientific reasoning 
within organisational systems and structures, but has meant that alternative 
forms of knowledge and meaning have consequently appeared irrational 
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Fisher, 1990; Mumby 1988).  Little scholarly attention, 
or research funding, has been directed towards exploring alternative rationalities 
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or conceptualisations of psychological distress because they have lacked social 
legitimacy.   
Considering the second problematic, that of the relationships between 
organisations and the state, critical scholars maintain that individual, 
organisational and social transformations are inextricably linked to the 
emancipation of marginalised groups.  These groups have struggled to resist the 
claims of others to know what is best for them and society, and have been 
collectively associated with the empowerment agenda (Rappaport, 1990).  The 
emergence of alternative systems of meaning has enabled a critical shift in social 
consciousness for such groups.  It has also created different expectations of how 
organisational visions, values and goals might be enacted.   
Critics have noted that, despite the appearances of change and reform, 
the hegemonies created by the arrangements of power among dominant groups 
have serious implications for vulnerable groups.  In the mental health sector, this 
has meant that the ideological and institutional authority of biomedicine and 
managerialism has concealed and naturalised multiple contradictions and 
inequities.  Importantly, it has led to the sublimation of questions about the role 
of “community”, in community care, and developed of responsibility for the care 
of vulnerable people to professionals and services.  These circumstances have 
proved remarkably resistant to challenge and disruption.  
The third problematic, of organising, highlighted the relationships among 
clinical services and community NGOs in the mental health sector.  Despite the 
community organisations endeavouring to facilitate peoples’ recovery by 
engaging them with their community in meaningful ways, they have struggled to 
establish credibility and legitimacy.  In contrast, many of the principles, identified 
as fundamental to recovery, have been intensely challenging for traditional 
mental health services.  
Organisations are influenced by multiple, interacting factors within, and 
beyond, organisational boundaries that enable or constrain the possibilities for 
organisational and institutional change.  Unfortunately, most scholarship has 
been concerned with the ways that institutions persist, rather than how they can 
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be challenged, disrupted and ultimately deinstitutionalised (Reay & Hinings, 
2005).  Even less scholarly attention has been paid to the ways in which 
institutions act in order to protect their power and legitimacy through defensive 
institutional work.   
Two distinct forms of institutional change efforts were identified in the 
literature (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Insider change has often provided the 
appearance of change, through the adoption of the language of change, but 
systems of power and institutional authority have remained embedded.  Insider 
change efforts, therefore, have typically been described as restructuring, or 
service improvement, rather than reconstruction or organisational 
transformation.   
In contrast, outsider change endeavours are initiated by less powerful 
groups who are disadvantaged by the status quo. These groups, therefore, are 
more invested in systemic change, have nothing to lose and everything to gain by 
organisational and institutional transformation.  This is certainly the case for 
people with lived experience of psychological distress, and to a lesser extent the 
community non-government organisations. 
The fourth and final problematic was concerned with the issues of voice, 
particularly perspectives outside those of dominant groups.  Critical and 
postmodern researchers have investigated how these groups are represented, 
and how they negotiate and construct alternative systems of organisational 
discourse and practice.  However, the literature showed that, despite the 
emergence of personal narrative and explanatory models of people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress, the objective expertise of medical 
professionals was still privileged over the subjectivity of human experience.  
The literature demonstrated that issues of voice, in terms of 
organisational change, have been less about language and more about the 
power to maintain control over meaning systems.  Multiple discourses and 
vocabularies exist within any organisational, or institutional, environment, some 
of which work in conjunction and others become sites of tension and resistance.  
In addition, new discourses and conceptual models disseminate throughout 
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organisational fields in ways that never faithfully reproduce their original 
meanings.  In fact, several scholars have argued that discourses are inevitably 
translated as they cross organisational boundaries.  Therefore, discursive shifts 
have not, necessarily, implied changes in the arrangements of power or the 
redistribution of resources.   
The literature reviewed supported my inquiry interests, first, in 
understanding how an emergent discourse such as recovery might be 
constructed and enacted.  In particular, it suggested how discourses might be 
“translated” by various voices and subject positions.  Second, it identified 
potential sites of institutional disruption and possible processes for the 
establishment of alternative organisational discourses.  In addition, it is indicated 
the ways in which institutions engage in defensive institutional work to protect 
their status and authority.  This area of institutional work is, also, currently 
under-researched.   
In the chapter that follows, I describe the research design and 
methodology of this project.  In particular, I outline my methodological stance 
and connect this to my theoretical preoccupations and literature.  I describe the 
recruitment and selection methods for my participant groups and finally I 
examine how I organised and analysed the data with respect to my research 
questions. 
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Chapter 5: Research design and methodology   
Introduction  
Underpinning this research project is the notion that, despite their best 
intentions, community NGOs, and mental health services generally, are not as 
effective as they would like to be in terms of becoming recovery-oriented 
(Barber, 2005; Jacobson & Curtis, 2000; Lord et al., 1998; O’Hagan, 1999, 2009; 
Sowers, 2005).  Previous research showed that some aspects were working really 
well (Barber, 2005) and that, if these were clearly identified and articulated, they 
could possibly be enhanced in organisational practices and successes replicated.  
Therefore, I developed my research questions to enable a thorough examination 
of what was happening in these organisations:  
1. In what ways are discourses of recovery constructed, negotiated and 
resisted in everyday practice within non-government community 
mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand? 
2. How are institutional dynamics working to construct, constrain or 
contradict organisational practices in terms of becoming recovery-
oriented? 
3. In what ways are institutional dynamics being problematised and 
challenged within these organisations and to what effect? 
In this chapter, I first discuss the methodological stance of my research, 
and how this is anchored in Critical Appreciative Inquiry methodology (Boje, 
2010; Grant & Humphries, 2006; van der Haar & Hosking, 2004).  Second, I 
explain how this methodological choice supports the research objectives and 
generated the kind of rich data required to answer my research questions 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).  I then describe the conceptualisation and enactment 
of the research design, including the development of research methods and 
tools, participant selection and recruitment and my responses to some issues 
that arose.  This included some unanticipated but necessary revisions of some 
original assumptions of my research design.  Finally, I describe the data analysis 
strategy and nature of thematic analysis I employed to represent faithfully the 
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participants voices while interpreting, meaningfully, the major themes and 
constructions that arose from the focus group, interview and textual data. 
Methodological stance   
Julian Rappaport (1990) has argued that “all research distorts, but some 
methods do so more than others: Different distortions give us different data, and 
they also empower different actors” (p. 57).  Scholars within the social services 
field have similarly maintained that research should be collaborative; giving voice 
to the people and communities of concern and seeking descriptive authenticity 
(Dick, 2009; Lewin, 1946; Minkler, 2000; Stringer, 1996).  Therefore, in this 
project, I was concerned to address the questions of not only “who does the 
content of this research empower?” but also “who does the method of this 
research empower?”  (Rappaport, 1990, p. 58) and to provide space for workers 
in the community mental health NGOs to tell their stories of recovery in ways 
that enabled them to feel empowered and grow their practice (Barber, 2005; 
Stringer, 1996; Townsend, 1998; Wadsworth, 1998).  So saying, I was also intent 
on ensuring rigour though the criteria of trustworthiness and fidelity to 
participants (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Dick, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1986) while 
remaining academically credible to a wider audience and producing results of 
significance that would be transferable to other organisational groups, 
communities and populations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Dick, 2009).  
Action research, therefore, was preferred ahead of other qualitative 
methodologies because of its emphasis on collaboration, empowerment and 
action for social change.  Specifically, I believed that a particular form of action 
research, Critical Appreciative inquiry (CAI), would lead to deeper insights into 
the narratives and discourses that members of these NGOs were utilising in 
order to organise themselves as recovery-oriented within the context of 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services (Boje, 2010; Fitzgerald, Oliver, & 
Hoxsey, 2010; Grant & Humphries,2006; van der Haar & Hosking, 2004).   
I was concerned to discover how recovery was being constructed by 
different people, groups and organisations as well as discerning what values and 
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larger discourses were at work (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Cheney, 2002; Deetz 
& Mumby, 1990; Fairclough, 1992, 1993), and in what ways these were 
competing and to what effect (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 1997; Ramon et 
al., 2007).   
My methodological stance was underpinned by two major assumptions: 
(i) a general, scholarly disenchantment in the social sciences with the grand 
narratives of science, religion and politics and their claims of universal truths 
(Foucault, 1972; Gergen & Thatchenkery, 1996; Harter et al., 2010; Rappaport, 
1995, 2002;Taylor, 2004); (ii) that organisations are discursive constructions of 
communicative practices, situated within historical, cultural, social, economic 
and political contexts (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004; Grant & Humphries, 2006; 
Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011).  The section that follows examines the critical 
and postmodern epistemological bases for my methodology. 
The critical and postmodern traditions as methodology 
Bryan Taylor (2004) noted that the postmodern turn in organisational 
research has opened traditional methods to critical scrutiny, taking nothing for 
granted and questioning the nature of the research process itself.  Following 
Foucault, he argued that “all inquiries after truth” (p. 135) are suspect and have 
served to mask and\or serve particular interests in local, cultural and political 
struggles (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Weber, 1946).  Scientific methods of knowledge 
generation, for example, have privileged professional accounts as more 
“truthful” than other organisational narratives and have routinely invalidated 
the voices of ordinary workers (Harter et al., 2010; Lapsley & Nikora, 2002).  
However, Foucault argued, professional authority is merely truth sanctioned by 
tradition and therefore scholars “should not leave a paradigm unchallenged 
simply because it is dominant” (Zuber-Skerritt & Farquhar, 2002, p. 103).   
In response, postmodern organisational communication scholars have 
developed methodologies that expose and challenge the preferred and 
historically dominant stories; instead seeking out suppressed narratives and 
meaning systems (Adame, 2006; Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007a, 2007b; Coney, 
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2004; Pilgrim, 2005; Taylor, 2004; Weick, 2000).  These scholars, have 
contended that the lived experience of everyday sense making within 
organisations and communities is characterised by many “overlapping, 
interweaving, and perhaps even competing, narratives rather than a single 
coherent and authoritative storyline” (Whittle & Mueller, 2010, p. 113).  The 
critical gaze in this project, therefore, was intended to facilitate insight, for both 
the researcher and participants, into their degree of identification with, and 
participation in, privileged or alternative discourses.   
Postmodern inquiry has sought to increase awareness of these struggles 
and expose the powerful and institutionalised discourses that have gained 
coherence, authority and legitimacy.  In pragmatic terms, for many social service 
organisations, this has meant that their practices and decision-making have been 
governed by managerial and professional norms that have actively marginalised, 
even foreclosed, alternate voices and interpretations (Barber, 2005; Deetz, 2004; 
Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Trethewey, 1997).  The strengths, capabilities and 
resourcefulness of workers in these organisations have, therefore, been 
routinely excluded from forums that determine the strategic development of the 
sector (Barber, 2005; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Kukler et al., 1998; Wade, 1999; 
Warriner, 1997).   
Julian Rappaport (1990) argued that a commitment to an empowerment 
social agenda in research means “identifying, facilitating or creating contexts in 
which heretofore silent and isolated people, those who are outsiders in various 
settings, organisations and communities, gain understanding, voice and influence 
over decisions that affect their lives” (p. 52).  Critical and postmodern 
organisational communication scholars, therefore, have supported the 
development of methodologies that echo and support more participatory 
communication and emancipatory practices in organisations (Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2000; Rappaport, 1990; S. Rose, 2000; Spano, 2001).  Specifically, a 
critically appreciative approach to this inquiry attended to previously unheard 
narratives of organisational life from the people for whom these matters were of 
immediate and personal concern (Ridgway, 2001).  It did not warrant any 
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particular expertise or subject position (van der Harr & Hosking, 2004) but was 
intended to facilitate understanding and generate knowledge of direct relevance 
to participants, giving them ownership of the findings and a sense of ethical 
fairness in the knowledge generation process (Berg, 2003; Barber, 2005).   
Critical methodologies have required scholars to take an ethical position 
with regard to the implications of communicative activities including research 
(Deetz, 2001; Rappaport, 1990, 2001).  They have maintained that no scholarship 
is value free, and researchers should abandon a pretext of disinterested science 
and develop a critical attitude, or reflexive stance, that explicitly identifies and 
acknowledges their partiality (Horkheimer, 1972; Jermier 1998; Rappaport, 1990, 
2001).  As members of the critical tradition, action research methodologies, 
including CAI, have also resisted a naive enchantment with “objective methods 
(that have seemed) to strip human behaviour of its meaning, agency, purpose 
and social context” (Lapsley & Nikora, 2002, p. 5).   
Despite surface disparities, both appreciative and critical methodological 
approaches assume that organisational change will be most successful when it 
has meaning for, and is to some extent owned by, those most affected by that 
change.  In the section that follows I discuss the salient aspects of CAI that 
informed this project and its pursuit of enlightened social and organisational 
change (Dick, 1993, 2009; Stringer, 1996).    
Action research and Critical Appreciative inquiry   
Critical Appreciative inquiry (CAI) and other action research 
methodologies share an interest in the pursuit of enlightened social and 
organisational change.  They enact research that seeks to empower and mobilise 
people, and resist attributing responsibility to them for the existence of 
problems, instead validating and trusting their expertise to develop solutions 
(Rappaport, 1990).  All these methodologies have a commitment to working with 
democratic values and to authentically and faithfully represent voices that are 
often ignored (Minkler, 2000; Rapp et al., 1993; Rappaport, 1990; Reason, 1994, 
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2000).  This has led to forms of action research becoming important methods of 
inquiry in the fields of health, education and organisational change management.   
All action research methodologies invite participants to explore the 
significance of their experience and actions in a collaborative, discursive space 
that acknowledges and validates their expertise, differences and contributions 
(Barber, 2005).  Like other forms of narrative inquiry, this methodology 
privileged participants’ representations of experience as a source of insight 
(Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007; Harter et al., 2006).  Participant groups could also, 
potentially, destabilise dominant stories by coming to recognise alternative 
possibilities and preferred outcomes that were frequently hidden by dominant 
accounts.   
The epistemological basis of both critical and appreciative approaches to 
inquiry is illumination of the ways in which power is mediated through discourse 
in determining organisation realities (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).  Typically, 
organisational change initiatives have been imposed from the top down and 
drawn only on managerial interests and perspectives.  Traditional problem and 
deficit-based analyses have created an exaggerated spotlight on perceived 
weaknesses within organisational communication and practices.  Focusing solely 
on finding specific solutions to perceived problems has created discursive 
closures that have limited the ways in which issues are framed and possibilities 
envisaged. 
Critical Appreciative inquiry differs from other action research 
methodologies in that it resists focusing on problem analysis in favour of 
identifying effective practice.  Problem definition is relegated to a place from 
which to identify and encourage potential solutions that are already “known”, at 
some level, to participants (Hall & Hammond, 1998).  Therefore, the intention is 
to generate visions of positive and preferred futures, as well as identifying a 
range of possible pathways and strategies towards those futures (Hammond & 
Royal, 1988).  
The fundamental assumptions that underpin appreciative inquiries are, 
first, that in every situation or organisation something is already working.  
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Second, in any situation, there are multiple realities and possibilities for new 
action.  Third, and importantly for this research, it is assumed that the very act of 
asking questions influences and shapes the reality for participants in some way 
(Cady & Caster, 2000; Cooperrider & Whitney, 2000; Zorn, Roper, Broadfoot, & 
Weaver, 2006).    
At its simplest, CAI involves interested groups in a thorough exploration 
of what works effectively in their past and current situations, and simultaneously 
engages them in identifying potential pathways for change, anchored in what is 
already known and “sensible” (Reason, 2000; van der Haar & Hosking, 2004).  
The process, therefore, encourages movement away from, problem-laden 
narratives and invites more hopeful and aspirational articulations of preferred 
futures (Hall & Hammond, 1998).  It provided participants with the opportunity 
to develop alternative views of organisational reality through a socially shared 
appreciation of organisational life, and to develop a “critical consciousness” of 
their individual and organisational circumstances and capacities within larger 
social contexts (Freire, 1973, 1996; Minkler & Cox, 1980; Zorn et al., 2006).    
Combining appreciative and critical approaches expanded the sense of 
“appreciative” from any trivial sense of naïve “positivity” (Ehrenreich, 2009; 
Fineman, 2006a; Grant & Humphries, 2006).  A more complex definition of 
appreciation as coming to know, and more deeply understand, increased the 
capacity of my methodology to engage with the complexities of organisational 
realities, as they were experienced by diverse organisational members (Cooks, 
2000; Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Grant & Humphries, 2006; van der Haar & Hosking, 
2004).  This sense of appreciative was defined by Grant and Humphries (2006) as 
articulating and dialoguing the best of what was, what could be and what should 
be, while envisaging and innovating the pathways to what might be.   
The methodological choice enabled participants to maintain their gaze on 
how they and their organisations could succeed rather than getting lost in 
endless discussions of why they fail (Barge & Oliver, 2003; Harter et al., 2006; 
McCashen, 2005).  The appreciative gaze allowed them to seek out the “best of 
what we do around here”; the critical gaze widened the scope to examine how 
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they might change “the way we do things round here” (van der Haar & Hosking, 
2004).   
This did not mean ignoring the real issues that faced individuals and 
organisations but, rather, it represented a conscious choice to attend to the 
achievements, capacities and resourcefulness that had enabled successful 
outcomes previously and thereby identify the seeds of future possibilities 
(Saleeby, 2001).   
It was anticipated that participation in this research process would 
encourage new understandings of organisational realities, and that alternative 
discourses would present themselves.  While these new constructions of 
experience could not guarantee immediate action, they could still generate 
transformative power. 
Reflexivity and my role as research coordinator  
Reflexivity is implicit in all forms of action research (AR) and predicated 
on researcher participation in the world under study (Burawoy, 1998).  
Therefore, a crucial feature of the research design is how a researcher should 
treat her own voice (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Dick, 1993, 2009; Reason, 1994. 
2000).  All variations of AR emphasise engagement rather than detachment and 
Julian Rappaport (1990) has commented that “to say that collaboration is 
important is to say something about the relationship between the action-
researcher and the persons of concern [and] when people genuinely collaborate, 
they engage in a mutual-influence process” (p. 54).  This meant that as a 
research collaborator I was self-consciously engaging with the world of the 
participants interacting as an interested participant with a background of 
experiences in the sector and an explicit optimism about its future.  
The overarching ambition of this project was to identify and champion 
the potential for organisational change, not support compliance or resignation 
with established authorities and dominant discourses.  Under these 
circumstances, methodological sophistication was secondary to the generation 
of practical and popular accounts that could be used to envisage individual and 
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organisational transformation; whether or not these advanced theoretical 
considerations (Winter, 1989).   Being reflexive, in this case, meant balancing the 
need to be inclusive of multiple, sometimes competing, narratives and the 
idiosyncrasies of local and messy realities without reducing the analysis to mere 
babble (Boje, 2001; Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012).  In other words, as research 
coordinator I needed to make sense of the narratives that participants offered 
me, but in ways I could be sure faithfully represented their intent, and desires for 
change, without allowing my own synthesising role be shaped by my pre-existing 
proclivities. 
My methodological and design choices were inevitably influenced by my 
own identifications and subjectivities, and these permeated the research 
process, including the questions I asked and in the ways in which I tried to 
answer them.  My previous research, examining strengths-based practices and 
community support work, made me sympathetic, knowledgeable and committed 
to the future of the sector (Barber, 2005).  I also had extensive experience in the 
sector, as a programme coordinator and service manager, at an exciting period 
of sector change: to wit, the establishment of Mental Health Commission, the 
publication of The Blueprint and the introduction of the recovery discourse into a 
community sector that was, for the first time, offered a level playing field to 
develop innovative responsive services.  All this meant that, as a moderator and 
interviewer, I was self-consciously and transparently engaged with the issues for 
the sector and it was clear to participants that I was on the side of the NGOs.   
My stance was an important aspect of my access to, and engagement 
with, prospective participants, but I needed to account for these interactive 
effects in the analysis (Stewart, Shamdasari, & Rook, 2007).  Further, I needed to 
be aware of any special privileges I might accrue to myself by virtue of my 
engagement with the sector, academic background, and overall control of the 
shape of the project (Barber, 2005; Rappaport, 1990, 1995).  My task then was 
how to represent faithfully the voices of the other participants, while remaining 
cognisant of my own engagement and control of methodological processes.   
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It is not possible to be both reflexive and omniscient.  There will always 
be a level of distortion inherent in the philosophical “situatedness” of an 
observer, participant or research facilitator.  However, being critically 
appreciative meant that I claimed no privileged position as the research 
facilitator.  This meant careful, self-conscious and continuous examination of the 
processes for gathering, organising and interpreting the data as well.  In 
particular, it meant identifying the norms and assumptions that guided my 
thinking and actions throughout the project and checking that the methods were 
relevant and appropriate to any subsequent knowledge claims.  At the analysis 
stage of the research it meant clearly establishing a systematic logic for assessing 
and communicating the interactive process.   
Coordinating the research meant being clear about what I wanted to hear 
about, to guide and focus the discussion; but, at the same time, I needed to keep 
the conversational space open for participants to be able to fully explore their 
own priorities, expressed in their own language.  I relinquished any sense of the 
“god’s eye view” and established a mutually influential process that remained 
open to changes in the thinking and perspectives of all involved (Barber, 2005; 
Gergen & Gergen, 2006; Rappaport, 1990, 1995; Reason, 1994).  Paradoxically, 
this stance gave me less control over where the discussions might lead, and 
restricted my opportunities as moderator to challenge some perspectives to see 
further below the surface.  However, I also needed to remain alert for 
contradictions and the existence of continuously negotiated positions (Barber, 
2005; Rappaport, 1995).  Participant feedback forms indicated that I managed 
this balance. 
There were limitations to my subjectivity, not least of which was my 
understated authority as researcher.  I had previous knowledge and a 
background of scholarship in the subject area, prior knowledge and perceptions 
of some of these organisations from my background in the sector, as well as a 
sense of obligation and loyalty to my research participants.  Therefore, my level 
of disclosure, or non-disclosure, about my own predilections created a possible 
ethical dilemma.  This was compounded in two interviews where, in one I had my 
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own “interpretation” of what was being said, and in the other where I straight 
out did not believe the participant’s description of her organisation’s practice 
priorities.  In the event, neither transcript proved significant to the major themes 
emerging; however I was left with the uncomfortable awareness that I had not 
considered a strategy for dealing with difficult situations in interviews; nor had I 
adequately considered the boundaries between representation and 
interpretation of participant talk.   
So saying, the overall responsibility for the theoretical and design aspects 
of the project were mine; as were the deadlines and responsibilities for ensuring 
the project was completed.  As the ultimate author of the work it was also my 
responsibility to ensure the research maintained a level of academic rigour and 
was a conscientious endeavour to “tell the truth”.  I was responsible for 
summarising what was learned and for ensuring that it was both a faithful 
representation of participants’ perspectives and a careful analysis and 
interpretation of significant issues and themes that emerged (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2003; Dick, 2009; Tuckett, 2005).  Therefore, I needed to maintain a certain 
amount of control over the conditions affecting the research and I was inevitably 
the ultimate arbiter of inclusion, emphasis, and integration (Parker & Tritter, 
2006; Stewart et al., 2007; Woodring, Foley, & Rada, 2006).   
Research design and methods 
I required a research design that would honour the expertise and 
knowledge of participants; but which also enriched and expanded their current 
understanding of their situation.  I was concerned that participants’ stories 
should be told in ways that would uncover how organisational decisions were 
made, which organisational stories were privileged, and how this affected 
individual and organisational discourses as well as service delivery.  In this sense, 
my methodological choices followed Freire’s (1973) concept of critical 
consciousness in facilitating everyday members of organisational communities to 
develop new ways of seeing, thinking and talking about their organisational 
realities.  This was intended to lead to the creation of new meanings and changes 
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in the world of experience for participants, researcher and organisations (Hill & 
Capper, 1999).   
Therefore, I intended to create an energetic open space in which 
participants could explore and develop their own constructions of how 
organisations might align themselves more effectively with their own core 
visions and values.  I anticipated that, subsequently, this more evolved and 
communal awareness of organisational contexts could inform changes in how 
participants expressed themselves and increase their capacity to take action 
towards a desired future (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Zorn et al., 2006).   
Requirements of the research design 
As an inductive, naturalistic inquiry, I did not pre-determine too many 
aspects of the research design, but instead developed more flexible strategies to 
respond to emerging content and particular contextual realities.  So saying, the 
credibility of the research design rested on how theory, methodology, research 
processes and research rationale combined to support the research objectives 
and provide a sensible way to develop and answer the research questions 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Punch, 1998).  Previous research and literature 
suggested that implementing a recovery orientation in mental health services 
was proving difficult to achieve (Barber, 2005; O’Hagan, 2009; Turner-Crowson & 
Wallcraft, 2002).  In addition, the role of the community organisations in the 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector seemed to be diminishing in some 
important ways (Harrison, 2010; Warriner, 2010).   
Organisational development and action research scholars have noted that 
effective organisational change needs to be anchored in meaningful ways to 
people’s collective experience (Dick, 1996; Reason, 1994).  This indicated the 
importance of developing participatory research practices, driven as far as 
possible by “community” priorities, multiple voices and a shared understanding 
of the circumstances of these organisations and their constituting discourses 
(Deetz, 2003; Dick, 1996; Greenhalgh et al., 2005; Reason, 1994).  I endeavoured 
to find ways to elicit the everyday theories and explanatory models that ordinary 
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people used within their organisational environments in order that we all might 
come to a better, shared understanding of what meaningful social action might 
look like in mental health services (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, 2003; Harter et al., 
2010). 
Any research design is required to be a disciplined, systematic and 
analytically rigorous inquiry.  Action research methodologies achieve rigour 
through evaluation of their “worthwhile”-ness to participants (Dick, 2003; 
Reason, 1994).  Similarly, other qualitative scholars have argued that narrative 
“truth” is characterised by trustworthiness and authenticity rather than scientific 
objectivity (Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Kincheloe & McLaren, 1998; Lincoln, 1995).  
Some have gone further to claim that methodological rigour is a better measure 
of academic legitimacy than cognitive impenetrability (Dick, 2003; Greenhalgh et 
al., 2005).  Therefore, there needed to be a logical coherence throughout all 
aspects of the project and it needed to express accurately the organisational 
realities of the multiple stakeholders (Conle, 2001; Lincoln, 1995).   
Yvonna Lincoln (1995) described trustworthiness and authenticity as 
indicative of research that produces rich, thick, detailed descriptions and where 
the constructions of all participants are represented with equal power and 
vigour.  Likewise, Mulholland and Wallace (2003) have argued that the 
“legitimation of the findings in qualitative research is enhanced by multiple 
tellings of stories of lived experience” (p. 22).  In addition, the research needed 
to be conducted and reported in such a way that the arguments could be 
critically examined and the conclusions deemed credible (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
All of the above influenced my choices of methods and procedures for gathering 
appropriate data.   
In the end, focus groups were a logical and useful choice for participants 
to engage in conversation and share their experiences in a relatively open forum.  
I also used semi-structured interviews with managers for purely practical, and 
geographical, reasons.  In addition, texts such as national strategy and policy 
documents provided useful data and framed the interactive discussions within 
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the current context of the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector (see 
Appendix 5 for list of texts).   
Methods: Focus groups and semi-structured interviews 
Focus groups have enjoyed resurgence in the fields of social and health 
science; largely due to their suitability for gathering the perspectives of people 
who have been previously unheard or overlooked in research (Kidd & Parshall, 
2000; Koppelman & Bourjolly, 2001; Stewart et al., 2007; Woodring et al., 2006).  
They have also proved to be an excellent way of unearthing and examining public 
understandings and experiences of phenomena such as mental health and illness 
(Kitzinger, 1995).  It was important for this research project that the choice of 
method provide a voice for people who have not previously been invited to the 
discussions that inform and their everyday organisational realities.   
Fern (1982) concluded that focus groups are effective because, in 
contrast to interviews, they lower participants’ caution and reserve due to their 
relative anonymity and reduction in accountability.  He posited that a well-
facilitated group creates an atmosphere of excitement and enthusiasm that 
encouraged participants to freely express their ideas and feelings.  In addition, 
again unlike interviews, a variety of communication forms such as jokes, 
anecdotes, personal stories, and expostulations become available; all of which 
yield important clues as to participants’ attitudes, values and priorities (Kitzinger, 
1994).  Fundamentally, and philosophically, focus groups were chosen as the 
preferred form of data collection because, as Lambert (2006) has explained:   
In conversational storytelling, [. . .] stories lead to stories lead 
to stories.  We can watch the patterns unfold as each story 
transforms the conversations, the meaning, and the exchange 
into deeper and more intimate communication.  There is so 
much invisible power in this simple activity that people walk 
away from some gatherings feeling transformed . . . (p. 11). 
The focused aspect of the groups signified that participants were people 
who shared a common interest in the mental health sector.  Therefore, I 
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expected the participants to have a strong engagement with the subjects under 
discussion.  In addition, the inherent flexibility of focus groups offered a 
responsiveness that would be lost in quantitative techniques (Morrison, 1998).  
They could also be conducted within more naturalistic and social settings, were 
cost effective in terms of time and resources and delivered a larger data yield 
(Krueger & Casey, 2000; Morgan, 1997; Parker & Tritter, 2006).   
The open-ended nature of the focus groups offered participants choices 
about what they talked about, how they responded and encouraged interaction 
while also allowing them to change their minds while they were together (Zorn 
et al., 2006).  The group context encouraged diversity and divergence, inviting 
deeper consideration of the issues under discussion.  I anticipated that the 
process would allow ambiguities and contradictions to emerge, and that these 
would either be reflexively challenged and\or would expose implicit knowledge, 
beliefs, values and other taken-for-granted meanings among group members.   
So saying, I was intent on examining not only people’s constructions of 
recovery and what this meant for community mental health organisations, but 
how and why they came to think as they did and whether this changed over the 
course of a discussion.  I was interested in the language they used, the concepts 
they drew on and the associations they made when making sense of important 
ideas.  I believed that the interactive features of these discussions would be 
important indicators of the various frameworks they constructed in order to 
make sense of their organisational realities and their role within the mental 
health sector.   
As indicated previously, the decision to use both focus groups and semi-
structured interviews was pragmatic rather than philosophical (Lambert & 
Loiselle, 2008).  With only one, or sometimes two, senior managers in an 
organisation it would have been difficult, as well as costly, to coordinate focus 
groups for these participants.  However, postmodern trends in interviewing have 
blurred the boundaries between formal interviewing and more conversational 
methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), and in both methods, I was intent to facilitate 
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collaborative conversations that created a space for participants to develop the 
ideas and issues that were important to them.   
Different methods provide different data but also offer opportunities to 
illuminate different understandings and add richness to the analysis (Lambert & 
Loiselle, 2008).  It was important to remain alert to any hierarchy of data that 
might develop in the analysis and to ensure all voices were treated fairly.  In 
addition, and to provide as much comparability as possible, the interviews were 
loosely structured and guided by the same prompt questions as the focus 
groups.   
Participants were organised into three cohorts according to their roles 
and responsibilities, within the typical management structures of these 
organisations.  The criteria were a prospective participant’s relative autonomy 
and power to influence decision making as well as their capacity to influence the 
strategic direction and development of their organisations.  These criteria also, 
naturally, grouped people in terms of the nature of their relationships with 
service users and delivery of core services. 
Participants were, therefore, separated into the following categories: 
1. “Flax root” support workers.  These have no authority over others, limited 
decision making power and primary relationship(s) with service users.  
There were 73 of these, predominantly female of whom, 26 also 
identified as people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress. Of these, 20 were in designated peer support roles (see Tables 2 
& 6, Appendix 1). 
2. Service coordinators and Team Leaders.  These have some supervisory 
authority over others, have some decision-making responsibility and 
participation in organisational processes, are accountable in both 
directions and have less direct contact with service users.  There were 38 
in this cohort, the vast majority of whom were female with five who 
identified as having lived experience of serious psychological distress. 
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Four had designated peer support lead roles (see Tables 3 & 7, Appendix 
1). 
3. CEOs and Senior Managers.  These have relative autonomy and authority 
over others as well as a significant capacity to make decisions and control 
strategy, policy, planning and organisational development, and a limited 
direct contact with service users.  There were 20 participants in this 
category, 16 of whom were interviewed and five who were involved in 
focus groups.  Interestingly 60% of this influential group were male.  Five 
identified as people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress.  Three were managers of service user led organisations (see 
Tables 4 and 8, Appendix 1). 
As previously explained, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
most senior managers.  However, I was able to conduct a focus group with the 
whole senior management team from one large NGO in Wellington, who had 
kindly made themselves available.  In addition, I was able to interview two 
members of the senior management team in three other organisations, two in 
Auckland and one in Hamilton.  
In the next section, I describe how participants were selected and 
recruited, and how the data was collected.  
Procedures for participant recruitment and data collection 
The focus groups and semi-structured interviews provided a rich set of 
data from a total of 131 participants, representing 29 community mental health 
NGOs, concentrated in four major DHB regions: Auckland, Waikato, Wellington 
and Christchurch (see Tables 1-4, Appendix 1).  Participants were identified and 
invited through a variety of mental health databases and network mailing lists.  
This provided a mix of organisational types, included urban and rural 
organisations, but was resource efficient in terms of travel and time.   
Participants worked in a variety of community service settings including 
residential; home based support; employment and vocational support; consumer 
and family support.  Participant organisations included four that are designated 
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service user organisations, three that provide support for families and two 
Kaupapa Māori organisations.  In addition, two organisations have designated 
Peer Support teams and four have Kaupapa Māori arms to their services.  
Overall, there was a mix of residential and home-based community support 
organisations as well as advocacy and consulting services, drop-in centres, day 
programmes and peer respite services (for a full summary of organisational  
demographics, please see Tables 5 & 6, Appendix 1). 
Participant selection and recruitment  
The recruitment process was both purposive and opportunistic.  I had my 
own networks within the community mental health sector; some of these were 
participants in my Master’s research project.  I was also able to recruit 
participants from mental health training workshops, for community practitioners 
throughout the country, that I had facilitated.  I used the snowball effect of these 
encounters to follow leads and take advantage of unexpected opportunities to 
invite participants.  I also had meetings with the national Service User Lead from 
Te Pou14, and was subsequently invited to present a seminar to the other 
members of the clinical service team in Hamilton.  I followed this by meeting 
with the Te Pou national workforce development coordinator, who was leading 
the development of the national mental health service framework.  All of these 
encounters created fresh contacts and opportunities to expand my networks in 
the sector, some of which resulted in active participation in the project while 
others offered food for thought and reflection.   
I did not originally intend to directly recruit service users (or people with 
lived experience of psychological distress) as participants.  This was partly due to 
the ethical issues and an unwieldy enlargement of scope.  But it was also due to 
the philosophical stance that the views of these groups were already in the 
                                                     
14 Te Pou o Te Whakaaro Nui [legal identity Te Pou Ltd.] is the organisation with responsibility for 
the mental health sector workforce and service development in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  It 
incorporates all of: Mental Health Research and Development Strategy (MHRDS), the Mental 
Health Standard Measures of Assessment and Recovery initiative, known as MH-SMART and the 
Mental Health Workforce Development Programme (MHWDP). 
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public domain through numerous texts.  I considered that it was long overdue for 
others in the sector to make the organisational and sector changes for which 
service user groups had long advocated.  Therefore, I intended to represent 
service user perspectives, through the growing body of consumer literature and 
research, as the context for the other participant views.   
I did recognise, however, that service users would naturally become 
participants because many worked in the sector as support workers, peer 
support workers and leaders of service user organisations.  Similarly, other 
participants, naturally, would be family members.  However, as I began to 
analyse the data, it was immediately apparent that these participants’ 
perspectives were fundamentally different from those of their colleagues, and 
needed to be identified separately within each cohort.  
Question formulation  
The formulation of the focus group question framework was crucial to 
unearthing personal and organisational strategies for successful practice (see 
Appendix 2 for focus group question guide).  I wanted to invite personal stories, 
and follow these with questions that encouraged further exploration and 
reflection.  The nature and structure of the question framework, and the 
systematic sequencing of questions, were carefully considered to allow 
familiarity with the topic to build but also to ensure there was adequate time for 
individuals to recollect and listen to others.   
I was also important to develop questions that were explicitly 
appreciative.  I did not intend to deny or minimise issues of serious concern to 
participants, but I did want to provide opportunities for them to articulate their 
enthusiasms and stories of successful outcomes.  This was a conscious 
alternative to re-visiting problems and circumstances that were unlikely to be 
helpful for initiating organisational change (Barge & Oliver, 2003; van der Haar & 
Hosking, 2004).  Finally I created questions that provided opportunities for 
participants to identify the issues in the sector that needed to be talked about, 
what other people in the community should know about these organisations and 
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the work they do as well as “What is currently not on the agenda that should 
be?”.  The responses to these questions, and the post-focus group feedback 
forms, ensured that I was capturing data about the most relevant, significant and 
current issues facing these organisations. 
In the next section, I provide the chronological outline of the actual 
procedures I undertook for data gathering and collation.  
Data collection procedures 
The first focus groups, convened in Hamilton, were intended to be pilot 
groups where participants would provide feedback about all aspects of the 
process.  I anticipated adjusting aspects of the research design in response to the 
data gathered from these groups.  I had developed pre-focus group forms (see 
Appendix 3) that captured demographic information as well as initial, benchmark 
data such as organisational Mission Statements, personal and organisational 
stances on recovery etc.  From these I was able to get an initial, thumbnail 
impression of the preferred stories and current understandings of recovery in 
the sector; as well as the official, explicit organisational intentions and significant 
misalignments with the personal values of participants.  
Similarly, I created post-focus group forms (see Appendix 4) that were 
intended test the appropriateness of my issue identification and the relevance of 
the question formulation.  Both the pre- focus group forms (see Appendix 3) and 
post- focus group forms (see Appendix 4) were designed to inform the future roll 
out of the project.  The collated summary of this data can be found in Appendix 6 
and is discussed in the analysis section.  Suffice to say that this material not only 
demonstrated that the project was on the right track but also proved to be rich 
data in itself.  Therefore, I included these forms in all subsequent focus groups 
and interviews.  
Establishing good practice for the focus groups  
An intrinsic tension exists between the theory and pragmatics of forming 
focus groups, which are invariably situated within an environment that is largely 
constructed by the facilitator.  Although, epistemologically, there is little 
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difference in data quality between focus group and any other data collection 
method, many factors impact on good practice in data collection and rigour in 
analysis; all of which required careful consideration (Freeman, 2006; Parker & 
Tritter, 2006). 
First, the composition of the focus groups required careful thought.  
While there is no prescription about the size or context of focus groups, and no 
data is more authentic than any other, research suggests that the composition 
and structure of groups, their relative homogeneity or diversity and the nature of 
participants’ relationships with each other need to be taken into account 
(Morgan, 1997; Morrison, 1998; Zorn et al., 2006).  It is generally agreed that 
there is a tendency for greater conformity in heterogeneous, or mixed, groups as 
participants are more concerned about the inter-personal relationships.  In 
contrast, some scholars argue that groups, which are more homogeneous in 
terms of demographics, personality and physical characteristics tend to work 
better (Kitzinger, 1995; Krueger, 2000; Morgan, 1998).  Others warn that the 
extent to which the groups are constrained by pragmatic concerns and 
organisational issues are all factors that need consideration and planning 
(Stewart et al., 2007).   
Therefore, as far as possible, I wanted to minimise the complications of 
asymmetrical power and status relationships; so I convened the focus groups 
with peers from the same, or other local, organisations.  This aspect of the 
research design was intended to provide an environment where participants 
would feel free to express themselves in the ways that were most meaningful to 
them and limit the possibility that some members may be considered more 
authoritative within a group (Zoller & Fairhurst, 2007).   
It is widely believed that facilitating encounters among people will 
generate data that goes beneath surface explanations; that is inherently richer 
than that gained through interviews.  Therefore, the interactive effects and 
group dynamics were integral in encouraging the emergence and development 
of issues and ideas (Parker & Tritter, 2006).  As moderator, I needed to carefully 
facilitate the development of the group dynamics, but gradually a kind of synergy 
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grew among participants, which was apparent once all had had the opportunity 
to contribute (Kitzinger, 1994, 1995; Stewart et al., 2007; Woodring et al., 2006).  
A primary role for moderating the groups was to elicit participation from each 
participant as early as possible, and I did this by inviting each person in turn to 
introduce themselves and describe their role.  I explained that this was also 
important to get their voice on tape for the transcriber.  
Criticisms, limitations and realities in the field 
Focus groups produce primarily social and interactive meanings 
(Kitzinger, 1994; Zorn et al., 2006).  As a researcher, I needed to accept that 
multiple constructions of meaning were possible based on different 
constructions from those engaged in the discussion (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; 
Tuckett, 2005).  This meant that I needed to discern not only similarities and 
distinctions in language use, but also assign significance according to the 
contextual features of the conversations (van der Haar & Hosking, 2004).  For 
instance, as Morgan (1997) has pointed out, habituated topics tend to provoke 
automatic responses, or ones that are not thought out in detail.  This was 
apparent, for example, when I asked participants directly about recovery or the 
“medical model”.  Other issues prompted participants to expand, explain and 
think more deeply about the issues under consideration.  As a moderator, I used 
prompts and challenges, sometimes directed at individuals, sometimes to the 
group in order to elicit more critical thought about particular topics. 
For example, I remained conscious, even in the early stage of the analysis 
that not all storytellers are equally powerful.  This was the basis of my selection 
of participants into cohorts, but even then, within groups there were inevitable 
differences in status, personality and experience.  I needed to be cognisant that 
some people would speak more than others did and some who would remain 
largely silent.  I guided this with skilful moderation, but remained conscious of 
how my own interests and values might have influenced changes in direction or 
shifts in thinking.  Similarly, interviewees, as senior managers were more likely to 
offer “sanitised” or preferred stories in the less challenging environment of a one 
to one interview.   These participants were more likely to be conscious of their 
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role in organisational reputation, and their greater accountability to “how things 
are done”. 
The flow of each focus group and interview was unique.  A range of 
contextual and environmental effects were noticed and remarked on by 
participants.  For instance, two participants commented that they felt 
constrained because the focus group was conducted in their work environment.  
This had been difficult to avoid because the organisation had offered the space 
as an act of generosity.  In six cases, focus groups were held with representatives 
from a single organisation.  These included three support worker groups, one 
each from Auckland, Wellington and Hamilton; two team leader groups, from 
Wellington and Hamilton, and one peer support team from Auckland.  This 
created challenges as well as opportunities.  It was interesting, for example, to 
compare the differing degrees of organisational identification between groups.  
In addition, being able to directly compare focus groups and interviews from 
different cohorts within a single organisation confirmed my sense that 
distinctions were less about role and status, but more about regions and 
individual organisations themselves.  Comparisons between these single 
organisation focus groups were also valuable, with participants from one 
seeming to valorise and identify with their organisation to a remarkable extent at 
all levels, under a catch-cry of “We’re simply the best”.  My field notes described 
these encounters as “engaging with the glossy brochures”; meaning that these 
participants uncritically, almost evangelically, expressed the organisations 
preferred or dominant story.  In contrast, participants from the other two 
organisations were far more critically reflective throughout the organisation and 
expressed a more genuine sense of working together to grow and make things 
better. 
It was apparent very early on, that people who had a personal history of 
serious psychological distress or diagnosis utilised a very different and distinct 
discourse from which to talk about their experiences of recovery.  It became 
useful therefore to single out the five organisations that identified as “service 
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user”15 organisations as well as four others that had designated peer support16 
workers, or even peer support teams.  In total 29 of the 131 participants 
identified themselves as, not only organisational members, but also service users 
(see Appendix 1 for demographic analysis of participants and organisations ).  
The foremost criticism of appreciative methods, and indeed focus group 
methods, is that they risk trivialisation and distortion through a Pollyanna-like 
approach to serious and difficult organisational issues (Fineman, 2006b).  
Barbara Ehrenreich (2009), among others, raises important concerns about the 
ideological appropriation of a “positive” discourse by those with economic or 
political motives for suppressing robust discussion of issues that confront 
ordinary people in their organisational lives.  “Being positive”, in the sense of 
merely expressing optimistic views, or providing non-critical feedback, on 
organisational realities, frequently underlines power differences in 
organisational relationships, and does nothing to solicit dialogue that might 
expose significant differences in perspectives and “appreciations” of aspects of 
organisational life.   Ehrenreich maintains there are dangerous distortions when 
powerful interests and systems attribute genuine discontent to individual 
incapacities to maintain optimism (Ehrenreich, 2009; Fineman, 2006b).   
Other criticisms of traditional appreciation methods have included their 
use and manipulation by those concerned with increasing productivity or 
compliance.  Barge & Oliver (2003) claim that the “true” appreciative spirit in 
organisations requires those in powerful positions to “to connect with what 
others value” (p. 130).   
Several scholars have criticised the use of focus groups as being merely 
an expedient way of interviewing several people at once rather than addressing 
salient features of the group process interactions between participants (Kidd & 
Parshall, 2000; Kitzinger, 1994, 1995; Morrison, 1998).  They have argued that 
                                                     
15 ‘Service user’ is commonly used to refer to people who have had experiences of extreme 
psychological distress and been admitted to treatment services at some stage 
16 Peer support is the name given to an identifiable approach, for both individuals and teams 
whose particular expertise arises from their own experiences of mental illness. 
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doing so risks missing the divergences of meaning as they shift and emerge from 
within the group.  Barbour (2001) adds that the richness of the data and the 
analysis is the strength of the method while conformity in the process is often a 
limitation.  However, practical circumstances e.g. conducting a focus group 
where only two people turned up require cautious and reflective analysis.  As 
moderator, I needed to be particularly careful in such situations, when more 
active facilitation was required, that I did not overly influence the discussion. 
I also needed to remain conscious of two important distinctions between 
the focus groups and interviews.  The first was a potential difficulty that arose 
because the interviewees were all senior managers; they were prominent in their 
organisations and had a sense of themselves as authoritative, which was not 
present in the focus groups (Kitzinger, 1994).  I wanted to generate frank 
discussions and not just elicit the “party line” and there was a risk that these 
participants drew on an increased sense of responsibility and expectations of 
their role and status to explain or justify themselves and their organisation.  In 
addition, it was more likely that these participants would use the interview to 
push a preferred view, unchallenged, and unchallengeable, by an interviewer 
intent on not alienating a participant (Conger & Kanungo, 1987).  Taken in 
isolation, therefore, the individual interviews could have become opportunities 
to self-promote as well as to imprint the dominant organisational story. 
Second, there was a fundamental difference between focus groups and 
interviews in terms of the relationships that developed between me, as 
researcher, and participants (Parker & Tritter, 2006).  I wanted to engender a 
reflective conversation about future organisational possibilities and this was 
difficult to do in one-on-one interviews without my own perspectives intruding 
or creating a sense of stage-managing the process.  In contrast, participant 
assumptions in the focus groups were routinely “thrown into relief by the way 
they challenge each other, the questions they ask [and] the evidence they bring 
to bear on the issue” (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 301).  Although there were fewer 
opportunities, in the focus groups, to explore individual perspectives in depth, in 
many ways the interactive nature of the groups achieved greater depth because 
 198 
they led to deeper thinking and a richer set of perspectives than was possible in 
an individual interview (Zorn et al., 2006).    
A further difference was that I was generally able to create the setting for 
the focus groups.  I set up the room, provided refreshments, had a PowerPoint 
introduction and some carefully planned interpersonal strategies to put 
participants at ease the moment they entered the room.  None of this was 
feasible for the individual interviews, which were usually held within the 
organisational setting of the senior manager or CEO, where I was positioned as a 
guest.   
Possibly the major limitation of this research, from a methodological 
standpoint, was an inability to generate action and effect organisational change 
through whole system effort and engagement (Cady & Caster, 2000; Cooperrider 
& Srivastva, 1987; Fuller et al., 2000; Lewis et al., 2008).  Organisational change is 
an important premise of CAI, but this was just not practical within the scope of a 
doctoral research project where the researcher was the only participant 
committed to a deadline, and the research design could not be over-reliant on 
actions undertaken by other participants.  This circumstance was further 
complicated because participants were not employed by the same organisation 
or even working in the same region.  All of which meant there could be no 
presumption of practical organisational action or change at this time.   
I relied, instead, on the basic premise that these participants and their 
organisations wanted an inquiry approach that captured their aspirations as 
much as their problems, and embraced optimism and celebrated success rather 
than focused on problems and risk.  The focus groups and individual interviews 
allowed us to identify, and stand outside, normalised organisational discourses 
and to explore questions of “how would things be different if we made other 
choices?”  (Taylor, 2004, p. 113).  In doing this, participants were directed to 
recognise and develop a shared perspective of how transformative 
organisational change, more critically oriented to their expressed values and 
vision of recovery, might be achieved.  The process also aimed to enhance their 
sense of agency, and it encouraged them to consider alternative, and more 
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effective, actions as practitioners and organisations (Barber, 2005; Fuller et al., 
2000; McCashen, 2005; Zorn et al., 2006).   
In turn, this required my active commitment as research coordinator to 
create, and engage with, a collaborative space that recognised the wealth of 
resources that participants brought and allowed them to shape the process in 
terms of their own priorities.  Encouraging participants to “realise their best 
intentions” was still the overarching aim for the research. 
The organisation and analysis of the data  
Analysis of the data, regardless of the form of inquiry, is required to be a 
disciplined process with transparent, systematic and clearly defined protocols.  
My original methodology and intended procedures had anticipated major 
distinctions among the cohorts, and I had expected to treat the interview data 
from senior managers somewhat differently from that of the focus groups.  
However, in the apparent absence of these distinctions in early examination of 
the data, and the strength of the emerging themes, I made the decision to 
combine the data and undertake, primarily, a thematic discourse analysis.   
In keeping with my critically appreciative methodological stance, I 
undertook a critical thematic data analysis.  This involved processes focused on 
identifying the values, perceptions and concepts that participants used to discuss 
organisational effectiveness and recovery, and how these were communicated 
through organisational talk, texts and practices.  This was accompanied by a 
critical analysis intent on examining how participants drew from multiple 
discourses, within the sector and the wider socio-political environment, and 
what this revealed about the potential for change in organisational and 
institutional arrangements in the mental health sector of Aotearoa\New Zealand.  
Critical thematic analysis  
The analysis was thematic in that it was continuously looking for 
recurrent threads of meaning through the repetition and emphasis of key words, 
phrases, metaphors and other significant elements and patterns of language use 
(Aronson, 1994; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Owen, 1984; Tuckett, 2005).  As these 
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emerged from participants’ discussions they were carefully assembled to 
produce a comprehensive picture of their collective experience.  Themes were 
identified by connecting and gathering these narrative fragments of ideas or 
experiences, and might have been meaningless had they been viewed in isolation 
(Boje, 2001).  Of course, I was interested in developing only those themes that 
related to the research questions and this served as a continual reminder that 
the responsibility for the organisation of the data and the eventual coherence of 
the narrative rested with me as researcher (Leininger, 1985).   
In the analysis, it was important to distinguish between talk that was 
indicative of locally constructed and contextualised discourses, more universal, 
historically situated vocabularies, and widespread linguistic phenomena that 
constructed larger socio-cultural discourses (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000).  
However, I remained cognisant that indications of overarching themes were also 
present in local discourses and needed to be carefully summarised and 
synthesised.  A critical gaze further enabled me to compare accounts and discern 
those that were more powerful in determining the recovery practices of these 
organisations; while simultaneously seeking alternative discourses that might 
prove fruitful for transformation to a more idealised recovery orientation.  
Therefore, it was important in responding to the complexity of interview and 
focus group accounts to review regularly how I was moving from my encounters 
with the transcripts to aggregating the elements into summaries and other 
interpretations of wider discourse sets (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).   
Continual comparisons between the transcripts, the sector texts and an 
active investigation of the literature reinforced my sense that identified themes 
rang true for participants as they articulated their experiences.  Interweaving the 
literature with the findings increased my confidence that the story under 
construction had merit (Aronson, 1994).  In building the argument for selecting 
themes and making inferences I frequently referred to both my original literature 
review as well as seeking out new literature that helped me understand what 
was emerging from the data.   
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This return to the literature provided new theoretical material, 
specifically literature around institutionalisation and the few examples of 
scholarship that discussed processes of institutional change and disruption 
(Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  The literature 
around translation was also significant as it became apparent that people were 
utilising language and referring to concepts in multiple ways.  (For a detailed 
discussion of how my initial impressions, preliminary findings, emerging themes 
and participant feedback that guided the analysis please see Appendix 8.)  
Organising the data 
The primary data for this project were the transcripts of the 22 focus 
groups and 16 interviews that I undertook around the country.  As each focus 
group was typically 2 ½ hours long, this amounted to some 1500 pages of 
transcripts.  In addition, as previously discussed, a rich source of secondary data 
arose from the pre-focus group\interview and post- focus group\interview 
forms, as well as the transcribed field notes I had recorded immediately after 
focus groups and interviews.  I also drew on a body of supplementary 
documentary or textual data that included national, and sector, strategy and 
policy texts (see Appendix 5 for a full list of these texts), as well as organisational 
material such as mission statements, websites and other promotional material 
whereby organisations identified themselves with their values and other 
discourses around mental health.   
Each of these data sources was useful for explicating the relationship 
between preferred organisational and sector stories with the everyday realities 
of their organisational practices.  However, the distinctions I had expected 
between cohorts were not as evident or dramatic as anticipated and it was clear 
that a comparative analysis among these groups was less significant.  Therefore, I 
now needed to decide how to treat focus group and interview data.  The primary 
concern was not to create an inadvertent hierarchy of data, with some methods 
considered more “accurate” or significant.  This was an important consideration 
given the comparatively higher organisational status of senior managers; a status 
that generally gave them a more strategic view and for whom the environment 
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of an interview had offered a greater opportunity to produce a coherent 
narrative.  In the event, I was more likely to privilege the voices and perspectives 
of workers within focus groups as more “trustworthy”, if only because their 
views were open to challenge and debate and ultimately more collaborative in 
their iteration. 
Collectively these data sets comprehensively addressed my research 
questions and provided insights into dominant and alternative narratives as well 
as discerning the levels at which they functioned and their relative power within 
organisations (Bleakely, 2002; Bruner, 1991; Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Fuller et 
al., 2000).  The combination of data sources and data gathering methods also 
provided a form of triangulation that made the analysis more robust and 
rigorous (Lambert & Loiselle, 2008).   
The focus group discussions and interviews were recorded and then 
transcribed by a paid transcriber.  Each participant was assigned a unique code 
that identified which focus group, cohort and region they came from.  The code 
also identified whether they had participated in a service user focus group or one 
that involved a single organisation.  I utilised both the electronic and hardcopy 
versions of the transcripts to undertake an initial eyeball analysis.  I created a 
cover sheet to attach to transcripts that allowed me to note key words, key 
themes and the overall direction each focus group or interview took.  
Simultaneously, I began coding the data using some of the surface functions of 
MS Word such as highlighting text and adding comments as I read and re-read 
the transcripts.   
I read and re-read the transcripts and developed my field notes in 
conjunction with listening to the digital recordings.  This provided me with an 
early appreciation of the richness of the data (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  I made comments onto the cover sheet of each transcript and, through 
these, I built up a set of narrative fragments that began to identify significant 
language use, key themes and units of meaning (Boje, 2001; Miles & Huberman. 
1994).   
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These first readings, colour coding and notes also enabled me to 
categorise and collate data into three documents that incorporated material 
relevant to each research question.  Where data overlapped, it was included in 
both documents.  This focussing process also allowed for overall reduction of the 
data set with material not pertinent to this project parked separately for future 
work (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Boyatzis, 1998).  The categorisation enabled the 
emergence of a data display and an early theme schema that more coherently 
drew together significant ideas and the relationships among them (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  These were entered into tables, one for each research 
question (see Appendix 7 for emergent themes). 
The collated and summarised post-focus group\interview forms provided 
an exploratory identification of key themes and helped me develop a feel for the 
boundaries of my research questions (Appendices 6, 7 & 8).  The forms provided 
a starting point for comparing the focus group discussions about what was 
working well in their organisations and what the next steps towards recovery 
might look like.  They were also very important, reflexively, for confirming that 
participants had felt heard.  In addition, the field journal notes were a record of 
my immediate and overall impressions: the noteworthy characteristics of each 
focus group or interview, my thoughts, interpretations, questions, and directions 
for further data collection (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
Focus group data can be assembled and compared in different ways each 
with different potentials for revealing data patterns.  Therefore, I needed to 
make selection choices to ensure that the data yield did not become 
unmanageable.  At the same time I needed to ensure that comparisons and 
interpretations explored sufficient themes, including significant absences, to 
produce meaningful discovery.  The themes that emerged were compared 
among focus groups and interviews and coded by cohort and region.  Notable 
quotes and comments were identified and marked for easy reference.  The 
transcript data were also compared with some current and historical texts to 
tease out the ways in which recovery and other important discourses were being 
framed across the sector (Aronson, 1994; Tuckett, 2005).   
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National and sector texts (for full list see Appendix 5) provided the 
historical framework of national mental health policy and strategy over the last 
fifteen years and anchored the contexts of the study.  The vagaries of the 
relationships between community mental health NGOs, the various Ministries of 
Health and their nominated funding bodies over that time were of interest, as 
was the changing nature of the socio-political environment.   
The aim was to uncover some of the interpretative struggles (Mumby, 
2005) around the discourses of recovery within these organisations and at the 
boundaries of their interactions with wider social discourses such as biomedicine 
and managerialism (Phillips et al, 2004).  This meant developing an iterative 
strategy that moved back and forth between examinations of the raw data to 
summary descriptions and then to interpretations that suggested important 
meanings.  This led to a final, critical analysis that examined the implications and 
significance of these themes for the sector and mental health services as a 
whole.  The early analysis guided the substantive thematic analysis and provided 
confirmation of the appropriateness of the inquiry methods and investigative 
direction (Appendices 7 & 8).   
Conclusion 
Barge and Oliver (2003) have suggested that becoming appreciative, in 
terms of organisational and management practices, means taking account of 
what others within the organisation value, becoming reflexive and thereby 
gaining a deeper appreciative understanding of the organisation, its stakeholders 
and the multiple social, cultural, political and economic factors that influence its 
growth and development.  Critically appreciative inquiry as a methodology 
resonated with the other important structural and theoretical elements of this 
project; it included eliciting a range of voices and perspectives as a means of 
uncovering alternative ways of conceptualising organisational processes, 
especially in terms of a recovery orientation.   
Resonance was also achieved methodologically through the criteria for rigour for 
naturalistic inquiry, first explicated by Lincoln and Guba (1986).  These criteria 
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include principles of fairness; that constructions of all stakeholders were 
represented with equal power.  Similarly, “ontological authentication” (p. 82) 
was crucial as I needed to represent the new consciousness, of the participants 
and myself, of the complexities of their social, political and cultural world.  
“Educational authentication” (p. 82) was also evident as participants gained 
enhanced understandings of the realities of others while the whole project 
engaged in a kind of “catalytic authentication” (p. 82), by virtue of a collaborative 
activity that gave voice to the previously voiceless.  
Focus groups and semi-structured interviews were effective in facilitating 
conversational and collaborative discussions that uncovered the language tools, 
assumptions and rationalities that determined local and organisational 
conventions of what was considered appropriate and relevant to discourses of 
recovery and other social values.  The methodological choices were also 
important for attending to participant talk about the relationships between their 
organisations and society as well as other normalised discourses.  
The data from focus groups and interviews provided some powerful but 
unanticipated insights.  I had expected that my analysis would expose tensions 
among recovery and other, dominant, social discourses such as biomedicine and 
managerialism.  However, I quickly realised that I had gathered important 
narratives that described what happened to an alternative discourse such as 
recovery when it endeavoured to become established within a heavily 
institutionalised field such as mental health (Maguire & Hardy, 1999).   
In the chapters that follow, I present the analyses of my findings 
organised around each of my research questions.  The first chapter addresses the 
first research question and is concerned with participants’ constructions of 
recovery discourses and their expression in community organisations.  I entitled 
it Lost in translation: Negotiating the discourses of recovery and this explores 
how participants constructed experiences of “madness”, or mental illness, and 
the implications this had for their discursive constructions of recovery.  These 
were primarily issues of voice but also exposed the different rationalities 
underpinning different discourses.  
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The second findings chapter, Encountering the institutions is concerned 
mostly with the complex features of institutional power and the implications this 
has for their persistence and legitimacy, as well as their influence over less 
authoritative discourses and the community mental health organisations.  The 
earlier examination of the problematics of organising and the relationship 
between organisations and the state is particularly pertinent here.  Participants 
were less articulate about these aspects of their organisational realities but 
regularly expressed frustration around the ways recovery was being enacted in 
their relationships with the DHBs.   
The third findings chapter, entitled Fighting back: Struggles and 
innovations is concerned with the ways that participants endeavoured to 
problematise and disrupt the institutional discourses of biomedicine and 
managerialism and establish alternative discourses of recovery in their 
organisations’ practices.  It also examines the evidence of defensive institutional 
work, in particular discursive strategies such as translation as these institutions 
sought to maintain their legitimacy and power.   
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Chapter 6: Lost in translation: Negotiating the 
discourses of recovery  
Those who do not have power over the stories that dominate 
their lives, the power to retell them, rethink them, 
deconstruct them, joke about them, and change them…truly 
are powerless because they cannot think new thoughts. 
    Salman Rushdie (1991, p. 480) 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I address my first research question: In what ways are 
discourses of recovery constructed, negotiated and resisted within non-
government community mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand?  
In what follows I explore how recovery is being organised, in terms of practices, 
measures, outcomes and relationships within, and among, the community 
organisations and the wider mental health sector.  This analysis revealed the 
many tensions among different parts of the mental health system.  It also 
demonstrated how struggles for control of the meanings of mental health and 
“illness” have been, and are still, evolving.  In particular, those participants who 
had their own experiences of psychological distress or even identified as “service 
users” while working concurrently in these community mental health 
organisations, constructed narratives of madness and recovery very differently 
from other participants.  These constructions also underlaid how they 
understood the work they did within their organisations (see Appendices 7 & 8). 
Therefore, I first critically examine the constructions of, and distinctions 
between, experiences of madness and mental illness in terms of the problematic 
of voice (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  Second, I explore the significance of 
these distinctions in terms of recovery discourses evident in the talk of 
participants; I also examine how it is being constructed in important texts.  I then 
attend to what an “ordinary” life in community meant for participants.  This is 
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followed, with reference to the problematic of organising (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 
2007), by a discussion of how participants and texts constructed recovery-
oriented services in the mental health sector.   
Finally, I draw on the theoretical lens of translation to examine the 
implications of multiple meanings, conflicts and tensions in the language and 
concepts utilised by participants, as they negotiated multiple discourses and 
managed the transfer of ideas across organisational boundaries and throughout 
their organisational interactions (Cooren, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Venuti, 
2004).   
Stories of madness  
The initial analysis of the transcripts exposed some powerful, but 
somewhat surprising, features.  This was exemplified by a remarkable distinction 
between subjective “models of madness” (Read et al., 2004), and a reified 
construct of “mental illness”.  Participants with their own experiences of “going 
mad” echoed literature that challenged the primacy of a biomedical story of their 
“illness” and experience.  This inconsistency was clearly well known to, and taken 
for granted by, these participants and they talked about madness in very 
different terms from other participants.   
Participants with their own experiences of serious psychological distress 
described what they had undergone as overwhelming, intense and 
unmanageable at the time.  However, they were clear that this was also a 
profoundly human experience that had value and meaning.  They frequently 
struggled to come to terms with a powerful experience for which they had lacked 
the skills and tools to manage at the time.  But, they were concerned to make 
meaning from their experience in ways that could enhance their understanding 
of themselves and their aspirations for life in general. 
For them, any discussion of recovery was inevitably grounded in these 
personal stories of madness, which were narratives that began in the past and 
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moved into the future.  Their histories and contexts were vital in making sense of 
the ways their lives and aspirations for the future had changed. 
The power of story 
The personal experience of “going mad” was integral to constructions of 
recovery for people with lived experience of serious psychological distress.  They 
used metaphorical, emotional and evocative language, with which to discuss 
their experiences of both madness and recovery.  Discussions of recovery were 
inevitably grounded in the madness story, and contrasted markedly with other 
participants for whom the experience itself was either peripheral or went 
unremarked.  This contrast is evident in the pair of quotes below: 
Any illness can, does, set a person back, it can physical, 
mental, or health wise, it will set your abilities back, but it is 
having this ability to accept that yes I am unwell, and yes I 
cannot cope with my housework, no matter what the cause 
is, it is being able to call on other people for help 
  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
This acceptance of deficit and disability contrasted strongly with the 
perspective of a senior manager in Wellington, who had his own 
experience of psychological distress: 
There also needs to be something around having respect for 
the experience, it is not something that is just a deficit [. . .] 
Actually it is a really powerful dynamic huge experience that 
it is so powerful that actually there is an element of respect 
or even awe of the experience, how big it is, and it is really 
important for us when we interact with people to actually 
have that sort of respect for the experience.  
   (Senior Manager 1, Wellington) 
For workers with lived experience the expressions of their experience and 
symptoms were ultimately communicative events; ones they struggled over time 
to understand the meaning of and often needed help to come to terms with.  
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This came with the awareness that “people are not out to create havoc for 
themselves to make your life difficult” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  Instead, 
it was important that other workers recognised that there was a reason behind 
people’s behaviour and that making sense of what they had been through and 
where they had come out was recovery for these participants.  Learning and re-
learning about their sense of self, others and a life that was profoundly changed 
after their experience was vital for them in managing their lives and envisioning 
their futures. 
The stories of others 
The power of personal stories was central to resistance of the dominant 
medical stories based on an assumption of organic disease.  In general the 
workers who had personal experience of serious psychological distress rejected 
the reification of their experience as mental illness, and were reluctant to discuss 
it in those terms.  As one person expressed their experience:  
 . . . sadness and anger, and maybe sexual abuse, and maybe 
violent abuse, bullying at school, or trauma in your 
childhood, and it is not actually bi-polar [disorder] it is all the 
feelings behind it.       
  (Support worker, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
The disconnect between people’s own explanatory models and the 
diagnosis they were given literally “didn’t make sense” to people.  Most 
completely dismissed the biomedical pathologising, dehumanising and 
categorising of what they had been through.  Participants echoed this sense 
repeatedly:  
I think you have got to have some really important 
assumptions, and I think that there [are] assumptions around 
what is crisis, you know.  I think of crisis as a critical learning 
opportunity really.  It is a learning opportunity that is forced 
on you, because if you don’t learn you are going to die in 
some way.   (Senior Manager 3, Wellington) 
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They also rejected the biomedical perspective that what they had gone 
through was unequivocally negative and valueless; their experience was merely 
problems, symptoms, behaviours and emotions that needed to be fixed or 
brought under control.  As a peer support worker from Auckland commented: 
All these so called symptoms are just human experiences that 
exist on a continuum, and when you have been given that 
diagnosis, it just means that you have ended up down one 
end of the continuum, but it doesn’t mean that it is not a 
normal human reaction, because it is.   
  (Peer Support 8, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
Most anxiety was directed to the dominance of the medical story and the 
fact that clinical professionals discounted their own thoughts and explanatory 
models.  Diagnoses also changed frequently, and this was more often due to 
changes in personnel in the clinical team rather than any new information being 
incorporated into their assessment.  These participants were far more concerned 
with the social and psychological factors that had led to their experience, many 
referring directly to patterns of trauma or abuse that in conjunction with other 
life circumstances had proved overwhelming at some time or other.   
It was important to this group to resist the identity imposed on them by 
the label of being mentally ill and to claim a more valued identity for themselves, 
especially within mental health services.  They felt dehumanised, devalued and 
mistrustful of the biomedical explanations of their circumstances as well as the 
biological and physical treatments that were inevitably associated with it.  There 
was an inevitable sense of loss of human and social connection; of self-esteem 
and confidence that came with their experiences, many associated with the 
harmful effects of clinical treatment itself.  Accepting or submitting to the 
biomedical interpretation was clearly seen as a form of surrender to something 
ubiquitous and powerful; this had serious and adverse consequences for people: 
It’s the labelling of course, human beings are good at that, oh 
so and so is this, or is that.  Classifying people into a mould 
almost, yea, and all that is associated with that.  So once you 
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become a diagnosis you lose a sense of self-worth and if you 
take on that role of the diagnosis, a label that someone’s put 
on you, you begin to act and behave accordingly.  
  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
Other serious consequences of the biomedical story included the 
persistence of their recorded history in clinical mental health services.  Some 
referred to this as like having an indelible tattoo, and labels that were 30 years 
old, such as “a history of aggression”, still followed them through the system 
whether appropriate or even accurate.  Some commented that even police 
records do not go back that far.  Although these comments could be removed 
from a person’s clinical history, it required an active request and the agreement 
of the current clinician.  An exchange amongst support workers in Wellington 
typified the frustration many felt: 
From a recovery focus, you have to be able to move on and 
not keep on being reminded of what happened in the past.  
If I got reminded of what I did 10 years ago.  That is a stigma, 
stigmatised.      
  (Support Worker 8, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
Similarly, in a Hamilton group, support workers discussed the general 
reliability and accuracy of referrals the contents of which were, nevertheless, 
preserved, disseminated and acted on as fact:  
Only about a quarter of them have told the truth, and it is like 
“Oh my god I am with this dangerous criminal [. . .] am I 
safe?”  Oh yes, and I read here he shouldn’t be left alone with 
a woman.  Okay I have to go in there, but when you get 
behind that . . . some of it is so historical, he could be like a 
60 year old and this happened when he was 15, and it never 
gets dropped off.  And even your criminal record goes after 
so many years       
  (Support Worker 2, Focus Group B, Hamilton) 
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Clinical records, by contrast were typically stories that included diagnostic 
and needs assessments, daily notes, incident reports, discharge plans and 
referrals.  Not only were these “stories” told from one, usually biomedical, 
standpoint but they were invariably deficit and problem focussed; solely a record 
of negative “incidents” that required intervention or treatment.  Many 
participants reported this as unbalanced and demoralising:  
(PSW 2)  It is the diagnosis a lot of the time that just finishes 
you off; oh well they have got that, that’s it.  For 
some people it is great the diagnosis, “Oh okay 
this is what is wrong with me”, but then for other 
people it is like a death sentence.  
(PSW 3)  Especially when they get it wrong  
(PSW 2)  And they tend to get it wrong all the time; 90% of 
the time it is not really what it is  
(PSW 4)  And it follows you around for 20 years. 
(Peer Support workers 2, 3, 4, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
There appeared to be no room in the clinical story for contextual 
information of personal resourcefulness or circumstances.  The before of 
people’s lives prior to entry to the service was outlined, if at all, in the clinical 
referral forms and discharge plans.  This left no legitimate space to talk of the 
experiences themselves, let alone establish an inventory of people’s strengths, 
supports and resources, thus naturalising further the biomedical account.   
Because clinical stories were so thin, they were also open to multiple 
interpretations.  In one Wellington focus group, participants recounted a story 
about a young man who had been described in assessments and referrals as 
being “aggressive to women” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group A, Wellington).  
This was apparently based on a single incident in his early teens when he was in 
conflict with his mother.  Not only was her version of events the only one on 
record, but this information was forming part of referral reports several years 
later.  An excerpt from this conversation follows:  
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(SW1)  Somehow it’s generalised towards the entire gender, 
when it should only be focused on that one person 
(SW7)  Because she was a bitch  
(SW1)  Yeah 
(SW7)  And it wouldn’t state that the mum was aggressive 
towards him 
(SW1)  No that is a very good point    
 (Support workers 1, 7, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
The dominance of arbitrary, clinical judgements meant referral reports 
were a contentious issue for many participants.  Some, from a range of 
organisations, spoke of refusing to read referrals until they had met a person 
themselves.  But significantly, others including a few service users considered 
knowing a person’s history as described in referrals “as vital information” 
(Support Worker 1, Focus Group H, Hamilton), reflecting the dominance of the 
clinical story.  
People were equally scathing about clinical responses to madness; they 
were critical of most treatments and, in particular, medication.  This was an issue 
echoed in significant national texts such as Te Hononga 2015 (Mental Health 
Commission, 2007b) which explicitly outlined a vision for the future where 
“medication will be recognised as causing significant harm as well as providing 
significant relief in some cases” (p. 14).  But its inclusion as a future aspiration 
reinforced participant talk of frequently inappropriate and inadequate responses 
to their distress.  As one peer support worker in Auckland described it:  
And it can be so in-depth - the causes, the trauma that you 
can’t even talk about because you haven’t got the words for 
it and it is like how is medication going to help that.  
 (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
In addition to being ineffectual and inadequate, it seemed clear that 
many treatments were experienced as actively harmful. 
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First do no harm 
Participants with personal experience of serious psychological distress 
were also the only ones who explicitly referred to the iatrogenic, or harmful, 
effects of being in clinical treatment services.  There were many references to 
the service users they worked with being afraid of, and avoiding, clinical 
treatment services; of being “locked up in hospital” (Peer Support Worker 6, 
Focus Group PS, Auckland); even diagnosis being a “death sentence” (Peer 
Support Worker 3, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Similarly, these participants 
themselves frequently experienced diagnoses and concomitant treatment 
regimes as unhelpful.  This was largely unremarked by others in focus groups and 
completely absent from national documents such as those generated by the 
Ministry of Health (2005a) and the DHBs.  
In addition, the effects of treatments and hospitalisation were seen as 
significant contributors to the difficulties service users encountered in managing 
their lives.  Sometimes these were the overt side-effects of medication and other 
treatment regimes; but participants also reported secondary effects of 
depression, hopelessness and extreme loss of self-confidence that were the 
consequence of others taking control of their lives and the systematic dismissal 
of their own thoughts, feelings and opinions.  Recovery became, in this sense, as 
much to do with recovering from how the biomedical model was “done to” 
people, as from their original experiences of distress. 
By contrast, other participants, without personal experience of serious 
psychological distress, rarely mentioned the experience and circumstances of 
madness that was so central to their colleagues understanding of the work they 
did.  Most non-service users within these organisations appeared to have 
absorbed as commonplace the idea that recovery only began when a person 
entered services and created a documented record of assessments and 
measurements of progress.  There were important exceptions:  
Giving people time and listening to their story because the 
people we work with have the most amazing stories and they 
don’t often get the opportunity to talk about them, and to 
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talk about who they are, people don’t want to know  
  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group W, Waikato) 
Telling their stories was clearly very important to people with lived 
experience of psychological distress and several organisations acknowledged this 
in their policies.  A senior manager from an organisation that had strong service 
user leadership remarked that “everything; symptoms, behaviours [is] 
communicating something” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington) and people needed 
to be invited and encouraged to talk about the issues facing them.  Another 
organisation that had explicitly adopted Charles Rapp’s strengths model17 (Rapp, 
1998) used entry interviews to ask questions about a person’s life “before 
mental illness” in order to provide clues to potential aspirations and goals a 
person might want to work towards.  A third, which had embedded a Peer 
Support service18 deeply within its overall organisational structure, recognised 
the importance of people being able to tell their story in a safe environment if 
this is what they wanted.  
Nevertheless, many participants reported that there was also 
considerable fear and mistrust expressed by service users; that talking about 
their experiences to service workers could lead to a roller-coaster of 
interventions and loss of control over their decisions.  As one participant pointed 
out, “I have found that a lot of people are not talking about what they are 
experiencing because telling you what they are experiencing means that they get 
judged or occasionally pre-assessed; something [gets] done to them” (Senior 
Manager 5, Wellington).  This was contrasted with the advantages of Peer 
Support services, where “they don’t have to feel like they are taking a risk, that 
the story will be taken away” (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group S, 
Christchurch). 
                                                     
17 Note the Strengths Model, as developed by Charles Rapp (1998)  is not the same, although 
frequently confused with, strengths based practice that was initially developed by Walther 
Kishardt and others (Barber, 2005; McCashen, 2005; Weick et al., 1989)) 
18 Peer Support services, available in a few DHB catchments, are based on the shared experiences 
that peer support workers have with service users. 
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Participant stories of madness illuminated the tension between the 
biomedical story of diagnosis and symptom control, with the lived experience 
and aspirations of people who have suffered episodes of extreme distress.  These 
accounts exemplified challenges that service users encountered in services, in 
endeavouring to resist biomedical models and substitute their own explanatory 
models over several decades.  The bio-medical story not only involved reifying 
diagnosis but also discursively closed down, and decontextualised the human 
experience of psychological distress.  At its heart, the conflict appears to be with 
a construction of experiences as wholly negative and valueless versus one that 
has intrinsic communicative value, and from which people can learn, grow and 
aspire to a more hopeful future. 
Stories of recovery  
In this section, I examine how all participants defined and talked about 
recovery within the context of NGOs in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  While the data 
did not provide a single “true” or authentic discourse of recovery it was apparent 
that different discourses served different interests and functions that had 
implications for organisational practices and the ways that services were 
delivered in this country.  It was also interesting to note what was, and what was 
not, talked about by participants in these conversations.  The critical distinction, 
again, was between how participants informed by their personal experience of 
serious psychological distress and recovery talked, in contrast with other 
participants who continued to rely on definitions and descriptors that appeared 
in national policy and strategy documents such as the Blueprint (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998).  Other significant thematic distinctions were apparent in 
how participants drew on vocabularies of empowerment or independence, 
aspirations or goals and how these were incorporated into organisational 
policies, practices and processes about recovery.  
(Re)defining recovery in Aotearoa\New Zealand: Discovery and rediscovery 
Although recovery was inevitably positioned as the antithesis of the 
medical model, it was nevertheless constructed and negotiated in several 
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different ways.  All participants were aware that the significance of recovery was 
that it had “arisen because the medical model does not work a lot of the time” 
(Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  And while the need for an 
alternative paradigm was acknowledged, some commented that it was “a shame 
we have to have a name or model or a philosophy in order to treat people with 
respect and dignity” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  Many were 
aware of the historical and political context from which it had emerged.  For 
example:  
In terms of the terminology I think that [recovery] has been 
a bit of a buzz word and in some ways it has been a response 
to statements like “severe and enduring mental illness”, and 
the tyranny of that over people’s lives [. . .] for a lot of people 
it is recovery from that impression.   
    (Senior Manager 3, Wellington)  
There was a good deal of congruence among participants from within the 
same organisation.  This was especially noteworthy where organisational 
leadership teams clearly articulated their personal, as well as organisational, 
values and models.  Participant stories of recovery were generally founded on 
the same ontological basis, of subjective human experience, as the stories of 
madness to which they corresponded.  However here the boundaries were more 
blurred and multiple meanings were evident:  
Recovery is not about a cure, it is not about, necessarily, 
about getting rid of the symptoms.  [We] really hope that 
people have less distressing symptoms, but that may not be 
the reality.  So you have recovery as a paradigm, you have 
rehabilitation as a paradigm, you have cure as a paradigm, 
and recovery overlaps them but it is not them.  
    (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) 
The talk of those participants who worked in organisations whose 
organisational evolution was strongly informed by the experiences and voice of 
people with lived experience of serious psychological distress was distinctive.  In 
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contrast with many other participants, this group discussed recovery in ways that 
were inevitably richly nuanced, organic, and thoughtfully articulated.  It was 
frequently talked about as coming to terms with a new self, rather than a return 
to an old way of being in the world.  There was little sense of recovery meaning 
“getting back to where they were before”.  Instead, there was certain 
hopefulness and optimism for a new future:  
So it’s perhaps getting to a new place, with some of those 
things that you had before.  But also, the lessons you’ve 
learnt through the process or journey.   
    (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton)  
For participants with personal experiences of madness and recovery, the 
process of recovery was to make sense of it; to learn from it; to find meaning and 
value in it that would transform their sense of being in the world.  Others 
maintained it was less about re-covery and more about discovery.  As a 
participant from Auckland explained: 
It is not about recovering because that indicates that there is 
something wrong with you; there is not necessarily anything 
wrong with you.  You have been through some tough stuff 
and it has had this effect, and you have not had the tools to 
deal with it, so it is about discovering the strengths about 
yourself and discovering the tools you can use to live your life 
better.  (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
On the other hand, many participants who had not had lived experiences 
of serious psychological distress frequently referred to stock definitions and 
repeated the phrasing of the definition that prefaces the Blueprint (1998) when 
asked what recovery means to them.  For example, this definition by a support 
worker was typical:  
[It] is about being able to live well even though you have an 
illness or a disability or a medical condition that might hinder 
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aspects of your life.      
  (Support Worker 1, Focus group C, Hamilton) 
This regurgitation and the unthoughtful reproduction of statements, such 
as “living well in the presence or absence of illness” (Mental Health Commission, 
1998) and, “It’s a unique, individual journey where people achieve their goals” 
(Support Worker 5, Focus Group P, Hamilton), seemed to indicate that the 
thinking around recovery had not developed over the last 15 years for many 
people.  Nor was it deeply embedded within many organisational discourses and 
practices.  These participants also seemed to think recovery was a taken-for-
granted, almost outmoded concept, without appearing to recognise the inherent 
contradictions in their comments about recovery, and organisational practices.   
All participants exhibited a good deal of empathy with service users, but 
their thinking about recovery appeared to have stalled in the face of more 
pressing organisational requirements such as “risk management” and “clinical 
oversight”.  They expressed considerable frustration with the constraints put on 
them by clinical teams and DHB funders and they could see that these were 
antithetical to individualised and flexible approaches to supporting a person’s 
recovery:   
[The] medical model is about risk management rather than 
[recovery], so the doctors want to see that the patients are 
taking their medications and they have had a reduction in 
symptoms and that.      
  (Support Worker 6, Focus Group P, Hamilton) 
Despite these tensions, and sometimes contradictions, in their 
organisational environments, almost all participants used a journey metaphor to 
describe their notion of recovery.  However, compromises were evident in the 
ways that recovery “journeys” were constructed in terms of organisational 
practices. 
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The nature of journeys  
Workers who also had lived experience of serious psychological distress 
described the journeys of recovery as stories that had beginnings as well as 
destinations, and invariably looked back to the experience of madness.  Their 
history and context were vital in making sense of the ways their lives had 
changed and their aspirations for their future:  
I used to think recovery meant being like you were before 
you struggled with something, and I spend years trying to get 
back to that, and eventually when I realised - to accept that I 
am never going to be the same, but I can be different and be, 
yeah, better and be a lot richer, that is when I started to 
recover.  Yeah I am always going to be a worrier and the rest 
of it, but I can manage this and it doesn’t have to like drive 
me, whereas I am in the driver’s seat a bit more now. 
 (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
For these people recovery was ultimately a journey of transformation; a 
journey that has stages rather than goals (Senior Manager 3, Wellington); each 
of which required a thoughtful and distinct response and that needed to be 
taken in order with “first things first”.  For these participants what was required 
was an awareness of where a person was at; “that everyone is doing the best 
with information and the skills that they have at this time” (Senior Manager 5, 
Wellington).  There was no expectation that these would be linear, or 
straightforward, journeys.  As one person put it: 
It is a sort of a process; it is something that is continuous and 
dynamic and changes all the time.  And just because, it 
doesn’t end so it doesn’t continuously get easier and easier.  
It can have waves, it can have loops, it can have wiggles. 
  (Support Worker 3, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
The key distinction about the nature of journeys was that, for workers 
with their own experience of serious psychological distress, recovery journeys 
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were about learning and personal transformation.  Others echoed similar 
sentiments: 
The recovery journey is unique [and it is] a huge thing, yeah 
it is endless and there is so much learning to do, and growth 
to do. (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, Waikato)  
For participants and organisations less informed by the voices of people 
with personal experience of serious psychological distress, the metaphor of the 
journey was ambiguous.  Some disparaged constructions of recovery as being 
merely a service requirement and for nearly all of these workers and 
organisations the journey of recovery seemed to begin only when people 
entered services with a documented clinical referral and documented 
expectations of carefully measured progress.   
Many participants acknowledged that recovery journeys take time and 
expressed frustration at unrealistic expectations that “after a lifetime of 
experiences, [clinical] services want a 5min fix” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group P, 
Hamilton).  They also understood that learning necessarily meant that people 
would make mistakes and needed encouragement to learn from these.  This was 
often thwarted by contracting and other service policies.  This exchange was 
from a team leader focus group in Hamilton: 
(TL4)  Recovery IS making mistakes - going back and forth, 
continuing to do that until they decide that it’s not . . .  
(TL5)  Services lack tolerance 
(TL4)  Getting “chucked out”, “Don’t make mistakes or else”.  
  (Team Leaders 4, 5, Focus Group P, Hamilton) 
But participants who had personal experiences of distress were insistent 
that recovery journeys were natural processes that could be impeded by 
inappropriate intervention.  “Everybody recovers from things if the environment 
allows them to,” remarked a Wellington senior manager (Senior Manager 5, 
Wellington) and this was echoed in an Auckland group with the comment that 
“people may not know what they want half the time; but they know what they 
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don’t want” (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  In general, the 
consensus seemed to be that a successful recovery was “reaching a place within 
you in your life that is right for you, and positive for you, and I sort of see it as 
gaining peace of mind.”  (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland)  
How workers and organisations responded to the realities of a person’s 
life circumstances appeared to correlate with their underlying ontological and 
socio-cultural positions on the experiences of madness\mental illness and 
recovery.  It seemed that there were different socio-cultural expectations of 
people using mental health services than of the general population.  As one 
senior manager commented, with some irony,   
I didn’t learn the first time I had a hangover.  I know that is 
shocking.  It probably took me a good thousand hangovers 
before I suddenly realised that hangovers weren’t such a 
good thing.  We are only part of the journey for a service user.
    (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
Many participants articulated this ideal of being supported to learn 
through the inevitable ups and downs of a recovery journey; although this was 
often accompanied by a sense of frustration at being constrained by other 
service and environmental requirements.   
Empowerment, autonomy and “independence” 
One of the most significant aspects of recovery for workers with personal 
experience of serious psychological distress was the idea of self-determination 
over their lives.  This was variously expressed, in the literature as well as focus 
groups and interviews, as empowerment, autonomy, tino rangatiratanga (self-
determination), or personal power.  Personal power was defined in Destination 
recovery (MHAC, 2008) as “achieved when people experience hope, purpose, 
self-agency, a positive identity, a sense of achievement and satisfying 
relationships” (p. 29).  
Regardless of the language used, for this group the concept was used to 
signify the power to make important decisions and choices about the way they 
 224 
lived their lives.  Autonomy was a word used by participants to indicate a need to 
be in charge of their own lives.  It was founded on the idea that people had 
expertise and understood themselves and what worked for them best.  Even 
where this was not yet the case they asserted the right to make their own 
mistakes and learn from them:  
(PSW1) It’s the autonomy, giving people the chance to find 
themselves.  To step out and make mistakes without 
being told well that’s it you have failed.  Being able to 
learn those mistakes and move out from them, finding 
yourself and what suits you  
(PSW7)  Getting to know who you are and then having the 
confidence to learn to stand by that, and learn to be 
assertive enough to listen to what you need in life, not 
always what everybody else needs.   
(Peer support workers 1, 7 , Focus group PS, Auckland) 
However, it is also important to note that notions of autonomy and 
independence served particular ontological positions and socio-cultural 
expectations, and these were sometimes conflated.  For workers with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress, empowerment, or the right to 
autonomy, was clearly a site of resistance to the power and authority clinical 
teams and other services maintained over significant aspects of their lives.  On 
the other hand, empowerment, for example, was open to some very loose 
interpretations that illuminated, albeit unintentionally, the underlying dynamics 
of power relationships.  For instance, one Hamilton team leader made this 
revealing statement: 
We talk a lot about empowering people but sometimes 
people don’t want it; they just want to do what is required 
you know.  We instil this momentum of empowerment, [but] 
sometimes they just haven’t the energy to actually fill out 
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that form or that sort of thing you know.   
  (Support Worker 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton) 
There was considerable tension between a sense of autonomy that 
indicated reclamation of personal power and the subtle translation from that 
into “independence” that was central to most service contracts and 
organisational cultures.  Independence seemed to mean both an individualistic 
emphasis on “doing things for themselves” while maintaining a traditional 
service ethic of paternalism and authority.  This translated the notion of personal 
power and resourcefulness into service expectations and pressure.  For services, 
what remained unchanged was the locus of power in decision-making.  There 
were varying levels of consciousness of this tension as the following remarks 
demonstrate: 
Independence [clinical key workers] push for, and I keep 
saying it is inter-dependence, none of us could live out there 
in the way they are expecting our guys to be living out there, 
none.  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
And then in an Auckland group: 
Somewhere down the line we have to teach them 
independence as well because we are not going to be there 
for them all the time as well.     
  (Support Worker 1, Focus Group B, Auckland) 
In many cases, it appeared changes in the contracting environment that 
encouraged independence were more about devolving service responsibility and 
cutting costs rather than facilitating true choice or increasing personal power 
over peoples’ lives.  This was the case when a Waikato team leader referred to a 
“magnificent piece of work” that reduced the need for staff sleepovers.  She 
framed this as “identifying what [we] don’t need to do” (Team Leader 3, Focus 
Group W, Waikato) and better “managing risk”.  But in the end, this was about 
meeting service needs and controlling organisational decision making, rather 
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than any obvious increase in personal autonomy for service users.  She further 
justified this stance, as others did also, by stating: 
How long has [he] been in the service, over 13 years?  And 
often it is about that very thing, are we creating dependence 
or independence, because everybody might be fine, but 
some of the time, most of the time, in an inverted way, by 
wanting to do good, we do things for people that they don’t 
need. (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, Waikato)  
These statements served to blur the boundaries of exactly whose needs 
were being met in services and were invariably based on a presumption of 
service benevolence that thinly disguised the unilateral exercise of power over 
people’s lives.  People who had experienced services first hand roundly 
challenged this assumption; but other participants routinely utilised these 
translations of recovery without seeming to be aware of how these maintained 
many of the traditional ways of delivering services.  Several told stories of 
people’s independence couched in terms of supermarket shopping, budgeting 
and housework. 
Similarly, there was no simple binary opposition of independence and 
dependence.  For workers with their own experiences of serious psychological 
distress, “dependence” was framed as disempowerment, and clearly, an issue 
related to services themselves.  For example:  
[Recovery is] not fostering dependence at all in any way; it is 
not babysitting, it is not taxi driving, it is not rescuing.  It is 
walking alongside and supporting for them to get where they 
want.       
 (Peer Support Worker 3, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
In contrast, other participants translated dependence as a sign of 
weakness or neediness on the part of service users.  This was compounded by a 
general lack of acknowledgment that much, so-called, dependent behaviour was 
due to the iatrogenic and institutionalised effects of previous service 
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expectations and treatments.  In other words, that the rules may have changed 
but positions of power and powerlessness remained the same; it was still the 
service organisations that determined how “the game” would be played. 
Both workers with lived experience of serious psychological distress and 
others, including some senior managers, emphasised that self-responsibility was 
an aspect of self-determination, and this was necessary for regaining the 
normalcy and “normalising” of everyday life: 
Recovery is [. . .] having as normal a life as possible but as we 
all know a normal life isn’t just getting what you want; it is 
getting some of the things that you want and a lot of the 
things you don’t want that are not so bad when you get them 
anyway.  So it’s normal opportunities to succeed, fail, be 
happy, be sad.  To me that is recovery and it is not having the 
stigma of mental illness or anything else sitting over your 
head that actually automatically excludes you from certain 
things.    (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
It was evident that the perceived opportunities for genuine open-ended 
choice for service users were limited, and participants and their organisations 
struggled with this.  Restricting meaningful choice and decision-making in their 
lives was also acknowledged as having a negative impact on people’s motivation 
and capacity for self-determination.  Constructions of recovery, by people with 
lived experience of serious psychological distress, emphasised the importance of 
feeling in control of important aspects of their lives.  As one senior manager put 
it, “If you don’t have ownership you don’t care” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  
Instead many participants commented that their “clients don’t get to make their 
own decisions about their own lives which is really horrible” (Peer Support 
Worker 3, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Although this was a pragmatic reality for 
organisations, under the contracting umbrellas of their DHBs, it clearly 
concerned most participants. 
However, several participants noted that living a life of choice had little 
relation to nominal notions of “normality”.  In fact, they echoed Patricia Deegan 
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(1996) in suggesting that communities and societies needed to broaden their 
criteria of acceptance and tolerance:   
For most outside people, his life would look quite chaotic and 
very, very different.  But the fact that is he able to do it in his 
own home and able to make his own decisions, he can eat 
what he wants, do what he wants.  His recovery to the 
outside world would look, you know probably quite wacky, 
but hey he is doing it his way and he is enjoying it; it works.  I 
see that as recovery, whereas a lot of other people probably 
think he has a long way to go, but hey, he is doing well.  
  (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Auckland) 
Navigating the boundary between a person’s aspirations and service 
expectations, created considerable stress for participants in determining how 
they worked with the people to whom they believed they were ultimately 
accountable.  For example, an Auckland support worker acknowledged, “my 
ideal for him may be totally different from what he has for himself” (Support 
Worker 3, Focus Group B, Auckland).  But she was also aware that the service 
user would know, himself, when he was ready to move on to the next stage.  In 
the end, what service users wanted for their lives came down to important 
distinctions between their own aspirations and service goals. 
Aspirations versus goals 
Autonomy or personal power clearly involved the rights of people, with 
lived experience of serious psychological distress, to be their own primary source 
of expertise and to have access to the resources, rights and opportunities that 
allowed them to make decisions about their own best interests.  Many were 
keen to distance themselves from more conservative notions that emphasised 
functional independence and setting goals.  Locating recovery in a more general 
discourse of well-being situated it within a broader field of health promotion, 
rather than the biomedical frame of illness and disease.  This reinforced the 
sense of an aspirational “self” as opposed to merely one of maintaining 
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functionality and symptom control.  This clearly increased hopefulness and “an 
excitement about what the future might bring for you” (Peer Support Worker 2, 
Focus Group S, Christchurch) as well as expanding people’s expectations of their 
horizons.  A team leader from a service user led organisation referred to talking 
to people about their wildest dreams rather than their service needs.   
Senior managers also spoke of people’s aspirations but, perhaps 
indicative of their more strategic vision, used vague and somewhat ambiguous 
terms that were not necessarily measureable.  For example:  
People want more work, better connection, better 
accommodation, more money and a sense of satisfaction and 
success in their life.  So there are global things, but every 
person wants different bits of that.    
    (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) 
Similarly, another articulated her concern that services were typically 
disability support services and rather than focussed on improvements “in their 
feeling of well-being and a feeling of being more in control of their life and their 
existence and their destiny” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  In contrast, the 
CEO of a service user organisation in Hamilton described their recovery service as 
supporting people to invest themselves in their life.  
However, more frequently, the notion of independence diminished 
recovery to merely the setting of goals against which outcomes could be 
measured.  These were invariably focussed towards service exit as the only 
outcome that really “counted” in terms of their funding and contracting 
requirements.  Most importantly, however, it shifted the locus of power from a 
personal subject with sovereign rights of self-determination, to an objective 
service assessment of their capacity and readiness.  
I think we also do [recovery] within our paperwork, you know 
working with a person on their goals and reviewing their 
service reviews.  We also have support assessments, which 
are done every six months, you know [and] working towards 
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moving through the system.     
  (Team Leader 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton)  
Participants frequently appeared to accept as natural the idea of setting 
goals as a way of defining a person’s recovery journey and progress, while at the 
same time acknowledging these goal plans as obligatory service and contracting 
requirements.  Some participants even referred to “getting them to do their 
goals” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group H, Hamilton) without any apparent sense 
of the contradiction between this coercive behaviour and their organisation’s 
claims of being “client-centred”.  Some support workers and team leaders clearly 
felt conflicted when service users did not want to do goal plans, especially when 
it was clear that these put pressure and expectations on them.  But as an 
organisational imperative, they routinely came up with other ways to complete 
them, such as negotiating with service users to complete them orally.  It was 
never an option for service users not to participate in goal setting at all:  
Goal planning or the recovery goals are like, you know in 
[organisation] policies they are fairly set out rigidly.  Some 
people don’t want to be participating in formal paperwork, 
so it is about being innovative and trying to find out what are 
the interests of this person, and then incorporating those 
interests [into the goal plan].    
  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group W, Waikato) 
Many participants explicitly stated that goal planning was an 
organisational constraint that was often in tension with the aspirations of service 
users in terms of their ordinary living.  For example, a team leader from Hamilton 
explained that conflict arose because, for clients, “recovery was around being 
the best person I could be here and now” where for the organisation it was 
about “moving on, outcomes focused and meeting key performance indicators 
you know”  (Team Leaders 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  This conflict was clearly 
a source of frustration for many, especially as goals were driven by 
organisational expectations and created considerable anxiety for service users.  It 
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“scares the shit out of some of them” said one support worker from Wellington 
(Support Worker 2, Focus Group A, Wellington). 
Of course, some of this goal planning was very successful and worthwhile 
and several organisations tried assiduously to be as flexible and responsive to 
people’s needs as their own contracting requirements would allow.  Many tried 
hard to straddle dual expectations of service users and contracts, aiming to make 
goals meaningful and aspirational: 
We are aiming for what the service user is aiming for and 
sometimes [we] talk about stay-goals and go-goals [. . .]  So 
their go-goal might be about getting work, and their stay-goal 
might be about staying in their current relationships [but] 
developing them a bit further.  So sometimes, it is . . . more 
about enriching the quality of what you are doing.  [For 
others] it might be going, finding something new.  
    (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) 
Similarly, very few service user led organisations mentioned recovery in 
terms of goal setting and where they did, the sense was of an unavoidable evil 
for meeting contracting requirements.  Many spoke of having to work around 
mandatory form filling and goal plans that created arbitrary time-lines in order to 
“get their dreams away up there, we head towards that in a roundabout sort of 
way.”  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).   
Goal setting, however, was clearly and nominally, the quantifiable and 
measurable aspect of recovery for organisational contracting requirements, and 
it was a mechanism for accountability to funders and not a feature of recovery in 
itself.  Many participants admitted that needs assessment and goal plans were 
purely administrative requirements and they might sit in a file for six months 
until review time.  Other organisations were very active about goal plans, but this 
also meant that both support workers and service users were required to 
account for their time together solely in terms of progress towards identified 
goals, whatever new life circumstances might have arisen.  In this context, 
 232 
therefore, the only meaningful outcome for organisations was invariably service 
user “exit” from the service. 
Living an ordinary life in community 
The original Blueprint (Mental Health Commission, 1998) stated 
unequivocally that “recovery could never take place in an environment where 
people were isolated from their communities” (p. 1).  Indeed, all participants 
acknowledged the importance of “community” in recovery although this was 
variously constructed.  The distinctions corresponded to the different ontological 
constructions of recovery that either positioned people as returning to “normal” 
life from a place of deviance or as struggling to reorganise lives and relationships 
from the context of frequently catastrophic experiences.  Emerging discourses of 
well-being also emphasised the responsibilities of communities for 
accommodating the vulnerabilities, and supporting the aspirations, of all 
members and emphasised the reclamation of the rights of citizenship as well as 
the healing power of community.  A peer support worker from Auckland 
described the impact of alienation from community:  
A lot of people feel isolated from the community because 
they have been cast out basically because of their diagnosis 
and not accepted, so they feel very disconnected from the 
community.  All research shows that all human beings have 
innate need to feel part of a community.   
 (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland)  
Several ideas were important in participant discussions of “living in 
community”.  First was the capacity to do the ordinary things that made up life 
for most people.  Second, was having the opportunity to contribute to 
community life as well as having access to the resources that were implicit in the 
rights of citizenship.  In addition, emerging discourses of recovery and well-being 
constructed communities as agents of health promotion, with a responsibility to 
promote acceptance and be communal in their support of the flourishing of all 
members.  These notions contrasted with commonly used constructions of 
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community and community care that referred merely to physical locations and 
generally indicated other social services and DHB community mental health 
teams.   
These were not simple binaries, however, but a complex set of 
contextual, shifting and dynamic factors.  It was also apparent that constructions 
of community varied in both their implications and applications in mental health 
services.  Positions and boundaries were often blurred in focus groups with 
participants slipping unconsciously from one construction to another.  This was 
less the case in interviews with senior managers, whose articulated positions 
more consistently reflected their strategic policy goals and mission statements.  
Participants from organisations with strong service user focus or leadership also 
tended to have community connectedness at the forefront of their endeavours.  
At the end of the day, service users clearly centred their aspirations on their 
capacity to have an “ordinary” life. 
Being ordinary and connecting with the community 
Most participants acknowledged that, whatever their diagnosis or 
disability, people “still lived most of their life in the community” (Senior Manager 
1, Hamilton).  This meant that, more than just being tolerated, people needed a 
valued place in their communities of choice.  Recovering community, from the 
perspective of participants with their own experiences of serious psychological 
distress echoed the expectations outlined in Destination recovery:  
A valued place is reached when people are an integral part of 
safe, strong families, have equal access to education, 
employment, housing, transport, and goods and services, 
and are free to participate in the commercial, cultural, 
political, spiritual and recreational life of their communities.  
(MHAC, 2008, p. 29). 
This construction highlighted the role of communities in creating 
disability; where exclusion was more a result of poor societal responses than a 
person’s pathology (Harter et al., 2006; Sayce, 2001).  A senior manager from 
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Wellington articulated his organisation’s vision for “fully integrated communities 
because that is the environment in which recovery can grow”.  He went on to 
add that this required communities to have “greater knowledge and ownership” 
of the experiences that had led to isolation and distress both before and after 
people had entered the mental health system, and to be resourced in “how to be 
with it” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington). 
For many the benefits of being in community meant focussing on the 
ordinariness of life rather than services based on diagnosis or in reference to 
illness.  For example, a team leader from Hamilton was concerned about the 
focus on people’s lives being that of a “professional patient” and wanting to 
reverse that into “making that only a small part and the rest doing all the usual 
things.  Eating chocolate and going for coffee, doing the dishes” (Team Leader 4, 
Focus Group H, Hamilton)  Many participants spoke of the importance of doing 
ordinary things with service users; having coffee at a cafe, going to the beach, 
being a walking companion, or just being a witness to the journey of another’s 
life.   
However, there were obvious tensions between merely getting out and 
about, doing ordinary enjoyable activities as an individual person, and actually 
engaging and connecting with others in the natural settings and contexts of 
community life.  In the most unreflective cases, being “out in the community” 
was restricted to going to the supermarket and learning to catch a bus.  
However, other participants used similar anecdotes to challenge them as 
examples of poor, non-recovery-oriented support work.  Individualised activities, 
with support workers as companions, clearly had their place, but too often, there 
were no other strategies that facilitated engagement with groups or 
organisations outside mental health services.   
Participants talked about what it meant for service users to be connected 
to the community; contributing to and feeling embraced by community life.  
Implicit in these conversations was the sense that facilitating, and maintaining, 
access to community resources and opportunities was central to creating an 
ordinary life and a preferred future, and was as much about strengthening 
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communities as it was about individual responsibilities to adhere to social mores.  
As this senior manager from Auckland argued, “Community participation is 
actually having [things], doing things which facilitate the feeling that you are a 
valued participant in your community” so that people are contributors, “actually 
part of the weaving of the community” not merely spectators with “other people 
weaving around you” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland).  
As well as engagement with the ordinary activities of living, many 
participants emphasised the need for personal choices about “the life I want to 
live”, whether or not this looked normal to others.  This could be a difficult 
boundary to navigate.  While personal empowerment was central to most 
discourses of recovery so was the capacity to become a confident social being 
and a member of community.  Several participants noted that people needed to 
learn to take care of, for example, their living environment and personal hygiene 
in order to be accepted by others.  A team leader from Hamilton remarked, 
“Unfortunately we do need to get on with our neighbours if we want to have a 
fairly smooth, quiet life” as well as developing the skills “to negotiate 
relationships if people aren’t to become isolated” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group 
P, Hamilton). 
The construction of community, as an environment rich with resources 
and opportunities, appeared indicative of the extent to which participants and 
organisations were integrating recovery discourses into their organisational 
communications and practices.  For many, connecting people to their 
communities, whether old or new, was an organisational imperative for recovery 
and, as one senior manager from Auckland remarked, “it just seems to me to be 
a compelling thing to do” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  This was also related to 
the theme of people rebuilding their self-confidence through new “adventures”.   
Encouraging an adventurous life enabled workers and organisations to 
identify and draw on people’s strengths, interests and previous achievements to 
promote new opportunities that rebuilt self-esteem as people experienced 
achievement, realised what was possible and what they could accomplish in the 
“real” world.  One senior manager explained that he liked the focus on strengths 
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because “everyone has had hobbies, sports and pastimes that they may want to 
reconnect with” and that a focus on future possibilities should have “one eye 
facing forward and one eye facing back” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  
Unfortunately, a sense of adventure was not only missing from clinical goal plans 
and outcome measures but frequently at odds with contracting requirements of 
risk management and risk aversion.  A senior manager from Hamilton faced 
considerable resistance from clinical staff when he set up a rifle range for people 
who were in an inpatient ward at the time. 
It was all done properly . . . we had guys come who were very 
low motivated, didn’t want to participate, and when they left 
they were buzzing, they were jumping up and down.  And we 
started getting comments from the wards “What have you 
done to these guys?  They are just so motivated, they are 
wanting to do things.”   (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton) 
Despite such efforts, being “in community” was seldom easy or 
straightforward for many service users, many having faced years of 
institutionalised control as well as on-going stigma and discrimination to varying 
degrees.  Participants reported that many worried about fitting in and they were 
appreciative of the courage of service users, acknowledging that it was “scary 
stepping up to a whole new group of people and allow them to discover you and 
for you to discover them” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  Similarly, 
finding the entry points into the community was a real challenge for many 
service users: 
Community is such a hard thing in this day and age, unless 
you are a member of the church or something, which is a 
really great type of community in terms of support for 
people.  If you are just out there and housed by yourself and 
you don’t have family around, where do you get that sense 
of community, and so you have to work at it and actually 
search for it and find it and develop it yourself, and that can 
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be really hard.       
 (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
Notions of community care were, also, very ambiguously constructed.  
The clinical construction tended to refer to the physical location of outpatient 
services as well as local community agencies.  This tended to perpetuate a 
marginalised “community” of mental health service users at odds with recovery 
and ordinary living within a community with ordinary people.  
The community that cared 
Many participants seemed to refer to “the community” as the local range 
of community services and agencies including churches and charities that 
provided activities for people to occupy their time and meet others.  While this 
was not necessarily problematic it frequently seemed couched in an old 
fashioned paternalistic benevolence that focussed more on “good people doing 
good things” in their community rather than the personal empowerment of 
service users.  For example, a team leader from Waikato recounted, what she 
described as “a beautiful story” about “how some ladies from the Anglican 
church have taken this person under their wing, and included him in plays, and 
when they told me about that, what wonderful opportunities and how fabulous 
that is, and it is just lovely, lovely caring people” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, 
Waikato) 
On the other hand, it was difficult to manage the boundary between 
supporting people to rebuild their confidence and aspirations without relegating 
them to a life of “filling in time” on the borders of communities.  Some support 
workers saw their role as learning about “a lot of different organisations that are 
available” and then helping service users to access these so they “are not bored 
or wasting their days, or just you know getting them to that stage where there 
are going to be things in the community that they might really want to go and 
try” (Peer Support Worker 4, Focus Group S, Christchurch).  In some cases 
participation proved to be yet another site of coercion and a support worker 
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from Wellington described the reaction of service users when she suggested a 
“community” programme:  
If I mention [another service], it’s like a filthy dirty word.  “I 
went there for 20 years”, or “for 10 years they forced me to 
go there, forced me otherwise they threatened I would be 
back in hospital.”       
  (Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
So saying, community participation did not seem to be valued by 
professionals, or considered in clinical plans beyond purely functional goals such 
as budgeting, cooking and house-cleaning.  This meant that organisational and 
contracting constraints, which governed the behaviour of both service users and 
NGOs, frequently thwarted increased, active participation in community.  There 
was evident conflict within organisations about regulatory control over who 
made the decisions about what was considered suitable activity.  Team leaders in 
Hamilton discussed their frustrations at organisational policies that created 
barriers for ordinary community activities for adults, such as going the pub to 
play pool, to Auckland for the casino or even taking people out on weekends to 
the beach.  As one commented:  
We had to put in tons of paperwork just to get them up to 
Auckland, and we got the best parking deal at Skycity, and 
the best restaurant was up there because we got discounts, 
and by crikey, there are some red faces because we shouldn’t 
have gone near that place.  But you know that's where 
people head to if they’re going [to Auckland].  
  (Team Leaders 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton)  
Participants also reported tensions with service users being pressured to 
make continuous measureable change including going “to join the little centres 
and do cards or whatever, and that is only an hour or two a week”  (Support 
Worker 4, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Several support workers felt similarly 
coerced to “find something else for the next personal plan whereas where they 
are at now is actually really happy” (Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, 
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Wellington).  They were frequently faced with explaining to service users that 
unless they were prepared to do something they would no longer have visits 
from their support worker.  All of which amounted to very little personal power 
for people using mental health services.    
Many participants opined that paid employment and living in a home of 
one’s own, whether rented or not, represented belonging and participating in 
community.  Work was clearly perceived as an important outcome, not only for a 
sense of contribution and involvement in the real, social world but for obvious 
benefits such as increased income.  However, as one team leader added the real 
value was that, for service users, “their self-worth just really goes through the 
roof, they feel like socialising; everything about work just changes them 
completely” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton). 
Many organisations created, and encouraged, opportunities for service 
users to experience ordinary interactions and relationships within the general 
community through voluntary or paid work.  In one small community, an organic 
garden was established and developed within the service.  This not only provided 
a sought after service to the community in terms of valued food produce but was 
an important means for building people’s confidence with the community.  In 
this project, neither staff nor service user roles were static or fixed and people 
took on more responsibility and leadership as they felt capable.  This meant 
people progressed upwards and many moved out of the service altogether.  In 
one case, a team leader explained that a service user had “got a job as a result of 
being in the garden, and now he has left the whole service” (Team Leader 3, 
Focus Group W, Waikato). 
Somewhat paradoxically, professionals were often responsible for holding 
service users back despite the emphasis on “exiting” people from services.  
Research participants described many professionals as routinely pessimistic, and 
they used notions of “risk aversion” and “work readiness” to justify further 
control over people’s lives.  A senior manager from Christchurch described how 
counterproductive it was when occupational therapists and other professionals 
wanted service users “to do a very slow transition process to work” when there 
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was compelling evidence that “finding work and supporting people to manage 
the kind of issues in their life to get [work], and keep it, is what works for people” 
(Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  Most importantly, this reluctance further 
eroded service users’ confidence that they could ever truly regain valued roles in 
the community.   
Having one’s own home, rather than living in enforced group sharing 
arrangements in supported accommodation was also hugely significant and 
empowering.  This offered personal freedom from service intervention as well as 
the power to insist that “in my own place I don’t want you guys around 24 hours 
a day” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group W, Waikato).  But participants reported 
that, far from facilitating personal power and choice, services, particularly clinical 
services, often stood in the way of service users reengaging with community on 
their own terms.  This was not merely ineffectual but frequently led to negative 
outcomes.  A team leader from Hamilton expressed his frustration at the 
revolving door syndrome when service users’ own recovery aspirations and 
desires were not met.  In one case, a person was continually sent to live 
“independently” in the community; but on his own and against his clearly 
expressed desire.  As the team leader explained, whatever other people thought 
was appropriate it was as “simple as that, he wanted company.  He’s now happy 
living in a room down at the Commercial Hotel.  (Team Leaders 2, Focus Group P, 
Hamilton)  
Other participants noted that “not everyone is built the same” and it was 
important for people to define for themselves their natural state of sociability.  
One participant described her own personality as a “bit of a loner” adding that 
she was “quite happy with my own company, I don’t have to go out and join a 
whole heap of groups” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group P, Hamilton), and yet 
social connection was often mandated for services users and could easily 
become paternalistic or prescriptive based on staff or service values.  
Overall, there was considerable ambiguity around the constructions of 
community and community care, despite national policy and strategy documents 
stating that community participation was a desired outcome.  Many participants 
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and organisations were still heavily constrained by their contracts in how this 
was enacted in practice.  This not only narrowed the boundaries of community 
for organisations but also impacted the degree of personal power and choice 
available to service users trying to reclaim a meaningful and valued life as a 
rightful citizen in the community of their choice.  
Organising recovery: Relationships, roles & outcomes   
The previous sections concerned participant constructions of madness, 
journeys of recovery, and what constituted an ordinary life in community.  These 
constructions then provided the context for the ways that participants and 
significant texts constructed recovery-oriented mental health services and the 
community NGOs in particular.  Participants were asked what was working well 
in their organisations in terms of recovery, what was constraining their best 
intentions, and what they envisaged were the best possible outcomes for users 
of their services.  From these discussions it was evident that participants 
considered as a given that their organisations were recovery-oriented.  However, 
the various groups constructed the meaning of this very differently, especially 
those who were from either peer support teams or service user organisations.  
This was also despite the fact that most described their organisational 
communications and practices as influenced more strongly by contracting and 
funding requirements than genuine empowerment and choice for service users. 
In this section, I focus on four major aspects of the organisation of 
recovery as discussed by participants.  These are the anticipated outcomes of 
recovery-oriented organisations; organisational identity and niche; 
organisational relationships and communication, both internal and external; the 
perceived roles of participants and their organisations within mental health 
services.   
Recovery: The nature of outcomes 
The Mental Health Advocacy Coalition (2008) has stated that “measures 
of effectiveness of services (should be) simple and focus on outcomes that are 
important to service users” (p. 10).  A senior manager from Auckland described 
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his organisation’s perspective on positive, recovery outcomes as assisting 
“someone to better their circumstances or improve their life in a way that they 
feel meaningful” at the same time acknowledging that this might mean 
“different things to different people”.  Good individual outcomes, therefore, 
might range from someone getting a job to recognising when “the voices are 
getting just a bit too loud” and “they are not able to manage that anymore”.  
However, it might also be that a person “actually cooked something for the first 
time in their lives”, or “talked to their Mum for the first time in 20 years after 
burning those bridges” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  But it was evident from 
participant talk that these, more subjective, senses of progress and outcomes 
were not considered adequate measures by DHB funders in most regions.   
As discussed earlier, workers with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress talked about the fundamental goal of recovery being 
transformation; beginning with the opportunities, personal power and support 
to find meaning in their experience and to integrate it into a new and 
transformative identity.  In contrast, the perception of many research 
participants was that funder expectations drove their organisations and recovery 
outcomes were purely functional with service exit the only outcome that really 
counted.  Therefore, organisational record keeping and reporting focussed on 
linear progress and expectations of discharge.  These measurements of recovery 
progress were a source of frustration for participants as well as service users.  As 
one participant from a service user organisation protested, “Is it a measurement 
of success, seeing someone for an appointment once a week, three months, six 
months?”  (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton) 
Senior manager participants described instances where, despite excellent 
evaluations, community non-government services were either cut or put on 
three-month contract rollovers by their DHB.  These events exacerbated 
concerns that narrowly defined recovery outcomes, such as the increasing 
pressure to adopt the clinical assessment tool HONOS worked against the 
personal outcomes and unique achievements of ordinary living.  Participants 
challenged the extent to which positive changes in life circumstances or 
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individual growth could be measured objectively, and whether these were even 
attributable to mental health service intervention or involvement, given that 
they neither considered nor controlled for situational factors.  For example, a 
CEO from Auckland commented that measuring outcomes tells only one of many 
possible stories, and that these typically meet service needs rather than personal 
aspirations.  He commented:  
I suspect if you ask people they will tell you what is a good 
outcome for them, and maybe it is not as measurable as we 
think it is.  [Measuring outcomes] tells us more about what 
[the organisation is] doing [rather] than what service users 
think.    (Senior Manager 2, Auckland) 
Objective or statistical measures of progress, therefore, were an uneasy 
fit with more subjective and personal senses of achievement.  This was 
compounded because clinical teams were primarily concerned with symptom 
reduction and behavioural control that narrowly proscribed recovery.  One 
participant described this position as, “Well if we manage your symptoms with 
medication then that is the level of recovery that can be expected” (Team Leader 
4, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  This was problematic for both support workers 
and service users, not only because medication and side-effects were often 
perceived as detrimental to personal choice and recovery.  Of more concern was 
that, “Where services are concerned we are still in that phase of outcomes and 
you know tick the boxes and where they fit: and they are their measuring sticks 
and not the individuals” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  
Participants reported considerable difficulty negotiating these other expectations 
with their own constructions of recovery and support centred on individual 
choice and aspiration, with one saying, “If we run a recovery-oriented service we 
have to be careful not to make it our recovery” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton).   
This created an important discursive and, ultimately, epistemological 
issue for organisations faced was with requirements for objective measures and 
performance indicators that conflicted with the narratives or stories that many 
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believed were more meaningful.  Many participants commented that even 
though they were now encouraged to provide narrative reporting, this was an 
adjunct to the statistical information that formed the core of reporting 
expectations, and it was unclear whether these were even read let alone utilised 
in policy decision making.  In the end, it became just another administrative 
chore for many.  The CEO of a service user organisation in Christchurch described 
the narrative reports about organisational activities and outcomes she produced 
for the Ministry of Health as her “effort to feed a picture”.  However, she went 
on to note that she commented to the Deputy Minister of Health that, “I don’t 
know where they go when I leave them, I have no idea if anyone reads that 
narrative” and he apparently replied that he did not either but he would find out.  
However, she reported that she never heard back.  (Senior Manager 1, 
Christchurch)  
The narrative accounts of successful recovery, often posted as good news 
stories on organisational websites or in texts such as Frontline (Peters, 2010) and 
Destination recovery (MHAC, 2008), were also open to interpretation and 
translations that were not truly reflective of organisational endeavours to 
“realise their best intentions” with respect to recovery.  As a senior manager 
from Auckland remarked, “Success stories aren’t outcomes; they are wonderful 
stories of an individual outcome.  They are not outcomes for an organisation 
point of view” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  On the other hand, several 
participants expressed disappointment that when their organisations published 
service user stories of madness and recovery these were typically used as 
examples of successful service outcomes rather than genuine attempts to shift 
the construction of mental illness itself.  This was related to a phenomenon that 
several participants referred to as “posters on the wall” which hinted at their 
disillusionment with surface, and ultimately discursive, rather than substantive 
changes in paradigm and practice.   
Participants generally agreed that recovery meant people living a life of 
choice in their ordinary communities and no longer requiring service support.  
However, several tensions arose with how exiting services was constructed.  At 
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the heart of the conflict were contracting specifications and funder expectations 
of unilateral, linear movement towards discharge that most participants believed 
exerted undue pressure on both them and service users, and were antithetical to 
recovery principles of personal power and choice.  Several participants 
commented that their observations of service discharge were, “pretty much that 
they are forced out” despite service users being “not quite ready to go yet” 
(Support Worker 4, Focus Group A, Christchurch). 
This construction of service exit, as an outcome, contrasted with what 
many participants described as service users “getting on with life” (Team Leader 
2, Focus Group W, Waikato) or becoming “too busy to see me”  (Team Leader 1, 
Focus Group P, Auckland).  The distinction between “discharge” and just “moving 
on” with life depended on where the locus of power was situated.  In other 
words, who or what was driving and determining the pace of a person’s journey 
of recovery.  The CEO of a service user organisation in Hamilton described this as 
people getting “a real life again” and feeling “wanted, loved, respected [and] a 
worthwhile and integrated part of society” (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton). 
Participants agreed that “best practice” support work relationships should be 
time-limited, temporary and focussed on a person leaving the service because 
they were ready, willing and able to take up a full life in their community again.  
This approach expressed a hopefulness about the future, that “this too shall 
pass”, which was clearly missing in clinical and other services.  However, 
participants were clear that this needed to be in the best interests of the service 
user rather than the requirements of organisational structures and processes.  
Being recovery-oriented for participants meant increasing the flexibility and 
responsiveness of services to the fluctuating needs of service users.  A senior 
manager from Auckland said that to be truly recovery-oriented you needed to 
expect recovery and this meant consistently pulling back.  He added that this 
meant sometimes “pulling back at a very slow rate, other times you are pulling 
back very quickly” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
However, there was also a concern about service exit as “abandonment” 
and several participants reported that this created considerable anxiety for 
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service users.  In practice, the processes of clinical assessment meant people 
were not able to get help when they needed it and they feared discharge would 
mean being shut out from relationships and services they knew and trusted.  
Having to go back to the beginning and re-enter the system through a clinical 
assessment, with all the associated trauma that entailed was fraught for many.  
Several organisations endeavoured to get around their contracts in this regard, 
offering service users phone-call support, or reassurance about re-entry to the 
service, if required; but they typically had to juggle and re-allocate resources to 
do so.   
Many participants reported attempting to negotiate conflicting 
expectations in a variety of ways.  One important strategy was to attempt to 
increase the “meaningfulness of goals” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) rather than 
apply a simplistic measurement of progress against pre-set targets.  In three 
organisations, this was formally incorporated through the development of matrix 
frameworks that endeavoured to capture life dimensions that were relevant, 
important and personal for service users without enforcing a prescriptive one-
size-fits-all set of processes.  In addition, several organisations actively sought to 
be pre-emptive with respect to contracting and service specification changes; 
developing organisational measures and processes that met their own 
organisational values and objectives before more restrictive requirements could 
be imposed.  
Meaningful employment and paid work were mentioned frequently as 
organisational measures of success for service users.  However, there was 
ambivalence about how low expectations and stigma were expressed in the 
notion that “any old job will do” or being in a job, merely to “tick the [outcome] 
box” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton) rather than desirable and 
meaningful employment.  This clearly impacted negatively on service users’ self-
confidence and motivation, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy for many.  In one 
Wellington focus group discussion, a team leader explained how low 
expectations sent a message to service users, “You can’t expect to do any better.  
We don’t expect you to be able to achieve anything better than a cleaning job 
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despite what you have done before; your knowledge and experience” (Team 
Leader 2, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Another participant from Hamilton 
concluded that the measure should be “whether that's added value to their life 
or whether it is just one of the things they have to do to get an outcome, and is 
probably what the majority of society out there [expects]”(Team Leader 4, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton).  
Another outcome reported as particularly important to service users was 
“having a place of their own”, whether this meant living alone or with others.  
Living in residential services with others not of one’s own choosing was reported 
as unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.  Sometimes it was about the anti-social 
aspects of their symptoms such as hearing voices or being “paranoid about what 
your neighbour is thinking about you” which meant that “sleeping in the same 
house as someone else is just impossible” (Team Leader 6, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton).  However, for most it was just because, “they’ve got their own stuff 
around them, they can personalise it to the way that they want to which then 
brings up a sense of pride in [their] environment.  [They] want to invite people in 
for a coffee” (Team Leader 6, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  
Others reported, however, that many service users liked sharing a home 
with others, and this could create issues for services, who were expected to 
move people on and out.  Several commented on the irony of moving people 
out, with the anxiety and sense of abandonment this could create, just as they 
had become secure and happy in their sense of being in the world.  One 
Auckland organisation negotiated this dilemma innovatively and effectively by 
moving the service itself out and leaving the people behind to get on with their 
lives.  As the manager of this service commented, “We buggered off.  And that 
worked really well.  [They] are still getting the support they require.  We have 
just gone, letting them get on with it” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland). 
Most organisations and participants, therefore, were determined to work 
around the expectations and constraints of the contracting and funding 
environment in terms of achieving meaningful outcomes and being recovery 
oriented.  But this was clearly an on-going struggle with more powerful clinical 
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services.  In the next sections, I examine how participants constructed a recovery 
orientation in services and what this implied for establishing a unique, valued 
identity and niche within the gamut of Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health 
services.   
Becoming recovery-oriented: Organisational identity and niche 
Community NGOs in Aotearoa\New Zealand have typically been 
responsive to the values and principles of a recovery model despite the obvious 
difficulties (Harrison, 2010; McMorland et al., 2008; Peters, 2010; Platform Trust, 
2007, 2008).  Most participants in this research claimed their organisations were 
recovery-oriented, in line with the values and missions mandated by their trust 
deeds and constitutions.  Yet these organisations, and the support workers 
specifically, were inevitably positioned and identified as less knowledgeable and 
less credible than their clinical counterparts within the spectrum of mental 
health services.  
For many participants being recovery oriented meant being innovative 
wherever possible and it was in this area of participant talk that endeavours to 
undertake organisational transformation were most apparent.  Among the 
initiatives discussed were KeyWe Way, a peer respite service in Wellington (see 
also Peters, 2009) and the intentional peer support teams established in some 
organisations and funded under distinct contracting arrangements (see also 
Central Potential, 2008; Mead, 2005; Mead et al., 2001; Ley, Roberts, & Willis, 
2010).  There were also a variety of local and organisational initiatives that 
encouraged healthy, active lifestyles, as well as organic gardening, book clubs, 
coffee groups, music, comedy and radio ventures that were generally 
coordinated by peer support teams or service user led organisations.  Various 
efforts to increase the credibility of community NGOs were also apparent.  These 
were mostly sited in Auckland and included attempts at collaboration by bringing 
clinical staff on board as well as developing sites where clinical and community 
services were located side by side (see also McMorland et al., 2008; Peters, 
2009).   
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Strongly articulated values embedded throughout organisational 
leadership and communication practices were the best indicator of a recovery 
orientation.  This became evident, almost incidentally, through the inclusion of 
participants from all tiers of five organisations, two of which were national.  In 
addition, three other support worker and team leader focus groups were 
representative of a single, or two allied, organisations.  This enabled close 
comparison among the cohorts of a particular organisation.  Two organisations 
provided the best evidence that organisational leadership, and\or the presence 
of strong service user participation in the development of policy and practices, 
reinforced a recovery orientation in an organisation.  
One of these organisations, in Wellington, had a history of active service 
user participation in the senior management team, one of whom commented, 
“We have lots of recovery conversations, I mean it, we have lots and lots 
conversations with service users and team members and the wider organisation” 
(Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  The other, in Auckland, had established peer 
support teams within the organisation, and a service coordinator remarked, 
“More and more it does feel like a values centred organisation.  I know that often 
we are focused on what needs to change, especially in my team because we have 
got a quality focus” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  A peer support worker 
supported this claim when he remarked that he “loved the fact” that the 
organisation was “moving away from sick, [and], focusing on living, that is a huge 
one” (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  The communicative 
practices in these organisations emphasised systematic reflexive practice, 
including a weekly “listening post” where staff and service users could talk to the 
CEO about anything they chose uninterrupted.  Another senior manager from 
Auckland described the congruence within his organisation as “strong social 
justice values that have been developed and massaged for 100 years [that] is 
very useful, we have a very strong philosophical foundation” (Senior Manager 3, 
Auckland).  
Unsurprisingly, authentic recovery orientation was also evident in 
comments from participants who worked in service user led organisations.  One 
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senior manager from a service user organisation in Hamilton commented, “A 
recovery service is about investing yourself in your life” (Senior Manager 4, 
Hamilton).  Most participants remarked on the importance of service user 
involvement in service development, and not only through the establishment of 
peer support services.  For instance, an organisation in Auckland was actively 
“increasing service user involvement in service development and planning 
processes” and putting “a lot of effort and resource into building the capacity 
within service users to do that” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland). 
However, other participants spoke of their frustration that recovery and 
strengths-based practice had become little more than “just changing pamphlets 
on the wall” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  For example, another 
support worker from a different focus group in Hamilton remarked that her 
organisation had,   
something up on the wall that talks about strengths based 
things [but] they only focus on the strengths when they want 
to discharge someone, and they want to tick the little ticky 
boxes that mean that they’ve achieved their outcomes.  I 
haven’t seen that much in practice in terms of the work that 
is done for people.      
  (Support Worker 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
This reinforced the sense that establishing an authentic recovery 
orientation within the mental health services environment was clearly a struggle 
for many organisations.   
Focus group questions also unearthed how participants envisaged the 
identity of, and niche for, community NGOs as credible organisations within the 
sector environment and as champions of recovery.  Most of the discussions 
reinforced strong advocacy and leadership as being crucial aspects in rebuilding 
the confidence people had lost to discriminate between what was normal life, 
and what was “illness”, due to the pathologising of their feelings and 
experiences.  Therefore, central to the talk about organisational identity and 
transformation was a desire to open spaces for challenge and adventure that 
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would provide on-going opportunities for growth and success.  This frequently 
meant developing creative, innovative strategies and adopting a “do whatever it 
takes” approach to service delivery.  And organisations often went beyond the 
bounds of their service contracts, as the CEO of a Kaupapa Māori organisation 
explained:  
We have a [contract], which is funded for two education 
workshops per year, and we do four a week.  [We] can’t 
afford it but [we do it because] the community wants it.  
[They] haven’t got any money, but there is a need over there 
and we have expertise so . . . .     
   (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton) 
He went on to explain that, “It is not about qualification[s].  It is [about] 
innovation; it is being willing to step outside of the framework.”  Other 
participants echoed this sentiment and it seemed that organisational approaches 
based on social, rather than medical, models consistently meant having to break 
the rules.  As one team leader explained: 
[I was told]  “Don’t ever pick anyone up for accommodation 
[issues]” and that was by a [DHB social worker].  Well I pick 
everyone up; that is the first thing.  Most people come 
through the door with accommodation issues, [and] that is 
the issue beneath the whole iceberg of stuff.  [So] if you just 
have this strict rule [you] miss working with people who have 
actually got huge life stresses going on [and] it all ties in 
together.  (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
The capacity to work with people in flexible, consciously purposeful ways 
required the strategic management of contracts, funder expectations and service 
specifications.  But this clearly drained the resources, effort and energy of the 
organisations.  One senior manager explained that her organisation was 
constantly having to “twist ourselves into knots to meet a service spec and then 
spend half our time trying to rewrite that, and you know kind of fudge it in a way 
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to meet the requirements”.  However, she added, “we are actually doing what 
we know people want and what works” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).    
In general, participants saw the niche for the sector in people feeling that 
services “are part of their support network.  [We] are not all of it; we are just a 
chunk of it” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  Implicit in these discussions was the 
notion that successful recovery and re-engagement with community were 
fostered more by qualitative and circumstantial factors.  These aspects included 
the nature of relationships people had with organisations, the encouragement 
they received to be adventurous as well as service responses to difficult and 
challenging experiences.   
Recovery: Relationships and roles in service delivery  
The nature of support relationships and participants’ perception of their 
roles was integral to all discussions of recovery.  Most participants were aware 
that the human-to-human encounter was the most important aspect of their 
role, and that, in and of itself, could be therapeutic.  It was the ordinary 
activities, conversations, mutual relationships and just catching up that was 
important.  As this senior manager of a service user organisation in Hamilton 
expressed it, “We talk about life, and can often spend up to half a meeting just 
talking; catching up with where people are at and what they’ve done; what 
they’ve been through within the last week, two weeks, or when they last came” 
(Senior Manager 4, Hamilton) 
Roles and relationships that supported recovery appeared to involve 
assisting people to widen their repertoire of strategies, capacities, 
resourcefulness and self-awareness in order to move on with their lives.  This 
meant organisations and support workers needing to be supportive of each stage 
without pressure or expectations.  Some participants even explicitly stated that 
“[We should be] investing in relationships not beds” (Senior Manager 3, 
Wellington).   
Support workers, as well as workers with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress, spoke frequently of the value of just “being with” 
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someone, of witnessing their journey and of demonstrating care, optimism and 
belief without being directive.  Several participants talked about the evidence of 
success being frequently intangible; witnessing a person’s capacity to “enjoy 
rather than endure life” (Peer Support Worker 8, Focus Group PS, Auckland) or 
even building personal resilience by learning to “live with [their] mental illness 
rather than getting over it” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Wellington).  As one 
Wellington support worker declared, “Everybody on this earth deserves to have 
someone they trust knock on their door, or see them, or witness.  They love that 
feeling that there is somebody that likes them” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group 
A, Wellington). 
However, rigid time limitations and resource allocations were discussed 
frequently as being the biggest barrier to establishing effective recovery 
relationships.  Participants, other than peer support workers, were finding it 
increasingly difficult to justify the benefit of just being with someone, “having a 
chat”, when contracting requirements were so tightly pinned down to the 
achievement of pre-set goals.  A support worker expressed his frustration as “I 
don’t think you can measure the meaning of life” (Support Worker 4, Focus 
Group A, Wellington) and another complained of being “so answerable to 
everybody- what percentage of [a service user’s] day was spent doing this or this 
or this, how are you showing it, what are the outcomes” and, she added, “it 
doesn’t work like that” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
The constraints of service specifications provided little time for ordinary 
conversations about people’s lives, aspirations and significant experiences.  
Invitations to talk about what it was like for them when they went “mad” were 
either incidental or actively discouraged.  “We’re not counsellors” as one support 
worker in Wellington put it.  Understandably, some support workers may have 
felt out of their depth in dealing with the frequently distressing nature of these 
stories.  But this was clearly the basis of an effective relationship for many other 
participants.  A team leader from Hamilton believed that the best support she 
could offer was “giving people time and listening to their story” because the 
people she worked with “have the most amazing stories and they don’t often get 
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the opportunity to talk about them, and to talk about who they are (Team Leader 
5, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  
It was evident that a sense of reciprocity, mutuality and genuine regard 
was critical for effective and authentic support relationships; although this could 
also be a site of tension with notions of “professionalism” and professional 
boundaries.  A senior manager from Hamilton believed in the importance of 
spending quality time with people.  She said,   
Don’t always look for outcomes when you are meeting with 
them; get to know them, let them get to know you.  Okay you 
have to create some sense of boundaries, but be open to 
sharing some sense of intimacy [because then] you actually 
move into a place of therapeutic practice [and the] person 
can honestly know who you are.      
    (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton) 
Participants who also had lived experience of serious psychological 
distress described effective support relationships as encouraging a recovery 
process through the affirmation and identification of their strengths, 
resourcefulness and capacities as well as a “relentless optimism” about the 
future (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  Several commented that 
an attitude of hopefulness often made the difference and meant reframing 
“failure” and recognising mistakes as learning opportunities.  Many participants 
referred to the need to “believe in people, even when they had lost belief in 
themselves” and this included acknowledging a person’s own expertise was “just 
as valuable and important as the skills that a nurse has, as the OT [occupational 
therapist] has, as the doctor has.” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
Recovery relationships were frequently articulated as “walking alongside” 
someone.  While in some instances this seemed to be an unthoughtful 
reproduction of a cliché, it nevertheless represented a notion of partnership and 
even companionship which accepted that people could, and were, leading their 
own recovery with service involvement being only part of that journey.  In 
several instances participants expanded on this metaphor in a variety of ways.  
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For example, “People do recovery whether they are in a service or not and if you 
really want to help someone you may as well help with what they are doing 
anyway” said a team leader from Hamilton (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton). 
In contrast, several participants explicitly rejected the apparent 
complacency and passivity of a notion of walking alongside and reframed this as 
working alongside, implying an obligation to be an active and engaged 
companion in a recovery journey.  At one end of this spectrum were support 
workers who “would use recovery as an excuse not to do the work with clients” 
and just say to someone, “This is what you need to do for your recovery: Now go 
and do it” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group W, Waikato).  While at the other were 
support workers “getting involved, [getting] right in there” (Senior Manager 2, 
Hamilton).  At the heart of the issue appeared to be the nature of an authentic 
support relationship and how workers and organisations could “act faithfully in 
someone’s best interests” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  Several participants 
talked about “being real” and sometimes this seemed counter intuitive.  For 
example:  
We don’t believe in bending over backwards.  And service 
users often find that difficult but then [they] start to 
appreciate it, because they are actually treated the same as 
everyone else in the population is treated.  They are not 
special, they are not different; they are the same.  Common 
garden normal and that is how we really work.  
    (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
However, it was also evident that a basis of deep caring underpinned this 
kind of authenticity and honesty in these relationships.  A support worker from 
Hamilton explained that respect and caring meant she needed to be able have 
the “hard conversations” and to say, “Hey the choice that you have made there 
is not great, why did you do it?”  (Support Worker 1, Focus Group C, Hamilton).  
This idea was accompanied by the need for a kind of radical acceptance of a 
person’s circumstances, and as a senior manager from Wellington said, “People 
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are not out to create havoc for themselves, to make your life difficult” (Senior 
Manager 2, Wellington).  This translated into a construction of a support role as a 
kind of tough love.  A senior manager from Auckland described his approach as 
getting, 
. . . . very frustrated with this back to front nonsense.  People 
say, “You have got to dress nicely and shower and look good 
before I will take you to a job interview.”  Don’t be stupid, I 
wouldn’t do it.  You go to the job interview, the person says, 
“Mate you look good but you stink, and I am not giving you a 
job because of that.”  (Senior Manager 3, Auckland). 
Unfortunately, and historically, service users have typically been framed 
as helpless and disabled, while support workers have usually been attributed 
roles as home help and caregivers.  This has created systemic, institutionalised 
relationships of co-dependency that have been difficult to break down.  A senior 
manager from Auckland explained that it was like any ordinary professional 
relationship:  
You go to see your accountant because you have accounting 
problems, you then don’t keep on seeing your accountant for 
five [years].  You see a doctor when you need to, you don’t 
start visiting your doctor all the time.  It is hard, but support 
becomes addictive.  You start turning up and cleaning my 
house and never stop [then it becomes] “Good on you, you 
missed a bit.”   (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
Generally, an effective support relationship depended on who was in the 
driver’s seat.  Many participants commented that service users were distrustful 
of professional relationships and particularly those based on the pathology of 
people’s experience, which ascribed the locus of power in professionals to make 
expert decisions, to guide, direct and “fix” problems.  Participants were aware of 
asymmetrical assumptions of power and a team leader from Hamilton described 
a typical reaction to claims of expertise, “Oh I did this and this and this and I’m 
the [big expert]. They know that it’s a crock”.  He went on to comment:  
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They’re not going to tell you their story, they’re not going to 
tell you their dreams and aspirations or whatever if they can't 
see that you are a real person.  Otherwise you're a 
psychiatrist, someone who sits behind a desk.   
  (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
It was equally significant whether participants talked about either 
“asking” or “telling” service users.  This was most apparent when talk slipped 
into a focus on deficits or “weaknesses” and led to remarks such as “getting 
them to [do] their goals” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group P, Hamilton) or “fixing 
their problems” (Support Worker 4, Focus Group B, Auckland).  This contrasted 
with other participants who acknowledged that “everybody struggles” (Peer 
Support Worker 7, Focus Group PS, Auckland) with the issues of living at times.  
This called for a very different but simple approach that began with “the biggest 
question is to start asking, ‘What can we do for you to help you?’  That's a basic 
question I know, but most of them [just] get told what to do” (Team Leader 2, 
Focus Group A, Hamilton). 
Realistic expressions of respect in mutual relationships functioned as a 
kind of modelling and helped people recognise their own power.  A support 
worker from Hamilton commented that many people who had been in mental 
health services for years have found it difficult to form good relations and “they 
have been isolated [so] even just participating in a normal relationship is a great 
outcome” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  Others emphasised 
affirming and validating the essential humanity of serious psychological distress 
with one team leader declaring:  
Recovery is giving them back everything that has been taken 
away from them you know; their self-worth, their 
independence, [and] helping them to go and find that, and 
doing the journey with them.  Not just expecting them to 
travel along there by themselves.    
  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
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While participants and the NGOs were endeavouring to work as flexibly 
as possible, within contracting constraints, this was often clearly uncomfortable 
for clinical staff who were used to being in control of all aspects of encounters 
with service users.  A support worker from Auckland told a story about 
supporting a young client to meet with his clinical key worker at Burger King.  She 
explained, “because that was the place he was the most comfortable.  [But] his 
key worker was this health fanatic, and she wasn’t comfortable there at all.  [It] 
actually gave him more power than the rest of us because it was his 
environment” (Support Worker 4, Focus Group B, Auckland). 
For most participants, the support worker role involved encouraging 
people’s capacity for developing a repertoire of responses for managing the 
vicissitudes of life; recognising, as one participant put it, “It is the strengths and 
resilience within the person themselves that is going to be able to lead that 
recovery” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Wellington).  This meant that a 
significant aspect of the role was modelling the ordinariness of life’s ups and 
downs; helping people to re-learn themselves; to identify their unique patterns, 
strengths and resourcefulness; to increase their personal confidence in being 
able to manage and judge for themselves what is normal and human.  This 
required considerable courage and one peer support worker described “moving 
from a focus on sickness to a focus on living”, and making life better after 
“dealing with some tough stuff” (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland).  At the end of the day a team leader from the Waikato argued: 
They don’t [actually] need us.  They have survived.  [They] are 
survivors most of them.  And what they need from us is some 
alternatives, some skills, some ideas, some hope, but they 
don’t need us to tell them what to do, and I think that is the 
biggest trap you know.      
  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group W, Waikato)  
Support workers and other participants framed their role very differently 
from DHB clinical services and funders who appeared to think they were 
caregivers or home help; if they knew or considered what they did at all.  There 
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was a lot of frustration at this seemingly wilful ignorance on the part of DHB 
clinical teams.  As a Wellington support worker described her situation, “If we 
say we are support workers [it creates] a kind of relationship with us by the 
clinical teams, ‘Oh what you do is cleaning and cooking’.”  (Support Worker 2, 
Focus Group A, Wellington).  One Team Leader from Waikato protested that 
being a support worker is “an incredibly skilled job and I really don’t think it is 
recognised” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, Waikato).  Other participants 
resented being treated as hired help by clinical workers.  For instance, “Some key 
workers think they are in charge and ‘You are my puppy and run after me’, or, 
‘Can you go over and pick up their medication and take it over because I am too 
busy’, and I am like ‘Yeah so am I’.  [If] it is not part of my referral I am not going 
to go and do that” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group H, Hamilton).   
Breaking down these barriers was very difficult for most of these 
community workers and was very dependent on the attitudes of clinical staff and 
their interpersonal relationships.  A peer support worker from Auckland 
explained that distributing information about the peer support service came 
down to the whim of clinical staff.  She remarked that, “I have tried time and 
time again to be able to present our service to all the clinical staff because I think 
it is really important [and] they are just non-responsive really” (Peer Support 
Worker 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  
National policy expectations are that people with lived experience of 
serious psychological distress should “experience trustworthy agencies that work 
across boundaries and enable service users to lead their own recovery” (Ministry 
of Health, 2005, p. 4).  Yet, clinical goal setting and discharge plans were 
frequently produced with no consultation with service users, families or the 
community organisations who were written in to their implementation.  As well 
as the process being antithetical to a recovery orientation in services, these plans 
were frequently different from service users’ own aspirations and desires, 
imposing constraints and expectations on both them and NGOs.  Meeting 
expectations then created “a very difficult balance” for maintaining an 
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organisation’s positive relationship and “not destroy[ing] it by the constant 
nagging” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group A, Wellington). 
Participants in focus groups and interviews invariably characterised the 
relationships between clinical teams and the NGOs as hierarchical.  They made 
frequent comments about clinical teams such as, “Even when the high up people 
are all for us sometimes it doesn’t translate down to the people doing it” (Peer 
Support Worker 5, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Some senior managers, perhaps 
because of their more strategic focus, opined that future trends may increase the 
profile of the NGOs, but this was more likely to be driven by resource 
management rather than paradigmatic shifts.  Nevertheless, some believed that 
resource constraints could be utilised as an opportunity to establish a niche for 
the community organisations.  One senior manager in Auckland optimistically 
believed that, “Clinical teams [will] need to rely more on their community NGO 
partners, and I think there are things that [we] can actually do more [effectively] 
with benefit to the client” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  
There were a few examples where participants believed their 
relationships with funding and clinical teams were working well.  This had 
invariably involved a great deal of energy and effort on the part of the NGOs; but 
where this had worked the outcomes were, inevitably, considered worth it.  For 
example, another senior manager from Auckland believed that collaboration 
with the clinical team had meant people moved more smoothly through the 
service and “they are getting their needs met in a more timely fashion, and there 
is a sense that things are more generally person centred”  (Senior Manager 4, 
Auckland).  In addition, there was evidence that alternative service specifications 
and contracting arrangements were available to a few organisations.  This was 
particularly the case with service user organisations, others who employed 
designated peer support workers, and one Auckland organisation who had a 
contracted peer support service team.  
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Intentional Peer Support  
Intentional peer support seemed to be the most significant initiative that 
contributed towards implementing a recovery orientation in the community 
organisations.  These contracting arrangements, where they existed, provided 
comparative autonomy and were clearly extremely successful.  They certainly 
offered greater flexibility and responsiveness, but the experience of the KeyWe 
Way peer respite service, which was put on three month contract rollover 
despite excellent evaluations (Peters, 2009), cautioned against planning ahead 
with any certainty.   
Peers support workers had a well-defined niche within their organisations 
and the peer relationship was explicitly founded on facilitating personal power 
and self-determination.  A peer support worker from a dedicated team in 
Auckland explained the key difference in peer support relationships was equality.  
She said, “We are not the experts in their recovery, and we know that they have 
inside them the knowledge of what is going to be best for them” (Peer Support 
Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  These relationships were clearly much 
easier to establish within peer support contracts that allowed them to both 
responsive and accountable to the service users they worked with; rather than 
being restricted by rigid contracting specifications.  A team leader from Hamilton 
explained that their peer support workers offered “a huge difference in the way 
we practice compared to other staff”.  She contended that enabling somebody to 
“speak is the best thing you can do for them, you know to be actually heard, 
really, really heard” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, Hamilton).   
Peer Support workers clearly anticipated such conversations and they 
reported considerable anxiety on the part of service users that if clinical or 
“other” mental health workers knew what was going on an inexorable clinical 
machine would be set in motion that was not safe for them.  They reported that 
service users worried that other workers would “run off and ring the CAT team” 
(Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland); that their experience would 
be framed in clinical terms and they would lose control of their lives.  However, 
this meant that the peer relationship also carried with it some serious 
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responsibilities because people “have all told me that these are things that they 
have never told anybody in their lives you know.  It is such a privileged and scary 
position to be in” and “by opening up to you they are giving you the choice to 
help them see that they can do things about this (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus 
Group PS, Auckland). 
The overarching impression, emerging from the focus group and 
interview conversations, was how people used the same vocabularies, especially 
around notions of recovery, but clearly meant different things.  It was apparent 
that, not only did participants used language in multiple, ambiguous ways, but 
that these usages were not of equal power. 
Lost in translation: Conflicts and tensions  
Recovery was inevitably positioned as the antithesis of the biomedical 
model in the literature as well as participant talk.  However, despite an 
assumption of common ground, recovery was clearly being translated in ways 
that served particular interests (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Venuti, 2004).  It was 
also apparent that the emphasis on recovery in national strategy and policy was 
changing and becoming more fragmented(O’Hagan, 2009; Warriner, 2010).  This 
suggested that new stories of recovery were being constructed and that these 
displayed multiple authors (Boje, 2001).   
Many participants appeared to be aware that something had been lost 
from the concept of recovery and there were sites of ambiguity, tension and 
resistance.  One support worker in Hamilton referred to “the big stick of 
recovery” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group B, Hamilton) while a team leader in 
Christchurch wondered if “the term recovery [has just] become another label” 
(Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Christchurch).   
Recovery and rehabilitation: Business as usual?  
In most focus groups and interviews, participants unconsciously slipped 
from discourses of recovery, framed as person centred and empowering, to 
other discourses typical of rehabilitation or even medical models.  Terms such as 
mental health and well-being were routinely conflated with mental illness and 
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addiction, symptom control and reduction in the prevalence of illness.  This was 
even more evident in national and sector texts that drew on multiple translations 
that appeared to qualify a commitment to recovery in services without 
relinquishing other beliefs or intents such as biomedical expertise.   
These allowed multiple translations to coexist, while situated interests 
and goals remained unchanged.  The national mental health and addiction plan 
for 2006-2015, Te Kokiri (Ministry of Health, 2006) routinely drew on both 
recovery and bio-medical discourses within policy and strategy statements that 
were open to “interested” interpretations.  For example, the same sentence that 
referred to mental health services being “built on a culture of recovery and 
wellness” goes on to refer to “participation by people affected by mental illness 
“ (p. 2) and then introduces “a workforce that delivers effectively at the interface 
between cultural and clinical practice”  (p. 2, emphasis added).  
Similarly, recovery and rehabilitation were frequently conflated by 
research participants, especially by those with a background of clinical training.  
These were typically psychiatric nurses or occupational therapists, and they 
believed that recovery offered nothing new.  One senior manager from 
Wellington admitted that her first response to a recovery discourse was to be 
“affronted as many clinicians were at the time” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  
Her understanding had evolved markedly over time, and she currently led a 
senior management team that comprised several people with lived experience of 
serious psychological distress.  Unfortunately, much of the talk in focus groups 
and interviews indicated that recovery as rehabilitation was still the position of 
many clinically trained health professionals.   
Two organisations explicitly used the Bio-psycho-social rehabilitation 
model developed by the Centre for Psychiatric Rehabilitation at Boston 
University (1994), and another unashamedly used psychometric assessments of 
staff and service users.  However, senior managers in these organisations 
appeared to see no conflict between this and the recovery orientation mandated 
in national policy (Mental Health Commission, 1998; Ministry of Health, 1994, 
2005).  In fact several, especially managers, were explicit, even unapologetic, 
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that it was just business as usual.  For instance a senior manager from Auckland 
admitted that when he “first became interested in [recovery]it was very much 
around [the] context of rehabilitation because that was what my training 
entailed” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland) 
However, many others, and notably those from support worker and team 
leader cohorts, problematised the distinction between rehabilitation and 
recovery, and the power differential that it implied.  They typically grappled with 
the functional and deficit based emphasis of rehabilitation approaches.  Several 
also reported resistance from service users at having recovery done to them.  
They were concerned that recovery discourses, entrenched in psychosocial 
rehabilitation approaches, ignored important social, political and economic 
barriers to people participating fully in their communities, and placed undue 
responsibility for a person’s sense of well-being on their own efforts (Banks et al., 
2004; O’Hagan, 2001, 2004).  One team leader from Auckland remarked that, 
“Recovery is quite [different from] rehabilitation but sometimes those two things 
get confused”.  She went on to add, “If someone had bulldozed me into 
rehabilitation I would have probably went the opposite way” (Team Leader 1, 
Focus Group A, Auckland).  
In addition, participants were aware that multiple interpretations or 
translations of recovery had been evident from its introduction into national 
policy and this raised several issues for service users in particular.   
Translating recovery 
As discussed earlier, people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress resisted the implication that they were returning to a point in the past, 
believing that the journey through madness was more a discovery of a new self 
and new territory (Leibrich, 2000).  For others, it seemed re-cover-y was an 
injunction to “cover up again” and implied a requirement to hide their distress 
and experience: to be ashamed of it (O’Hagan, 2009).  Still others did not accept 
that this profoundly human experience was an illness at all, and that recovery 
meant accepting bio-medical accounts and interpretations of their experience.   
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For some participants, ambiguity and vagueness had enabled dilution of 
the conceptual power of recovery, and those with clinical training and\or DHB 
backgrounds, particularly senior managers, appeared at ease with this blurring of 
the discursive boundaries as it enabled them to participate in multiple discourse 
communities.  One explained that “the word seems to have had a substantive 
history in our communities” and it was a concept that “people are very 
comfortable with” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  He saw it as “part and parcel 
of a natural process as people moved through our system of care” rather than a 
concept with important philosophical and practical ramifications for 
organisations. 
Such constructions highlighted other on-going problems with the 
language, labels and translations of recovery that were evident within 
organisations and services.  These suggested that despite language shifts, there 
had been little corresponding change in service practices.  One participant 
stated, “We might call it all these lovely fancy lovey-dovey names, [but] to me it 
is still very clinical” (Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Wellington).  It appeared 
that translations of recovery were regularly identified with Focus Group PS, 
medical story of mental illness in some organisations.  A team leader from 
Christchurch commented: “There is a clinical version and then there is a version 
of recovery, or rehabilitation as some refer to it, and then there is the person’s 
version of it” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Christchurch). 
Participants were aware of the power of language and, to some extent, 
were cognisant of how the language of recovery was being manipulated 
specifically.  As a senior manager from Christchurch intimated, “We shy away 
from some of the more contrived recovery language” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch).  Others, too, were aware of the ways that multiple discourses and 
translations were being used strategically to promote the appearance of a 
recovery orientation in mental health services, and equally aware that other 
priorities were actually driving the agenda.  A senior manager from Christchurch 
noted,  
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Politically there is a big push [coming] from the Ministry of 
Health to move things out into the community and probably 
it is because of money.  But their vocabulary is alright, they 
are talking about recovery and peer support and community 
support [and] that kind of thing.  So the words are all okay. 
    (Senior Manager 1, Christchurch) 
Similarly, most participants were conscious of managing multiple 
discourses and how these could be misleading.  For example, a team leader was 
critical of her organisation’s strategic use of language, aware that people 
“interpret language in different ways and can be influenced in different ways 
too”.  She added that her organisation’s “description of itself it is an attempt to 
persuade you that this is their values and this is how they are going to conduct 
themselves in the community” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group B, Wellington) 
although she believed this public perception was false.   
Differences in stance appeared to correlate with institutional insider or 
outsider positions on recovery.  Insiders, for example those who had previously 
come from DHB environments, did not problematise the evolution of the 
recovery discourse or its absorption into the dominant translation; it was just the 
“way of the world”.  A senior manager from Auckland, who previously had a 
funding role with the DHB, remarked that most people were familiar with the 
“notion of having concepts come, many people being attracted to them, and 
then the concept goes and we have a resonance of it left [and] then we look to 
the next concept or the next philosophy that comes along” (Senior Manager 2, 
Auckland).  However, others appeared to realise that something important had 
been lost inside multiple interpretations. 
Natural evolution or fatally compromised? 
The “talk” of participants, who were either service users themselves or 
whose organisations had strong service user leadership, drew on other, more 
recent discourses and suggested an evolution of thinking that was not apparent 
in the talk of other participants.  Many of these “other” participants questioned 
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the relevance or power of a recovery discourse; making comments such as, “I 
think that there is a danger that the consumer voice is not going to be listened to 
as much in this environment because everyone is talking recovery” (Team Leader 
1, Focus Group A, Auckland).  This, and similar comments indicated the need for 
a privileged service user voice, to define or make sense of recovery in their own 
way.  Alternatively, as Mary O’Hagan (2009) and others have discussed, services 
risked an insider appropriation of the discourse that rejected any privileged voice 
for service users.  A senior manager from Wellington seemed to exemplify these 
concerns in saying that, “We shouldn’t make it something that academics or 
even service users capture and have as their own” (Senior Manager 1, 
Wellington). 
Several other participants problematised the shifts in the recovery 
discourse and asserted the need for renewed power in the language.  A 
participant from Christchurch expressed regret that recovery “has lost perhaps 
its meaning or its focus” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Christchurch) and that 
change was needed for that reason.  Although they seemed unaware that Mary 
O’Hagan (2009), a one-time mental health commissioner and long-time advocate 
in the international psychiatric survivor movement, has gone as far as referring 
to recovery as being fatally compromised or “colonised”, it seemed that this was 
their sense of what was pervading the discourse.  Several participants made 
statements such as, “Recovery [sounds] all cheesy doesn’t it, because you are so 
used to saying it now” (Senior Manager 3, Wellington).  He went on to say that, 
although he could understand why some people now thought it was “an idea of 
yesterday”, the barriers to genuine social inclusion and “living the life you want 
to live out there” still existed (Senior Manager 3, Wellington). 
Translations of recovery also functioned as a form of strategic ambiguity 
(Eisenberg, 1984; Davenport & Leitch, 2005) and allowed participants and others 
from the NGOs to communicate and negotiate the interface with clinical and 
funder arms.  It appeared that senior managers, particularly, were strategically 
negotiating multiple discourses of recovery, mostly to appear conciliatory and 
demonstrate organisational cooperation.  A senior manager from Wellington 
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noted that in their communications with the DHB “there are two different 
languages and there is that extra tension too when the same language gets used 
in two different ways” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington).  For some utilising this 
ambiguity was not seen as a problem, even where it reinforced the power of 
insider translations.  For example, “We use the same vocab but we are actually 
attaching it to different discourses.  [So] it is no surprise that different people in 
different parts of the sector use it in different ways and that is fine” (Senior 
Manager 2, Auckland).  
However, for other participants, a requirement to adapt their language in 
order to participate in multiple discourses created considerable unease.  
Difficulties in negotiating the many tensions at discursive boundaries with clinical 
teams and funders were evident in the ways in which participants framed these 
encounters.  For example, as a Wellington senior manager confessed, “If 
[another] staff member had heard me speaking those terms I would have felt 
really embarrassed; like I had sold out or something” (Senior Manager 4, 
Wellington).  Or similarly, “I [had] to pull out all the deficit place stuff, otherwise 
they will not value what we do” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
Most participants, other than workers with their own experiences of 
serious psychological distress, did not clearly articulate awareness that recovery 
as a discourse may have been compromised by more dominant translations.  
Instead, they tended to accept uncritically insider notions that recovery was 
becoming an outmoded concept, and this was even to be expected and accepted 
as natural.  Workers with their own experiences of serious psychological distress, 
on the other hand, were far more aware that recovery had been colonised 
(Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009; Wallcraft, 2009) by more powerful stories of 
illness and functional normality.  These participants were introducing a new 
discourse of well-being, frequently expressed as an explicit rejection of recovery. 
An emerging discourse of well-being 
The emerging discourse of well-being suggested a new strategy for 
reclaiming the language of subjective experience.  One senior manager explained 
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the evolution as, “We use recovery of well-being to give them a sense of some 
sort of journey:  How they actually look at that experience and learn from it, and 
have some form of transformation” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington).  This new 
discourse was apparent throughout the country but primarily from participants 
with lived experience of serious psychological distress.  One peer support worker 
explained it as, “If you have well-being, then the deficit in your life, the illness in 
your life becomes less important, so [I just] focus on well-being a lot more.”  
(Peer Support Worker 4, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Another participant was 
explicit that this was a move away from a medical translation of the recovery 
discourse.  He said, “Even the shift from using the word recovery [and] more the 
use of the word well-being, and a shift from the medical model [that] you are 
going to ‘recover’ from [an] illness” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group B, Auckland).  
This shift to a discourse of well-being served several purposes.  First, 
there was clear frustration, often explicit, that recovery was not being enacted in 
organisations in ways that people found helpful.  Second, a discourse of well-
being placed people’s experiences within the “normal” population and not 
outside it.  Well-being was seen as something that everybody needs in order to 
thrive, and therefore removed the sense of people needing to make up ground 
before being worthy of a valued place in their communities.  One participant 
from Wellington defined this explicitly in terms of the engagement that service 
users and the NGOs had with their communities.  She discussed how their 
organisation considered the introduction of well-being in the sense of, “How 
does a nation, or community, develop a sense of how to support people’s 
individual well-being, [and then] how do the experiences of people who are not 
in a state of well-being mentally interact with all of that?” (Senior Manager 5, 
Wellington).  Similarly, a team leader from a service user organisation in 
Hamilton explained how, previously, her whole life had become centred on her 
next clinical appointment rather than the well-being of her life as a whole.  She 
was continually expected to delve “deeper and deeper into my problems [until] 
my whole life just became a problem and I thought I couldn’t do anything cool 
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until after I had sorted that out.  So that's the difference” (Team Leader 4, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton)  
It seemed clear, therefore, that important tensions have remained 
around multiple translations of recovery and whose interests these serve.  This 
has meant a continuing lack of conceptual power for recovery as a model of 
practice for the community NGOs.  In fact, this has been so much so that the 
original discourse communities of recovery, people who have had personal 
experience of serious psychological distress, have begun to turn away from it and 
have championed emergent discourses of well-being. 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has addressed my first research question 
through an analysis of significant features of recovery discourses and the ways 
these were being constructed, negotiated and resisted by participants and the 
community NGOs.  Fifteen years after the development of The Blueprint (Mental 
Health Commission, 1998), it might have seemed unequivocal that a recovery-
orientation would be evident throughout mental health services in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand.  However, the findings of this research indicated that 
multiple discourses of recovery are being used and contradictions exist between 
constructions of recovery expressed throughout the NGOs and the wider sector 
stakeholders.   
The primary discursive conflicts among “models of madness” 
underpinned most other boundary tensions between the various interest groups  
and participants, and these echoed recent claims and arguments in literature 
authored by people with their own experiences of serious psychological distress 
(Adame, 2006; Gawith & Abrams, 2006; O’Hagan, 2009a, 2012; Pearson, 2004).  
For them, recovery was primarily concerned with issues of voice, identity and 
underlying rationality as they struggled to control the meaning systems, and 
reclaim the language, of their experiences.   
For participants who had their own personal, lived experience of serious 
psychological distress, the stories of their experiences of madness were central.  
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They consistently described these events as intense, overwhelming and 
extremely difficult; but nevertheless deeply human, communicative and of value.  
Their constructions of madness described inherently complex and deeply 
personal phenomena that were intertwined with the evolution of recovery 
discourses; all of which constructions resisted others’ accounts of their 
experiences.  
Many participants drew on a metaphor of recovery as a unique and 
personal journey.  However, for workers with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress, the recovery journey was highly contextualised and 
historical, and their talk was richly nuanced and organic in contrast with the 
almost clichéd sound bites of some other participants.  This indicated that for 
these participants recovery language and discourses were constantly evolving as 
they struggled for control of their explanatory models.  In contrast, other 
participants tended to construct recovery journeys as a measure of progress 
through mental health services, beginning only once people had entered services 
and expedited towards discharge.  This limited a person’s “history” to the narrow 
perspective of clinical accounts.   
There was a general assumption throughout the focus groups, interviews 
and texts that Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services were already 
recovery-oriented.  This misconception was reinforced by national policy texts, 
which claimed that recovery “underpins services [and] recognises that service 
users must lead their own recovery, have personal power and a valued place in 
their whānau and communities” (Ministry of Health, 2006, p. 2).  However, it was 
very clear in focus groups and interviews that these claims were exaggerated at 
best, and service users actually had very little real power over the important 
decisions that affected their lives.  
It was clear that there was not a single, authentic or shared discourse of 
recovery.  Instead, there seemed to be merely sets of common vocabularies and 
an assumption that ”we’re talking about the same thing” (Senior Manager 3, 
Wellington).  Most focus groups appeared to be operating from multiple 
meanings, and translations of recovery and ambiguities and inconsistencies 
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frequently went unremarked.  This also demonstrated that there were well-
defined, if unarticulated limits to being recovery-oriented.  In many cases, the 
language of recovery adopted in policy reforms appeared to be merely 
translated into other discourses with little change in practice and outcomes for 
service users.  Participants were frequently participating in more than one of 
these discourses as they struggled to negotiate the boundaries with clinical 
services and funders. 
Ostensibly, a recovery focus meant that the best outcome for service 
users in any mental health service organisation was to live an ordinary life in 
their community, with all the choices, opportunities and resources and rights of 
citizenship that this implied.  Yet it was clear that there was considerable 
ambiguity to how this was being realised in practice.  Translations of important 
constructs had significant effects and reinforced indications that there was still a 
significant gap between the expectations of service users for their recovery and 
what currently takes place in mental health services.   
National policy and strategy texts tended to treat generic mental health 
services discursively, and unproblematically, as a homogenous set of 
organisations (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006).  The lack of differentiation 
between the NGOs and clinical services had the effect of attributing broad 
recovery aims, such as service choice and living well in community to all mental 
health organisations.  Strategic vision statements, for example, included the 
importance of responsiveness, trustworthiness, personal choice, community 
engagement and service user leadership (Ministry of Health, 2005).  However, it 
was clear from the focus groups and interviews that these concepts did not have 
the same meanings, conceptual power nor practice bases in the various 
organisations of the mental health system.   
Despite this environment, the community NGOs seemed uniquely placed, 
and mandated by their trust deeds and constitutions, to support the aspirations 
of service users for a meaningful life within the communities of their choice.  
Unfortunately, their organisational missions and values were frequently in 
 273 
conflict with, and regularly superseded by, contracting requirements and clinical 
priorities.   
While progress towards a recovery orientation in organisational systems, 
structures and service delivery was evident in the community organisations, this 
was hampered by ideological constraints from other interests; constraints that 
have proved so persistent that many now regarded recovery as fatally 
compromised.  For these reasons, people with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress were endeavouring to shift the discourse towards a health 
promotion model of well-being.  The well-being discourse appeared to have 
emerged in response to generalised frustrations about the lack of noticeable 
change in the system despite the “talk” of recovery.    
As early as 2001, Priscilla Ridgway was expressing a “growing concern 
that recovery may become the latest catch phrase used merely to reframe 
traditional activities, rather than evolving into a well-constructed paradigm that 
can effectively guide policy and practice” (Ridgway, 2001, p. 335).  In the next 
chapter, I explore in more detail how these translations illuminated asymmetrical 
relationships that serve particular interests in the encounters with other, 
institutionalised and powerful discourses.  There I further develop the argument 
that translations of recovery have allowed powerful interests to remain 
powerful; in particular, the DHB clinical and funding arms who are representative 
of biomedical discourses and managerial discourses respectively.  It may be that 
recovery was lost in translation before it even began to transform mental health 
services in this country. 
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Chapter 7: Encountering the institutions   
The language of psychiatry [has been] a monologue of reason about 
madness.     Michel Foucault (1973, ix–x) 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with my second research question and 
examines the evidence that demonstrated the persistence and power of 
institutional discourses and practices, even within the NGOs and despite the 
formal adoption of recovery as national policy in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental 
health services.  In particular, I develop the earlier examination of the discourses 
and translations of recovery into an analysis of the effects on these discourses, 
usually positioned as alternative, when they encountered the powerful, 
institutionalised and macro-discourses of biomedicine and managerialism.  In 
doing so I address my second research question: How are institutional dynamics 
working to construct, constrain or contradict organisational practices in terms of 
becoming recovery-oriented? 
First, I revisit the complex nature of institutions and the evidence from 
focus groups and interviews that demonstrated their persistence and dominance 
throughout the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector, despite formal 
policies of recovery (Mental health Commission, 1998; Ministry of Health, 1994, 
2005).  The evidence showed that naturalised and socially normalised 
assumptions underpinned the regulatory environment, and reinforced the 
cognitive pillars of the mental health institutions.  
Second, I examine the ways that participants discussed 
deinstitutionalisation and how this seemed to be conflated with the sociological 
phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter 2) and assumed an adoption 
of alternative models of community care in mental health services.  Third, I 
outline evidence of the dynamics of institutional power that has enabled these to 
endure despite policy frameworks that mandate alternative approaches such as 
recovery.  I contend that significant institutionalised features of biomedicine and 
managerialism have continued to control organisational discourses and practice 
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even within NGOs because, to varying extents, they were normalised or 
naturalised, even by participants.   
I then analyse the impacts of institutional legitimation and authority on 
the relationships the NGOs, participants and service users have with clinical 
teams and funders from District Health Boards.  In particular, I examine the 
issues that arose for participants and service users from the authority afforded 
these powerful institutions by the regulatory environment, and the mechanisms 
by which this authority was maintained throughout the community at large.  
Normal and natural: Societal assumptions, myths of 
deinstitutionalisation and the normative institutional pillar 
A Foucauldian awareness that the treatment of madness has been as 
much an act of social exclusion as it has been of medical practice has generally 
been absent from the wider social imagination.  This has created a dilemma for 
mental health organisations, who are ostensibly supporting people to be in 
control of their own lives, and where recovery discourses are explicitly 
contrasted with coercive practices.  For example, the Blueprint (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998) stated, “Recovery could never take place in an environment 
where people were isolated from their communities, where power was used to 
coerce people and deny them choices” (p. 1).  Social isolation, therefore, has 
made it harder to shift social awareness about the nature of psychological 
distress, its precursors and what constitutes effective, helpful support.    
Most participants equated the deinstitutionalisation of mental health 
care with the multiple translations of community and community care.  In other 
words, deinstitutionalisation was typically constructed simply as the relocation of 
people into community neighbourhoods, and community care as merely a set of 
services beyond the hospital.  These naturalisations represented the normative 
pillar of the mental health institutions, and illuminated the hegemonic 
relationships among mental health organisations, DHBs as agents of government, 
and wider society.  This had important impacts on service delivery, particularly 
for the community NGOs.   
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The primary tension in participant discussions of community was 
between a sense of claiming a space in community, with expectations of 
community responsibility to accommodate all its members, and an institutional, 
socially normalised, construction of community.  The latter positioned service 
users as outsiders needing to become functionally “normal” to re-join society.  In 
particular, discourses of recovery that drew on rehabilitation models reflected 
societal expectations and institutional norms that emphasised an individual’s 
responsibility to become “fit for society”. 
Becoming “fit for society” 
Significant institutional features were clearly naturalised by many 
participants as societal assumptions, embedded in the normative pillars of both 
biomedicine and managerialism.  Although this was often challenged by 
participants with lived experience of serious psychological distress, many 
accepted that the sustainability, and legitimacy, of their publicly funded 
organisations depended on their alignment with established socio-cultural and 
political norms, the legislative authority of biomedicine, and the naturalised 
attitudes of society.  One participant articulated this as follows: 
What we see as the mental health system is a reflection 
roughly of what society in general wants . . . some people 
want people with mental health to disappear and not be 
seen; some people want an intervention to stop abnormal 
behaviour, and for that to be managed, and some people 
want people to heal them and get better, and we have this 
mishmash of stuff.  (Senior Manager 2, Wellington) 
Participants often referred to stereotypes that still existed, the social 
pressure to be in paid work, and the stigma that services users continued to 
encounter.   
Equally, the social normalisation of poverty for people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress was of real concern to participants.  
A team leader from Wellington described the difficulties people had in, not only 
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“surviving with mental illness, but also with poverty as well.  And it is almost like 
society says that is okay, and it isn’t”  He described how hard it was to help 
people move out of their situation “when you have a whole society saying that is 
okay” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Wellington).   
Being “ready” for society was also a site of Orwellian-like control, the 
terms of which were conditional, arbitrary and without opportunity for redress.  
This clearly conflicted with the recovery principles of personal power and choice.  
In several stories, from a variety of regions, people made energetic efforts to 
effect desired changes in their circumstances, and meet the conditions they were 
told were necessary to do this.  However, the goal posts were changed, or they 
were knocked back despite meeting the requirements.  In two cases, this 
involved whether a service user would be “allowed” to have a pet in a home for 
which they were the leaseholder.  A support worker from Wellington reported 
that the person had made all the changes to her fences required by council.  She 
even had permission from Housing Cooperation, her landlord, to keep a dog.  
Somehow, her request was still rejected by her clinical key worker.  “I just don’t 
think whoever is up there doing the number crunching actually knows what to 
do” she commented (Support Worker 2, Focus Group A, Wellington). 
However, some participants also naturalised notions of being “in 
community” that did not seem to equate to the rights of citizenship; but instead 
suggested that people with lived experience of psychological distress were on a 
kind of probation.  This construction of community care, also evident in 
significant national and sector texts (Ministry of Health, 2001b, 2005, 2006), 
emphasised functionality and the skills people needed to acquire, in order to 
become ready to re-join society.   
This frame reproduced the notion of individual responsibility for well-
being and was invariably associated with paternalistic notions of what “the 
community” expected of service users and services.  Some participants accepted 
this uncritically.  For example: 
[This service] is about skill acquisition, confidence, 
knowledge building, resources, working for that individual.  
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Then they move onto the next step in their life, and then the 
next step.  And I think the community also has a perception, 
not only of that sort of dangerous stuff around mental illness, 
but also that they need to be taken care of and protected.
  (Team Leader 6, Focus Group P, Hamilton) 
Some policy texts even referred explicitly to the community NGOs as 
residential rehabilitation services (Ministry of Health, 2001b).  One senior 
manager unwittingly demonstrated the common notion that services needed to 
get people ready to be accepted into normal society by describing “living in a 
community of choice” as the reason the organisation focussed on their “healthy 
lifestyle coordinators” (Senior Manager 3 Hamilton).   
In the section that follows, I extend the discussion of community and 
community care from Chapter 4, to examine how these constructions, or 
translations, normalised, challenged or perpetuated institutional power in 
mental health services. 
Constructing community and community care 
Normalised understandings of deinstitutionalisation and community care 
have assumed these to be nominally equivalent and logically consequent.  Many 
participants and most national policy texts not only assumed that modern 
mental health services were community based, but that “the institutions” were a 
thing of the past.  This popular misunderstanding of deinstitutionalisation has 
arisen because most people, including participants, thought of institutions in 
purely material terms, as large facilities in remote locations.  People with mental 
health issues have been assumed to be “out in the community”, merely because 
“the institutions have closed down” (Peters, 2010, p. 10).  It was commonplace 
for participants, and policy texts (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006), to refer to 
current mental health services as “community based”, and “people with mental 
illness and addictions (being) cared for in the community” (Peters, 2010, p. 7) 
despite evidence that, for many service users, there was little engagement with 
ordinary community resources and opportunities.   
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Addressing barriers to community engagement for service users also 
appeared to be a reaction against expectations of a purely personal responsibility 
for health.  Instead, some participants reported that their organisations were 
“trying to get communities to be better places for folk to live in and also more 
inclusive” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  A senior manager of an 
Auckland organisation argued that a lack of social participation was, “not all 
about people not being good enough or not being well enough” (Senior Manager 
2, Auckland).  Therefore, like some others, his organisation was endeavouring to 
counter community resistance by reorganising organisational resources and 
stretching their contracting boundaries through, for example, the creation of 
new “community development” positions in the organisation.   
There were several ways that expectations of community care were 
constructed as “rehab readiness” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland), especially by 
clinical services.  Major indicators appeared to be the abilities to budget, cook 
and keep their houses clean and there were many anecdotes of how support 
workers were treated like domestic help and held responsible for a person’s 
tidiness and general hygiene.  Participants resisted, and even challenged, these 
expectations on the grounds of being discriminatory.  As one Wellington team 
leader stated, there was “an expectation for people to have their houses spotless 
[and] I don’t know how people get this in their head that messiness is a sign of 
unwellness” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group B, Wellington).   
A support worker from Wellington maintained that, “Expecting people to 
be tidier than I am it is really hypocritical.”  She added that societal 
preoccupations with people becoming “perfect human beings” meant that,  
“Somehow recovery means you can cook, and you can clean and you can budget, 
and you know, and half of us can’t do that” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group A, 
Wellington).  A senior manager from Auckland pointed out that judgements 
applied to the behaviours of service users could equally have been applied to 
him as a young man, exhibiting ordinary teenage behaviour.  He acknowledged 
that although, in those days, he was “drinking and smoking far too much” no one 
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assumed that he should be “put under [guardianship control] for your own 
good. ” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland). 
Interestingly, workers with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress never spoke of community support work as proving oneself socially 
acceptable.  But some fundamental attitudes were so naturalised that even some 
of these participants had internalised the idea of somehow being deserving of 
community life.  “Like if you have done all your housework and you know it is 
spotless, and you have cakes and you have a teapot”, said a peer support worker 
from Christchurch (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus Group S, Christchurch) 
Unsurprisingly, many service users had experienced “the community” as 
stigmatising and discriminating.  Many participants argued that communities 
needed to take responsibility for acknowledging and embracing all their 
members.  They were concerned about changing “the contamination, that 
thinking in the community” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  This theme echoed 
Patricia Deegan’s (1996) call for “the mainstream to become a wide stream”, and 
the notion of “opening communities to an idea that they can take responsibility 
for individuals that live in their community” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  
Participants generally observed that the environment, both within 
services and the wider community, was changing, albeit slowly and unevenly.  
Worryingly, however, they repeatedly echoed sector texts, which portrayed the 
institutional era as a sociological circumstance that was historical and irrelevant. 
The “bad old days” have gone  
Focus group discussions and interviews reinforced Rob Warriner’s (2010) 
concern that “people speak of ‘deinstitutionalisation’ in the past tense – as if 
we’ve done that, so what’s next?”(p. 73).  Several participants referred to 
institutionalised service users as being the ones who had been in the “bins” 
thereby reinforcing a sense that institutions were mere physical buildings and 
environments.   
Some participants commented that they “didn’t know enough about the 
institutionalisation days” (Team Leader 6, Focus Group P, Hamilton) and a 
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support worker from Wellington thought there was “not enough training on 
what institutionalised is, how it affects people and how to work with people who 
have been in long-term institutionalisation”.  She went on to add, “Young ones 
don’t know anything about institutionalisation.  All they know about is recovery.” 
(Support Worker 6, Focus Group A, Wellington), reinforcing the sense that 
institutionalisation was past, and a recovery-oriented mental health system was 
an established fact.   
All these narrative fragments suggested that the popular discourses that 
equated institutions with buildings and communities with physical locations, had 
provided the appearance of change in the philosophy and practices of mental 
health service delivery while effectively obscuring the extent of institutional 
power that persisted.   Therefore, despite expressing frustration at DHBs 
controlling the scope of their organisational practices, participants rarely framed 
these constraints as systemic; thereby excluding them from conversations that 
might have more effectively challenged the issues they faced.   
Unfortunately, many aspects of the “bad old days”, particularly attitudes 
and stigma, appeared to have been transferred intact from the so-called 
institutional era into current mental health services, especially through staff who 
were re-employed in community settings.  This caused concern for many 
participants faced with these attitudes, either within their own organisations or 
in relationships with clinical staff.  For example, some support workers from 
Hamilton compared “the old school Tokaanui19 nurses” with staff who had not 
come from such facilities.  When prompted to explain further one described this 
attitude as, “The authority approach: ‘This is what is going on’, ‘this is what is 
happening’, and sort of ‘like it or lump it’ ” (Support Worker 5, Focus Group H, 
Hamilton).  Another added, “Yeah comply or things are going to get ugly for you, 
you know” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group H, Hamilton).  However, although 
the harmful impacts of treatment services have been the subject of various 
Mental Health Commission publications (1998b, 2004) and public inquiries 
                                                     
19 See footnote p. 13. 
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(Brunton, 2004, 2005; Mason, 1988, 1996), participants were comparatively 
reticent about how peoples’ recovery had been affected by such experiences.  
In the next section, I examine how participants positioned themselves 
and their organisations in the face of institutional pressures, and the implications 
this created for their relationships with clinical services.  
The institutions of the mental health system  
The complex structural arrangements, discursive features and 
relationships of power that form institutions, are poorly understood by the 
general public (Johns, 2010; Warriner, 2010).  Senior manager participants, 
particularly those from service user or kaupapa Māori organisations20, were 
exceptions to this and could generally analyse and articulate clearly their 
awareness of institutional influences.  However, senior manager interviewees 
from clinical backgrounds appeared more conflicted about the persistence of 
institutional influences.  
The first major indicator of institutional persistence was the ubiquitous, 
yet incidental, referencing of the clinical aspects of mental health services by 
participants.  This was more surprising because, beyond asking participants what 
they understood by the “medical model”, no prompt questions were specifically 
directed at clinical services (see focus group questions guide Appendix 2).  In 
these references, participants inevitably contrasted clinical services with what 
we do.  This suggested that, despite widespread insistence that 
institutionalisation was a phenomenon of the past, biomedicine continued to 
have significant influence over the organisational life of participants and the 
users of their services. 
Participants, especially support workers and team leaders, regularly 
referenced the biomedical model through the use of terms such as “clinical”, 
                                                     
20 See Appendix 9, but in brief, kaupapa Māori organisations that operate from an 
explicitly Māori worldview and cultural approaches to support such as working with 
families\whānau and communities, a holistic approach and a focus on relationship 
development between people and services.  
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“professional” and “expert”.  This was noteworthy because the medical model 
itself seemed poorly understood, despite invariably being positioned as the anti-
thesis of recovery.  Naturalisation of the biomedical discourse was also apparent 
in the ways some participants focussed on deficits, problems and diagnosis in 
their exchanges with service users, even while speaking about recovery.  Many 
seemed unaware that this was indicative of institutional influence over their 
discourse and practices, or of the contradictions between assertions of their 
organisation being recovery-oriented and the control that clinical services 
continued to exert in their organisational environments.  
Regional variations were apparent, with participants from the larger 
organisations in Wellington and Auckland generally articulating a more nuanced 
analysis of these issues.  Senior managers from elsewhere, also, were more often 
aware of institutional power; but they were equally likely to rationalise or justify 
the institutional environment because of their focus on organisational survival 
and sustainability.  They were more likely to treat institutional constraints as a 
given and learn to navigate them and “get on with it”.   
Participants with lived experience of serious psychological distress were 
far more conscious of the impacts of institutional persistence on service users’ 
well-being.  One senior manager of a service user organisation in Christchurch, 
was well aware that medical priorities remained the norm, remarking that, 
“Whatever the problem is, the first look is at the medical regime, tweak this 
drug, add this drug, shuffle the diagnosis along.  And we all know that it takes 
[more than that] in most situations” (Senior Manager 1, Christchurch).  
It was clear that biomedical and managerial values routinely overrode 
recovery priorities when these values were in conflict.  Some participants 
referred to “recovery being done Monday to Friday” (Support Worker 3, Focus 
Group B, Auckland), or only when it did not conflict with more pressing issues.  
Although participants acknowledged some of the issues were pragmatic, several 
commented that, “People are discharged from hospital, [just because] beds are 
full, they are discharged tonight.”  This had serious implications for the services, 
families and other supports when they were being discharged.  “The logistics of 
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getting family and the doctors and everybody together in half an hour are 
impossible”, this team leader added (Team Leader 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  
In summary, despite the continuing references to established recovery-
oriented mental health services in recent national texts (Ministry of Health, 
2012, 2013; Mental Health Commission 2012a, 2012b), there appeared to be 
little evidence for substantive disruption of historically institutionalised, clinical 
discourses and practices in the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector.   
We already “do recovery” in mental health services 
Many sector texts claimed that “establishing recovery-oriented services” 
(Mental Health Commission, 2007b, p. 7) was a success of the last decade.  
Participants, also, almost always referred to their organisations and themselves 
as “doing recovery”, seemingly unaware of the contradictions with other parts of 
the discussion where the locus of control of their own practice, their 
organisations and service users was clearly with DHB clinical and funding teams.  
For example, one Hamilton team leader described her organisation as “leaders in 
the field” and that they have “a philosophy that makes us different.”  She went 
on to add explicitly that “the opposite of that is institutionalisation, which is ‘we 
have been there and done that’ in New Zealand” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group P, 
Hamilton). 
In addition, many support workers and team leaders from particular 
organisations were somewhat unreflective in assuming that they and their 
organisations were already recovery oriented.  Another team leader from rural 
Waikato stated: 
(Our organisation) has always done things differently and has 
always challenged other organisations to see things through 
different eyes and because we are a leader, because [our 
organisation] does have recovery as an underpinning 
philosophy that actually gives us a mandate.   
  (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, Waikato) 
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Participants did not seem to recognise that, if recovery was genuinely 
effective in driving the discourses and practices in these organisations, 
substantive shifts in power should have been evident.  In particular, it should 
have been apparent in NGOs, through changes to the ways resources are 
mobilised in the sector and development of their autonomy in the design, 
development and delivery of their services.  In other words, as the Mental Health 
Commission (2007) discussed, there would be evidence of mental health services 
“working to ensure that everyone is empowered; that we all have increased 
control over our lives, and can actively participate in our communities” (p. 12).  
Instead, participants articulated their frustrations at the issues they faced as 
discrete rather than systemic.  They did not identify, for example, the ways in 
which systemic processes of access to services, diagnosis, treatment and 
discharge might be incompatible with ideals of recovery in mental health 
organisations.   
Instead, while most participants talked of service users having choices, 
this was clearly within a fairly narrowly proscribed range of options controlled by 
organisations in response to either contracting or clinical team requirements.  In 
the worst cases, personal choice was arbitrarily removed and this was frustrating 
for participants.  One senior manager was clearly irritated by inflexible regimes 
that impacted unnecessarily on a person’s autonomy in their daily life.  He 
declared, “Show me where it is written; show me the psychiatrist that will swear, 
on oath, that this person has to have their meds at seven o’clock.  Yes, there are 
some medications that need to be 12 hours apart.  So move the next one back a 
couple of hours” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  Examples such as these 
indicated that there has been no significant reduction in clinical control and the 
community organisations.  Far from being organised around an emergent 
recovery model, most continued to operate under rigid institutional constraints.   
It was equally evident that their recovery efforts were routinely 
undermined, and NGOs treated as subordinate to clinical services by both the 
clinical and funding arms of the District Health Boards.  This was stated explicitly 
in this example: 
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We strive to work in a recovery-focussed way and strengths-
based practice way with people, compared to clinical services 
who are required to work with people in a very clinical way, 
and the notes you see from doctors and nurses and notes 
from files that come through, it is very hard for them to write 
in a recovery-focused way from a clinical perspective 
because their focus is medical model.    
  (Support Worker 2, Focus Group H, Hamilton) 
Such interactions illuminated a whimsical binary between clinical needs 
and recovery support needs where clinical needs were treated as primary and 
superior.  Yet these excluded or ignored much of the contextual, personal and 
practical considerations that were central to the daily lives and well-being of 
people in their care.  Several participants provided examples of discharge 
arrangements that illustrated these frustrations.  A group of team leaders from 
Hamilton had this exchange: 
(TL5)  It is stressful for our staff, who get a phone call saying, 
“Can you come and pick him up?”  
(TL2)  Because a lot of times it is at four o’clock  
(TL5)  On a Friday  
(TL2)  And you know the person doesn’t have any food in 
their home or anything like that.   
 (Team Leaders 2, 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
Claims of recovery orientation in services, therefore, seemed premature 
at best.  Some participants saw positive change in both services and society, but 
this was by no means the norm and several commented on the slow pace of 
change with one commenting that, “Clinical teams are now learning about 
recovery . . . .  three years ago they didn’t know” (Support Worker 10, Focus 
Group A, Wellington).   
In several cases, the persistence of institutional legacies appeared 
unremarkable to some participants.  One senior manager of a residential service 
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described the recent removal of signage, “the staff house, and this is the staff 
toilet, and this is the staff fridge” (Senior Manager 6, Auckland) as an example of 
significant organisational change.  He seemed unaware that most people would 
assume that such archaic labelling had been removed long ago.  All of which 
suggested that, despite national policy and the assumptions of recovery-oriented 
mental health services, change has not only been very slow in coming, but 
appears to have lacked a sector wide will or strategy. 
The community non-government organisations are different 
Despite the rhetorical focus on “community” in mental health services, it 
seemed clear that the role of NGOs was rarely acknowledged, let alone validated 
within the mental health system.  Sector texts appeared to blur the boundaries 
by, for example, referring to “the community mental health and addiction sector 
at work in New Zealand” (Peters, 2010; Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2012, 
2013).  This stratagem not only conflated mental health with mental illness and 
addiction but further reinforced notions of community services being merely 
geographical relocations of clinical services.  Mental health sector consultant, 
Janet Peters, was not alone in further muddying the discursive waters of 
community choice by stating, “The core business of many NGOs is to support 
people who have mental health and addiction problems to live the best possible 
life in their community of choice, despite the [at times] disabling consequences 
of mental illness” (Peters, 2010, p. 3). 
Participants unequivocally distanced themselves from in-patient clinical 
services.  For them hospital was a stalwart of the institutional era and life on the 
“outside” was a different world.  They were frustrated that clinical professionals 
“don't know what it’s like out in the world for a person who’s just got out of 
hospital” (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton).  In addition, a lack of collaboration at the 
boundaries between clinical and community services was reflected in the 
“variable alignment and integration between services provided by DHBs and 
those provided by NGOs” (Ministry of Health, 2012, p. 3) in terms of people’s 
movements into the community from in-patient facilities.  This was a source of 
frustration for participants who positioned themselves, and their organisations, 
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as explicitly concerned with the successful reconnection of people with their 
communities and the lives of their choice.   
Evidence of the persistence of institutionalised practices was even more 
apparent when some of the barriers were removed.  A support worker from 
Wellington described what it was like when people discharged from in-patient 
facilities began to realise they didn’t need to see permission for everything they 
wanted to do.  She said,  
When they start making decisions and stuff for themselves, 
it is like, ‘Oh my god I can do this.’  And that was after years 
of having it drummed into them, ‘you have to come and have 
tea at this time’, ‘you have to peel spuds at this time’.  [Its] 
just things that we take for granted.   
  (Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, Wellington)  
Institutional intransigence was not, however, merely a feature of the 
normative aspect of mental health organisational discourse and practices.  It was 
also represented by a formidable body of institutional knowledge.  In the 
following section, I explore more deeply how participant talk highlighted the 
cognitive pillar of the institutions.  
Enduring and persistent: The cognitive pillar and bodies of knowledge  
As I discussed in the literature review, the persistence of institutions lies 
in their power to define the nature of knowledge, rationality, and legitimate 
inquiry in ways that become socially normative.  This is referred to as the 
cognitive pillar of an institution (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Institutional bodies of 
knowledge not only include significant texts, but also draw on particular 
rationalities and discursive practices.  There was perhaps no better evidence of 
institutional persistence in mental health services than the naturalised reification 
of mental illness; to which nearly all national texts referred and into which usage 
many participants slipped unconsciously.  The cognitive pillar of an institution 
also holds to itself the power to accredit professionals and define what counts as 
expertise.  Many participants, while articulating multiple frustrations with clinical 
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services, continued unthinkingly to refer to clinical knowledge and expertism as 
somehow higher or superior.  
In this section I examine how participants constructed and referenced the 
medical model and clinical services; in particular the influence that naturalised 
acceptance of the superiority of clinical knowledge had on their organisational 
environments.  I also compare these perspectives with the ways in which 
significant sector texts constructed concepts like biomedicine and recovery and 
the degree to which these perpetuate institutional knowledge and notions of 
professionalism.  In addition, I explore how participants referenced the effects of 
managerialism in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services. 
Common sense: The taken for granted aspects of institutional knowledge 
Participants made distinctions between those environments where the 
medical model was naturalised and those where it was resisted or challenged.  A 
team leader from Hamilton explained that, “Now I am working for the DHB I 
have to work really hard not to get co-opted by that medical model”.  She and 
her fellow social workers were conscious of having “think constantly in strength 
based language.  Not to have that clinical language impact” (Team Leader 5, 
Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
National texts reinforced the taken-for-granted, biomedical assumptions 
of the reification of mental illness as organic disease stating, for example, that 
“mental illness accounts for 15 percent of the total burden of disease in the 
developed world” (Ministry of Health, 2005, p. 1).  Similarly, these texts regularly 
associated terms such as “mental health and well-being” with “mental illness and 
addiction”.  Statements such as “good mental health and well-being is more than 
the absence of mental illness or addiction” were similarly juxtaposed with 
assertions that “understanding mental illness and addiction in the general 
community is critical” (Ministry of Health, 2005, p. 12).   
In focus group discussions, fragments of larger narratives (Boje, 2001) 
about the medical model and clinical authority were evident and numerous, yet 
participants seemed bemused when asked directly about these issues.  This 
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seemed to indicate considerable naturalisation of the role and superiority of 
biomedicine even where this was resisted in more self-conscious talk.  A degree 
of naturalisation was also evident even within larger humanitarian discourses 
and strengths based practices.  A deficit framing of peoples’ experience was 
often repeated unreflectively.  For example, “I think you need to identify your 
weaknesses and that way you grow” said a Wellington support worker (Support 
Worker 5, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Such comments occurred alongside the 
continued reification of mental illness, “Yes they have an illness, but they are 
also human beings” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Auckland).  Sometimes even 
stigmatising language went unremarked.  For example, another support worker  
remarked, “I don’t actually really think that I have ever met anybody that is 
mental forever” (Support Worker 8, Focus Group A, Wellington).  
Internal contradictions and ambivalence were also apparent and 
fragments of biomedical narratives were embedded in more general discussions 
of support and recovery.  This suggested that discourses of recovery were being 
subsumed by larger institutional narratives.  For example, while many 
participants were clearly frustrated with clinical attitudes and relationships of 
control most did not actively challenge clinical expertise but accepted that 
authority in a person’s life.  Even a peer support worker, who was dismayed by 
how many service users felt they were not listened to by psychiatrists, and how 
hopeless that made them feel, remarked “it is just a shame that we are not 
clinical and that we are not trained in that area” (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus 
Group S, Christchurch).  This comment valorised the status and authority of 
clinical knowledge rather than the biomedical model itself. 
The social valorisation of a biomedical construction of experience had 
other serious implications as recent changes to Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) legislation, which now requires a clinical diagnosis of mental 
“illness” for survivors of sexual abuse to be eligible for funded counselling, have 
demonstrated.  This was clearly causing alarm among peer support workers in 
particular.  One even believed that “there is going to be a higher rate of suicides.  
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I mean who wants mental illness when you don’t need to have that” (Peer 
Support Worker 9, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
The naturalisation of biomedical constructions seemed to make it more 
difficult for many participants to recognise and articulate the institutional 
synergies that impacted on their organisational environments and individual 
practices.  In the next section, I examine how participants constructed the 
biomedical knowledge base and the role this played in their own practices. 
Bodies of knowledge and the “medical model” 
When asked what the medical model and its influence on mental health 
services meant for them, many participants responded in terms of medication, 
diagnosis and deficits.  Typically, the medical model was defined or described as, 
“A clinical approach.  Treatment, treatment focused, treatment based; the word 
that very much comes to mind is like ‘authority over’” (Support Worker 2, Focus 
Group H, Hamilton).  Workers with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress were generally the most articulate and nuanced in their discussions of 
the medical model and many senior managers seemed aware of its more 
complex institutionalised power and influence.  However, many support workers 
and team leaders also responded to direct questions about the medical model 
with rather surprising naiveté and defined it in quite narrow terms.  Several 
made vague comments such as, “It would probably be, in my view, more around 
the treatment regime, the medication, and assessing where you know the 
disability or whatever is at, that sort of thing” (Support Worker 6, Focus Group P, 
Hamilton).  This was surprising given that elsewhere in the discussions they made 
numerous incidental references to “clinical knowledge”, “clinical talk” and the 
power of clinical teams in controlling their everyday organisational 
communications and practice.   
Biomedical knowledge and language were perceived as technical “jargon, 
big words” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group H, Hamilton) that were both 
alienating and exclusive.  One senior manager remarked that “speaking in more 
clinical terms to other people” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington) was 
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uncomfortable for service users and staff who were used to her speaking in more 
recovery-based language.  Others were clearly frustrated by language they 
perceived as deliberately and unnecessarily complicated.  In particular, as one 
support worker remarked, “It is not an easy language to understand.  You get 
words like oedema and you know extra-pyramidal you know dah-di-dah, instead 
of saying ‘the person has got tremors in their hands’, what is so hard about 
writing that?”.  She went on to add that, “The one that really gets me is ‘non-
compliant’.  Why can’t people just choose not to take their medication for [a 
given] reason, and work with them around that” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group 
P, Hamilton). 
A reliance on biomedical language and knowledge also had the effect of 
depersonalising people and reinforcing an identity of “patienthood”.  This team 
leader commented only looking at “nursey things” or “doctory things” meant 
that “because you're only looking at a little bit of a person, it’s easier not to treat 
them like a person” (Team Leader 6, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  However, it 
was also clear that an ability to manage the biomedical discourse was necessary 
in order to be credible and effective.  For instance, another Team Leader 
complained that “I [have] to pull out all the deficit place stuff; otherwise they will 
not value what we do” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, Wellington).   
Most participants framed the medical model as being concerned with 
control, and particularly with symptom control and behaviour management 
predicated inevitably on a model of reified organic disease.  A support worker 
from Christchurch was disparaging about the “quick fix” of medication that 
meant people “calmed down and [became] more manageable okay.  And that is 
where it is at: Because it is about the manageability of the people” (Support 
Worker 3, Focus Group S, Christchurch).  Others were equally explicit about the 
tensions, even power struggles, between recovery and bio-medical approaches, 
with one Hamilton support worker saying that the medical model “is almost the 
be all and end all, you know and I think the recovery model [works] around that” 
(Support Worker 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  This was also troubling when it 
came to finding recovery outcome measures.  A senior manager was concerned 
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that clinicians were just using HONOS and, “no other measures being used, and it 
sounds like there is not a kind of spirit of looking for other measures” (Senior 
Manager 5, Wellington). 
It was evident, therefore, that biomedical accounts of people’s 
experience were still dominant in directing the delivery and development of 
mental health services including the NGOs.  In the next section, I examine the 
evidence that shows how biomedical stories of diagnosis, treatment and 
prognosis continued to be prioritised throughout the sector. 
Diagnosis still the most important story 
Institutional definitions of mental illness, based on assumptions of 
organic disease and objective biological indicators, led inevitably to the 
intransigent role of psychiatric diagnosis in determining a person’s mental health 
status and explained why it has remained the most important “story” in service 
referrals, needs assessments and discharge plans.  Although participants 
frequently accepted the reification of mental illness, it was also resisted: 
“Because it is the medical model, everyone is seen as if there is something wrong 
with them” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  This 
interpretation of people’s experience was vigorously challenged.  A team leader 
from a service user organisation in Hamilton commented that, “We’ve all talked 
about not owning the label or diagnosis; wearing it on our foreheads, on our 
sleeves; wherever we go we’re known by our label” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group 
A, Hamilton).   
Participants had serious doubts about the limitations of diagnostic 
categories and the ways that subjective experiences were inevitably 
decontextualised.  Too frequently this led to unnecessary medicalisation of 
common human dilemmas and the fear that people “can’t have normal emotions 
because the mental health system will put [them] in hospital’ [when] they are 
just grieving over the loss of someone” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, 
Auckland).  Another participant echoed this anxiety over the impact of medical 
classification in saying that, “Once you become a diagnosis you lose a sense of 
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self-worth and if you take on that role of the diagnosis, a label that someone’s 
put on you, you begin to act and behave accordingly” (Team Leader 4, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton). 
The persistence and power of a diagnosis created the most concern with 
one peer support worker saying that “diagnosis a lot of the time that just finishes 
you off” (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland) and another 
describing it as a “death sentence” (Peer Support Worker 3, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland).  It was also mistrusted as an adequate, or even accurate, explanation 
of a person’s experience.  For example, “They tend to get it wrong all the time, 
90% of the time it is not really what it is [and] it follows you around for 20 years” 
(Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
Participants from all regions and organisations repeated these themes in 
most focus groups.  One senior manager reflected that diagnostic labelling 
seemed to be more about territorial boundaries than any therapeutic benefit, 
saying, “There is a whole pile of normal human emotion and human response 
that our mental health system view as being somehow their territory” (Senior 
Manager 2, Christchurch).  Several participants challenged this territorial 
exclusion and alienation through advocacy.  For example, a team leader in 
Hamilton remarked that she would “actually stop the psychiatrist, turn to the 
person and say, ‘Do you understand what’s happening?’”  (Team Leader 5, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton).   
Unfortunately, it was clear that “mental health labels” and constant 
references to being “ill” were also internalised by service users themselves.  This 
internalised stigma interfered with people recovering and re-building self-
confidence, becoming somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy as the following 
example shows.  A support worker from Wellington remarked that service users 
often “think there's a magic pill” and became anxious to see a doctor or “do 
something about it [when they] probably had a headache and a lot of people do” 
(Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
In general, participants talked of human experience being more useful as 
“knowledge” than diagnosis, and clinical knowledge on its own was portrayed as 
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a narrow and rigid framework that restricted participants’ ability to work with 
people from within their own explanatory models.  This appeared to require a 
very different kind of encounter, one that recognised that “some people are 
extremely sensitive and have a wicked intuition.  And you are telling them that 
they are haywire, because they have some gifts that they have actually grown up 
with” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group W, Waikato).  In addition, excluding 
contextualised knowledge and other sources of expertise frequently had 
negative implications for service users and workers.  The narrow lens often 
prevented them from working in more holistic ways and frequently did not 
acknowledge or value the work they did. 
The narrow lens: Evidence based practices and treatment options  
The reification of mental illness raised other epistemological issues, such 
as the research agenda and what counted as legitimate approaches to inquiry.  
Biomedical research has continued to valorise positivist methodologies into the 
origins, biological markers, “cures” and treatments and this has meant that the 
biomedical lens has had a narrow, decontextualised and depersonalised focus.  
This, in turn, has led to narrow treatment options, specifically pharmacological 
treatments, and fed into the increasing clamour for evidence based practices.  
The Mental Health Advocacy Coalition (2008) expressed their concern in saying 
that, “Evidence about mental health services and treatments comes primarily 
from a narrow quantitative base, and ignores the subjective experience of 
people who use services” (p. 27).  
Many participants spoke of various theories and approaches being 
applied in mental health services over time yet it was apparent that service users 
had little control, or even input, into evaluating these.  As one worker said, “I 
have been in the system for so long, have seen so many different theories, things 
that have worked, some that haven’t” (Peer Support Worker 9, Focus Group PS,  
Auckland).  The national mental health and addiction plan was explicit about 
expectations of, and reliance on, “on-going developments in technology, from 
changes in pharmacology to new ways of gathering, managing and sharing 
information” (Ministry of Health, 2006, p. 2).  This preoccupation with 
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technological solutions was at odds with the intent, also expressed in the 
national plan, of “a recovery philosophy that underpins services for people and 
recognises that service users must lead their own recovery, have personal 
power” (Ministry of Health, 2006, p. 3).  Many participants seemed aware of 
these environmental pressures, with a team leader from Auckland commenting 
that “psychopharmacology I think is winning - the drug companies have a lot of 
money” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Auckland).   
Yet despite the valorisation of medication, there was little support for the 
notion that this was necessarily beneficial.  Participants, especially those with 
lived experience of serious psychological distress, expressed frustration at the 
ubiquity of medication and particularly its inefficacy for many people.  This peer 
support worker was especially insistent that, “To be honest if medication works, 
if it cured it, we wouldn’t have a job because everyone we work with is on 
medication, everyone!”  (Peer Support Worker 7, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  
Not only was medication usually the only treatment option provided but 
alternative practices, experienced as beneficial by service users, were either 
actively discouraged or simply not funded.  A peer support worker expressed her 
regret that “all those other things that could really change someone’s life; but 
they can’t pay for it themselves and it is not going to be funded because it is not 
medication you know” (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland) 
Many participants also spoke about negative and harmful effects of 
medication, but it was apparent that they had little power to effect change in 
prescribing practices.  Several commented that increasing medication was the 
knee jerk reaction of most professionals to any change in mood or life 
circumstance.  One disclosed that she, herself, had been “going through a rough 
patch and [the doctor’s] first initial thing was to go back on medication. . . .  I felt 
let down by her at that stage” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group S, 
Christchurch).  Another protested, “I get so sick because it is the medication that 
is causing half of it; you can’t function and can’t think” (Peer Support Worker 1, 
Focus Group PS, Auckland).   
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Similarly, the side effects of many medications were frequently 
antithetical to recovery goals of full participation and regaining valued roles in 
their communities.  Another support worker from Christchurch said, “The 
medications they get given actually prevent any realistic view of going back to 
work.  I mean a lot of the medications make people very lethargic” (Peer Support 
Worker 3, Focus Group S, Christchurch) and another from the same focus group 
added, “I couldn’t read; now I can actually read again.  I was on medication for 
years, so it can stop you doing a lot of things” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus 
Group S, Christchurch) 
Where people experienced medication as helpful, this often seemed to 
be a matter of luck rather than an evidence-based process.  An Auckland support 
worker explained that a person she worked with “had one positive experience 
from medication from a long history of really bad reactions just making her feel 
worse” (Peer Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Several participants 
were explicit that service users “didn’t get to choose what type of therapy or 
approach; they don’t get to choose the medical model, they get given the 
medical model” (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland), and even 
when they asked for other therapies these were not generally provided.  
Most participants were aware that other therapeutic activities were 
consistent with a recovery philosophy and approach.  But these were neither 
universally, nor systematically, available and depended on regional service 
configurations and \ or the predisposition of individual clinicians.  This was 
despite the explicit acknowledgement of the need for “talking based therapies” 
in national policy texts (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006).  A peer support worker 
from Auckland stated, “Theoretically, talking therapies are meant to be available 
to anyone who is in mental health services, but they are not” (Peer Support 
Team Leader 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  In addition, when alternatives were 
offered these could be conditional on compliance with clinically preferred 
options such as medication.  Several participants, mostly workers with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress, talked about experiences of overt 
coercion regarding treatment.  Several participants told stories similar to this one 
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from Auckland where, “If I didn’t go to the group that taught DBT (Dialectic 
Behavioural Therapy) I didn’t qualify for one on one [therapy and] there was a 
contract which had never been made clear to me, that if you miss two [group 
sessions] you get cut [from one-to-one therapy]” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus 
Group PS, Auckland). 
Narrow evidence-based treatment parameters also contributed to the 
sense, expressed by multiple participants, that something important was lost 
when service users interacted with clinical services.  Participants were mistrustful 
of the narrow focus and this created conflict even within clinical services.  One 
senior manager spoke of his experience in a clinical alcohol and drug service, 
explaining why he eventually resigned.  He said, “When I went to CADS 
[Community Alcohol and Drugs Service], all this pain and marmite coming out of 
people, and I had to tell them ‘I can’t deal with it, I can’t do anything about it . . . 
because if I put it in my notes I’d get challenged on it: ‘What are you doing?  You 
are [not] a social worker” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  Most participants 
alluded to constraints on their practices that were at the expense of more 
recovery-oriented or contextualised accounts of experience.  This also suggested 
that while clinical responses typically “claimed the territory”, they remained 
averse to including, or even referring to, other services in their repertoire of 
responses.  In the section that follows, I examine the evidence of institutional 
capacities to define what counted as expertise and the notion of 
“professionalism”.  
Expertise and professionalism  
Participants constructions of the concept showed that the notion of 
“doctor knows best” was both problematised and normalised.  National policy 
and strategy texts, for example, routinely referred to the need for more clinical 
expertise based on the construction of madness as illness.  These continued to 
valorise clinical services, despite their overt aims for recovery-oriented services 
(Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006).  Even Janet Peters (2010), who explicitly 
championed the community non-government sector, appeared to accept that “a 
dwindling clinical mental health/addictions workforce is a critical problem” (p. 8).  
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Recent trends to address this deficit have included the transfer of care to 
primary providers such as general practitioners.  However, this has not 
challenged the foundational assumptions of the biomedical model and the 
superiority of clinical professionals.   
All of these aspects were evident in participant talk and one senior 
manager expressed frustration about the systemic interaction between 
managerialist and biomedical priorities that resulted in some seriously negative 
consequences for service users.  This senior manager described concerns she had 
in her region saying: 
We hospitalise people much more than anywhere else in the 
country, and we have got beds so they have to be full.  We 
have more psychiatrists than anywhere else in the country 
per head of population, so you would think that people 
would be very well cared for and have one of the higher 
levels of mental well-being in the country.  We don’t have 
that; all we have is the highest levels of prescribing in the 
country.    (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch) 
Although most participants consistently resisted professionals and 
professionalism they seemed unaware that the relationships between 
professionals and others were embedded in institutional dynamics.  However, 
they were aware that professionalism defined structures of power.  As a team 
leader in Auckland remarked almost nonchalantly, “I mean that is part of the 
medical model; a very hierarchical sense of your position which determines how 
much power you have” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, Auckland).  Most also 
recognised that this hierarchy of knowledge and expertise subordinated NGOs 
and support workers, and worked against emerging discourses and models of 
recovery.  For example, a support worker in Hamilton explicitly referred to “a 
hierarchy though with the medical profession” and that meant that the doctor 
had unilateral authority because, “He is at the top of the tower.  And while the 
tower should actually have the person [at] the top of the tower, the doctor sits 
there”  (Support Worker 3, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
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Participants had strong ideas of what being professional meant, and that 
this set clinical teams apart from service users and community sector workers.  
Workers with lived experience of serious psychological distress commented on 
feeling disoriented by having to “look a certain way, you have to be a certain 
way; you can’t be professional and suffer from a mental illness” (Peer Support 
Worker 4, Focus Group PS, Auckland).  Another participant from the same focus 
group commented on the difficulty in defining professional when he first became 
a peer support worker.  He was worried that he would “have to act professional 
and all this?  Which isn’t me.”  (Peer Support Worker 7, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland).  
Focus group discussions invariably framed clinical professionals as the 
other and it seemed clear that there was considerable mistrust in the 
relationships between clinical teams and workers in NGOs.  A support worker 
from Wellington commented that while relationships have improved initially she 
said  “[I] used to get quite defensive when I was working with them, they seemed 
to focus on what they wanted rather than what the person wanted”  (Support 
Worker 6, Focus Group A, Wellington).  The mistrust was mutual and some 
clinical staff in the NGOs found themselves in a mediating role.  For example, one 
clinically trained service manager remarked that, in order to reduce anxiety on 
the clinical team, “We need to play the ‘I am a registered health worker’ card, 
you know, here let’s all do this together great [. . .] so we do some of that 
cushioning; greasing the wheels is probably a better word”  (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland) 
Others were cynical about what professionals could offer and a team 
leader from Auckland commented that it was easy just to make a diagnosis and 
say “pop this pill, and come back in three months’ time” (Team Leader 5, Focus 
Group B, Auckland).  Prescribing medication also seemed to create a particular 
dilemma of professional expertise and the primary role of clinicians.  One senior 
manager was quite scathing in stating that, “Why would you say medication is no 
good if you are a psychiatrist.  What on earth are you going to do then?”  (Senior 
Manager 3, Auckland). 
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Being clinical, or professional, seemed to mean discounting the value of 
relationships.  As one senior manager admitted, “I guess because we have had a 
more sort of clinical focus in the past we haven’t really pushed the relationship 
side of things” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  Many participants echoed this as a 
major distinction between clinical and NGOs.  Another senior manager, from 
Hamilton, cautioned against focussing solely on outcomes before getting to 
know the people they worked with.  He insisted that for his organisation the 
“investment [in] relationships” was “essential to therapeutic practice” (Senior 
Manager 2, Hamilton).  
Resistance to being “professional” seemed to be based on a resistance to 
an assumption of authority over others experience, and anxiety service users 
expressed about being handed over to a system from which it would be 
impossible to extricate oneself.  Insistence on professional boundaries was also 
perceived as a demarcation zone and ultimately unhelpful for service users.  A 
Wellington support worker believed that clinical staff had “control issues” 
(Support Worker 3, Focus Group A, Wellington) and this meant they were not 
willing to learn anything outside their field of expertise. 
While it was clear that, some professionals from within clinical services 
established trusting relationships with individual service users, as a general rule 
these encounters were avoided.  Many participants reported that service users 
mistrusted anyone who might be perceived as professional and this reluctance 
was a direct consequence of the (mis)use of professional power.  They observed 
that service users experienced these encounters as negative and unhelpful if not, 
sometimes, downright harmful; although, they were anxious about what the 
system could do to them if they were “non-compliant” and many actively hid 
their symptoms.  One team leader remarked, “I think they’re a little bit 
frightened that we’re going to talk like a doctor to them.  They never open up to 
doctors anyway” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).   
Many encounters with clinical services were reported as demeaning and 
disempowering.  Peer support workers from Christchurch discussed how 
humiliating it was when they went into the psychiatric emergency department 
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and “the receptionist tells you to press a button by the door, and a speaker 
comes on and says, ‘What do you want?’, and you have to say in the reception 
area where everybody is sitting why you need this service” (Peer Support Worker 
2, Focus Group S, Christchurch).  There were also examples of a kind of 
professional arrogance where doctors made diagnostic decisions without 
evidence.  For example, “This person has denied hearing voices, delusions or 
hallucinations.  It just irritates me that they have that right to say, ‘this person 
has [schizophrenia] but has just refused to admit it’.” (Support Worker 3, Focus 
Group P, Hamilton). 
Similarly, there appeared to be little space within the system for trusting 
someone’s own expertise, despite good evidence that this could be effective.  A 
team leader from Hamilton talked about a neighbour who had previously had 
hospital admissions but did not want one this time.  Instead, “She wrote out her 
own plans; who her contacts were and she had support from an agency.  She did 
have an admission, but it was the shortest one that she has ever had in her 
recovery” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
Assumptions of the legitimacy of clinical services appeared to protect 
them from accountability.  This could include a continuum of responses from 
routinely over-riding others’ concerns, to devastating consequences including 
even death.  At the lower end of this scale, the capacity of support workers to 
intervene or advocate for service users in traumatic circumstances was severely 
limited.  One Christchurch support worker was very upset at feeling powerless, 
“because I haven’t got letters behind my name and no-one takes me seriously 
[but] they shouldn’t have been sent to hospital” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group 
S, Christchurch).   
In addition, at the extreme end, some participants were distressed they 
did not have the power to intervene in literally life-threatening situations.  A 
support worker from Wellington was distraught that over several years a client 
was treated as a hypochondriac when she complained, “that her throat was thick 
all the time, and she died saying her throat was thick”.  Sometime later, this 
worker encountered other service users who said the same thing.  This prompted 
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her to do some basic research and she found it was a known side-effect of a 
common anti-psychotic medication.  She discovered the medication “affects the 
central nervous system of the throat and [they] can’t swallow properly and that 
is why they think they are choking”.  This was clearly upsetting for her because, 
“that poor lady, for all those years you know, and they just said she was a 
hypochondriac” (Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Despite such 
examples being major concerns for many participants, clinical, national and 
policy texts have continued to disregard the iatrogenic effects of treatment 
services.   
Seeking professional help also seemed to be a double-edged sword.  
People would only be helped once they had gone through the clinical assessment 
and referral “gate”, but once through that gate they surrendered control of 
many major decisions affecting their lives.  In addition many reported concerns 
that “mental health patients aren’t allowed to hate the professionals” (Team 
Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton) alongside a fear that dysfunctional 
relationships would be pathologised and they would be “blamed”.  As one team 
leader said, “They get told, ‘you are being ‘behavioural’, ‘you are unruly’.” (Team 
Leader 3, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  This was also disempowering and one 
senior manager spoke of service users being trained, or institutionalised, into 
deferring to clinical expertise.  
Participants who had come to the NGO sector from clinical backgrounds 
were uncomfortable about the differences in approach.  One senior manager 
from Christchurch expressed her regret that clinical interactions were at odds 
with recovery ideals, saying that, “The real barrier to people’s recovery is clinical 
services at the moment, and I feel quite sad about that given that is where I have 
come from to this work”.  She went on to add, “I don’t see much about the way 
they interact with people, about the types of treatments offered that speak to 
me of recovery” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch). 
Despite fifteen years of rhetoric about recovery, it was apparent that real 
change has been slow in coming and was certainly not systemic.  As one support 
worker remarked, “The clinical teams are now learning about recovery” (Support 
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Worker 2, Focus Group A, Wellington).  But there was evidence that in places 
things were changing, and that particular individuals were making it work 
effectively.  Some participants reported that some “psychiatrists seem much 
more willing to adjust medication and respond to what the clients are saying” 
(Team Leader 6, Focus Group A, Auckland).  Certainly, everything appeared to 
work more successfully when everyone was involved in communication and 
decision-making.  This team leader from Hamilton was enthusiastic about the 
approach, and successful outcomes, of a particular psychiatrist who brought “the 
family, the nurses, the SF [Supporting Families], everybody in the one room.  [We 
all] knew what everybody else was doing and the client was happy with that” 
(Team Leader 2, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
Establishing legitimacy and credibility was central to the struggle between 
the different worlds of knowledge and experience.  In the next section I explore 
the nature of training, professional development and what constituted up-skilling 
available to participants.   
Credibility, up-skilling and training  
Many participants spoke of clinical training as up-skilling and used other, 
similar metaphors to suggest that they naturalised clinical knowledge as more 
authoritative: A superior rather than merely different, kind of expertise.  Clinical 
expertise was also seen as providing credibility and clinical credentials conferred 
authoritative status.  A senior manager from Hamilton rationalised the stance of 
his organisation in employing clinically trained staff.  He said, “The medical 
model for us, and our service, offers us some, [. . .] credibility in the field that we 
work in, and a lot of that has to do with those certificates that are sitting on [the] 
wall there”.  However he also qualified this position, adding that the organisation 
“sees that as a good investment, but they don’t dominate how [we work]” 
(Senior Manager 2, Hamilton). 
Recovery training was a key theme in many focus groups for how values 
and principles were communicated throughout their organisations.  However, 
this was contrasted with other forms of mandatory training, with some 
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participants commenting that some training seemed in conflict with a recovery 
orientation.  For example, one support worker from Hamilton remarked that 
“non-violent intervention to me doesn’t say anything about recovery” (Support 
Worker 5, Focus Group H, Hamilton) and another, team leader, remarked that 
“professional training compartmentalises people’s recovery” (Team Leader 6, 
Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Others believed that, “Educating the professionals, 
like the psychologists, is the big one.  There are some really open ones but there 
are some that are just very old school” (Peer Support Worker 4, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland). 
These comments suggested that, for participants, other kinds of 
knowledge and expertise were required to support people effectively in services, 
and that this “other” knowledge was difficult to introduce and establish.  They 
reported that other forms of knowledge and expertise such as subjective 
experience or alternative therapeutic models were typically discredited or 
dismissed.  Participants seemed to think that most clinicians were not willing to 
expand their knowledge base or acknowledge other discourses, even as adjuncts 
to the medical model.  One peer support worker exclaimed, “Yes the medical 
side of it is relevant [but] they have worked their whole career and whole lives in 
the mind-set of a medical model, they are not willing to open their minds up to 
something that is completely different” (Peer Support Worker 8, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland).  
In contrast, most participants found value in being able to draw from 
multiple sources of knowledge and experience.  One Christchurch participant 
remarked, “They need to put both together to work well.  Just because I haven’t 
got the letters behind my name [or] just because I am a consumer - and yes 
mental health consumer- doesn’t mean that I haven’t got some good things to 
say” (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group S, Christchurch).  There were many 
similar accounts and participants certainly did not want to discard knowledge; 
they just wanted a more wide-ranging and inclusive set of responses to be 
available.  As a team leader from a service user organisation in Hamilton said, 
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“There is definitely massive value in both.  Put them all together in some sort of 
healthy way” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  
Professionalism and expertise, therefore, acted as much to exclude other 
kinds of expertise as they did to protect biomedical knowledge within strongly 
demarcated professional boundaries.  Being forever outside these boundaries, 
mental health support workers and NGOs were routinely discredited and 
devalued.  In addition, the reproduction of institutional power was clearly 
constituted, at least in part, through the longstanding assumption of medical 
responsibility for the well-being of society, and how this has been embedded in 
the regulatory environment.  Maguire and Hardy (2009) referred to this as the 
legislative pillar of institutions. 
Legitimation and authority: The legislative pillar and relationships of 
power 
The legislative environment, historically, has been particularly influential 
in mental health care with a longstanding and state sanctioned relationship 
between psychiatric medicine and the criminal justice system.  The evidence, 
however, suggested that the institutions have over-stated this responsibility, 
drawing on a variety of arguments about societal expectations and mutual 
interests in managing “the public good”.  The Mental Health Advocacy Coalition 
(2008), maintained that while mental health services have a “politically charged 
role of containing and controlling some people.  It’s easy for these services to 
lose their focus on the needs and views of people who use them” (p. 26) 
Senior Managers tended to articulate a more global and strategic 
awareness and understanding of how their organisations were positioned within 
the larger regulatory frame.  Several, especially those in Auckland where 
collaboration was possible over five DHB regions due to economies of scale, were 
undertaking organisational initiatives to increase their own legitimacy and 
credibility.  However, it was apparent that this was as much about organisational 
sustainability and survival as it was about organisational transformation and the 
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realisation of their best intentions.  A considerable degree of compromise was 
evident and this was inevitably on the part of the NGOs.   
Degrees of compulsion: “Being under the Act” and other mechanisms of 
control 
The Mental Health Act (Ministry of Health, 1992), as noted earlier, was an 
attempt to balance the human rights and needs of individuals with the wider 
interests of the general community.  It conferred considerable responsibility on 
clinicians for the safety of “the community” as well as the authority to 
compulsorily treat and contain people it deemed a threat.  However, in practice, 
people have found it increasingly difficult to access mental health services on 
their own terms; instead being left until they have full blown crises which has 
then made it more likely they would be compulsorily admitted “under the Act”.   
Clinical power and control was often rationalised under the guise of 
clinical responsibility for the safety of individuals and communities.  National 
texts and the dominant biomedical stories about mental health services 
generally ignored coercion and compulsion as underlying features of many 
relationships between service users and clinical staff.  Yet these remained highly 
significant for service users and participants frequently referred to abuses of 
power.  In addition, it was clear that treatment continued to be used as threat or 
punishment, despite such practices being widely criticised over decades through 
public inquiries (W. Brunton, 2005; Mason, 1988, 1996), the media (Marbrook, 
2012) as well as various investigative reports (Mental Health Commission, 2004) 
and even, recently, acknowledged by the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 
2012).  A peer support worker from Auckland described the powerlessness that 
people experienced saying, “I have seen it happen where a young guy got angry 
at his case manager; he was angry.  That case manager went ‘Right, put him in 
hospital.’” (Peer Support Worker 3, Focus Group S, Christchurch).  
These situations were also indicative of the privileged status of clinical 
specialists and policy analysts who staff the Directorate of Mental Health 
(Ministry of Health, 2011) and are key informants to national policy and strategy 
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texts.  This kind of institutionalised power has been at the expense of other 
stakeholder perspectives such as the NGOs, which have been increasingly 
invisible in such texts over the last 15 years (Mental Health Commission, 1998a, 
2004b, 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b; Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2012c). 
In addition, the establishment of the District Health Boards in 2000 
blurred the boundaries for most participants between their funding and 
contracting responsibilities with simultaneously being the providers of clinical 
services in their regions.  Clinical staff from the DHBs regularly assumed extra 
authority over staff from the community organisations; although it was the 
funding arms that were responsible for contracting arrangements with NGOs.  
Participants seemed to accept this without understanding the distinction.  A 
support worker from Hamilton commented, “Ultimately we are in there because 
of the DHB: ‘We contract you blah, blah, blah, we are technically directly 
responsible.’  [So] whether you like it or not [they] are the boss man” (Support 
Worker 1, Focus Group H, Hamilton). 
In addition, participants from all regions reported clinical staff blurring 
the boundary between legislative authority and coercion; in effect overstating 
the limits of their responsibilities to service users.  One service manager 
compared his own youthful experience with what happened to service users in 
mental health services: 
There is an automatic assumption that we have to take the 
power and control off them.  Nonsense.  It is the first time he 
has ever got power and control.  I can remember my first pay 
cheque - well probably my first 50 pay cheques, you know - I 
am going to drink, I am going to smoke, I am going to have 
fun.  Because that is what happens when you give them their 
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money back, they party.  [. . .]  But there is a lot of pressure 
to put him under 3PR21. (Senior Manager 3, Auckland) 
Many participants expressed concern at the very real consequences of 
“non-compliance” for service users under this authority.  Ultimately, perceptions 
of compulsion seemed antithetical to the sense of hopefulness that underpinned 
most participant discourses of recovery.  They also reported the immense 
frustration and powerlessness service users experienced through being ignored.  
A senior manager from Christchurch told a story of a young man’s fear, 
humiliation and “his outrage at being put under the Mental Health Act because 
he didn’t comply, and his fear, real fear of the permanent repercussions for his 
life. He is 20” (Senior Manager 1, Christchurch).  She went on to explain that the 
issue was his refusal to take a drug because of the pain it caused him.  She said, 
“20 year olds aren’t used to being constipated; it is as simple as that.  It is a very 
personal, intimate area in which he just doesn’t want to have strangers involved.  
[They] are not really acknowledging that this is not just a physical condition; this 
is also an emotional response to the circumstances he is in” (Senior Manager 1, 
Christchurch).   
Participants were in no doubt that these instances were primarily about 
control rather than any therapeutic benefit.  Several talked about “key workers 
that are holding back [service users and they] have to go to them for approval for 
everything that they do” (Support Worker 5, Focus Group H, Hamilton)  This was 
particularly frustrating for participants who recognised that other ways of 
working with people were more effective and congruent with the self-
determining aspirations of recovery.  Many participants, and especially those 
with their own experiences of distress, were insistent that feeling in charge of 
                                                     
21 The 3PR Act allows the Family Court to make orders for people who 
have lost their mental capacity. The court can make ‘personal orders’ to deal 
with a specific issue or it can appoint a welfare guardian to have a general power 
to look after someone's personal care. (Protection of Personal and Property 
Rights Act 1988,) 
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one’s own life decisions was critical to recovery.  A peer support worker from 
Auckland observed, “Our clients don’t get to make their own decisions about 
their own lives which is really horrible because the empowerment of being able 
to make your own decisions is like control” (Peer Support Worker 2 Auckland).   
This reinforced the perspective expressed by many participants that 
heavy-handed use of statutory power was unnecessary and ineffectual.  Instead, 
they averred that patience, time, and positive relationships with service users 
were ultimately more effective and beneficial ways of working.  As one team 
leader remarked, “The majority of the time [we] can talk them around and not 
require the hospitalisation but it’s been the service or [a particular] clinician 
working in that way and being prepared to just take a little bit more time, 
whereas not everybody does”.  She went on to describe “the punitive approach” 
as “if you don’t do that we will put you into hospital” (Team Leader 3, Focus 
Group A, Christchurch).  However, some psychiatrists seemed willing to expand 
the boundaries of their professional relationships with service users and work 
with greater degrees of freedom and self-determination.  Unfortunately, this 
seemed restricted to particular regions and individual clinicians who “have tried 
to just keep the relationship intact for a period of time; so not force medication” 
(Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) rather than systemic policy and 
practice.  
Participants generally perceived that, whether subject to legal 
compulsion or other forms of coercion, service users were routinely, and 
regularly, “told what to do” rather than being asked, “What can we do for you to 
help you?”  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  It was evident that 
clinical staff used authority over service users and there were serious 
consequences for non-compliance.  In the next section, I look more closely at 
issues regarding who controlled access to services with a particular focus on 
“gate-keeping” as indicative of continuing institutional power.  
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Access, exit and “gate-keeping”: The significance of referral processes 
Procedures for access to mental health services have been widely 
acknowledged as being of concern (Ministry of Health, 2011) and it was clear 
from participant talk that decision making was still very much in the hands of 
clinical professionals, and this was reinforced systematically.  In particular, 
clinical services were the “keepers of the gate” to the whole spectrum of services 
and controlled all access, referrals and exits.  It was also evident that the NGOs 
were similarly powerless to initiate action.  A team leader from Hamilton 
expressed her frustration when alerting the community mental health team to 
an early warning sign and asking, for example, “Would you pop in and do the 
second visit of the week tomorrow rather than Friday?”  Then she subsequently 
found that they did not visit because the “person didn’t open the door.”  As she 
exclaimed, “Well that should be telling you something!”  (Team Leader 2, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton) 
In contrast, gate-keeping access to mental health services created several 
issues for people wanting early intervention and support.  Relinquishing control 
was a perceived barrier for some people, who would rather forgo help than risk 
being caught up in the mental health system.  Peer support workers in Auckland 
explained how counterproductive it could be for people wanting to access their 
service, but having to go through DHB clinical services to do so.  As one said,  
It doesn’t make sense because our role is to catch them when 
they are still motivated to do goals and things like that.  But 
then they have to do the battle of getting into the mental 
health system to actually access us which is awful.  
 (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group A, Auckland). 
Furthermore, even access to the NGOs was governed by referrals from 
DHB clinical teams, and could set up unwelcome competition among community 
providers.  This situation could be exacerbated by personalities and individual 
preferences that impacted on the reputation and credibility of the NGOs.  A 
group from one Hamilton organisation discussed how referrals could depend on 
the perceived reputation of the organisation “or the trend or favour of [clinical 
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staff], like, you know, who is the flavour of the month type thing” (Team Leader 
1, Focus Group H, Hamilton).  Similarly, it seemed clinical key workers were 
somewhat laissez-faire; content to let NGOs lobby for referrals and comfortable 
with the respective roles of power this reinforced.  These scenarios were at odds 
with descriptions of the non-government sector as crucial to the delivery of 
mental health and addiction services (Ministry of Health, 2012; Peters, 2010).   
Alarmingly, the opposite could also be true, and referrals could happen 
without even the service user being informed.  It was also apparent that 
discharge plans and referrals were routinely developed independently of the 
NGOs and families, and in the worst cases, people were discharged to services or 
families without any foreknowledge or communication.  This created tensions 
and negative impacts for all those involved and flew in the face of notions of 
“person centred” recovery.  A team leader from Hamilton shared her experience 
of, “The person doesn't actually know they’ve been referred to me.  So their 
choice?  They’re wondering why the hell I’ve turned up on their doorstep” (Team 
Leader 2, Focus Group W, Waikato).  Unfortunately, this was not a rare 
occurrence and reflected an administrative imperative rather than a recovery-
focussed decision.  Another example from a different Hamilton focus group 
noted that, frequently, “We get the ward ringing us saying, ‘So and so is going 
home.  The family don’t want him, he is leaving today’ and it is too dangerous” 
(Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  
At the other end, as discussed previously, people were also “exited” or 
pushed towards exit on the determination of DHB clinicians or funders alone.  
Some were cut adrift because they no longer fit criteria determined by DHB 
funders.  A support worker from Christchurch explained that she “had to 
discharge two clients because funding was no longer available to them under the 
magical age of 65, [and] the choice had been taken away from them” (Support 
Worker 1, Focus Group S, Christchurch) 
It was evident, therefore that in accessing the mental health system 
people were frequently, and systematically, disempowered.  It was difficult to 
consider recovery in this context despite most participants recognising that 
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service users being included in the decision making processes that most affected 
their lives was integral to successful outcomes.  In the next section, I address 
some of the processes embedded within mental health services that served to 
ensure compliance and, therefore, maintained institutional power. 
Asymmetry and dependence:  Funding, contracting & the costs of “non-
compliance” 
Institutions are characterised by their capacity to create resource 
dependencies and political vulnerabilities among organisations that may have 
conflicting goals and interests.  The community NGOs were in such asymmetrical 
relationships of dependence with the DHBs.  The conformity of the community 
organisations was established and maintained through extremely high costs for 
non-compliance with institutional pressures.  For NGOs, non-compliance carried 
economic risks; not only directly in terms of funding, but also in terms of reduced 
legitimacy and access to the resources that come with legitimacy (Phillips et al., 
2004).  Organisational viability clearly depended on keeping both clinical and 
contracting teams happy.  Many participants referred to “the power that the 
DHB has to be able to pull funding if you don’t play the game as an NGO” (Team 
Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
Increasing managerialism exacerbated tensions for the community 
mental health organisations, which had little input into developing contracting 
and service specifications.  However, as noted in a report commissioned by 
Platform Trust (2008), the blurred boundary between the provider and purchaser 
in DHBs meant that “provider-arm health professionals and managers are 
influencing funding and planning processes” (p. 5) clearly to the disadvantage of 
NGOs.  Many focus group participants did not realise that clinical teams do not 
actually contract their organisations but, rather, both are providers of, what 
should be, complementary services.  This sense was reinforced by clinical key 
workers who assumed authority over support workers, based on their own 
perception of unilateral DHB power, and under the guise of clinical responsibility.  
This asymmetry in their relationships was naturalised by some participants and 
masked its institutional power.  “It isn’t about power; put that on the shelf.  It is 
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about responsibility” one Hamilton support worker protested (Support Worker 2, 
Focus Group H, Hamilton). 
The Platform Trust (2008) report, also noted a general lack of 
transparency in contracting processes and highlighted that DHBs had received 
overall gains in funding but were failing to pass these on; thus expecting the 
NGOs to provide the same services, but leaving them seriously and systematically 
under-funded.  For example, one senior manager from Wellington remarked that 
“We have no FFT (Future Funding Track) and no cost of living adjustment; they 
have kept it all” (Senior Manager 3, Wellington).  Another senior manager from 
Auckland described their contractual obligations as having “to ensure that things 
are done certain ways, and that doesn’t always fit with the ideal; with what an 
ideal kind of recovery approach would be” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington).  In 
some cases the time-frames for contracts were arbitrarily adjusted, down to 
three months in one example, meaning that strategic planning and forecasting 
around staffing needs etc. were nearly impossible.  Other participants reported 
hostile audits that ignored positive evaluations and services that were cut 
despite evidential success.  In general, satisfying conflicting stakeholder interests 
illuminated power differentials in which the NGO services always seemed to be 
the “losers”.   
Wariness about unbridled managerialism and potentially punitive 
environments, also meant that organisations appeared to be over-emphasising 
administrative and reporting tasks at the expense of interpersonal support work.  
Many participants made reference to tasks that were time consuming and 
fundamentally managerialist “risk aversion”; these were meeting organisational 
needs at the expense of service users wishes.  A team leader from Wellington 
explained that they were often doing things “ just to cover our butt” and this 
meant expecting support workers to “spend all their time recording everything, 
just to cover ourselves, for no positive reason, it is really hard to balance” (Team 
Leader 3, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Other managerialist requirements, 
including audit processes also appeared to have resulted in ponderous and top-
heavy infrastructures.  No participants referred to these as improving practices 
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or service delivery; instead, they discussed at length how these requirements 
interfered with their daily work lives.  A group of Wellington support workers 
discussed such requirements as irrelevant at best and “just auditors’ 
requirements to get their tick boxes so that their managers [are] covering 
themselves” (Support Worker 6, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
Changes in personnel within the DHB could also lead to radical and 
arbitrary changes in policy to which the NGOs were particularly vulnerable, and 
which ran counter to their own ideals of recovery-oriented service delivery.  Even 
a strongly articulated and coherent alternative discourse within an organisation 
was no protection from more powerful institutional directives.  At a service 
delivery level, these influences were apparent in contracting requirements for 
goal planning in particular.  One group of senior managers believed that the 
environment was now so bad they described how “the journey forward is 
transformed through the journey to nowhere, into the journey backwards” 
(Senior Manager 5, Wellington).  In some regions, and in individual cases, 
relationships with institutional agents were changing.  However, as I shall discuss 
in the next section, blurring the boundaries between power and responsibility 
could give gave the appearance of personal power and freedom of choice to 
service users, while actually maintaining institutional power under the guise of 
individual “responsibilities”. 
Compliance, control and setting goals  
As is clear from what has been presented this far, service users appeared 
to have very little control over what treatments or service responses they 
received.  Participants reported serious limitations in the choices available to 
them and service users, exemplified by the compulsory development of 
individual goal plans.  Many participants commented this process was 
antithetical to “client-centred” recovery and that needs assessments prioritised 
the expectations of the referrer and a service user’s own choices and aspirations 
were ignored when these were in conflict.  These priorities also meant that goal 
planning typically focused on functional rehabilitation measures rather than 
recovery outcomes indicative of meaningful and satisfying lives in the natural 
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community.  As one Wellington participant remarked, “When a client gets 
referred there will be a list of goals, usually around medication, personal hygiene 
[and] diet” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group B, Wellington). 
Participants routinely reported that these plans were developed by 
clinical staff and frequently contradicted what service users said they wanted.  In 
contrast, the preferences they identified required approval by DHB clinical key 
workers.  They were often frustrated with key workers who set nominal goals for 
service users and implicitly for support workers as well.  A team leader from 
Waikato complained that key workers would claim, “A person needs friendship 
and companionship and things like that, and expect us to provide them”.  She 
went on to explain that she and her organisation were more interested “to talk 
about developing relationships as a goal; not having a support worker become a 
friend” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group W, Waikato).  Similarly, a senior manager 
from Auckland contrasted personal aspirations with arbitrary, functional goals 
such as, “You need to have five friends, and you need to have a job for 20 hours” 
(Senior Manager 1, Auckland). 
Managing conflicting interests created an extra layer of complexity for 
the community organisations and support worker.  One senior manager 
described it as “tricky” when plans were not “what people have said they want, 
but what important people have said is important” (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland).  These plans also reflected the values of workers or organisations and 
several participants drew on a language of permission, for example using phrases 
such as, “letting them” and “allowing”, with one team leader going so far as to 
say “even I know you [service user] can do it and I expect you to do it.”  (Team 
Leader 2, Focus Group W, Waikato, emphasis added).  Others used a kind of royal 
“we”, to disguise the locus of authority.  For example, “We have got a plan about 
maybe keeping the flat clean for the next three weeks” (Team Leader 1, Focus 
Group W, Waikato, emphasis added) or “[We] as a team might say this person 
needs to . . . .”  (Support Worker 9, Focus Group A, Wellington).   
Participants who used such constructions seemed somewhat unreflective 
and did not seem to consider that service users might be resisting a sense of 
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disempowerment about the lack of choice in managing their own lives.  For 
instance, this team leader couldn’t understand that after trying to teach 
someone “every day for six months [to] clean the toilet”, and “they still haven’t 
got it!” (Team Leader 6, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  Other participants offered 
more thoughtful responses that acknowledged an ethic of being honest about 
organisational imperatives that worked against people’s autonomous choice.  A 
senior manager from Auckland admitted that, “The reality is that sometimes it is 
our goal and sometimes it is stuff that we have been told we have to do.  [. . .]  
So we try to be honest with that” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland). 
Several participants also noted that goal setting was often expected to be 
an unrealistically “quick fix” after years of distress and social marginalisation.  A 
team leader from Hamilton commented on the “misunderstanding about whose 
recovery it was” and the unrealistic timeframe “when it has taken a lifetime 
getting to a certain point and then a five minute fix up job is expected” (Team 
Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Many talked about how it takes time for 
people to know what they want and that frequently they had been removed 
from opportunities and resources for so long that they needed graduated 
exposure to new possibilities and a sense of a larger world.  One senior manager 
was insistent that it was necessary to first notice what a person likes, or has 
enjoyed in the past and be persistent.  He said, “Expose them to it, [and] don’t 
do it once because we never like anything once, unless it is amazing. [They need 
to] do it several times” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).   
Others, too, argued for a more subjective and responsive approach to 
measuring progress towards goals and recovery.  Many expressed frustration 
that the person’s own life choices and measures of success were ignored or 
dismissed.  In a discussion about what counts as progress, a team leader from 
Christchurch commented that, “The person themselves thinks, and their family 
thinks how far have they come, no hospitalisation in three years, and all those 
things that I think are so overlooked sometimes” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, 
Christchurch).  In addition, maintaining a recovery orientation that was attentive 
to a person’s strengths, resourcefulness and aspirations was clearly subordinate 
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to other, typically DHB contracting, objectives.  A senior manager from Auckland 
admitted that working with strengths was not “part of our formalised practice 
but [is] something that we build into review processes” (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland).  Unfortunately, such a procedure offered few opportunities for self-
determination despite the discourses of “client-centred” services.  
Participants generally thought that goal planning was another mechanism 
by which clinical services established and maintained control over service users 
and the organisational practices of the NGOs.  However, the tensions also 
appeared to be somewhat naturalised and legitimised by institutional 
constructions of clinical and managerial “responsibility”.  This translation of 
institutional power seemed to close down further discussion of the nature and 
role of goals in supporting a person’s aspiration to live well in their community. 
Conclusion  
Institutions become established, discursively, as socially legitimate largely 
through the power and longevity of their historical traditions, relationships and 
norms (Lok & Willmott, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004).  They persist because they 
become naturalised by communities and societies, who also devolve a great deal 
of responsibility and authority to institutional agents.  The normative, cognitive 
and legislative features of institutional entrenchment were all apparent in 
participant talk, and this clearly had serious implications for the establishment of 
an alternative, recovery paradigm in mental health services.   
In particular, it was clear that recovery discourses had not been effective 
in deinstitutionalising biomedical and managerial norms despite the adoption of 
recovery language in organisational and national texts.  Participants reported 
that recovery approaches were routinely overridden by clinical and managerial 
imperatives and it was apparent that the institutions have continued to govern 
organisational communication and practice throughout the sector.  In fact, 
constructions of deinstitutionalisation, in other words treating the institutions as 
features of the past, effectively created discursive closure around both 
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biomedicine and managerialism as powerful, institutional drivers of 
organisations in the present.   
Normative power was particularly evident in the naturalised assumptions 
and hegemonic conventions underpinning participant attitudes to mental 
“illness”, community care, and other important concepts.  This explained, 
perhaps, why participants made ubiquitous, incidental references to biomedical 
and managerial power in organisational life and yet did not appear fully to 
understand their complex structural and discursive institutional features.  This 
meant that participants tended to express their many frustrations and issues as 
local and idiosyncratic rather than systemic and institutional.   
The cognitive institutional pillar was evident in the social and political 
legitimation of biomedical power that mandated clinical, professional authority 
over the care, control and cure of “mental illness”.  The clinical story of people’s 
experience was at the heart of the institutional medical model and frequently 
separated people from a sense of ownership over their experiences as well as 
ignoring their own explanatory models.  Many participants reported that while 
diagnosis could be useful, service users generally experienced it as unhelpful and 
intransigent.  It also appeared to lead to the unreflective pathologising of 
ordinary human emotions and common life circumstances.  In addition, the 
narrow lens meant a limited range of treatment options, which were controlled 
by DHB clinical services and funders, further limited the power and choice of 
service users and the community organisations. 
Operating from the same functionalist rationality biomedicine and 
managerialism worked in conjunction, through the DHBs, to determine the 
nature of treatment, service responses, and the ways that outcomes were 
measured.  Social valorisation of clinical authority meant that professionals also 
claimed expertise in defining and translating recovery for participants and other 
stakeholders.  These institutionalised translations inevitably pervaded the 
community NGOs as well, and effectively controlled organisational discourse and 
practices.     
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Legislative power and the regulatory authority conferred on the 
institutions created relationships of resource dependency and vulnerability 
among service users and mental health workers, as well as between NGOs and 
DHB services and funding arms.  While many participants, and even sector policy 
documents, talked about personal power and responsibility in recovery, 
considerable tension was evident in the exercise of control over significant 
decisions in people’s lives.  In particular it seemed that both funder and provider 
arms of DHBs exploited the boundaries between institutional power and clinical 
“responsibility” and this created asymmetrical relationships between clinical 
services, community support staff and service users.   
Asymmetrical and resource dependent relationships among the 
community sector and DHB funders and clinical teams meant that the costs for 
non-compliance, in terms of both funding and referrals, posed serious risks to the 
viability of NGOs.  Participants linked discussions of these relationships to 
organisational decisions about the focus of service delivery; specifically service 
specifications and reporting requirements that were frequently at the expense of 
the personal autonomy of service users.  While there were some, regional, 
examples where effective relationships, even collaboration, had been 
established among clinical, support staff and service users this was clearly not 
systemic; relying instead on the individual approach of some clinicians and the 
persistence and energy of the NGOs.   
It was very clear that institutional dynamics continued to construct, 
constrain or contradict organisational practices in terms of becoming recovery-
oriented despite a naturalised assumption of deinstitutionalisation in the mental 
health sector.  In the next chapter, I examine the ways in which these 
circumstances were problematised by participants and by the voices of service 
users through emerging narrative accounts in significant national texts.  There I 
not only analyse the evidence for the effectiveness of disrupting institutional 
power but also the ways in which the institutions could be seen to counter 
challenges to their power and status quo. 
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Chapter 8: Fighting back: Struggles, challenges 
and innovation  
Our intentions are good; our actions must be even better, and 
our achievements will be outstanding.  (Turia, 1999). 
Introduction   
In the previous chapter, I established that the institutions of biomedicine 
and managerialism have continued to direct organisational discourse and 
practices in the mental health sector.  The findings provided evidence of the 
persistence of institutional power through the structural framework of the 
normative, cognitive and legislative institutional pillars.  It was also apparent that 
participant references to biomedical and managerial influences in the 
community NGO sector were generally negative.  This was noteworthy because 
the focus group questions were not explicitly directed at the institutions; in fact, 
my use of an appreciative inquiry methodology anticipated and encouraged 
narratives of what was working well, and successful outcomes, in these 
organisations.  It was clear, therefore, that participants as well as authors of 
important texts, challenged, problematised and resisted systemic institutional 
power in various ways.  These challenges and counter challenges further 
illustrated the problematics of voice and organising in mental health services.  
Assumptions of professional benevolence, expertise, legitimated coercion 
and what it meant to be a mental health service user were all contested 
territories.  In addition, it was clear that alternative paradigms and discourses 
such as recovery had not achieved social or political legitimacy, and this was 
largely due to institutional pressures.  In this chapter, therefore, I address my 
third research question: In what ways are institutional dynamics being 
problematised and challenged within the community NGOs and to what effect? 
I first examine how participants and texts problematised and resisted 
institutional power through localised insubordination as well as more 
coordinated efforts and activism.  Second I examine change efforts in the sector, 
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from both inside and outside the institutional frameworks, and investigate how 
effective these have been and under what circumstances.  I explore evidence of 
some of the attempts made by the NGOs, as institutional outsiders, to establish 
innovative, alternative service delivery models as well as their struggles for 
organisational transformation in the sector.  I discuss how effective these 
initiatives appear to have been in disrupting institutional dynamics.  
I then attend to the ways that the mental health institutions, through the 
DHBs, undertook defensive institutional work in the face of challenges and 
perceived threats to their authority.  As previously discussed (p. 136), an 
important, although not rigid, distinction can be made between generalised and 
particularised defensive institutional work.  Generalised, primarily discursive, 
defensive work was explored in Chapter 7.  Therefore, in this section, I draw on 
the data to discern the strategies that institutional agents utilised, not merely to 
preserve the status quo and restore stability, but to purposively contain change 
efforts and counter perceived threats to their authority and status.  It was 
evident from sector texts and participants’ reports that counter-challenges were 
impeding the establishment of recovery as an orienting basis for discourse and 
practice in these community organisations. 
Subordination and insubordination: Taking on the institutions 
Initial analysis indicated participants resisted both biomedical and 
managerial authority using a variety of strategies.  Their frustrations were 
exemplified by the subordinate roles that most were ascribed by the clinical and 
funding arms of the DHBs.  Insubordination was evident in their explicit attempts 
to problematise institutional dynamics as well as more organised attempts to 
challenge and disrupt institutional pressures.  These efforts ranged from local 
and situated instances of “getting sneaky”, to more proactive attempts at 
advocacy and activism.  These tactics had variable efficacy in undermining 
institutional pillars. 
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Subordination and control: Problematising the system 
Despite seeming to have a limited awareness of the assumptions and 
frameworks that underpinned institutional persistence and strength, participants 
problematised the mental health system as a whole and particularly the 
hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships that positioned support workers 
and NGOs as subordinate to clinical staff.  Many made references to “mental 
health” and “the system” as overarching constructs with one describing it as a 
“juggernaut” and a “king unto its own” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  Yet the 
national mental health and addiction plan (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006), 
among others, claimed that mental health services were already based on “a 
strong consumer voice and a recognition that services must be built around the 
needs of the people who use them” (p. 2).  Such statements were ambiguous in 
terms of who had the authority to determine a person’s “needs” and this meant 
that hierarchical relationships of authority remained unchecked. 
The use of person centred and outcome focussed service descriptors was 
ubiquitous and commonly used in organisational and national texts (Ministry of 
Health, 2005, 2007; MHAC, 2008 among others).  The Mental Health Commission 
(2007), for example, explicitly addressed the need to reduce inequities for 
service users, stating that, “Autonomy will [be] reflected by people working to 
minimise power imbalances, regardless of their role” (p. 23).  However, not only 
did these texts fail to define how expectations of “consumer voice” might 
actually be embedded in service delivery and development but participants, too, 
resented their lack of an effective voice in the ways that service specifications 
were developed.   
Participants explicitly problematised a “system” that seemed intent on 
following an agenda that perpetuated practices of limited efficacy and ignored 
the expressed needs and wants of those affected most by such service provision.  
A team leader from Waikato described what he saw as service users “stating 
clearly that, ‘This isn’t actually working for me.’  But nobody seems to be 
listening” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group P, Waikato).  Another participant, a 
senior manager from Christchurch, remarked, for example, that the clinical needs 
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assessment process “covers very much that deficit dysfunctional model thing, 
and these are not usually what someone would say their needs are today, 
tomorrow, next week, and definitely not the things that are going to motivate 
them to make changes” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  Others expressed 
frustration at an over-riding sense that “nothing changes” (Senior Manager 4, 
Wellington).   
The perception of the system as immovable and intransigent was 
reinforced continuously, yet few articulated their frustrations as symptomatic of 
systemic, institutional power.  Even where there was a realisation that issues 
were systemic, there was an overall sense of powerlessness to effect change, 
whether as individuals or organisations.  This team leader from Hamilton argued 
that:   
You see everything going round and round in circles.  If you 
don’t stick something in the middle to stop it, they’re just 
going to carry on [for] year after year after year after year, 
and [you] think ‘Goodness, why didn’t someone change 
something.’  I don’t really care [what]; just try something 
different, but no one does.  They just keep doing the same 
thing. (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
As well as being contrary to recovery principles and aspirations, many 
complained about an inefficient use of resources, the bulk of which have 
continued to go to clinical services despite “people living most of their lives in 
the community” (Senior Manager 1, Hamilton).  Participants were especially 
exasperated by the inefficiencies of the revolving door syndrome.  One team 
leader reported that, “By the time [the] process goes through they have 
discharged themselves and gone back to wherever they came from, only to go 
full circle back to [the inpatient ward], so we get the same assessment process 
happening six months later” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group P, Hamilton). 
Participants were also angered by the way that service users’ behaviour 
became institutionalised with most obediently “doing what they’re told” by 
professionals (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  A team leader from Hamilton 
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stated that, “So many people will just swallow their pills - and they don’t know 
what they are for.  [Just] because they have been told to, and I hate that” (Team 
Leader 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  Others noted that “compliance” was often 
due to anxiety about their interactions with professionals and there were many 
comments such as, “They’re frightened of doctors.  The doctors don't explain 
properly; they just say “You need this sort of pill, away you go” (Team Leader 1, 
Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Negative interactions and coercion were recurrent 
themes in the focus groups particularly.  Many considered the system itself to be 
harmful to service users and their aspirations for recovery, with several 
remarking that hospitalisation was typically a negative experience and people 
then had to recover from “being in that kind of environment” (Senior Manager 5, 
Wellington).   
Additionally, most participants were concerned about the lack of real 
choices and the inequity of service users’ relationships with clinical staff.  It 
seemed that, while service users were routinely ascribed individual 
responsibility, for their lives and well-being, this did not equate to personal 
power or self-determination.  This also meant that a client’s “responsibility” 
frequently translated into a client’s “fault” and one team leader observed, “It’s 
really scary because it is always the client’s fault, their problem” (Team Leader 2, 
Focus Group B, Auckland).  The inherent power imbalance was evident in 
everyday encounters and several participants reported service users having to 
seek “approval for everything that they do” (Support Worker 2, Focus Group H, 
Hamilton) from clinical staff.   
It was not hard to understand the reasons for mistrust when clinical 
power often seemed inappropriately used.  The Code of Consumer Rights (Health 
& Disability Commission, 1999), for example, includes, among other protections, 
the rights of service users to see any information held about them, yet this was 
regularly over-ruled.  In several cases, participants commented that service users 
were not “allowed to see their own notes because that might upset them and 
[make] them unwell” but, as he added, “If you saw some of the things that 
people write then you would be upset too” (Peer Support Worker 7, Focus Group 
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PS, Auckland).  Even where service users were able to articulate their wants and 
tried to self-advocate, participants reported that decision making was seldom 
collaborative and another peer support worker from Auckland remarked that she 
“had to go along with all the medication for them to [approve the treatment I 
asked for]” (Peer Support Worker 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland). 
Participants frequently, and unfavourably, compared their organisational 
environments and practices with in-patient services.  The overall impression of 
the hospital environment was of stressed staff working within restrictive 
institutionalised environments and ignoring the common sense basics of a 
person’s life and needs, and in the process dehumanising and humiliating them.  
A team leader described her visits with a client who had been admitted to in-
patient services.  She said, “He didn’t know where his shoes were; didn’t know 
where his clothes were; didn’t know where his wallet was.  [. . .]  I had seen him 
bare feet one week and I still see him bare feet the next week” (Team Leader 5, 
Focus Group P, Hamilton)  
Participants noted a systemic lack of accountability by the DHBs and 
discussed how clinical services frequently worked to ignore or conceal bad 
practice.  One senior manager recognised this as a systemic, institutional issue.  
She said, “There is a culture there that is very risk averse about doing 
performance management . . . Clinical staff can fly under the radar for years, and 
they can be [left] unchallenged around the quality [of their work]” (Senior 
Manager 4, Auckland).  Others were similarly conscious of the difficulties in 
shifting the institutional culture, especially the cost-benefit argument that 
ignored where most mental health funding was spent.  A senior manager in 
Christchurch compared the NGO staff, who were paid a lot less but were willing 
to “work with somebody for years” if necessary, with the “$1000 a day hospitals 
[where] recovery doesn’t work as well”.  She added that DHB funders seemed to 
have “just acknowledged that as a culture that is very difficult to change” (Senior 
Manager 1, Christchurch).  These situations were reinforced by other, managerial 
priorities that also impacted negatively on recovery outcomes as participants 
constructed them.   
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Sector relationships were clearly a systemic, institutional and inter-
organisational issue and not merely an interpersonal one.  The vulnerability of 
NGOs to the effects of personnel changes within DHB funding and planning 
portfolio holders caused much apprehension about whether “the system [will] 
survive when the person moves on” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  The same 
senior manager echoed others from around the country that were concerned 
that the system was “pretty much personality driven” (Senior Manager 2, 
Wellington).  Participants expressed concerns about personality politics 
repeatedly.  Another senior manager commented, “I find the funder quite easy 
to talk to.  I can talk to her about all these wonderful things we want; she thinks 
it is fabulous; but you know it won’t go any further than that” (Senior Manager 3, 
Hamilton).  This created serious uncertainty for long-term service development 
(Peters, 2010) and genuine change was not apparent despite policy and, in some 
cases, good relationships with funders.   
In the next section, I discuss how participants, and texts that advocated 
for the role of NGOs, were critical of an increasingly managerialist environment 
that dictated their organisational practices, supported biomedical authority and 
constrained the emergence of alternative paradigms. 
Problematising managerialism and the contracting environment  
Managerialism was as much an embedded feature of the institutional 
system as biomedicine and, as discussed in the previous chapter, participants 
regularly conflated the clinical and funding arms in referring generically to “the 
DHBs”.  Most participants, and especially the senior managers, referred to the 
contracting environment and their contracting relationship with DHBs as the 
greatest challenge to organisational survival.  Substantial regional variations 
were evident, which added to a sense of ad hoc policy and planning within DHBs 
that impacted negatively on the community organisations’ ability to plan and 
their long term viability.   
The Platform Trust report (2008) noted while “there are pockets of 
excellence characterised by consistent and knowledgeable funding and planning 
 330 
managers” overwhelmingly the picture was characterised by “high turnover, lack 
of experience, and concern that the loss of institutional knowledge about the 
nature and purpose of contracts makes NGOs extremely vulnerable” (p. 5).  Jan 
Dowland, the chair of Platform Trust, concluded that the contracting 
environment painted “a disturbing picture” where “the dictates of the system 
have dominated the discussions between DHBs and NGOs, rather than how to 
improve the lives of people” (Platform Trust, 2008, p. 4).  Similarly, participants 
in this research, were also frustrated with cumbersome reporting and audit 
requirements, unilateral decision making within DHBs and delays in negotiating 
contracts.  Most were concerned that meeting contracting requirements meant 
taking time away from the real work and recovery.   
Many were also critical of contracting and funding processes that 
increased their vulnerability and subordination to the DHBs; but which also 
reduced their organisational capacity for flexibility and responsiveness.  Most 
were frustrated that there was no real accountability around values and recovery 
in an environment where anyone could “say what they like; as long as the 
contracts keep rolling in” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  They 
were concerned that, in becoming contracted service providers, their 
organisations had moved away from their constitutional obligations and 
accountabilities, and created “a whole new set of rules and dilemmas” (Team 
Leader 4, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  A senior manager from Christchurch 
worried that many flax root organisations had lost their identity when they “got 
themselves into contracts and that is a totally different spin on who and what 
you are.  So I think there is a challenge for organisations to retain independent 
integrity and [there] is real tension there because often the funder does not 
want to buy what you want to provide” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  
Overall, the burden of managerialist-driven procedures actively thwarted the 
attempts of these organisations to become recovery oriented. 
Participants reported feeling ignored, devalued and discounted with no 
place in contract negotiations for issues they saw as important.  Much of this 
frustration was due to contracts that bore little resemblance to the realities and 
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needs of communities or organisations.  Team leaders and senior managers, in 
particular, were critical of the disparity between formal Ministry policy positions 
and their contracted service specifications.  A senior manager from Auckland 
remarked, “Sometimes I feel like they are coming up with stuff that someone 
said to them at a cocktail party the night before” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  
A team leader from Christchurch spoke of having to send contracts back to the 
DHB because they were full of targets and “we don’t know where they have 
come from and what they are about, the contract makes very little sense” (Team 
Leader 3, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  
Many participants were similarly frustrated that their organisation’s 
recovery goals, as well as constitutional values and priorities, were frequently in 
conflict with the “quasi-market approach” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, 
Christchurch) and the difficulties of managing conflicting agenda were evident.  A 
team leader from Wellington reflected that, “We want to be giving the best we 
can to the client group, [and a] recovery, strengths-based approach.  And I do 
believe that most [staff] want to do that.  It is this other [business] agenda that 
becomes the stronger beast in the camp” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group B, 
Wellington).   
Unfortunately, managerial influences were further normalised by the 
typical makeup of trust boards.  One senior manager explained the inherent 
difficulties in “trying to explain our work to a board that has a strong business 
background, and [they] kind of look at me sideways” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch).  The typically bureaucratic structures of organisations also tended 
to subvert the intentions and values of recovery.  For example, a team leader 
from Christchurch expressed her frustration in saying, “We have got a board, we 
have got the CEO, we have got god knows how many general managers. We have 
got regional managers, operational managers, service delivery managers and 
support workers” adding that a business model was not helpful “without an 
understanding of [what we are trying to achieve]” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group 
A, Christchurch).  
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Generally, there appeared to be little institutional will, or structures, to 
treat NGOs as part of, let alone valuable to, the mental health sector.  In the 
section that follows, I examine the ways in which participants resisted and 
challenged institutional authority while noting that their power to effect 
significant change was limited. 
“Getting sneaky” and “being naughty”: Insubordination  
As noted earlier, participants referred to inter-organisational 
relationships that positioned support workers and NGOs as subordinate to 
clinical services.  “Once again it is the highest in the pack isn’t it?” remarked one 
support worker from Hamilton (Support Worker 2, Focus Group H, Hamilton).  A 
team leader from Christchurch expressed a similar sentiment, in observing that 
those who “work within that [medical] model perceive the NGO sector as being 
an inferior workforce” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  All 
participants observed that clinical staff discounted the perspectives of support 
workers and peer support workers despite their close relationships with service 
users.  They also routinely dismissed the role of support workers, treating them 
as care-givers or domestic help with referrals stating, for example, that a person 
needs “help in the home, the place is a mess” and the clinical key worker saying 
“Yeah get in there and do your thing.” (Support Worker 4, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton).  Having their role devalued was clearly frustrating and one support 
worker from Wellington advocated for a change of job title, “Call us recovery 
workers, recovery guidance; call us what we are and what we actually do.  [That] 
makes us recovery experts” (Support Worker 2, Focus group A, Wellington). 
But it was apparent that support workers and service users could also be 
insubordinate and participants utilised a variety of tactics to push back against 
institutional mechanisms of control where they perceived these to be 
antithetical to the principles and values of recovery.  Several participants 
described situations where they defied contracting requirements and service 
expectations explicitly in favour of actions they believed aligned with their values 
and ideals of recovery.  Some, including senior managers, described such 
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behaviours as “being naughty” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington) or “getting 
sneaky” (Support Worker 4, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  
It was evident that opportunities for insubordination were limited and 
sometimes being a “squeaky wheel” was the only effective challenge.  This team 
leader from Hamilton noted that,  
The people, we find, who don’t get pushed to move on as 
quickly are people with strong family and things like that; 
parents who are really very strongly vocal.  These are the 
people who will march up and bang on doors at the DHB.
  (Team Leader 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton).   
Others opted for covert resistance adopting more of a “what they don’t 
know won’t hurt them” approach.  For instance, one group of support workers 
discussed how they would “carry on doing what we are doing now, just don’t tell 
them, just work the way you would always work” (Support Worker 2, Focus 
Group A, Wellington).  Another group decided, “It doesn’t actually matter 
whether the organisation runs alongside you or not, what matters is that you are 
going to do it anyway” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton).   
Participants also challenged the authority of the biomedical model.  One 
team leader commented, “I ignore the medical model because it is all about 
deficits, and my work is working with strengths.  I am accentuating the positives 
so I ignore it” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Auckland).  Another, who had 
worked in various mental health services, remarked that, in the NGO 
environment, “We used to just work around the medical model; pretend it didn’t 
exist really” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Similarly, a senior 
manager from Hamilton explained that the medical model still determined “the 
practices that we are expected to adhere to” and added that resisting these 
expectations has meant that his organisation has been labelled “cowboys” 
because “we tend to push past those limits” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  
Many participants, although dismissive of professional expertism, were 
limited in their capacity to ignore this in practice.  Some reported that service 
 334 
users often used silence as the only form of insubordination available to them in 
the face of experiences of disempowerment.  A team leader from Hamilton 
related that, “If you sit there, ‘Oh I did this and this and this and I’m the expert’, 
they know that you are full of it. It’s a crock, you're not going to get anyone’s 
respect; no one’s going to trust you; they’re not going to tell you their story” 
(Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Other participants spoke about 
service users utilising any power they could to establish control in relationships.  
As this support worker from Hamilton recounted, “I’ve got one client who tells 
me to fuck off if I am too early.  [If] I am before 12 o’clock I am not allowed to go 
in her home [and] that is fine, I have respected that” (Support Worker 6, Focus 
Group H, Hamilton). 
Many participants endeavoured to distance themselves from clinical staff 
and break down constraints that interfered with maintaining authentic 
relationships with service users.  A team leader from a kaupapa Māori service in 
Hamilton described the sense of release that service users at her residential site 
felt when weekend staff took over and “all that humbug’s out.  That's all it is.  It’s 
all just jargon and humbug.  [It’s] just to impress the weekday staff that have to 
mix and mingle with professionals” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  
Other participants discussed localised forms of resistance such as “fighting back” 
with health professionals on an individual basis.  But overall, it seemed evident 
that individual, or organisational, insubordination was largely ineffectual in 
effecting systemic change; although, it sometimes offered some local solutions 
to specific circumstances.  More coordinated activities such as advocacy were 
apparent but these too seemed limited in efficacy.  
Advocacy and activism 
Organised resistance was most evident from organisations with strong 
service user participation or leadership.  The CEO of a service user organisation in 
Hamilton referred to her organisation embracing “grassroots activism” (Senior 
Manager 4, Hamilton).  However, it was also clear that opportunities for 
systematic strategies such as advocacy were limited because the costs for non-
compliance, both financial and organisational legitimacy, were too high.  Some, 
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however, believed that radical system transformation and organisational change 
were necessary.  For example, as another senior manager claimed, “nothing in 
this sector is going to get better until somebody has got the courage to tip 
everything on its head.  Because building new beds in hospitals is not going to 
make anything better”.  She added that to make recovery a reality, “We need to 
put the funding into the community sector, and we need to start getting real” 
(Senior Manager 3, Hamilton). 
Other participants thought that only revolutionary strategies and activism 
would work to confront the on-going power struggles and hegemonic status of 
clinical authority in particular.  A participant from Christchurch protested that, 
“When you are trying to wrestle power from one group of people to another, 
sometimes building [positive] relationships is just about maintaining the status 
quo” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  Instead, he believed,  
The big conflict is that the medical model remains dominant, 
and it needs to be challenged; the weaknesses need to be 
exposed; the abuse of human rights needs to be exposed; 
people need to be challenged at all levels about whether they 
are actually contributing to recovery or contributing to 
illness.   (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch) 
Advocacy, whether by organisations or individuals, was used in attempts 
to disrupt and ameliorate imbalances in power.  Sometimes this involved directly 
challenging the status quo, encouraging service users to become critical of 
institutional hierarchies that positioned them at the bottom.  Many reported, for 
example, a routine lack of professional courtesy with clinical staff regularly 
arriving substantially late for appointments, without excuse or explanation.   
Advocacy battles around medication highlighted differences in 
perspectives about symptom control versus an “ordinary” life in community.  
This Waikato team leader described their “fights” with clinical staff who were 
only concerned with the “therapeutic dose” of medication, where the support 
work staff were arguing that “this person can’t function, they can’t have a life; all 
they are doing is sleeping all day” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group W, Waikato).  
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Peer support workers, in particular, discussed how important it was for 
service users to have support before and during meetings with clinical staff that 
were commonly experienced as manipulative and intimidating.  More than one 
participant stated that relationships with professionals improved when a third 
party was present, just to witness the exchange.  This senior manager from 
Christchurch observed, “The doctors definitely, and nurses, everyone behaves 
better when there is a witness, and it can be as simple as that” (Senior Manager 
1, Christchurch).   
However, individual, idiosyncratic strategies for fighting back were usually 
unsuccessful and mostly contingent on other favourable circumstances; set 
against a background of institutional power of which service users, at least, were 
acutely aware.  One peer support worker explained that her own experience had 
only worked out because, “I had my best friend who is a clinical psychologist who 
went in with her psychologist’s hat on, so I was taken care of.  But it is still going 
on to this day and there are people not being taken care of” (Peer Support 
Worker 2, Focus Group PS,  Auckland).  Another described how necessary it was 
to support service user in these encounters, “because there is this very subtle 
blackmailing thing going on which I find very underhand, and I find it very 
unethical” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS,  Auckland). 
Participants also spoke about mediating on behalf of service users at the 
boundaries and transitions between inpatient services, the community and the 
NGOs.  One focus group discussed “trying to advocate for the person who’s [an] 
in-patient to get some things sorted so that he can have a reasonably smooth 
transition [into community services]” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group P, Hamilton).  
But sometimes resistance seemed to make things worse and a team leader from 
Hamilton described what happened when they tried to negotiate with the clinical 
team about a service user who specifically wanted a Kaupapa Māori service.  She 
said, “He sat in respite I think for about four months before they finally said 
‘Okay then, we will find him a kaupapa Māori service’, and he is doing really well 
now” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group A, Hamilton). 
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There was certainly a sense from participants that at some point they had 
to push back if only not to end up as scapegoats for problems beyond their 
control.  It was clear that in these matters biomedical and managerialist 
professionals were powerful allies within the DHBs.  A senior manager from 
Wellington described a DHB “culture of pushing it down and down . . . and at 
some point you have to go ‘No’ and push it back up.  No.  This is not my problem.  
I cannot safely do more than this and therefore I am not going to do it” (Senior 
Manager 4, Wellington).   
At the more extreme end, participants were uncomfortably aware of the 
possible risks and consequences.  A group of senior managers discussed their 
dilemma at being ordered to move a person to an inappropriate situation.  One 
said, “If we had allowed it, that person would have crashed and burned and 
taken everyone [down] spectacularly.  And that would have been his last bridge 
burned and he would end up in a really restrictive environment” (Senior 
Manager 5, Wellington).  But another commented on their luck that they “didn’t 
get [clinical staff] down my throat” because “no doctor had bothered to turn up 
to that meeting” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington). 
It was apparent, therefore, that efforts to challenge the institutional 
status quo by the community NGOs and service users, were largely ineffective.  
In the next section, I examine the efficacy of these efforts in terms of each of the 
institutional pillars (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), and their interactions, as these 
were evident in Aotearoa\New Zealand  mental health services and the effects 
on NGOS specifically. 
Undermining the institutional pillars  
Participants displayed differing levels of awareness about the complex, 
institutionalised bases of social norms, biomedical authority and managerialism.  
However, they did explicitly criticise the local circumstances in which their 
organisations were situated, and challenged at least some of the institutionalised 
rationalisations underpinning the policies and directions of mental health 
services.  Many challenged the socially normative attitudes of external society, 
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highlighting social and community accountabilities for creating disabling 
environments that reinforced institutional influences within their organisations.  
They echoed the Mental Health Commission (2012a) and noted that the 
community was frequently as much a source of problems as it was of solutions 
and many were critical of communities where “people are intolerant of any 
symptoms” (Senior Manager 1, Christchurch).  Publicly funded campaigns, such 
as Like Minds, Like Mine (Vaughn & Hansen, 2004), have attempted to directly 
confront popular depictions, and myths of violence, associated with so-called  
mental illness.  These appear to have been quite effective in shifting perceptions, 
and one participant opined, “People are more aware now of mental health 
services existing in communities.  [Ten] years ago, mental health services [only] 
existed in hospitals.  That is a huge, almost seismic shift for communities” (Senior 
Manager 2, Auckland).   
However, while the promotion of recovery had clearly shifted some social 
assumptions about people with experiences of psychological distress, it was 
apparent that these had often been replaced with new social norms and 
expectations.  In particular, participants reported unrealistic pressures for people 
to move rapidly through the mental health system and one peer support worker, 
for example, commented that new societal pressures amounted to “Well come 
on, you are going to be recovered; you have to get out there and do this or do 
that” (Peer Support Worker 3, Focus Group S, Christchurch). 
Most participants believed that the future of mental health services was 
not with biomedicine.  A team leader from Christchurch explicitly identified a 
“need to move away from a sort of scientific kind of perspective imposed on us 
by scientists in the form of psychiatrists and what not, to a more humanist kind 
of approach” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  The Mental Health 
Commission (2007b), also, explicitly looked forward to a near future where 
“there will be a different set of ideas about what mental illness is and what 
mental health is” (p. 14).  This report goes on to contend that medication, also, 
will be “recognised as causing significant harm as well as providing significant 
relief in some cases.  Some medications commonly in use today may be 
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unavailable by 2015 as the health risks they pose become better recognised” (p. 
14).  However, these examples seemed more indicative of desired, rather than 
observable, institutional change.   
Medication remained the most vexatious and symbolic issue for 
participants.  Participants with lived experience of serious psychological distress 
were not confident that mental health services offered much that was useful, 
and displayed an over-reliance on medication while personal preferences were 
routinely dismissed by clinical professionals.  As one peer support worker 
explained, “I couldn’t get any help from the mental health [services and] when 
you do it is medication, medication, medication” (Peer Support Worker 3, Focus 
Group S, Christchurch).  Another participant was even more radical in her 
frustration at the presumptive role of medication, advocating for a campaign of 
“complaint” in disrupting biomedical power and wherever possible “throw the 
research back at them” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).  Individual 
instances of professional attitude change to prescribing were noted but these 
were clearly still the exception not the norm.  A team leader from Hamilton 
commented that, “There’s not many psychiatrists that [will] allow people to not 
take their medication and continue on seeing them” (Team Leader 3, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton). 
Participants also spoke of frustrations with the regulatory frameworks 
that supported managerialism and biomedicine within Aotearoa\New Zealand.  
These comments resonated with global movements to implement legislative 
changes that would increase the rights of mental health service users.  However, 
despite national strategic plans, such as Te Kokiri (Ministry of Health, 2006) and 
Te Tahuhu (Ministry of Health, 2007) that have advocated for a stronger voice for 
service users in mental health service development, systemic sector reform has 
not been a priority in recent decades.  Unfortunately, and historically, the 
political and societal drivers of the mental health policy agenda have been 
scandal and crisis.  As this senior manager commented:   
It doesn’t sit comfortably with me that mental health should 
be so crisis driven and politicalised, because usually the end 
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result of those crises are very messy indeed usually for 
families and for service users, and for the sector itself, and 
quite traumatising.  I think mental health . . . should be a 
priority in every government’s policy agenda, simply because 
mental and psychological well-being is all of our business.
    (Senior Manager 2, Auckland) 
Some participants looked forward to “the day that the whole area starts 
integrating and getting away from the biomedical model” (Team Leader 2, Focus 
Group A, Auckland).  But overall, participant talk suggested that optimism about 
changes in Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services was more indicative of 
the elaborative change typical of insider attempts at improvement rather than 
transformative systemic change.  In the next section, I examine the ways that 
system and organisational change was evident in the sector and discuss the 
circumstances that supported or constrained these endeavours.   
The times they are a changin’: Trying to do it differently  
Community non-government organisations, as “outsiders”, were clearly 
at the forefront of the struggle to replace socially normative and naturalised 
discourses and practices with innovative service models that more closely 
aligned with the recovery aspirations of service users.  Indeed, the choice of 
methodology for this project was predicated on expectations of sharing “good 
news” and participants were eager to talk about change and tell stories of great 
outcomes for service users and their organisations.  Despite the on-going 
difficulties these organisations faced, most were managing “doing more with 
less” resourcing (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch) and working within contracting 
constraints in order to drive and implement innovations that were considered 
best practice internationally (Peters, 2010).  However, participants described 
organisational change efforts that displayed characteristics of either institutional 
insiders or outsiders, and these were correspondingly effective or ineffective in 
sustaining long-term change and organisational transformation.   
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“We just do it differently”: Innovation and the good news stories 
As discussed in the Background chapter, the era of the Health Funding 
Authority in the 1990s was a potentially fertile historical moment for many “flax 
root” and innovative initiatives to be developed in the community sector.  A 
senior manager from Auckland reminisced that as a funder at that time, he had 
been eager “to invest in the NGO sector as a way to extend and deepen the 
range of experiences that people would have of mental health services” (Senior 
Manager 2, Auckland).  He added that the intention had also been to “expand 
mental health into the community in the way that philosophically it should have 
headed” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  For all participants realising their best 
organisational intentions meant increasing expectations of, and creating 
opportunities for, organisational innovation and transformation.   
There were significant differences among organisations, however, about 
the clarity of their articulation of their organisational vision, values and best 
practices.  Organisations with strong philosophical foundations and values, 
consistently articulated throughout focus groups and interviews, correlated with 
endeavours to be more accountable to their constitutional values than to DHB 
contracts.  Participants, who believed their organisations were effective in terms 
of recovery, all reported various organisational mechanisms for incorporating 
recovery, and synergetic approaches (such as strengths-based practices), 
throughout organisational discourses and communications.  For example, a team 
leader from Christchurch talked about “strong social justice values that have 
been developed and massaged for 100 years at [our national organisation]” 
(Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Christchurch).   
Similarly, the presence of designated peer support teams and \or service 
user leadership within an organisation signalled organisational coherence and 
strength around values.  Other forms of service user involvement also appeared 
to define best practice by removing institutionalised barriers between staff and 
service user.  For instance, one Christchurch organisation had taken “the 
opportunity to put service users in front of other delivery staff in the wider 
organisation” which had the effect of reducing “the barriers between ‘us and 
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them’, and there is much more tolerance and inclusion” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch) 
In some organisations, consumer advisory systems had evolved, from 
service users sitting outside service delivery teams, into fully participatory teams 
where service user voices were incorporated into all stages of organisational 
planning and practices.  Similarly, a senior manager from Hamilton discussed 
their organisational processes aiming to ensure all voices were heard, as having 
“feed-in mechanisms, not feed-back; feed in: The way the people actually want 
things to happen in their service” (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton).  This meant that 
all organisational stakeholders, especially service users, were informing the 
development of services and not merely commenting on the results.  Other 
initiatives around the country included peer support services, peer respite 
services, packages of care, home-based support, community engagement, 
housing and employment support as well as endeavours such as Mad Pride 
concerts, theatrical productions and comedy galas (Platform Trust, 2008).   
Many organisations used websites and newsletters to publish good news 
stories and successful outcomes to ensure the discourse remained alive within 
the organisation and provided a reference for organisational reflection22.  
Communicating a generalised optimism and belief in a person’s capacity for 
creating a great life for themselves in their community also seemed crucial for 
sustaining organisational environments that provided effective support.  This 
senior manager explained that her organisation maintained its connection to the 
values and recovery philosophy because “we have a really strong belief in people 
and in people’s capacity to create a future for themselves” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch). 
Some participant organisations had contracts for peer support work 
teams and these were obviously very successful where they were available.  The 
contracts under which “peers” worked with service users were significantly 
different from those for generic community support workers and generally 
                                                     
22 See for example, http://connectsr.org.nz/, www.framework.org.nz, 
www.wellink.org.nz/, www.centre401.co.nz, www.comcare.org.nz 
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encouraged a greater degree of autonomy for both worker and service user.  
These relational approaches validated the peer relationship and engaged with 
the whole circumstances of a person’s life and community.  They were perceived 
as the most effective in enhancing recovery.  A senior manager from Hamilton 
described a major difference in peer support as not being “fear based”.  Instead, 
relationships were founded on trust and an assumption that people want to get 
better “because nobody wants to stay in that state” (Senior Manager 4, 
Hamilton).  However, it was not evident why the flexibility inherent in peer 
support was not an aspect of other community support work contracts; nor why 
there were no outcome “measures” that evaluated the efficacy of such 
relationships.   
Best practices also seemed to be a function of an organisation’s capacity 
to encourage personal, professional and organisation reflection.  Some 
organisations provided forums for organisational reflection and\or peer 
supervision and one had incorporated a “listening hour” where the CEO made 
herself available once a week just to listen to any member of staff on any issue, 
idea or topic they chose.  Another explained that her organisation had “lots of 
peer mentoring and reflective practice happening [and] we challenge each other 
to do things better” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group B, Christchurch).  Where it was 
working, organisational best practice invariably displayed coherence among 
communicative transparencies, strategic vision, and active engagement with 
community networks.  Participants also invariably emphasised the value of 
service user involvement and peer run services in effective service development 
and some diverse and interesting developments were apparent, although sadly 
these tended to be localised rather than systemic.  
Many participants commended the benefits of a strengths-based 
approach, noting that “having that positive focus consistently, trying to look for 
creative solutions” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch) did not mean ignoring a 
person’s struggles but focused on positive ways of managing them and drawing 
on a person’s strengths to overcome barriers.  However, surprisingly, few 
organisations identified as having an explicitly strengths-based philosophy and 
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the “strengths” discourse appeared to have dissipated from the landscape 
despite appearing in national texts and strategy documents.  One Auckland 
organisation, however, remained committed to this perspective and the CEO 
described how this was sustained throughout organisational discourse and 
practice: 
We are recognised as a strengths-based organisation, so all 
of our staff are specifically trained in the strengths model and 
the strengths approach.  Our language, our culture as an 
organisation, in terms of our rituals and our infrastructure, 
our policies, our organisation infrastructure are laced with 
that notion of recovery as a central tenet and strengths as a 
key to working with people.      
    (Senior Manager 2, Auckland) 
It was apparent that effective innovation still depended on being 
supported by key personnel at the DHBs.  For example, a group of peer support 
workers spoke about an exemplary in-patient service that was embedding 
service user involvement by establishing regular consumer meetings and more 
client-directed initiatives.  However, they added, the service was only developed 
at this site because of the head psychiatrist’s approval, and had not spread to 
other services within the DHB.  Participants also spoke about the importance of 
real, informed choices for service users.  As one service manager worker 
explained, genuine choice is more than, “would you like to be in the acute unit or 
would you like to be in this residential rehab unit?” (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland).  When provided with such an environment and opportunities to make 
important decisions for themselves, participants observed that service users 
quickly gained confidence and self-assertion.   
Invariably, participants made distinctions between the NGOs and clinical 
services based on the provider’s capacity and willingness to be innovative and 
responsive to the holistic needs of service users.  They frequently contrasted 
NGO initiative with a lack of common sense awareness that seemed 
characteristic of a tunnel-vision biomedical approach.  Support Workers from 
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Wellington discussed how their organisation systematically managed a range of 
physical health issues for a person new to their service, including a serious 
hearing problem that had been interpreted by clinical teams as “He grunts when 
he talks”.  One participant found it “amazing that it took one service out of 
probably 10 that he has been in to identify those things.  He has been in those 
services for so long and nobody knew he had a hearing problem.  To me that is 
disgusting” (Support Worker 7, Focus Group A, Wellington).  
Most agreed that establishing good collaborative relationships with 
funders and regional clinical services was essential to effective outcomes for 
service users and the credibility of their own organisations.  However, effective 
relationships appeared to be largely a feature of regional, historical and 
contextual contingencies 
Collaboration, cooperation and common sense: Building effective 
relationships  
An organisation’s relationships with its DHB funders and clinical teams 
had significant effects on its capacity to organise itself as recovery oriented.  
Effective, collaborative relationships were also clearly dependent on the history 
of service development in a region.  Auckland, for example, straddling five DHBs, 
offered opportunities for engagement, coordination and collaboration among 
the community organisations that created some organisational power for 
advocacy and strategies for levelling the playing field over time.  Despite the 
weakening of regional roles and a less favourable funding environment in the 
DHB era, providers there were able to maintain regional networks and sustain 
robust stakeholder involvement in the development of services.  An Auckland 
senior manager described her experience of the importance of regional 
coordination, and the current manager specifically, in advocating for a unique 
niche in the sector.  She stated, “He believes in recovery and he sees that NGOs 
are very effective at delivering some of the innovation around that and they are 
free to do things, less tied up with the bureaucratic requirements”.  Importantly, 
she commented that this enabled the NGO sector in Auckland to “do things 
 346 
differently.  We don’t have to be politically neutral.  And [we] have a very, very 
different driver than clinical [services]” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) 
Senior managers were the participants who were most engaged in 
collaborative arrangements with DHB funders and clinical teams.  Most of this 
cohort were confident about their relationships with DHB personnel, but 
conceded that they required considerable energy - an effort that was not usually 
reciprocated.  As one Senior Manager commented, “We need to put too many 
resources as an organisation into having a good relationship with the funder, 
which you know that is not ideal” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland).  In some cases 
collaboration appeared to be a contractual requirement for the NGOs but not 
clinical services.  A senior manager from Christchurch remarked it was “the 
community organisations that [make the effort] because we are the ones who 
have to demonstrate for our service specifications that we are linking in with 
[them]” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).   
Unfortunately effective relationships also remained heavily dependent on 
the personnel and personalities involved, particularly the attitudes and 
receptivity of clinical or DHB portfolio holders.  An Auckland senior manager 
commented that organisations could only “fight these battles as long as people 
on both sides actually have to turn up and fight them” (Senior Manager 3, 
Auckland).  Another observed that they “didn’t have a great relationship with our 
last funder” but that “the new one is really on the same wave length as us [and] 
she understands what we are doing, which is really useful for us”.  However, she 
admitted that it was “not ideal that driving our collaboration [is] the fact that we 
get on with her” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland). 
Other participants were wary of collaborative arrangements that had the 
appearance of partnerships but reinforced hierarchical relationships between 
NGOs and clinical services.  A team leader from a service user organisation in 
Hamilton described how a representative from the DHB wanted their 
cooperation in the development of a new Integrated Recovery service; 
specifically to identify how it might work.  She described how together they 
“made up a big plan: How we could do that and what would be really cool [and] 
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how we could work together.  [And then] he went away and we never saw him 
again.  [Our work] wasn’t included in it” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton). 
Some participants noted that positive relationships with professionals 
were characterised by a willingness to forgo institutionalised thinking and work 
collaboratively with mutually respectful communication and equitable 
engagement.  This was happening in places and a team leader in Waikato had 
noticed positive changes where “good doctors who will actually look at things 
and [see] that things are not working and actually work through that, and try 
changing things and doing other things”  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group W, 
Waikato). 
A few organisations were engaged in collaborative ventures that 
employed psychologists and other clinical staff.  A team leader from Auckland 
spoke about initial scepticism of a collaborative service established as a “one 
stop shop” in South Auckland.  She explained initial anxieties were that they 
would be “swamped by a clinical model”.  However, she added, in the end, there 
had been a good deal of learning in both directions and that “clinicians have 
moved on themselves hugely” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Auckland).  
Similarly, in Hamilton, a team leader described how it took a new clinical 
coordinator to recognise the need for a totally fresh strategy to resolve a 
situation that had become stagnant and confrontational over several years.  
Changes had meant that the service user was now “the happiest I’ve ever seen 
him.  He goes to see a psychiatrist once every three months, but there’s no 
medication involved.  They’ve got this deal worked out.”  (Team Leader 3, Focus 
Group A, Hamilton)   
Other participants noted the good intentions of some DHB staff, but that 
underlying conflicts in paradigms and values compromised effective 
collaboration.  A senior manager from a service user organisation in Christchurch 
claimed that good will alone was insufficient where conflicting translations of 
recovery were present.  She said, “I see a great keenness and willingness to be 
helpful, I see an urge to be efficient . . . efficient and fast [and] I don’t think that 
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works with a recovery model because [for example] there is a tendency to use 
drugs more quickly than there is to use de-escalation; there is just this straight 
line from the money to the behaviour and they don’t [take] time” (Senior 
Manager 1, Christchurch).  
It was apparent that, in some service environments, inter-organisational 
relationships were improving.  A senior manager from Auckland noted that 
clinical staff had reported favourably on their collaborations with support 
workers saying, “When it works it is fabulous, it cuts down on my workload, it 
cuts down on the number of meetings and assessments and paperwork [and] I 
think we can assume that that is a positive outcome for the client.  [And] there is 
a sense that things are more generally person centred” (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland).  Other participants noted that in some places “clinical teams have 
now started to include the support worker” (Support Worker 3, Focus Group A, 
Wellington) and that they were “starting to pay attention to what [the] service 
user is saying” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group A, Wellington).  Another support 
worker commented that she had observed a psychiatrist who gave a client 
information about a range of medications and let him/her choose his/her own, 
preferred, option.  However, she noted, this was “a first” (Support Worker 7, 
Focus Group A, Wellington).   
Unfortunately, effective relationships appeared to remain largely 
personality driven and therefore idiosyncratic.  One senior manager said, “If we 
have a good support worker and a good clinical key worker, [it] is fantastic, very 
collaborative, very mutually supportive.  If you have a bad support worker and a 
bad clinician then god help you” (Senior Manager 4, Auckland).  Participants also 
noted, somewhat surprisingly, that psychiatrists appeared more receptive to 
challenging traditional professional boundaries than clinical staff lower in the 
hierarchy.  A group of peer support workers noted that recent changes in an in-
patient unit were positive because “the head psychiatrist there is all for it” but 
that was “less so in the clinical and community teams” (Peer Support Worker 6, 
Focus Group PS, Auckland).   
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Participants also commented that when clinical staff were willing to work 
with an expanded sense of a person’s capabilities, strengths and recovery 
aspirations many were pleasantly surprised at the outcomes and relished the 
creative opportunities they offered.  A team leader from Auckland described 
some clinicians as saying “ ‘This is so much fun.’ And [the clinician] has really 
given it their best” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A,  Auckland).   
Most participants positioned themselves, and their organisations, as 
outsiders to strategic change in the sector, but some senior managers, who had 
worked previously in DHB clinical or funding roles, displayed perspectives that 
were more accepting of the status quo, and were thus more typical of 
institutional insiders.  Their talk was noticeably ambivalent with respect to the 
institutions, characterised by phrases such as “just getting on with it” (Senior 
Manager 2, Auckland), and emphasised service improvement rather than radical 
change and organisational transformation.  In the next section I compare these 
endeavours as exemplary of insider or outsider efforts, and examine their utility 
in terms of organisational and system change. 
Struggling to disrupt: Insider versus outsider efforts at sector change 
Maguire and Hardy (2009), noted that institutional insiders tend to 
defend existing practices and participants from insider backgrounds generally 
seemed overly sanguine about how far the system has come towards a recovery 
orientation.  They also adopted a standpoint of improving rather than 
transforming services.  One senior manager, from a clinical and funder 
background, seemed unequivocal in endorsing organisational improvement 
rather than system transformation: 
If we keep striving to improve, then one would hope by 
default our service delivery will get better.  Are we seeing 
enough people?  Do we have the right blend of staff? . . . Is 
the skill mix right? . . . So I think that there are organisational 
improvements that we can always make that will make our 
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service delivery better or even enhance it.   
    (Senior Manager 2, Auckland) 
In contrast, system outsiders, who included most participants and 
especially the peer support workers, are invested in transformational change 
because the status quo typically disadvantages and disempowers them.  People 
with lived experience of psychological distress, for example, have had the most 
to gain by destabilising institutionalised discourses that have accounted for their 
experiences in terms of biomedical pathology.  As outsiders, however, they have 
limited avenues with which to challenge and disrupt institutional powerbases 
and always appeared to be struggling to control the meanings and discourses of 
recovery.  This generally meant that efforts to do so were largely localised and 
mostly ineffectual.  
Participant insiders also appeared tolerant of expediency for the sake of 
organisational sustainability.  An Auckland senior manager admitted that “there 
might be all sorts of expediency and politics, [but] that is just what makes the 
world go around” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland).  Those with DHB backgrounds 
believed this gave them greater insider understanding and a capacity to 
negotiate whereas, in fact, considerable compromise was evident.  Some of 
those from insider DHB backgrounds also acted as “translators”, even attempting 
to reconcile oppositional discourses by positioning bad practices as isolated 
instances rather than systemic.  For example 
I don’t think the conflict is about the medical model and the 
recovery model and the rehab model. I think it is about 
people and their ability to work well together and listen.  
Good clinical Western medical model is about listening, and 
it has been given a very bad name in my view because of very 
bad practitioners.   (Senior Manager 4, Auckland) 
Similarly, insider participants accepted their primary accountability was 
to deliver on their contracts with government funders rather than recovery 
outcomes and service users.  This worked against any systemic will to increase 
flexibility in organisational practices and service delivery models.  One senior 
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manager explained that being contracted meant his organisation “had an 
obligation to meet the demands that those place on us in the first instance” 
(Senior Manager 2, Auckland). 
However, there were also strategic implications for maintaining goodwill 
with DHB funders and several senior managers discussed the need to “make it 
work”.  Some admitted that they self-consciously negotiated for small 
concessions to create some flexibility in contracts.  This was much easier for 
larger organisations or collaborative alliances to effect.  An Auckland senior 
manager remarked,  
Intentionality is about what battles I am going to pick; how I 
am going to turn this relationship into a positive affirming 
relationship; how I am going to build the ‘bank balance’ up, 
so when I need to draw on it I can.  That’s intentional, 
absolutely intentional. (Senior Manager 4, Auckland). 
Another manager, trained as an insider but who of her own volition had 
become a maverick, railed at the inability of insiders to effect transformational 
change.  As she said:  
The minute I [graduated from Occupational Therapy] I saw a 
system that doesn’t even begin to think it is going to help 
people.  It is shocking.  And meanwhile I watch all the 
professional bodies getting more and [more] esteem. Well 
use that [to provide] some leadership, and actually advocate 
for the things that you see around you all the time.  Doctors 
and nurses could have so much influence in our system to 
change things, why are we leaving it to service users. 
    (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton) 
Other maverick insiders also advocated for system transformation from 
the inside out, although they remained aware of the potential risks involved in 
following an unauthorised path.  One senior manager from Wellington argued 
that organisations needed to be “sort of on that boundary edge, that is the area 
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where your best work is [done].  It is stepping in a place where if something does 
go wrong you could really get slammed with it” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).   
Although insider change might be difficult, with privileged groups being 
unable or unwilling to redistribute power and resources, outsider change efforts 
were also frustrated due mainly to their lack of credibility, voice and legitimacy.  
These participants felt discouraged that many opportunities for involvement in 
change were ineffectual because the space was dominated by institutional 
professionals.  A senior manager from Hamilton remarked that forums and 
networks were “actually there for the professionals and for the people who want 
to decide where the money goes.  The people who are interested in how people 
get well aren’t usually at those forums” (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton).   
Others, however, believed there was strength in numbers and that 
provider networks and sector collaboration provided a collective voice and were 
therefore more powerful in effecting sustainable system change.  In Auckland at 
least, provider forums were perceived as effective because “there is mutual gain 
to be had” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  This senior manager added that the 
providers all had “really good experiences under our belt and we will work 
closely together and achieve results which neither of us could have achieved by 
ourselves”.  
Outsider participants regularly engaged in insubordination and chose 
opting out, or “non-compliance”, as a form of resistance.  Some insisted on 
working in accordance with their own values and sense of best practice despite 
the risk of censure.  A service manager from Auckland commented, “We are 
actually doing what we know people want and what works” (Senior Manager 1, 
Auckland).  Other attempts at disruption actively challenged institutional 
processes, some more effectively than others.  A team leader from a family 
support service in Hamilton had developed his own strategy to interrupt the 
revolving door cycle.  He developed a ‘Do not Discharge Home’ letter that went 
into a person’s file.  This meant that clinicians were blocked from discharging 
people to a stressed family environment.  He commented:  
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Of course, when the clinicians see those it gets in their way; 
it gets in their face. But at the end of the day the person 
who’s got the illness is no longer at home where things 
weren’t good.  [It] gives the environment a chance to 
recover. (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton) 
Essentially participants were utilising such strategies to manage the 
conflicts inherent among different translations of what recovery-oriented 
services should look like.  Some endeavoured to instigate organisational change 
by being “non-compliant” and doing what they believed should be done, despite 
contracting and funding limitations.  These efforts were necessarily localised and 
often furtive.  An Auckland participant explained, “If the need is there [a] lot of 
people do it surreptitiously”. However, he added, “if a clinician comes 
along . . . .?” and left the sentence hanging (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, 
Auckland).  Another commented, “I am only supposed to do two projects a year, 
and I am doing four a week.  And [the funders] keep saying to me, ‘You don’t 
need to do that.’  And I say, ‘I do need to do that.’” (Senior Manager 2, 
Hamilton).    
One strategy was to opt out of the system, and its insider processes and 
forums, altogether and focus efforts on transformative change.  This senior 
manager protested, “We could spend the next 20 years commenting on a system 
that we haven’t seen change in the last 10” (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton).  She 
explained that her organisation’s current relationship with the local DHB meant,  
We are not even interested.  I do not want to comment on 
their system.  If it steps on our toes I will say something, but 
I am not going out of my building to get involved, I am not 
interested anymore in what they are doing.  All of our energy 
will go into creating something different.   
    (Senior Manager 4, Hamilton) 
While such activities helped participants feel more assertive, they had 
little or no effect on system change.  Many participants expressed frustration 
that even common sense actions, fundamental when working with someone to 
 354 
reconnect them to their lives and communities, were ignored or devalued by 
DHB goal planners.  A senior manager from Christchurch compared this to 
“sticking things around a person, like a finger in the dyke” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch).  She went on to say, “If someone is struggling with managing their 
household stuff, [they] give them a housekeeper and a gardener or something 
like that.  And then that just gets tacked on. Nobody suggests why don’t you 
have a community support worker?  Who sits side by side with the person and 
teaches them how to do that stuff.  And the [service users] become 
disempowered” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  
Instead a great deal of participants’ energy was being expended in 
struggling to meet the needs of service users as well as the requirements of their 
contracts.  This was particularly frustrating as they all had great stories of 
successful outcomes for service users and best practices for a recovery 
orientation in their organisations, but these innovative ways of working were still 
not becoming the sector norm.  In the next section I examine how participants 
discussed possible and future strategies change in their organisations and the 
wider mental health sector.   
Future trends and the way things “should” be 
Some participants discussed strategies for developing a greater degree of 
organisational autonomy.  It was apparent they had carefully thought through 
these initiatives, “with the power of consumer voice behind them, and staff voice 
you know; we don’t just pluck them out of the air”, one senior manager 
explained (Senior Manager 4 Auckland).  Several organisations were actively 
seeking alternative sources of funding to reduce their dependency on DHBs and 
establish a sustainable entity that “wouldn’t collapse if it lost all of its contracts” 
(Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  Another senior manager noticed that a trend 
towards more collaborative practice was becoming informed by ”what is best for 
consumers, what the research is saying, about integrated treatment being better 
for outcomes”.  She was hopeful that the trend would continue and not be 
influenced by resourcing issues i.e. “an expectation that we do more for less 
money” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  Others believed political activism was a 
 355 
necessary stratagem to create social awareness and influence environmental 
change.  
However, most noted that the factors most likely to impeded positive 
change were resourcing problems; with DHBs increasingly needing to rely on 
community NGOs as partners because they are cheaper but also because there 
are worldwide shortages in clinical staff.  Several viewed this circumstance as an 
opportunity to improve service user experience throughout the system.  For 
example, in Auckland at least, there were moves to provide respite care in a 
person’s home and one senior manager believed that there were indications that 
this would continue.  As he commented: “We are lucky here that Aotearoa\New 
Zealand has a very strong consumer movement which is a lot more effective in 
driving change in the [community] sector because they don’t have their hands in 
their wallets” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland). 
Many participants echoed the sentiment that the DHB clinical and 
funding arms needed to educate themselves about what the NGOs were and 
could be doing; especially what was already working in terms of people’s 
recovery journeys through the mental health system.  A support worker from 
Christchurch thought that someone with authority needed to spend time with 
different organisations and “watch what goes on and just learn. And then at the 
end they are going to be able to say, ‘these organisations are doing really well, 
these other ones may be not good for the future.’” (Support Worker 3, Focus 
Group S, Christchurch).   
Others stressed the importance of the support worker role and this was 
reinforced by the perspectives of participants who also had personal experience 
of serious psychological distress.  Some noted that previously people “were 
taken out of hospital and dumped in the community again and that was it” (Peer 
Support Worker 3, Focus Group PS, Auckland) whereas now community support 
workers were available.  While this was seen as a positive for service users, there 
was scepticism about “whether it has any clout at the moment in changing the 
mental health [sector]” (Peer Support Worker 1, Focus Group PS, Auckland). 
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Others were cautiously optimistic that more collaborative projects and 
relationships were happening with a senior manager noting that people in the 
sector were now talking about collaboration and “recognition of the need for 
that”.  But, again, she reflected, “there is not always a smooth transition” and 
that was “based around personality and history” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  
On the other hand, significant national strategy and policy texts increasingly 
referred to the “changing nature of the workforce” and trends in “workforce 
mix”, but this applied only to clinical or other health professionals such as social 
workers and occupational therapists.  This further reinforced the impression that 
NGOs were being systematically devalued and discounted as important 
contributors to a recovery-oriented mental health sector.  
In the end, most participants displayed little confidence that their efforts, 
from within the NGOs, were effective in disrupting and destabilising institutional 
forces.  Many echoed Mary O’Hagan (2009) in referring to the colonisation of 
recovery and several compared the optimism of the Blueprint (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998) era in the mid-1990s with what they saw as worrying trends 
happening currently.  One senior manager from Wellington expressed his dismay 
that, having thought a more enlightened era was on the horizon, in fact it was “a 
big dark hole now”.  He said, “You wouldn’t think you would lose ground so 
much” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington).   
In the next section, I explore the ways in which the institutions could be 
seen to defend themselves from threats to their power and legitimacy.    
The empire strikes back: Counter challenges and defensive institutional 
work 
In addition to the various discursive strategies discussed previously, the 
institutions could be seen to actively employ a range of strategies to 
systematically defend against organisational and sector change in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand mental health services.  They effectively defended challenges to their 
power, legitimacy and authority, while resisting emergent discourses of recovery 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  The findings of this research 
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highlighted strategies of defensive institutional work that included overt hostility 
to the NGOs as well as systematic efforts to ignore and devalue their roles.  They 
also indicated significant institutional backlash at recovery itself.  Relationship 
asymmetries between NGOs and DHBs were frequently exploited resulting in 
contracting and service specifications that increased clinical oversight and risk 
management practices that effectively curbed the autonomy of the community 
organisations.   
Many of these defensive strategies were evident at national, and even 
international, levels; including a global move towards evidence-based practice 
that reasserted biomedical epistemological dominance and illustrated discursive 
closure around the nature of valid “evidence”.  But increasingly evident, since 
the establishment of the DHBs, were strategies that systematically eroded the 
voices and independence of the community NGOs as credible participants in the 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector. 
In this section, therefore, I look first at examples of how the institutions, 
especially those sanctioning biomedicine, positioned themselves as “embattled”, 
or under threat.  In addition, I examine how biomedical professionals responded 
to crises or incidents by blaming community expectations, individuals and the 
NGOs.  I then consider evidence of a clinical backlash against mental health 
services for being “too far down the recovery road”, followed by examples of 
actively hostile acts towards some NGOs perceived as troublemakers.  A further 
discussion highlights how participants believed they were increasingly being 
devalued or ignored by DHB personnel as institutional agents.  There was also 
evidence of the erosion of the “new” subject positions as well as lip service, or 
tokenism, towards recovery and system change.  Fourth, I examine the strategies 
used to pull community organisations firmly under the clinical umbrella in order 
to keep them compliant and subordinate.  Finally, I examine how many 
participants believed that their organisations were being systematically funded 
to fail. 
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Under threat: Positioning the institutions as embattled 
The institutions, and especially biomedicine, increasingly positioned 
themselves as embattled, or under threat, in sector texts (Ministry of Health, 
2001a).  These included disingenuous, and contradictory, assertions that shifted 
responsibility for mental health service “failures” onto individuals or 
communities, and minimised or discounted organisational, political and social 
realities.  For example, clinical professionals and others typically responded to 
reports of crises and service failures in the media as the inevitable result of 
clinical staff shortages or by blaming other sector stakeholders (Mason, 1996; 
Ministry of Health, 2001a, 2012; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2009).  This deflected 
attention away from any institutional accountability; despite the basis of 
professional, legitimised authority being their mandated responsibility for the 
behaviour of individuals and the safety of communities.   
At first sight, it appeared that the institutions sought to be excused their 
failings because their power was accepted reluctantly.  Even the Mental Health 
Advocacy Coalition (2008) appeared to be tolerant of clinical services on the 
basis of their “politically charged role of containing and controlling some 
people”, while simultaneously acknowledging that these services tended to “lose 
their focus on the needs and views of people who use them” (p. 26).  The 
coalition also implied that communities themselves were responsible for an 
undue burden on biomedical professionals, because they “have abdicated all 
responsibility for people with severe mental distress to mental health experts 
and services” adding that “if something goes wrong mental health services are 
habitually blamed” (MHAC, 2008, p. 26).  Yet, one of many clinical submissions to 
the non-clinical services review insisted, “the specialist service must be in the 
lead role, assessing the clinical risk and providing continuity of care” (Ministry of 
Health, 2001a, p. 43).  Additionally, given the privileged voice of medical 
practitioners in determining mental health policy and practice, the argument of 
responsibility reluctantly accepted seemed rather tautological.  
Subtle, and not so subtle, references to dangerousness and risk 
reinforced the socially normative justification of the “responsibility of clinicians” 
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and the “expectations of the community” (Ministry of Health, 2001a).  
Unfortunately, clinical narratives of risk, fuelled by sensationalised media events, 
fed risk-averse practices such as the use of compulsory treatment, locked wards 
and security guards.  Some participants also appeared to blame social attitudes 
for risk-averse environments without recognising or challenging this as a strategy 
that maintained bio-medical and managerial institutional power.  However, 
others were conscious that some professionals wanted to have it both ways.  A 
senior manager from Christchurch remarked that the clinicians’ stance on risk 
was about “covering one’s butt” and she was sceptical about the rationale that 
they “are the ones that end up in the coroner’s court”.  She argued, “Actually 
everybody who works with the person will end up in a coroner’s court if what 
they have done is not to the best of their ability” (Senior Manager 2, 
Christchurch). 
Risk aversion policies, practices and procedures functioned as 
mechanisms that constrained organisational practices and defended the 
institutions against innovation and change.  A senior manager from Auckland 
maintained that the emphasis on risk management merely served to reinforce 
relationships of power and devalued the role of the NGOs.  She explained that 
clinical services held the attitude that they “hold the risk things, so ‘you must be 
directed by us’ [and] that we will do the cups of tea and shops that kind of stuff” 
(Senior Manager 1, Auckland).  Another remarked, with irony, that “It is 
obviously much safer if psychiatrist is king” (Senior Manager 3, Wellington).   
The insistence on risk management also encouraged a renewed emphasis 
on negative reporting and incident recording.  A senior manager from Auckland 
reported an auditor’s alarm that her organisation was, “ignoring our 
responsibility to at least report, in terms of what was going on, in a negative 
way” (Senior Manager 5, Auckland).  Another participant noted that “There are 
so many fears around risk, because of different things, that you can lose sight of 
the fantastic things that [we are doing]” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  
The sense that the institutions, embodied in the DHBs, considered 
themselves to be under threat and needed to reclaim the territory was also 
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indicative of a defensive institutional backlash against recovery itself.  Managing 
the clinical community organisational boundary, therefore, meant withstanding 
the consequences of resistance or an institutional backlash.  This form of 
defensive work was the major barrier to the development of a unique niche and 
identity for the community mental health sector.   
Too far down the recovery road: The institutional backlash 
Alternative discourses such as recovery have provoked significant critical 
backlashes from psychiatry and other clinical professions (Craddock et al., 2008; 
Davidson et al., 2006; Ministry of Health, 2001), although some professionals 
were equally vehement advocates for change (Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Barker 
& Buchanan-Barker, 2011).  Several participants spoke about a clinical backlash 
that included punitive consequences for individuals and organisations perceived 
as being too recovery oriented.  This echoed concerns in some clinical literature 
that recovery was merely an irresponsible fad (Davidson et al., 2006).  A senior 
manager from Auckland, speaking about recent reviews of the Auckland hospital 
acute facility, the Connelly Unit23 ,remarked that, “The clinical director lost his 
position because of the perception that they had travelled too far down the 
recovery track” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).   
These institutional counter-challenges to recovery were clearly motivated 
by a desire to defend institutional power rather than any consideration of 
beneficial outcomes for service users.  As one senior manager from Wellington 
explained, “None of the rationale about this is that [we] are going to be more 
effective in terms of helping people regain their lives” (Senior Manager 2, 
Wellington); another added, or “how we will stop that injury that happens to 
people who go into the unit on top of their illness” (Senior Manager 5, 
Wellington).   
In addition, and perhaps more insidiously, there was a sense that, for 
clinical and DHB services, recovery had merely been an aberration in the 
“natural” flow of ideas over time.  This was echoed by some participants as a 
                                                     
23 An acute, high and complex needs hospital facility in Auckland. 
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kind of insider resignation which reinforced the clinical backlash apparent in 
some of the literature (Craddock et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2006).  A senior 
manager in Auckland remarked that “recovery now has had its time, and it just 
seems to be the natural order of things”.  He was also unconcerned that 
“different people in different parts of the sector use [recovery] in different ways, 
and that is fine” (Senior Manager 2, Auckland). 
In contrast, the submissions of service users and others to the non-clinical 
services review (Ministry of Health, 2001) invariably referred to recovery 
principles and the importance of a holistic approach to mental health services.  
These submissions warned that “proposed [clinically-based needs assessment] 
models would result in lack of choice and responsiveness to local issues” and 
concluded that clinical models “create uniformity for the sake of it” (Ministry of 
Health, 2001a, p. 32).  Yet clinical responses to the review were frequently 
defensive.  One clinician, for example, was aghast at the proposal that needs 
assessors or support coordinators “without a health professional qualification 
[could] assess consumer needs” (Ministry of Health, 2001a, p. 22).     
It was evident that the hierarchical boundary between clinical and 
community NGOs was strongly demarcated, and vigorously defended, by most 
clinical services and other institutional agents.  In some cases their relationships 
with NGOs were overtly hostile and exacerbated by an apparent intention, in 
several regions, to further undermine the NGO sector. 
Hostile environments: What we do with troublemakers 
Participants were aware that positive circumstances could change 
without warning as the institutions defended themselves against encroachment 
on the territory.  The senior manager group in Wellington spoke about a five year 
era where there had been “a constellation of favourable factors for recovery” 
(Senior Manager 4, Wellington) in their DHB region; collaboration had focused on 
recovery and DHB staff were purposeful about looking for alternative ways to 
deliver many of the services in the region.  Everyone, including psychiatrists, was 
trained in intentional peer support.  But when key personnel at the DHB were 
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replaced “a very exciting process [became] a very frustrating and then 
devastating process in the end” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington) and the “climate 
that was very, very favourable [became] very, very unfavourable, and discussions 
seem to have gone back 10 years” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington)  
Several participants, from throughout the country, reported that DHB 
funders exploited their power to advance their own interests at the expense of 
the NGOs.  In one instance, an independent review evaluated all youth services 
in the area and the results “really upset the applecart” as one participant put it 
(Senior Manager 1, Hamilton).  And yet, “the contract was taken off the ones 
that the [review] said were cool [and] given to the two [DHB] ones that weren’t 
rated so well” (Team Leader 4, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Others questioned 
how they could “beat that system when you know you are doing a good job, that 
you have the results” and when “clients who are totally unhappy about what is 
happening, and it is completely out of your hands” (Support Worker 3, Focus 
Group S, Christchurch).   
Others were disturbed about having to take a defensive approach to 
service delivery to cover contingencies, and in the worst cases some 
organisations saw themselves under threat from their DHB contractors.  For 
example, a senior manager from Wellington explained that it was hard not to be 
constantly warning staff to “be careful please; count everything, please record 
everything” rather than “having a healthy, open, creative way to approach our 
service users [just] to cover ourselves, for no positive reason”  (Senior Manager 
4, Wellington).   
However, participants were wary of the threats posed by challenging 
these circumstances or even advocating on their own behalf.  One senior 
manager remarked that “we are in too vulnerable a position to be whistle 
blowing” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington), while team leader from Hamilton 
observed that “the power that the DHB has to be able to pull funding if you don’t 
play the game as an NGO” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton).   
Asymmetrical relationships with DHBs created many vulnerabilities for 
the community NGOs.  In one instance, a group of Senior Managers discussed 
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being effectively immobilised by DHB funders simply rebuffing attempts to 
engage with them.  One observed that the emails of their CEO “are not even 
being acknowledged” (Senior Manager 4, Wellington) with another describing 
being stonewalled as “a really horrible experience” (Senior Manager 3, 
Wellington).  This sense of a potentially hostile environment was apparent at all 
levels of inter-organisational relationships and the costs of compliance seemed 
to require a disproportionate amount of effort and energy for the NGOs.   
In addition, several participants, from all regions, spoke of personnel and 
role changes within the DHBs as being highly reactive.  An organisation in 
Wellington, for example, who had established very effective relationships with 
previous DHB portfolio holders, experienced a change in personnel that was 
dramatic and hostile.  One remembered that an “overcorrection came in a pretty 
devastating way” and that the organisation had been “served up a surprise audit 
which was pretty vicious and hostile” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  This was 
contrasted with previously effective relationships among NGOs and DHB 
personnel:   
The previous [DHB] regime several times got NGOs together, 
when there was [any] critical situation with the ward and 
[we] came up with solutions.  This lot are having no dialogue 
as far as we know . . . with the previous regime there would 
have been a supportive learning approach to any incident, 
and with this one it will be used to hang the NGOs out to dry.
    (Senior Manager 1, Wellington) 
The theme of stifled innovation was recurrent and initiatives from NGOs 
appeared frequently to be ignored, unsupported or actively undermined.  Many 
participants were worried about the trend for the community organisations to 
become more clinically focussed.  A support worker from Wellington was 
concerned that “out there, in DHB land” this would “kill all this stuff, the creative 
[stuff], this being in the world [of the service user] and finding out what is going 
to work for them” (Support Worker 6, Focus Group PS, Wellington).  A 
participant from Hamilton commented that “No matter how innovative NGOs 
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can be, or anything else, it’s still driven by medical decisions by clinicians” (Team 
Leader 3, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  She added that if clinicians are “very risk 
averse, [and] draconian” then “you can’t do anything innovative if they are 
vetoing it” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Similarly, an organisation 
involved in the proposed development of an innovative community service 
provoked a sharp counter attack based on “the usual things.  That it wouldn’t be 
safe was their most loud concern: it wasn’t a locked environment; NGOs don’t 
know how to employ clinical staff; the usual” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington). 
In general, DHB efforts to declare their authority was exemplified by the 
increasing trend to dismiss and devalue the role of the NGOs.  In fact, trends that 
promoted the development of the peer support workforce appeared to have 
done so at the expense of a niche for generic community support and the NGOs, 
and deflected attention away from their role in sector transformation.   
If we ignore you, will you go away 
Discursive closure was effectively employed as a defensive strategy when 
participants tried to engage DHB managers with alternative discourses of 
organisational transformation and institutional change.  A senior manager from 
Wellington explained that, despite his organisation having international renown 
for leading innovation and best practice, “the new [funders] don’t know anyone 
in the mental health sector, so our literature and [international] support means 
nothing to them because they don’t understand how important it is; they don’t 
know the people [or] which ones to listen to” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington).  
Several participants commented that some DHBs sought to further 
reduce the legitimacy and power of the NGOs by actively eroding relationships 
on the basis that “there were too many providers anyway” (Team Leader 4, 
Focus Group A, Christchurch).  This diminished any influence the NGOs might 
retain because the DHBs were “not worried about their relationship with us” 
(Senior Manager 3, Auckland). 
Similarly, the same group discussed how the DHB used “silence in a very 
strategic way” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  One explained that they were 
 365 
often told that “issues would be resolved at the next meeting but “then you 
don’t hear about it again.  He added that when the organisation’s Board wrote to 
their DHB portfolio manager to raise their concerns it had “never been 
answered” (Senior Manager 2, Wellington).  Other participants reported that 
DHBs were often tokenistic in an appearance of progress while systematically 
devaluing the role of the NGOs.  A team leader from Christchurch remarked, that 
despite regular meetings “things don’t always progress any further, I would like 
to say some of it is a complete waste of time” (Team Leader 2, Focus Group A, 
Christchurch).  
These NGOs’ frustration was frequently accompanied by disappointment 
that initiatives which had the appearance of progress had turned out to be mere 
window dressing.  For instance several participants commented on new 
reporting requirements that included a narrative component.  These had been 
welcomed initially as opportunities to tell the good news stories of successful 
recovery.  But people became disillusioned when it was apparent that these 
were not influencing service specifications.  In many cases it was not clear that 
these narratives were even read, let alone having any efficacy in determining 
policy direction.  For instance: 
I stopped doing those stories when [the DHB] came to us 
once and said, “We would like you to give us a whole lot of 
good stories and bad stories.”  I said “I have been sending you 
two a month for the last three years.”  I am not writing 
anymore.  You know it was ridiculous, where are they?  
  (Support Worker 8, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
Overall, participants were sceptical that their voices were included in 
sector change efforts; nor did they think these reflected the community 
organisations’ values or discourses of recovery.  They were unconvinced that the 
information being gathered from them, and about them, was leading to tangible, 
observable change in policy and service specifications, let alone whole system 
transformation.  Many concluded that the “wrong” data was continuously being 
fed into planning and service development rather than accounts which actually 
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represented what was working well in their organisations.  One senior manager 
described reporting requirements as “the most bizarre questions” (Senior 
Manager 2, Christchurch) in terms of what the organisation was actually doing.  
Others were frustrated by a general lack of feedback from DHB portfolio 
managers.  
We had an audit, and there was no real feedback about some 
of the things that we had put in place, the innovative 
approaches, that sort of thing.  They wanted to hear about it, 
they wanted us to evidence it, and so we did, but again there 
was no feedback in regard to those things that we were 
doing.  (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, Christchurch) 
Others had attempted to compensate for statistical reporting by 
developing their own, more meaningful, processes to record what “really 
counted” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch).  Although such attempts meant 
“quite a bit of work for us” they reported that staff felt “quite energised about it.  
For the first time they are actually recording what they do, which is good [and] 
they are really happy about that” (Senior Manager 2, Christchurch 
It was also apparent that institutional defensive work included the 
systematic erosion of the new subject positions of the recovery era.  A steady 
decrease over time was apparent in references to the important role of 
community organisations in national texts; alongside a corresponding increase in 
emphasis on assumptions of clinical superiority, efficacy and benevolence 
(Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2012c).  Similarly, reference to the harmful 
impacts of treatment services on people’s lives had all but vanished from 
national policy and strategy documents.  The role of the Mental Health 
Commission (2012a, 2012b) was similarly eroded when the constitutional 
requirement for at least one commissioner to be a person with experience of 
serious psychological distress was removed.  This was followed shortly 
afterwards by the dissolution of the Mental Health Commission itself in 2012.   
DHB staff also used their power to stall new initiatives with tactics such as 
not referring to new services.  Designated peer support workers reported that, 
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even when psychiatrists supported their work, they were frequently “being 
blocked, it is not being allowed” (Peer Support Worker 5, Focus Group PS, 
Auckland) by clinical staff further down the hierarchy.  Similarly, a team leader in 
Auckland explained that a pilot project which “everybody said was a really good 
idea” was stonewalled because “referrals were very, very slow in coming 
through” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Auckland).  She believed that this was 
because DHB staff were “reluctant to relinquish some of their control [and] to try 
new things” (Team Leader 5, Focus Group A, Auckland).  Similarly, new services 
were not being promoted and a peer support worker in Auckland commented 
that “It seems to be down to the management at those places as to how openly 
our service is accepted and how the information is passed onto people”(Peer 
Support Worker 2, Focus Group PS, Auckland). 
These tactics were accompanied by an increasing insistence in contracting 
on “clinical oversight” of the NGOs, which could be seen as a defensive move by 
DHBs to increase control over these organisations and block alternative practice 
models.     
Being pulled under the clinical umbrella 
Most participants reported the NGOs being pulled under an ever 
enlarging clinical umbrella; thus formalising their positions of subordination.  “All 
our contracts are linked to ensuring that our clients have a clinical manager” 
stated one senior manager (Senior Manager 3, Christchurch).  Many were 
concerned that people wishing to be referred to services such as peer support 
were required by the DHB to have a clinical assessment, or in other words they 
needed to have the “label” before they could get support which many were 
reluctant to do.  Others remarked that their organisations were having to 
become more clinically focused.  For example, one support worker noted that: 
“We now have a clinical advisor which we never had before.  [We]used to [pride 
ourselves on being] a non-clinical organisation” (Support Worker 1, Focus Group 
A, Wellington). 
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Some participants hoped that the establishment of collaborative one stop 
shops would increase the legitimacy and credibility of the non-government 
sector; but it was evident that many of these arrangements merely reasserted 
clinical dominance.  A manager from Auckland admitted that it was “difficult to 
promote truly collaborative practice which isn’t just about ‘Let’s get together to 
talk about what you have done wrong’” (Senior Manager 1, Auckland).   
Many of these new arrangements and requirements utilised the 
discourses of “risk” and “risk management” to further bolster clinical authority.  
A team leader in Wellington described being compelled to follow the strict 
guidelines of their contracting requirements, saying, “If we try to deviate from 
these instructions, then we are not cooperating with primary clinicians and 
‘What kind of organisation are you that can’t follow these simple instructions?’”  
(Team Leader 1, Focus Group B, Wellington).  Other participants were similarly 
anxious about the consequences of non-compliance with one senior manager 
stating that “we don’t dare to miss risk management [and] that is why I am in 
trouble with CAT24 again” (Senior Manager 6, Wellington).   
All of these institutional arrangements defended themselves against 
disruption by reining in the activities of the community organisations.  
Participants believed these strategies, including the withholding of funds and 
resources, were deployed to undermine the NGOs particularly when they were 
offering alternative, innovative services.   
Being funded to fail: Where does all the money go?  
Creating an uncertain funding environment worked as a defensive 
institutional strategy because it interfered with strategic service and 
organisational development.  A senior manager from Wellington described how 
difficult it was to get information about future planning from DHB portfolio 
holders and believed this was another strategy of control over the NGOs.  He 
noted that their DHB CEO, “openly says he is not into that stuff  . . . planning, 
                                                     
24 CAT refers to the Crisis Assessment Team of Adult Mental Health Services within the DHB 
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strategic planning, consultation, he openly says those things.  Every [other] voice 
has [therefore] been disempowered” (Senior Manager 5, Wellington).   
Several participants discussed DHB expectations being increasingly 
difficult to manage and some believed they were being “funded to fail” (Team 
Leader 5, Focus Group A, Hamilton).  Many claimed their organisations were 
expected to provide more service with less resourcing, which inevitably squeezed 
frontline services and restricted the activities most participants and service users 
believed were priorities.  A senior manager from Christchurch firmly believed 
that curtailing funding was also a serious block to organisational and sector 
transformation, interpreting messages from the DHB as, “You are not getting 
dumped, but you will never grow”.  She went on to add that underfunding 
limited their capacity to retain good staff and that it was “hard to manage an 
extremely efficient effective service when wages are the thing that no-one will 
fund”.  She concluded that for her organisation it was “a matter of accepting 
whatever the DHB can offer you and scrabbling around everywhere else for 
whatever else you can grab, and getting by, and underpaying fabulous staff” 
(Senior Manager 1, Christchurch). 
Many, from throughout the country, reported that funding increases 
given to DHBs for cost of living adjustments, service establishment costs and 
other necessary administration were not being passed on, “leaving the NGOs 
significantly underfunded for providing the same services” (Platform Trust, 
2008).  The DHBs were also, typically, described as being “reluctant to give you 
enough money, enough to cover overheads; just” (Senior Manager 2, 
Wellington).  A team leader from Hamilton, somewhat cynically, remarked the 
local DHB was “particularly conservative in how they dole out money for people; 
to anything that is not for them really” (Team Leader 3, Focus Group A, 
Hamilton).  In similar vein, a team leader from Auckland commented that her 
“perception is that they will side with their colleagues if there is competition 
between a DHB to provide a service and an NGO” (Team Leader 1, Focus Group 
A, Auckland).  All of which appeared to be tactics to strengthen and defend 
institutional power at the expense of the NGOs. 
 370 
Many participants believed that, rather than service excellence and best 
practice being the basis for funding, organisations found themselves working “to 
their contracts in the sense that it was purely around the money, and not around 
the outcome” (Senior Manager 2, Hamilton).  Several reported that the biggest 
impacts of budget constraints were on activities that enabled support workers to 
connect service users with their community.  “I mean you can’t have an ordinary 
life if you can’t go to the beach, or go to the movies, or whatever it is that you 
want to do . . . You just can’t do these things that we take for granted” said one 
team leader (Team Leader 6, Focus Group H, Hamilton).  
Funding inequities were galling for participants, especially because 
increases were not being directed to the community organisations but, 
invariably, “still going to the wards” (Support Worker 8, Focus Group A, 
Wellington).  One support worker challenged the DHB to “get its arse down here 
to where the work is really done” (Support Worker 5, Focus Group A, Wellington) 
and participants were unequivocal that the work they did was significant, 
actively reduced the number of hospital admissions and saved the country 
millions of dollars.   
Conclusion  
Participants from the NGOs used a variety of strategies that challenged, 
problematised, and resisted institutional authority over their organisational 
environments and practices.  However, these were variable in effect, mostly 
localised and displayed strong regional tendencies.  In particular, the 
effectiveness of these strategies was determined by the quality of relationships 
that organisations had with their DHB clinical teams and funders.  Even where 
effective relationships were apparent, it was evident that the NGOs expended 
considerably more energy and effort at maintaining these than did their DHB 
counterparts.   
Social attitudes to institutionalised mental healthcare appeared to have 
changed over several decades, due in part to tensions between individualistic 
and social, or community, approaches.  However, it was also apparent that 
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socially naturalised reproductions of biomedical and managerial power 
reinforced the normalisation of coercion, powerlessness, chronicity, and poverty 
for people with lived experience of serious psychological distress.  Despite this, a 
growing resistance to professionalism was apparent that undermined 
institutionalised assumptions of medical benevolence, expertise and moral 
authority (Warriner, 2010).   
Challenging the institutions and explicitly valorising recovery as national 
policy, meant validating and privileging the voices of service users in 
organisational planning and development.  Intentional peer support teams, 
where these were contractually available were very effective but this growth 
appeared to have been at the expense of the NGO sector, which has continued 
to be underfunded and systematically devalued.  This has seriously compromised 
their capacity to be innovative, in line with their constitutional values, and 
strategic in their long term organisational development of a recovery orientation.   
The distinction between insider and outsider perspectives was apparent 
where participants from DHB backgrounds, while often providing knowledgeable 
and strategic leadership, seemed to do so at the expense of genuine 
organisational transformation and institutional disruption.  These participants 
were more likely to express confidence in current change efforts and 
improvements rather than radical transformation.  In contrast, service users and 
the community NGOs, as institutional outsiders, were clearly constrained by their 
financial vulnerability and dependency on the DHBs and were required to meet 
contracting expectations that frequently worked against their organisational 
values and conceptualisations of recovery.  
Participants indicated that recovery outcomes, such as community 
participation, were routinely overridden by other agendas and a drive to reduce 
costs through rigid purchasing models inhibited innovation and strategic service 
development of the NGOs.  The contracting power of the DHBs also exacerbated 
the chronic underfunding of the NGOs.  DHB clinical services were invariably the 
largest service provider in their local area and it was inevitable, and perhaps 
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unsurprising, that the majority of DHB funding went to their own clinical and 
hospital services.   
Discursive strategies such as translation, strategic ambiguity and 
discursive closure were seen to do generalised, institutional defensive work.  
Evidence from participants suggested considerable disillusionment with 
institutionalised translations of recovery that had infiltrated their organisational 
environments.  These appeared to work against attempts to disrupt the 
institutions by diminishing the power of alternative discourses.   
Particular strategies of defensive institutional work were also evident as 
the institutions of the DHBs reacted to challenges to their socially legitimised 
authority and defended themselves against institutional change and sector 
transformation.  The institutions, particularly clinical services, positioned 
themselves as under threat and this had provoked a backlash against recovery 
itself as well as creating an uncertain, sometimes hostile environment for the 
NGOs.  These defensive strategies increasingly devalued and discounted the 
NGOs.  They could be overt and direct, like challenging the credibility and 
reasonableness of service users, support workers and community organisations, 
or strategically silent and dismissive.  In addition contractual requirements that 
reduced the autonomy of the community organisations increasingly brought 
them back under a clinical umbrella also maintained institutional control.   
In the Discussion chapter that follows, I summarise the findings in terms 
of their theoretical and practical implications for improving the credibility and 
legitimacy of community NGOs in the Aotearoa\New Zealand  mental health 
sector.  Specifically, I discuss how less powerful actors and groups, such as these 
organisations and people with lived experience of psychological distress, might 
act to resolve tensions at the discursive boundaries with powerful 
institutionalised groups.   And, most importantly, how they might establish 
alternative discourses and practices in heavily institutionalised fields.  
   
 373 
Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusion 
Reinvention is not changing what is, but creating what isn’t.  
A butterfly is not an improved caterpillar; a butterfly is a 
different creature. 
   Goss, Pascale and Athos (1993, p. 98) 
Traditional mental health services are influenced by multiple, interacting 
factors from both within and beyond organisational boundaries; all of which may 
both enable and constrain the possibilities for organisational and institutional 
change.  Critical and postmodern scholarship provided a rationale for utilising the 
framework of problematics for organisational communication research 
developed by Dennis Mumby and Cynthia Stohl (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  
This framework enabled me to untangle the complex weave of interacting 
influences, and illuminate the institutional dynamics that are affecting the 
emerging identity and organisational transformation of the community NGO 
sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand, in terms of their intentions to become 
“recovery-oriented”.  This approach was particularly important within the fields 
of health and mental healthcare where a socially normalised, scientific 
biomedical model has remained dominant in the organising of mental health 
care (Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Kecmanovic & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2010; Pilgrim, 
2007; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2003; John Read, 2005).  It is significant that most 
critiques of these fields have occurred outside orthodox biomedicine and 
psychiatry. 
Internationally, mental health systems and organisations have been 
undergoing significant reform for several decades (see for example, Ashton et al., 
2005; Barker, 2003; Bel & Lindley, 2005; W. Brunton, 2004; Fisher, 1994a, 1994b; 
Jacobson & Curtis, 2000; S. Rose, 2000).  The progress of this reform has been 
influenced, and sometimes constrained, by a complex inter-relationship of 
contributory factors, all of which have impacted on the everyday practices and 
organisational realities of the community organisations (Harrison, 2010; 
O’Hagan, 1999; Peters, 2009, 2010; Warriner, 2001, 2010).  These factors have 
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included the introduction of a recovery philosophy that has worked in 
conjunction with growing civil and human rights movements throughout the 
Western world (Chamberlin, 1998; Mental Health Commission, 1998b; O’Hagan, 
2009c; Jacob Read, 2003a; Warner, 2004).  Alternative explanatory models, 
treatment responses and strategies for recovery from the impacts of serious 
psychological distress were articulated, and grounded in the narrative accounts 
of people with lived experience of extreme states of distress (see for example, 
Deegan, 1988, 1996; Leibrich, 2000; O’Hagan, 1998, 2004; Ridgeway, 2001).   
The arguments presented here are not intended to be critical of 
biomedicine itself, nor even of fiscally responsible managerial practices.  Many 
self-evident “goods” have come from biomedical science, even in mental health.  
However, what emerged clearly from the data was that the institutions cut a 
broad swathe and their socially normalised control over the organising of mental 
service delivery, strategy, and reform, had serious implications for service users 
and the community organisations.  The culturally embedded biomedical model 
had naturalised most of our beliefs about health, illness, treatment and 
individual responsibilities for health.  As a result, the discursive rules for talking 
about mental “illness” were constructed so that some possibilities for treatment 
responses and outcomes were realised rather than others, and those tended to 
ignore the circumstantial determinants of well-being and wider social change.   
Recovery, on the other hand, emphasised the community aspects of well-
being and challenged inequitable, individualistic approaches to the kinds of social 
organisation inherent in Western capitalist societies.  The NGOs have thus been 
caught in a space between conflicting sets of values and have had to constantly 
negotiate the boundaries between them.   
In this chapter, I first discuss the findings and analysis with specific 
reference to the implementation of a recovery-orientation in the mental health 
organisations of Aotearoa\New Zealand.  The findings demonstrated various 
efforts to challenge social and institutional norms and shift the boundaries that 
defined sector relationships and the rules of engagement in mental health 
services.  I then show how socially normative rationalities underpin institutional 
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resistance to change, despite legislative reform in the mental health sector.  This 
was illustrative of barriers to institutional change, where the misalignment of 
one or more of the institutional pillars is insufficient, in itself, to transform 
organisational arrangements and behaviour.   
I then outline the more general and important practical, theoretical and 
methodological implications that grow out of this analysis.  Specifically, the thesis 
highlights the processes of institutional persistence and change that are crucial 
for understanding, not only the abandonment of existing discourses and 
practices, but also for the establishment of alternative models (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  The thesis provides two major theoretical 
contributions.  First, it extends the conversation about how institutions engage in 
defensive work in the face of perceived threat and challenge (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009).  Second, it highlights the role of translation, as a discursive strategy, in 
doing defensive institutional work.  I then briefly discuss some of the limitations 
of this research to date and finally suggest some future pathways for further 
research and sector change.  
Discussion of findings  
The framework of problematics provided an anchor for a critique of the 
variety of issues underpinning the tensions between established and emerging 
discourses in the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector, as well as their 
relationships with each other.  A wide range of influences has woven the 
backdrop to contemporary mental health organisations and the literature review 
and background examined the major political, social and cultural precedents and 
contexts from which the mental health system has emerged.  The treatment of 
madness has always been peculiarly vulnerable to political, ideological and socio-
economic circumstances and there have been inevitable tensions among the 
social control function of mental health services, therapeutic care and individual 
human rights. 
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Organising recovery in the community sector of Aotearoa\New Zealand 
mental health services   
My first research question was primarily associated with the problematics 
of voice and organising (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  Here, I examined the 
discursive distinctions between participant groups, their organisations and the 
wider sector environment as they constructed key concepts.  The findings 
showed multiple constructions of significant terms such as madness, recovery, 
community life and what it meant to be a recovery-oriented organisation in the 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health system.   
The findings echoed recent claims and arguments from the literature, 
some authored by people with their own experiences of serious psychological 
distress, concerned with the issues of voice, identity and representation.  They 
were indicative of marginalised groups who struggled to reclaim the language, 
and control the meaning systems, of their experiences (Ashcraft & Pacanowsky, 
1996; Cheney et al., 2004; Harter et al., 2010; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  A lack of voice, valued identity and 
effective representation seriously limited the opportunities and choices for 
people even to envisage a meaningful and satisfying life (Harter et al., 2006).  
Some of these issues were a result of long-standing stigma, discrimination, and 
marginalisation but much was also clearly due to the impacts of the mental 
health system itself.  All of this has led to mental health service users inhabiting a 
narrow world of limited options and a systemic lack of personal power.   
It was evident that, despite being mandated in policy reforms and service 
descriptions, the language of recovery was being assimilated into other 
discourses; rather than becoming a powerfully constructed and effective 
alternative paradigm guiding service development, policy and practice.  For 
people with lived experience of serious psychological distress, the language of 
recovery was continuously evolving, in response to the appropriation of their 
discourse by other stakeholders and interest groups.   
The conceptual dissonance among participants made it clear that no 
single, authentic or shared discourse of recovery exists; but rather, there 
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remained a discrete set of common vocabularies and a beguiling fiction that 
“we’re all talking about the same thing” (Senior Manager 3, Auckland).  The 
fiction of a singular concept was maintained in the transactions between interest 
groups, in order to negotiate and function across organisational boundaries, but 
in fact was translated in multiple discourses.  Therefore, it was fulfilling an 
integrationist, rather than a change function (Mumby, 1988) in mental health 
sector reform.  
The theoretical lens of translation was used to examine the implications 
of multiple meanings, conflicts and tensions in the language and concepts 
utilised by participants, as they negotiated multiple discourses and managed the 
transfer of ideas across organisational boundaries and throughout their 
organisational interactions (Cooren, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Venuti, 2004).  
Translations of important constructs reinforced indications that there was still a 
significant gap between the expectations of service users for their recovery and 
what currently takes place in mental health services.   
Translations of recovery were not random, but emerged from the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of interest groups regarding the 
reification of mental illness or, conversely, constructions of madness.  
Institutionalised translation was evident in constructions of recovery as 
measurable progress through mental health services, beginning at service access 
and expedited towards discharge.  This translation, common among participants 
who did not have their own experiences of serious psychological distress, limited 
a person’s “history” to the narrow biomedical account.  They also revealed 
discursively complex notions of community care and a marked contrast between 
aspirations of living an ordinary life in community and being fit for society.  
Despite the rhetoric that mental health services exist to benefit a person’s 
aspirations and well-being, there was no rich sense of the lived experience of 
community and, pragmatically, the needs, priorities and interests of service users 
struggled in the face of more powerful voices and interests. 
There were well-defined, if unarticulated, limits to being a recovery-
oriented organisation, despite a general assumption that Aotearoa\New Zealand 
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mental health services were already recovery oriented.  National policy and 
strategy texts tended to treat generic mental health services discursively, and 
unproblematically, as a homogenous set of organisations (Ministry of Health, 
2005, 2006).  This seemed to be an example of strategic ambiguity and had the 
effect of attributing broad recovery aims, such as service choice and living well in 
community to all mental health organisations, including clinical services.  The co-
existence of multiple meanings made communication across organisational 
boundaries possible.  However, invariably, the resultant ambiguity supported the 
interests of dominant discourses and stakeholders by offering the appearance of 
change without altering relationships of power and dependence.  Biomedical and 
managerial translations of recovery remained dominant, and discourses based 
on the subjective experiences of distress and recovery were clearly not 
embedded in organisational practices.  
It was generally agreed that a recovery orientation in the configuration of 
mental health service organisations would look very different from traditional 
arrangements that prioritised clinical treatments and narrowly defined 
outcomes.  The community organisations had a will towards a recovery 
orientation and most had endeavoured to embed recovery values, such as self-
determination and full community participation, into their organisational 
systems, structures and service delivery.  However, they struggled to establish 
credibility and legitimacy, and it was clear that their best intentions were 
severely hampered by other stakeholders.  In particular, the institutionalisation 
of the bio-medical model as received truth still determined the orthodoxy in 
services, directed and dominated research, and controlled policy and strategy in 
the organisation of mental health systems.   
Reforming the sector: Resistance and persistence 
The second analysis chapter addressed my second research question.  
Here, I moved beyond discursive distinctions of recovery and was concerned 
with how the community NGOs managed within the wider sector and socio-
political environment.  Therefore, it was mostly concerned with the problematics 
of organising, the relationships among mental health organisations and society 
 379 
and the underpinning rationalities of normalised organisational communication 
and behaviour (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007).  In this chapter, I examined the 
complex arrangements of institutional power evident in the Aotearoa\New 
Zealand mental health sector and the implications this has for their persistence 
and legitimacy; as well as exploring their influence over less authoritative 
discourses such as recovery in the organisational practices of community NGOs. 
The mental health sector continued to be subject to biomedical and 
managerial institutional pressures as the operational arms of wider ideological, 
political and social forces.  In particular, it was apparent that the interactions of 
the three institutional pillars - normative, cognitive and regulatory- (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009) influenced, and impacted on, the participants, the community 
organisations and their practices around recovery as well as their relationships 
with other, more powerful, organisations such as the DHBs.  In addition, 
organisational missions and values were frequently in conflict with, and regularly 
superseded by, clinical priorities and managerial imperatives.  This meant there 
had been little practical change in outcomes for service users and no change in 
asymmetrical institutional relationships of power.   
It was clear that disrupting the social legitimacy of the biomedical 
paradigm was especially difficult.  This illustrated the problematic of rationality 
(Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) which is concerned with what seems reasonable 
within particular paradigmatic, social and historical circumstances.  What is 
logically coherent in a social system is necessarily inextricable from the 
discourses and practices that have shaped that social reality.  Therefore, the 
discourses of madness and the medical model were socially naturalised and 
bound ideo-politically, meaning that new paradigms were inevitably less credible 
and framed as alternative to the dominant and orthodox bases of knowledge and 
expertise.   
Normative power was evident when participants made ubiquitous, 
incidental references to biomedical and managerial authority in their 
organisational lives yet did not appear to be aware of key features of 
institutional arrangements.  Institutional practices and knowledge bases were 
 380 
naturalised and taken for granted even though participants simultaneously 
resisted this dominance.  Despite expressing frustration with local clinical teams 
and funders, participants did not usually challenge the actual premises on which 
these institutionalised relationships were based.  This reinforced the sense that 
participants and the lay public did not fully understand the complex interactions 
among the structural and discursive features of institutions (Coleborne & 
McKinnon, 2006; Johns, 2010; Warriner, 2010).  Therefore, they tended to 
express their many frustrations and issues as local and idiosyncratic rather than 
systemic and institutional.   
Recovery discourses had clearly not been effective in deinstitutionalising 
biomedical and managerial norms despite widespread assumptions about the 
historical deinstitutionalisation of mental health services in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand and other Western nations (W. Brunton, 2001; Joseph & Kearns, 1996, 
1999; Leonard, 1999; Sawyer, 2005; Warriner, 2010).  Treating the institutions as 
features of the past effectively created discursive closure around both 
biomedicine and managerialism as powerful, institutional drivers of 
organisations in the present.  Discursive closure was also evident in the related 
assumption that mental health organisations in Aotearoa\New Zealand were 
already recovery-oriented.  Similarly, expedient and strategic use of multiple 
discourses by institutional stakeholders also obscured significant differences 
among the sector organisations; with no space for the kind of engagement and 
debates about fundamental philosophies and values that Rob Warriner (2001, 
2010), among other sector commentators has called for.   
The NGOs were vulnerable to shifts in the socio-political environment 
that have been typical of the mental health sector over time (W. Brunton, 2001, 
2005).  Socio-political arrangements facilitated the adoption of recovery into 
mental health policy but the legislative changes that ushered in the DHBs 
effectively nullified its implementation and restored the traditional power of 
clinical services.  This demonstrated that it takes more than misalignment of one 
institutional pillar to establish a new paradigm and ensure its stability.   
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Organisational transformation or service improvement?   
The third analysis chapter answered my third research question, and was 
primarily informed by the problematics of organising and organising and the 
state (Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) and their inter-woven relationships.  
Institutional parameters still seemed to be inordinately powerful in determining 
the nature and quality of service delivery in the sector and a lack of substantive 
change in mental health services had created considerable disillusionment.  
Discursive strategies such as translation, strategic ambiguity and discursive 
closure could be seen to do defensive institutional work and thwarted attempts 
to disrupt the institutions by diminishing the power of alternative discourses.  In 
response, therefore, many service users in the sector were now endeavouring to 
move the discourse away from recovery towards a health promotion model of 
well-being (Ganesh & McAllum, 2010; Mental Health Commission, 2012a, 2012b; 
Sointu, 2005, 2006) 
The chapter explored how participants endeavoured to problematise and 
disrupt institutional constraints, and highlighted the extent to which these 
attempts were effective.  It also looked at stories of innovation, successful 
outcomes and how NGOs were engaged in organisational transformation and 
recovery orientated organisational change.  The community NGOs were ideally 
positioned for supporting recovery aspirations, meaningful lives and community 
participation, and these ideals were the bases of how participants spoke of their 
role.  They could readily articulate best practices and what constituted successful 
recovery outcomes, but were clearly frustrated in their attempts to introduce 
and establish innovative practices and strategies.   
Strategies for innovation in the sector were variable in effect, mostly 
localised and depended heavily on the quality of relationships that organisations 
had with their DHB clinical teams and funders.  This created a form of personality 
politics that many felt compelled to engage in, especially senior managers, but 
which frequently worked against their organisational values and 
conceptualisations of recovery.  Such grace and favour relationships disguised 
institutional power to some extent.  Even where effective relationships were 
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established these were clearly not systemic, relying instead on the stance of 
individual clinicians and the persistence and energy of the NGOs.  The NGOs 
expended a lot of effort to appear non-threatening and conciliatory in managing 
organisational relationships at the borders with DHB clinical and funding teams.  
There was little evidence, however, that this occurred in the opposite direction.   
Institutional logics governed the communication of discourses and ideas 
across organisational boundaries that, in turn, governed everyday organisational 
practices.  The many costs for non-compliance were evidence of regulatory 
institutional pressures and posed serious risks to the viability of NGOs.  
Participants discussed several instances of “iron fists in velvet gloves” that 
reinforced the subordinate position of the NGOs and provided further evidence 
of hierarchical, institutional relationships.   
Participants and their organisations problematised and challenged 
institutional power but mostly in local, situated ways.  National network 
organisations endeavoured to provide more coordinated strategies and 
responses; however, these too were variable in effect.  Over time, various 
organisational initiatives to establish innovation and a recovery orientation were 
attempted; but these were constrained in important ways, tended to be isolated 
instances and most had struggled to become established.  A growing resistance 
to “professionalism” was also evident, and this undermined institutionalised 
assumptions of medical benevolence and moral authority.   
Maguire and Hardy (2009) refer to two distinct forms of institutional 
change efforts as insider and outsider initiated.  Both were evident in the data.  
Typically, insider attempts provide the appearance of change, commonly 
described as restructuring as opposed to re-construction or organisational 
transformation (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Insider participants, typically senior 
managers or CEOs, often provided knowledgeable and strategic leadership, but 
at the expense of genuine institutional disruption.  These participants tended to 
adopt, or “colonise” (Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 2009a; Wallcraft, 2009), the 
institutionally translated vocabulary of recovery and accept the lack of 
substantive change in systems and practices.  They, perhaps inevitably, seemed 
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more concerned with organisational viability and survival.  These participants 
were also more likely to express confidence in current change efforts and service 
improvements. 
Outsiders, on the other hand, are typically less powerful groups who are 
disadvantaged by the status quo (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  They are, therefore, 
personally invested in systemic change, and they have everything to gain by 
organisational and institutional transformation (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  The 
effectiveness of outsider change efforts depends on their power and capacity to 
disrupt one or more institutional pillars, and in the face of defensive institutional 
work.  People with lived experience of serious psychological distress, and to a 
lesser extent support workers and the NGO sector in general, were outsiders to 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health services and framed their roles and 
organisational identities very differently from clinical services.  These groups 
clearly had the most to gain by destabilising institutionalised discourses and 
practices.  
These outsiders sought to establish new organisational identities and 
subject positions in order to challenge current organisational arrangements and 
practices.  But, as with any social institution, only a limited number of subject 
positions are understood as meaningful, legitimate, and powerful (Hardy et al., 
2005).  The challenge for new subject positions, and actors, to emerge is not only 
to problematise aspects of the prevailing discourse but also to endeavour to 
understand what is blocking expression of an alternative paradigm.  Emerging 
perspectives necessarily engage with, and constructed with reference to, the 
extant social contexts and dominant discourses.  So, while outsiders articulated 
and valorised different perspectives, voices and subject positions, they had 
difficulty finding allies who were not compromised, or challenged, by that 
prospective change.  This highlighted institutional reliance on the normative 
pillar that, in turn, validated the cognitive and rational bases of institutional 
authority. This was apparent even where legislative changes, such as the 
adoption of recovery into national policy had appeared to drive change.   
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In this research, I have made an important, although not rigid, distinction 
between generalised and particularised defensive institutional work.  It was 
evident that the institutions were engaging in institutional work that defended 
them against perceived threats and challenge.  It was also apparent that the 
establishment of the DHBs in 2000 had been a significant environmental change 
that reasserted institutional authority against which the alternative paradigm of 
recovery struggled to gain traction.  All of these barriers were indicative of 
particular defensive institutional work, and typical responses to perceived 
threats when alternative discourses and actors arise to challenge, disrupt or 
destabilise institutional practices.  Many of these strategies acted to devalue and 
discount the NGOs as outsiders.  They could be overt and direct, like challenging 
the credibility and reasonableness of service users, support workers and 
community organisations; or they could be strategically silent and dismissive.   
Translation was an important discursive strategy, central to the success of 
generalised institutional defensiveness.  It ensured the maintenance of 
institutional authority, the recomposition of institutional stability, and the 
persistence of status, power and legitimacy of its agents.  Despite legislative 
change and policy frameworks that mandated alternative approaches, such as 
recovery, translation ensured there was no diminution of institutional power in 
the relationships among organisations, the institutions and the state. 
Institutional stakeholders, especially clinical services, often positioned 
themselves as embattled, or under threat from recovery and other alternative 
ways of thinking.  This had provoked a backlash against recovery itself, as well as 
creating an uncertain and sometimes hostile environment for the NGOs.  The 
findings corroborated recent literature (Ashton et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 
2007; Duncan et al., 2004; Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007; Jureidini, 2012; O’Hagan, 
2009a, O’Hagan et al., 2012; Warriner, 2010) and highlighted the same on-going 
issues and lack of real progress in mental health sector reform.   
Overall, participants reported considerable disillusionment with the 
institutionalised translations of recovery that had infiltrated their organisational 
environments and diminished the power of alternative discourses of recovery.  In 
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addition, seemingly incompatible meanings coexisted in organisational life and 
perhaps explained why, for many, recovery had become a tired and passé 
concept, and why a conscious and deliberate strategy has emerged, to move the 
focus away from recovery, compromised by institutionalised biomedicine, in 
favour of the more “living” discourses of individual and community well-being.  
Combining theoretical understandings of both translation and defensive 
institutional work within a critical approach to organisational change offers 
insights into how biomedical and managerial power are operationalised over a 
whole organisational field, while acting also as mechanisms for social control.  
This may also go part way to explaining why recovery, as a locally emergent 
discourse, has struggled to become established.  Therefore, the foremost 
contribution of this analysis to the organising of the mental health sector in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand is facilitating a deeper understanding of the complex 
features of institutions, and the dynamics of their persistence so that 
institutional disruption might be directed more effectively and systematically, 
rather than locally and in isolation.   
However, this situation and circumstance is an exemplar of more general 
issues that face marginalised groups as they struggle for voice, and how 
alternative discourses and paradigms might become established in the face of 
socially normalised and institutionally powerful logics and practices.  In the next 
section, I outline the general theoretical and methodological contributions this 
thesis makes to the field of organisational communication.  
Implications: Practical, theoretical and methodological  
This thesis offers three major contributions to scholarship in 
organisational communication.  First, it adds to our understanding of the 
complex features of institutions and how, through the interactions of their 
institutional pillars, these establish, and maintain, authority over an 
organisational field.  Particularly, it adds to the small body of research that 
examines processes of institutional disruption, and the inherent difficulties in 
destabilising institutional logics and introducing alternative discourses and 
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practices into institutionalised fields (Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Sullivan, 1992).   
Second, it makes a theoretical contribution to the exploration of 
institutional defensive work and the impacts this has for potential institutional 
change agents, especially outsiders to an institutional field (Lawrence, Leca & 
Zilber, 2013; Lounsbury, 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Third, the thesis extends 
scholarly understanding of translation as a defensive institutional strategy 
(Venuti, 2004; Zilber, 2002, 2006).  This has significance for many groups 
struggling to introduce new paradigms who find that, despite apparent language 
shifts, there is no substantive change in the institutional environment.  It 
illuminates how the appropriation of others’ conceptual worldview contributes 
to the erosion of alternative discourses and the disillusionment of the discourse 
communities for whom they have most significance (Barker, 2003; O’Hagan, 
2009a; Wallcraft, 2009).  A more detailed discussion of these contributions 
follows. 
Institutions are established, discursively, as socially legitimate largely 
through the power and longevity of their historical traditions, relationships and 
norms (Lok & Willmott, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004).  They are then naturalised by 
communities and societies, who devolve a great deal of responsibility and 
authority to institutional agents.  New discourses and conceptual models 
disseminate throughout organisational fields in ways that never faithfully 
reproduce their original meanings.  These findings, then, hold important 
implications for the capacities of less powerful individuals, groups and 
organisations to disrupt and destabilise institutional practices in order to 
establish alternative discourses.   
Mutually beneficial relationships with the state, through government 
ministries and other policy makers, also sanction institutional capacities to 
normalise social attitudes and naturalise particular rationalities, which, in turn, 
enabled hegemonic control over organisational discourses and behaviour.  These 
capacities also explained the power of institutional discourses to exclude, limit 
 387 
and restrict ways of talking about and constructing knowledge about key 
concepts in a field.   
Scholars have generally been more concerned with the ways in which 
institutions are maintained and reproduced; rather than the means by which 
they can be, challenged, disrupted and ultimately deinstitutionalised (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Mumby, 1988; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  The complex nature of 
institutions, the power, coherence and persistence of their bodies of knowledge 
and hierarchical structures, have also limited their capacity for critical self-
reflection and reduced institutional and professional accountability for “failure”.  
The result has been enduring tension at the discursive boundaries of powerful 
institutionalised groups and less powerful actors and organisations, such as the 
community NGOs and people with lived experience of serious psychological 
distress. 
A critical approach also illustrated the role of institutions in doing the 
work of ideological and political systems.  The institutional pillars of biomedicine, 
such as managerialism, strengthened through their historical social contexts and 
symbiotic relationships with other ratio-scientific institutions, have created a 
web of power in the mental health sector that has successfully resisted change 
and absorbed alternative discourses.  Critical examination of institutional 
processes helps to explain the mechanisms by which their social legitimation has 
continued to control organisational discourse and practices. 
The findings of this research contribute to critical institutional theory, and 
specifically to the understanding of institutional disruption (Clemente & Roulet, 
2015; Fakhoury & Priebe, 2002, 2007; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oliver, 1992).  
They demonstrated the inherent difficulties of introducing new paradigms 
because institutions have a unique social potency that is upheld by the status 
quo.  Institutional pressures have ensured the conformity of individual 
organisations and have been the major barrier to organisational transformation 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Mizruchi & Fein, 
1999).   
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Institutional change is possible, if difficult, by the misalignment of one or 
more of the three, cognitive, normative or regulatory institutional pillars.  
However, reconciling large scale, social and institutional forces with individual 
and organisational capacities to act in particular ways is inevitably problematic.  
It takes more than disruption to the discourse to embed new logics and 
paradigms, and thereby organisational practices.  Old institutional logics 
continue to influence the structural and material institutional arrangements, 
even if the coherence of discourses is disrupted (Reay & Hinings, 2005).   
The thesis also supports a currently small body of research and provides 
evidence of institutional persistence through various strategies of defensive 
work, undertaken by institutions to counter perceived challenges to their power, 
legitimacy and authority.  The analysis extends the work of Maguire and Hardy 
(2009), who investigated the deinstitutionalisation of DDT following publication 
of the book The Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), and examines the less successful 
efforts to deinstitutionalise the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector and 
establish an alternative paradigm of recovery.   
Socially marginalised, and less powerful, groups have habitually struggled 
to maintain control of their emerging discourses and resist the appropriation of 
key concepts by powerful, privileged groups.  For example, this has been 
particularly difficult in the mental health field where there has been a sustained, 
clinical backlash against recovery.  Among their objections have been claims that 
recovery is just a fad that sets people up for failure; that professionals have 
already been doing recovery for decades; that recovery-oriented care adds to the 
professional burden (Davidson et al., 2005).  Trying to introduce new ways of 
conceptualising the world of their experience has been especially frustrating for 
socially marginalised groups when they have felt control of their discourse 
slipping away from them, not always through overt challenges but insidiously, 
through multiple translations by more dominant institutionalised discourses.  No 
matter how persuasive less powerful groups were, nor how concerned they were 
to manage the meanings of concepts and practices they struggled to control the 
ways that others translated the discourse.   
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Several areas appear to be under-researched and, in particular, there 
have been few investigations into how institutional discourses and organisational 
practices might be disrupted, or destabilised, and alternative discourses and 
explanatory models introduced (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Importantly, little 
scholarly attention has been directed to how institutions engage in defensive 
institutional work to preserve and protect their status and authority, and the 
mechanisms and strategies by which they respond to perceived challenge and 
threat.  This thesis, therefore, has provided a contribution to this scholarship, 
particularly through investigation of the role of translation as institutional 
defensive work and the effect this has on emerging discourses and their 
discourse communities (Clemente & Roulet, 2015; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Zilber, 2006).   
At the boundaries between discourse communities, there is often no 
language of correspondence to represent, adequately or faithfully, concepts 
from another paradigm.  Therefore, the translation metaphor, rather than a 
diffusion model, more accurately depicts the negotiated interactions between 
individuals and groups in asymmetrical power relationships (A. Brown, 2004; S. 
Brown, 2002; Chavez, 2009; Cooren, 2001; Ganesh, 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Zilber, 2006).  Translation enables dominant groups, embedded in 
institutional cultures, to resist disruption, maintain control of institutional 
knowledge, and keep arrangements of power intact, and offers the appearance 
of change while masking institutional intransigence.  As the processes of 
institutional disruption and institutional defence interact, and marginalised 
groups struggled to maintain control of their discourse, powerful groups often 
reject, and reframe as obsolete, their own translated discourses. 
The first line of institutional defence work has been reliant on the 
punitive consequences that non-compliance brings with it, particularly the 
control of resources and funding.  However, as the data shows, equally 
important “costs” are reductions in organisational legitimacy and credibility.   
The third contribution of this thesis is methodological.  Consideration of 
this form of a critically appreciative fono approach underlines the problematic of 
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voice (Maguire & Hardy, 2009) and exemplifies Freire’s concept of 
conscientisation, which explicitly engages with the issues of dialogue, power and 
praxis (Freire, 1970).  His model of empowerment, through creating spaces for 
shared understandings, not only enabled participants to feel significant as 
organisational members and workers, but also actively enhanced their sense of 
agency, thereby illuminating pathways for organisational transformation and 
encouraging future action.   
The fono composition of focus groups, in cohorts of peers, removed 
power asymmetries and created opportunities for educational authentication 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1986) in the form of dialogic reflection among participants; 
workers who held deep knowledge about their organisations and experiences, 
yet who were typically outsiders to biomedical and managerial orthodoxies, 
marginalised, and\or treated as inconsequential.  “Naming” their world (Freire, 
1970, p. 69) through dialogue encouraged critical reflection and enabled people 
to discover the ways in which they were, in fact “situated”.  Together, they 
created shared understandings of their common circumstances and recognised 
how they had come to accept, or at least tolerate, their own subordination.   
In the collaborative fono space, among their peers, participants were 
freely able to challenge the dominant, preferred stories, expose privileged 
perspectives and articulate other ways of organising the Aotearoa\New Zealand 
mental health sector.  Specifically, through critical appreciation these 
participants were able to envisage preferred futures and potential pathways to 
organisational transformation and strategic sector development.  It is in this 
sense, then, that critical and appreciative approaches come together in a 
conjunction of research as advocacy. 
These processes raise issues of identity, marginalisation and naturalised 
rules about who can legitimately construct organisational and social knowledge 
within organisational and social systems.  Barge and Oliver (2003) have 
suggested that becoming appreciative, in terms of organisational and 
management practices, means taking account of what others within the 
organisation value gaining a deeper appreciative understanding of the 
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organisation, its stakeholders and the multiple social, cultural, political and 
economic factors that influence its growth and development.  Therefore, a key 
tenet of my critically appreciative inquiry was important for validating and 
privileging the voices of less powerful groups, including people with lived 
experience of serious psychological distress.  Encouraging participants to share 
the stories, practices and ideals of recovery that excited them, and that were 
already working well in their organisations uncovered alternative, and potentially 
transformative, ways of conceptualising organisational practices, identities and 
niche.  
The appreciative process enabled participants, typically outsiders to 
organisational development and strategy processes, to envisage preferred 
futures, challenge the dominant, preferred stories in the mental health sector 
and expose privileged perspectives.   
Thus, a critically appreciative methodology has important implications for 
convening future sector forums and encouraging conversations about 
fundamental philosophies, the forces that promote transformation as well as the 
barriers to change.  A focus on what positive, organisational transformation 
could look like could then become naturally embedded in current best practices 
and usefully connected to potential pathways and realistic strategies for 
organisational change.  
Limitations  
The limitations of this project were primarily concerned with the early 
assumption of the research design and methodological processes.  As I explained 
in the Methodology chapter, I established the focus groups, expecting significant 
differences in the talk between cohorts at different levels within organisations; 
but these distinctions did not eventuate.   
In addition, I made a conscious and deliberate decision initially, not to 
seek out directly the perspectives of people with lived experience of serious 
psychological distress.  The first reason for this decision was primarily ethical.  
My stance was that people with lived experience of psychological distress had 
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clearly publicised what they needed from mental health service organisations 
through the authorship of a growing body of texts (see for example, Central 
Potential, 2008; Deegan, 1998; Leibrich, 2000; Mental Health Commission, 1998; 
O’Hagan, 1999; Pearson, 2000, 2001).  Therefore, I intended to investigate how 
well the sector, generally, was representing their perspectives in everyday 
organisational communication and practice.  Second, I knew that many people 
with lived experience of psychological distress also worked in the sector, and 
that service users and service user organisations would be naturally represented 
within the range of participants and the community organisations.   
However, it was immediately apparent from the analysis that the voices 
and narratives of participants, with their own experiences of serious 
psychological distress, were significantly different from others in the sector.  I 
therefore needed to extract meaningful comparisons from my data in ways that I 
had not anticipated.  Fortunately, there were enough of these participants (29 of 
131 participants), and the emergent themes so strong, that I am confident the 
comparative analysis, especially around models of madness and stories of 
recovery in the first analysis chapter, faithfully represents the organisational 
realities of the sector. 
Comparing the language and talk of these participants with others then 
guided the analysis rather than my original assumption that the distinctions 
would be among the cohorts i.e. support workers, team leaders and senior 
managers.  This distinction, however, did highlight the insider backgrounds of 
several senior managers and explained their approach to their strategic role as 
organisational leaders, responsible for organisational viability and survival.  
What also seemed evident, and warrants further investigation, was the 
coherence of the talk among members of the same organisation.  This proved 
counter-intuitive to my original assumptions of distinctions among participants 
with different roles and responsibilities.  This suggests that the significance of the 
organisational communication of values, and their establishment in practice, is 
indicative of a clear articulation of organisational identity and faith in the 
organisational leadership.  Such research might take the form of mini-case 
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studies of particular organisations and a fuller examination of the introduction of 
specific organisational innovations and eventual outcomes.  Similarly, a 
longitudinal analysis of sector texts and policies over several decades could also 
produce rich insights about the interactions among normative, cognitive and 
legislative impacts on sector and institutional change over time.   
Following where the data led, meant that I also deviated somewhat from 
the active aspects of action research and appreciative inquiry.  This also 
detracted somewhat from my original intention of prioritising stories of success 
and innovation around a recovery-orientation in these organisations.  However, 
the focus group and interview feedback forms indicated that participants had 
gained important insights, and a new appreciation, into their own organisations 
and the NGO sector in Aotearoa\New Zealand as a whole.  It was also apparent 
from these that sharing their perspectives within the groups had facilitated new 
understandings that could lead to material change in organisational practices 
and potential transformation of the sector (Zorn et al., 2006)).  In the event, 
there was neither time nor resources to return to participants and garner the 
changes they, or their organisations, had made in their organisational 
communications and practice.   
In addition, the project generated such a plethora of rich data from just 
one round of data gathering that I needed to then be selective and pragmatic 
about what the analysis could realistically address.  Therefore, the thesis has 
concerned itself with only the thematic and content aspects of the data, and 
fundamentally ignored the interactive data from the focus groups.  I believe this 
will provide a rich mine of its own in future analysis.  
Future directions and possibilities 
Institutional logics and authority are difficult to disrupt.  However, for 
many reasons it is often important to do so.  While institutions offer stability, 
consistency and a degree of standardisation throughout an organisational field, 
which promotes confidence in stakeholders and wider society, they often do so 
at the expense of less socially powerful groups, organisations and communities.  
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Destabilisation, therefore, is important to stakeholders who are disadvantaged 
by the status quo; who want a voice and opportunities to influence the 
circumstances of their personal and organisational lives (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Zilber, 2002, 2006).     
Many issues underlying the mental health sector in Aotearoa\New 
Zealand need thorough exploration.  Mental health services are not intended to 
be in a person’s life forever.  Therefore, it is important that the sector develop a 
profile of the person they expect to emerge from service involvement in their 
lives, and how this can be expressed effectively in organisational practice.  In 
addition, the community organisations, particularly, need a clear articulation of 
their identity and a niche for the roles they perform.  Transformation of the 
sector would also require the development of a strongly articulated, shared and 
visionary discourse of recovery or well-being if it were to survive translation by 
others.  Institutionalising recovery would mean new organisational arrangements 
and a radical reconceptualisation of organisational roles and relationships.     
In the particular situation of mental health organisations, these findings 
indicate many possibilities for further investigator and applied research.  Mental 
health service leaders worldwide have called for the transformation of mental 
health systems.  However, despite the appearances of change and reform, the 
same people with entrenched status, authority and power have tended to 
conceal and naturalise multiple contradictions and inequities, and have proved 
remarkably resistant to challenge and disruption.  Therefore, the framework of 
problematics provides an important analytical tool for, and recognising 
institutional influences and barriers on, organisational change efforts.   
The emergence of alternative systems of meaning, new voices, new 
subject positions and expectations of how organisations might enact different 
values and visions can enable a critical shift in social consciousness.  
Unfortunately, this alone does not inevitably lead to social action or substantive 
organisational change.  Therefore, an increased understanding of defensive 
institutional work and the processes of translation would aid investigation of the 
degree to which alternative paradigms have penetrated and shifted institutional 
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pillars.  For example it would be educative to examine how regulatory or 
legislative changes, shifts in social norms and rationalities have engendered 
particular responses (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Additionally, and importantly, 
have these been merely discursive shifts rather than substantive organisational 
and institutional change.  
There has been little scholarly attention, or funding, directed towards 
exploring alternative conceptualisations of psychological distress, because they 
have lacked social legitimacy.  Authors with personal experiences of serious 
psychological distress have called for their own explanatory models of distress 
and recognition of their aspirations for social, political and organisational 
transformation.  Therefore, research agenda and methodologies, other than 
quantitative positivism, need to be encouraged, and used to monitor changes in 
service development and practices.   
These findings also have important implications, and further research is 
needed, for how less powerful actors, organisations and alternative discourses 
can become established in institutionalised fields in the face of defensive 
institutional work.  The institutionalised fields of education, justice and Western 
systems of democratic government come immediately to mid.  In addition, the 
ubiquitous encroachment of neoliberal logics and managerialism through the 
various processes of globalisation and the urgency of managing conflicting 
scientific claims in international responses to climate change, are worthy of 
future scrutiny.  Critical examination of the ways that powerful groups defend 
their discourses through their use of discursive strategies such as translation, and 
thereby maintain their arrangements of power, is increasingly vital to social and 
human survival.  
Generally, lay understandings of how institutional pillars operate to 
maintain institutional authority, has been poor (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; 
Oliver, 1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  Their complex interactive features has 
made it hard to identify where resistance and challenges could be effective.  This 
has meant that most change efforts have been local and situated rather than 
systemic and strategic.  As Maguire & Hardy (2009) explain, this disruption needs 
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to occur synchronously on several fronts, specifically directed at the normative, 
cognitive and legislative pillars.  This also has important implications for the 
introduction and establishment of new, alternative paradigms.  Therefore, 
research that balances traditional institutional theory with more critical 
approaches would support people, organisations and communities to engage 
with and influence organisational evolution and change.   
Further research is also needed to examine closely the dynamics of the 
relationships that the neoliberal logics of organising, embedded in biomedicine 
and managerialism, have with their social context and to challenge their narrow 
evidence base.  Tensions abound in the struggle for control of the discursive 
spaces when it comes to notions of the “public good”, individual and social 
responsibilities for well-being as well as constructions of “the community” 
among others.  Understanding the mechanisms by which personal, organisational 
and community agency is enabled or constrained is crucial.  In particular, it would 
seem important to investigate how the community organisations might change 
their relationships with institutional and clinical organisations in ways that 
diminish their inherent asymmetry.  Researchers would need to recognise and 
understand the processes of defensive institutional work, in order to understand 
and respond to inevitable institutional backlash.   
In addition, unquestioned social legitimacy leads to a degree of 
institutional complacency.  This has led to forms of change that are typical of 
insider reforms and organisational improvement, rather than a critical review of 
base assumptions and arrangements of power that might lead to re-
construction.  Thus, institutional insiders tend to employ various mechanisms to 
maintain their authority and seek their own survival at the expense of genuine 
transformation.  These not only include costs for non-compliance to control 
organisational behaviour but other corrective mechanisms when one or more of 
the institutional pillars becomes misaligned.  This has been evident in the mental 
health field, including the Aotearoa\New Zealand mental health sector, when 
clinical discourses of risk arose to counter discursive and legislative changes 
around the introduction of recovery (Sawyer, 2005).  Other significant 
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mechanisms include the various generalised and specific institutional defensive 
work discussed in this thesis.  Translation, in particular, as a defensive strategy, 
deserves more scholarly attention.  
The discursive resources of various stakeholder groups would be a rich 
source of data for comparative analysis and longitudinal research using a 
methodological approach similar to that of Maguire and Hardy (2009).  This 
would encourage more scholarly attention on new voices and subject positions, 
with reference to changes in language and discursive resources, and could 
usefully focus on how such shifts and translations are used to maintain 
institutional authority and powerbases.  Future studies could pay particular 
attention to, and compare how the discursive resources stakeholders use and 
how they seek to position themselves and their organisations in institutional 
fields.  It would be equally useful to examine relationships among discourse 
communities over time (Henderson et al., 2007; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Weaver, 
2010).   
It would also be very educative to apply the framework of problematics 
(Mumby & Stohl, 1996, 2007) to explore how the institutional pillars interact to 
maintain social disadvantage.  For example, critical investigations to scope larger 
issues such as the social and political representation of indigenous communities 
and the effects of dominant institutions such as the law, education and health on 
cultural identity, educational achievement and other indicators of social well-
being.  A cursory glance at the attempts of these and other communities show 
that discursive changes alone are insufficient to disrupt normative pillars and 
language changes in isolation risk being ridiculed as “politically correct”. 
These frameworks would also be useful for macro analyses of other 
global issues and to examine relationships among the institutional pillars, 
particularly how legislation and regulation interacts with cognitive and socially 
normalised discourses and practices.  An example might be the extent to which 
growing public alarm over climate change has led to adequate and substantive 
change in normalised rationalities and regulation, given the dominance of neo-
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liberal economics and acceleration of the processes of globalisation (Cheney & 
Cloud, 2006; Ganesh et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2005)  
Organisational and institutional transformation is more than mere 
change.  Transformation is the death of one way and the birth of another; it does 
not mean doing more of the same, or even doing the same things better (Adams 
et al., 2006).  Equally, organisational transformation requires fundamental shifts 
in the rational bases of institutional logics and the enactment of new attitudes, 
values, and relationships in discourses and practices that connect to the social 
world in just and equitable arrangements.   
Transforming organisational practice around recovery is a real and 
pragmatic issue for mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand.  An 
effective NGO sector could be positioned as a significant subject position and 
model for a more genuinely recovery-oriented mental health sector.  However, 
this would require a profound paradigm shift and a further wave of 
organisational transformation, which fully incorporated other voices and 
perspectives.  Mary O’Hagan (2010), a prominent campaigner over several 
decades for sector reform in Aotearoa\New Zealand, recently commented, “We 
cannot create genuine change without transforming social and professional 
attitudes to madness”.  However, it is clear that, despite their best intentions, 
these organisations have struggled to enact a recovery philosophy that would 
realise their aspirations for organisational and sector transformation.   
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Appendix 1: Summaries of participant demographics 
Table 1: Summary Participant Demographic Information  
Summary of Participants Numbers Comment 
Total Participants  131 The community mental health sector, like 
most social services is dominated by 
women especially in lower paid roles. Male 40 
Female 91 
Identified as Service users 36 
Identified as Māori 16 
Regional Breakdown 
SW25\TL26 FG27 
participants  
Interview\SM28 focus group 
Auckland 27 5 (Interviews) 
Waikato  50 6 (Interviews) 
Wellington  19 6 (1 Interview, 5 Senior manager Focus 
Group) 
Christchurch  15 3 (Interviews) 
Table 2: Summary Support Worker participants    
Support Worker participants Numbers Comments 
Number of Focus groups 11 1 focus group was a designated Peer Support 
Team from 1 organisation in Auckland that 
included 2 Co-Team Leaders 
1 focus group in Christchurch was comprised 
of workers who also identified as having used 
mental health services.  Three of these 
worked for a service user organisation; the 
other 3 for generic NGOs 
In Auckland, there were 4 workers working 
for 3 organisations who were designated 
Asian\Indian support workers working within 
their cultural communities   
Total No.  Support workers 73 
Male 21 
Female 52 
Identified as Service users 26 
Identified as Māori \ (drew from 
a Māori perspective) 
10 
Identified as “other” culture\ 
(drew on other cultural 
perspective) 
4 
                                                     
25 “SW ” is an abbreviation for “support worker ” 
26 “TL” is an abbreviation for “team Leader” 
27 “FG” is an abbreviation for “focus group” 
28 “SM” is an abbreviation for “senior manager” 
 400 
Table 3: Summary Team Leader participants  
Team Leader participants Numbers Comment 
Number of Focus groups 10 3 Team Leaders had experience of 
working in DHB environment as nurses 
or social workers and were able to bring 
that comparative experience to the focus 
group. 
Total No: Team Leaders 38 
Male 7 
Female 31 
Identified as Service users 5 
Identified as Māori  5 
Table 4: Summary Senior Manager participants    
Senior Manager Participants Numbers Comment 
Number of Interviews 16 1 Wellington organisation made their 
whole senior management team 
available and I was able to conduct a 
focus group with these 6 people, 2 of 
whom also identified as having used 
mental health services. 
I senior manager of a small service user 
organisation in Hamilton participated in 
a focus group rather than be interviewed 
Number of Focus groups 1 
Total No.  Senior Managers 20 
Male 12 
Female 8 
Identified as Service users 5 
Identified as Māori  1 
Table 5: Summary Participant Organisations    
Participant organisations  Numbers Comment 
Total No.  Organisations  27  
Auckland 3 
Waikato 12 
Wellington  3 
Christchurch  9 
Designated Peer Support Team \ 
Peer Support workers 
2  
Service user organisations  4 
Family support organisations  3 
Kaupapa Māori  service team  4 
Kaupapa Māori  organisation 1 
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Table 6: Summary of Community Support Worker Focus Groups  
Location  Focus group \ 
Interview 
Composition No of 
Participants 
Auckland Central Focus group 
Code: A 
Single large organisation 
Mix male, female 
1 designated Asian support worker  
2 service user workers29 
7 
West Auckland  Focus group 
Code: B 
2 large organisations  
Mix male, female 
2 designated Asian workers 
7 
West Auckland  
Peer support 
Team 
Focus Group 
Code: PS 
1 organisation  
2 team leaders & 6 peer support workers 
All peer support workers 
8 
Hamilton  Focus Group 
Code: A 
4 organisations 
I CEO of small service user organisation  
4 
Hamilton  Focus Group 
Code: B 
2 organisations 
I family support worker 
2 
Hamilton  Focus Group 
Code: C  
4 organisations 
2 of 6 designated kaupapa Māori workers 
2 of 6 Family support workers 
6 
Hamilton  Focus Group 
Code: H 
1 national organisation  - home-based 
1 male, 4 female 
5 
Hamilton Focus Group 
Code: P 
1 large organisation, urban, residential  
All female 
1 Team Leader attended  
7 
Waikato 
(Thames \Waihi) 
Focus Group 
Code: W 
1 organisation 
All female 
2 service user peer support workers 
7 
Wellington  Focus Group 
Code: A 
I large organisation 
Mixed Male and female 
2 designated peer support workers  
10 
Christchurch Focus group 
Code: A 
3 organisations - 1 service user run 
1 male & 4 female 
5 
Christchurch Focus group 
Code: S 
(Service users)  
3 organisations – 1 service user run 
Mixed male and female  
All service user peer support workers 
5 
  
                                                     
29 In other words, workers who also identified as having used mental health services 
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Table 7: Summary of Team Leader Focus Groups  
Location  Focus group \ 
Interview 
Composition No of 
Participants 
West Auckland  Focus group 
Code: A 
2 organisations 
1 male and 5 female  
6 
Hamilton Focus group 
Code: P 
1 national organisation: residential & 
home based community support  
6 
Hamilton Focus group 
Code: A 
4 organisations  
1 service user organisation  
2 service user workers 
1 social worker now DHB 
5 
Hamilton Focus group 
Code: H 
1 national organisation  
Home based community support 
2 female 
2 
Waikato 
(Thames\Waihi) 
Focus group 
Code: W 
I national organisation 
All female 
6 
Wellington  Focus group 
Code: A 
1 large organisation  
1 male and 5 female 
1 Kaupapa Māori  worker 
6 
Wellington  Focus group 
Code: B 
1 national organisation,  
2 clinical team leaders  
2 
Christchurch   Focus group 
Code: A 
5 organisations  
1 service user organisation 
1 peer support worker 
5 
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Table 8:  Summary of Senior Manager Focus Groups and Interviews  
Location  Focus group \ 
Interview 
Composition No of 
Participants 
West Auckland  Interview  
Code:  4 
 3 
 1 
2 organisations  
1 CEO large organisation30   
1 Senior Manager 31  
1 Service Manager32  
1 male and 2 female 
3 
Central Auckland  Interview 
Code:  2 
 5 
1 organisation  
1 CEO organisation  
1 Senior Manager  
2 male 
2 
Hamilton Interviews 
Code:  2 
 3, 4 
 1 
 5 
5 organisations  
1 CEO of a Kaupapa Māori org. 
2 CEO, 1 service user organisation  
I Manager Family Support 
1 Operations Manager service user 
organisation  
1 service user organisation  
1 Kaupapa Māori  organisation  
1 Family Support organisation  
3 service users 
1 Māori 
2 male and 4 female 
5 
Wellington  Focus group 
Code:  2 
 3,4,5,6,7 
1 large organisation  
1 CEO  
5 senior managers 
3 SM also service users 
3 male and 3 female 
6 
Wellington  Interview  
Code:  1 
CEO head office  national family 
support organisation  
1 
Christchurch   Interview  
Code:  1 
 3 
 2 
3 organisations  
CEO service user organisation 
Regional Manager national org. 
CEO large organisation     
3 
  
                                                     
30 This CEO was not from the same organisation as the Senior Manager below 
31 This interviewee was not from the same organisation as the CEO above 
32 The Service  Manager was from the same organisation as the CE above 
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Appendix 2: Focus group questions 
Table 9: Focus Group Questions 
Introductory round, eliciting individual responses:  
Tell me about your role . . . . . 
Focussing Question 
1. Tell me what recovery means to you?  Is it important for a service to be recovery 
oriented? Why? 
What are the most important values underpinning these approaches? 
What do recovery and strengths-based practice mean to you in terms of relationships with service 
users? 
What do recovery and strengths-based practice mean to you in terms of outcomes for service users? 
What do you think “community participation” and “social inclusion” mean for service users? 
What does successful living, ordinary living mean for service users? 
Where should we put our best time, thought and energy in services if we want to help people 
develop a sense of ordinary life?  What kinds of things should we be doing? 
What are the supports, structures, systems that enhance successful living? 
2. Tell me about recovery and strengths-based practice in your organisation 
How important is it in your organisation to be recovery oriented? 
What works well in your organisation in terms of recovery and\or strengths-based practice  
How is recovery and\or strengths-based practice communicated – how do people ‘know’ about it? 
What would be the best aspects of your organisation, from a service user perspective? 
What are the best possible outcomes for a service user in your organisation at present? 
How do aspects of the organisation express recovery and\or strengths-based practice?  
For example: Policies, Procedures, Organisational structure, Staffing, Training & professional 
development, Communications, Service specifications 
What is possible in your organisation?  What kind of a difference can you make in people’s lives? 
What constrains this from happening?  What is it difficult for your mental health service to 
consistently do well? 
3. Tell me about the wider environment and other stakeholders that impact on how your 
organisation is becoming recovery oriented and \or strengths-based practice 
Who are the other stakeholders that influence your organisation and its visions and values?  
What are the significant influences and relationships your organisation has with other stakeholders?  
How do these work?  E.g.  Community, DHB, Clinical services, Funders, Families, Other agencies 
What do you understand about the “medical model”?  How do you think this model influences 
community services and organisations? 
How do you perceive the political or social landscape – have things changed?  What impacts do 
political shifts have? 
What are the issues and influences facing your organisation trying to become recovery oriented or 
strengths-based?  What supports?  Constrains? 
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Appendix 3: Pre-focus group participant forms 
Realising Our Best Intentions: Vision, values and voice in community mental 
health organisations.  PhD research project 
Kirsty Barber barberk@mngt.waikato.ac.nz 
Participant Information Form 
Name Code: 
Region Cohort: 
Contact Details: 
Email  
Phone       
Mailing       
    
Consent Form  Agrees to recording  Identification  
 
Organisation:  
Address:  
 
Organisation service description 
 
Position held: 
Role description: 
 
Other\ previous roles in mental health sector 
 
Organisations Mission, Vision and\or philosophy statement(s) 
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Organisational approach to (or position on) recovery 
 
 
To what extent does your own position \ practice of recovery correspond to 
your organisations? 
Conflicts Some tension Some 
agreement 
Basically 
similar 
Identical 
     
 
Organisational approach to (or position on) strengths-based practices 
 
 
 
To what extent does your own position \ practice of strengths-based practice 
correspond to your organisations? 
Conflicts Some tension Some 
agreement 
Basically 
similar 
Identical 
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Appendix 4: Post-focus group participant forms 
Realising Our Best Intentions: Vision, values and voice in community mental 
health organisations - PhD research project 
Kirsty Barber  barberk@mngt.waikato.ac.nz 
Participant Feedback Form 
Overall, what was your experience of this focus group? 
Not useful  Not very 
worthwhile 
Okay Worthwhile Very worthwhile 
     
Please indicate three key messages or ideas that came through for you in the focus 
group 
1.  
2.  
3.  
Please comment below on the questions asked in the focus group 
Overall, what was your experience of the questions asked 
Irrelevant and 
unimportant  
Few relevant 
and important 
Somewhat 
relevant & 
important 
Most relevant 
and important 
All relevant and 
important 
     
Each main topic question is listed individually below, please comment as indicated 
 Keep Change Leave  
1. Tell me what recovery means to you?    
2. How are recovery and strengths-based practice “talked 
about”, expressed, communicated in your organisation? 
   
3. What would a recovery-oriented service be like?    
4. What do recovery and strengths-based practice mean in 
terms of outcomes for service users? 
   
5. What do you think would be an “ordinary life”?    
6. What do you think is “successful” living?    
7. What does strengths-based practice mean to you?    
8. What is “community participation” and “social inclusion”?    
9. What are the influences of the wider environment and 
other stakeholders in terms of recovery and strengths-
based practice in your organisation? 
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Other questions \ issues for discussion that would have been useful 
 
 
 
Please comment below on the activities used in the focus group 
Overall, what was your experience of the activities 
Irrelevant and 
unimportant  
Few relevant and 
important 
Some relevant 
and important 
Most relevant 
and important 
All relevant and 
important 
     
Each activity is listed individually below, please comment as indicated 
1. Scaling activity - Where your organisation is 
at in terms of recovery and \or SBP?   
Keep Change Leave Out 
         Yes No 
Has this process been useful to you in terms of understanding issues for 
developing recovery and strengths-based practice in community mental 
health organisations? 
  
Has your experience in this focus group changed or enhanced your thinking 
about recovery? 
  
Has your experience in this focus group changed or enhanced your thinking 
about strengths-based practice? 
  
Do you think this research is worthwhile in terms of the development of 
the community mental health NGO sector? 
  
Have you any suggestions to improve either the process or usefulness of this research 
project? 
 
Thank you again, noho ora mai, na Kirsty  
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Appendix 5: Textual data 
Table 10:  Important National and Sector Texts as data sources  
Item  Publisher  Date Utility and\or Themes 
Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) 
Act 1992 
Ministry of 
Health 
1992 The Act formalised the 
definition of “mental disorder” 
and endeavoured to provide 
individual rights & protections 
Moving Forward: The 
national mental health plan 
for more and better services 
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
1997 Strategic signal from newly 
formed Mental Health 
Commission also outlined 
terms of reference  
The Blueprint for Mental 
Health Services in New 
Zealand  
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
1998 Set the benchmarks for “the 
way things should be” in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand mental 
health services  
Te Mahere O Nga Ara Haere: 
Map of the Journeys 
Towards Equality Respect & 
Rights for People who 
Experience Mental Illness 
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
1998 Specific strategy for addresses 
stigma and discrimination; 
became the Like Minds, Like 
Mine campaign over time 
Communities and 
Government - Potential for 
Partnership Whakato-pu-
Whakaaro.   
Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
2001 Outlined and lobbied for the 
role and potential of non-
government organisations & 
their relationship with 
government. 
National Plan 2003-05: 
Project to counter stigma 
and discrimination 
associated with mental 
illness 
Ministry of 
Health 
2003 Government policy & funding 
endorsement of anti-
discrimination & stigma 
campaign  
Te Tahuhu: Improving 
Mental Health 2005-2015: 
The 2nd NZ MH & Addiction 
Plan 
Ministry of 
Health 
2005 Outlines government policy 
and priorities for mental health 
sector for 2005 to 2015.  
Explicitly links mental health to 
addiction.   
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Table 10: Important National and Sector Texts as data sources (cont.) 
Te Kokiri: The MH & 
Addiction Action Plan 
2006–2015 
Ministry of 
Health 
2006 Companion to Te Tahuhu 
developed to directly guide 
implementation 
Te Haererenga mo te 
Whakaoranga: The 
Journey of recovery for 
the N Z Mental Health 
Sector, 1996-2006 
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
2007 Chronicles the development of 
mental health services in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand 2005-
2015 
Te Hononga 2015: 
Connecting for greater 
well-being 
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
2007 A unifying picture of the sector 
in 2015 from MHC perspective 
focused on values & NZ society 
Te Awhiti: National 
Mental Health & 
Addictions Workforce 
Development Plan for, 
and in support of, Non-
Government 
Organisations 2006-2009 
Ministry of 
Health\Health 
Research 
Council 
2006 Makes the case for full NGO 
participation in sector 
development as legitimate and 
credible partners in the growth 
of mental health services in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand  
The Services we Need: 
Mental health service 
users’ expectations for 
the future 
Central 
Potential: Te 
Rito Maia 
2008 A “guide to systemic advocacy” 
by nationally recognised 
consortium of service users 
contracted by 6 DHBs through 
central North Island  
Destination recovery: Te 
Ūnga ki Uta: Te Oranga.   
Mental 
Health 
Advocacy 
Coalition 
(MHAC) 
2008 Eclectic sector group formalised 
in 1994 to provide mental 
health sector perspectives and 
policy advice to the Ministry of 
Health  
Frontline: The 
community mental 
health and addiction 
sector at work in New 
Zealand 
Platform 
Trust 
2010 NGO perspective on community 
organisations, innovations and 
recovery.  Vignettes and 
rationale for sector. 
Recovery Meanings and 
Measures: a scan of the 
literature* 
Mental 
Health 
Commission 
2011 Demonstrated some important 
“translations” from variety of 
perspectives within the sector 
 Interestingly this document introduces the HONOS (Health of the Nation Outcomes scale but 
ends up evaluating a range of other, recovery specific, assessment tools. despite this it is 
HONOS that has been adopted into NZ mental health services    
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Appendix 6: Preliminary data from pre and post focus 
group forms 
Table 11: Preliminary statistics from pre and post focus group forms 
Item  (5 point Likert scale) % response 
The focus group or interview was . . . ‘very worthwhile’ (5 on 
scale) 
50% 
The focus group or interview was . . . ‘worthwhile’ (4 on 
scale) 
48% 
Issues discussed were . . . ‘all relevant and 
important’ (5 on scale) 
49% 
Issues discussed were . . . ‘mostly relevant and 
important’ (4 on scale) 
44% 
The process has been useful in terms of 
understanding issues for developing recovery 
and strengths-based practice in community 
mental health organisations 
82 comments on 
process specific issues 
92% 
This research is worthwhile in terms of the 
development of the community mental health 
NGO sector 
99 comments about 
community ngos and 
community support 
workers. 
96% 
The experience in this focus group changed or 
enhanced your thinking about recovery?   
40 comments specific 
to importance of 
recovery 
69% 
The experience in this focus group changed or 
enhanced your thinking about strengths-based 
practice? 
 
15 comments specific 
to strengths & 
strengths-based 
practice.* 
68% 
NB.  It was very apparent from the conversations that participants subsumed a 
“strengths” approach under the umbrella of “recovery”.  Those who were explicit about 
strengths sometimes meant the Strengths Model (Rapp et al., 1999; Weick et al., 1989; 
Sullivan, 1992) which has been formally adopted or endorsed by some organisations.  A 
few others were aware of and drew from discourses of strengths-based practice (Barber, 
2005; Saleeby, 2002; McCashen, 2005).  However, several organisations had not been 
formally exposed to either of these discourses and given the other directions that the 
data was taking; I decided not to focus on strengths-based practice as a separate theme. 
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Appendix 7: Emergent themes  
Table 12: Emergent Themes  
RQ 1: In what ways are discourses of recovery constructed, negotiated and resisted in 
within non-government community mental health organisations in Aotearoa\ New 
Zealand 
Emergent Themes Notes 
1. Stories of madness  
2. Stories of recovery: The nature of journeys 
3. Measuring progress and the outcomes of recovery 
4. Recovery relationships and roles 
5. Emerging discourses of recovery and well-being 
6. Living in “community” or Being “fit” for society 
Lost in translation: 1st analysis 
chapter 
Participant talk compared & 
contrasted sector documents & 
service user literature. 
Privileged service user voices and the 
right to self-identify. 
RQ 2: How are institutional dynamics working to construct, constrain or contradict 
organisational practices in terms of becoming “recovery –oriented”? 
1. Normal and natural; the “taken for granted” aspects 
of social assumptions & institutional discourses 
2. The bad old days have gone: Myths of 
deinstitutionalisation 
3. Enduring and persistent: Bodies of knowledge  
4. Expertise and professionalism 
5. Legitimation and authority: Asymmetry and 
relationships of power 
Encountering the Institutions: 2nd 
analysis chapter 
Sector documents, focus groups 
especially Peer support workers with 
respect to institutionalised injustice.   
Focus groups & organisational texts 
re contracting and funding 
Funders & clinical providers: 
“evidence based practices” 
RQ 3: In what ways are institutional dynamics being problematised and challenged within 
the community non-government organisations and to what effect? 
1. Subordination and insubordination 
2. Problematising: Undermining the institutional pillars  
3. Struggling to disrupt: insiders and outsiders taking on 
the institutions  
4. Where does all the money go: The rise and rise of 
clinical services 
5. “We just do it differently”: Clinical services versus the 
non-government organisations   
6. The Empire strikes back: Counter challenges and 
defensive institutional work 
Subordination & 
Insubordination: 3rd  analysis 
chapter 
Focus groups & Interviews  
Positioning the institutions as 
“embattled” 
Teaming up: Blurring the 
funder\provider boundary 
Managing multiple discourses 
“clinical oversight” & “risk aversion” 
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Appendix 8: Initial impressions, preliminary findings 
and emerging themes   
Initial impressions and participant feedback that guided the analysis  
The early analysis and preliminary findings guided my substantive 
thematic analysis, and provided confirmation of the appropriateness of the 
inquiry methods and investigative direction.  The collated summaries of the pre-
focus group\ interview forms and post- focus group\interview feedback forms 
(Appendices 6 & 7) showed commonalities among language use and the 
identified key messages provided an initial sense of the variance among 
participants.  Similarly, the quantitative aspects of this data allowed me to gauge 
some initial, and general, inferences about the issues that mattered most to 
participants and the overall worth of the project to them.  The results of this 
brief analysis are displayed in Appendices 6 and 7.  
Participants were invited to make additional comments on their post-
focus group forms and the collation of these revealed some interesting features.  
Over half chose to comment on how the focus group discussion had shifted their 
thinking in some way, with 69% indicating that their understanding of recovery 
had been enriched through the shared talk.  Many appreciated the opportunity 
to see how other workers and organisations were faring and 47 explicitly 
referred to the value of having an open, safe and collaborative space in which to 
share thoughts and ideas; as well as recognising common challenges.  Only one 
participant indicated that the focus group was “not worthwhile” and yet went on 
to state, along with 49% of participants that all the issues discussed were 
“relevant and important”.  Another 15 participants commented directly on the 
importance of the project itself.    
The second most important category for participants, inferred from the 
number of people who chose to comment on this, was the significance of the 
roles and niche of community support workers (49 comments) and the NGO 
sector as a whole (47 comments).  Most of these comments referred to the 
importance of effective relationships with service users and the need to keep 
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pushing for a new paradigm in the sector by adopting a “whole of organisation” 
approach i.e. aiming for congruence between policies and practice.  Eleven 
people referred directly to the importance of peer support in recovery work.  
I compared language features, constructions and thematic patterns in the 
transcript data with this secondary data from pre and post focus group forms 
and data from the national and sector texts.  From these comparisons, I 
discerned emergent themes (Appendix 7).  The texts were interesting in that 
those not authored by service users, over time, had come to treat recovery-
oriented mental health services as a given.  Others such as Destination recovery 
(MHAC, 2008) and Frontline (Peters, 2010) provided local Aotearoa\New Zealand 
exemplars of visionary practice; but even these did not correspond with best 
practice service descriptions discussed in Getting the Services We Need (2008), 
and is a text authored by a service user organisation who were contracted by six 
DHBs in the central North Island.  Similarly the dominant, or preferred, 
organisational stories expressed in most texts were not echoed in the focus 
groups and interviews.  However, at this point, I needed to substantially reduce 
the size of the data set, and I eventually put aside further close analysis of these 
texts; instead using them mainly to position the discourses within the wider 
context of mental health services in Aotearoa\New Zealand. 
Examination of the pre and post focus group forms to discern tensions, if 
any, among participants’ own values with their organisational values indicated 
that participant values were “identical” or “basically similar” to those of their 
organisations.  This was the first signal that the most important issues faced by 
participants might be external to the organisations.  This sense was reinforced by 
other comments that constructed a binary between DHB clinical services, as 
“them”, and “us”; a relationship that also created resource dependency and 
funding constraints.  A total of 39 comments were directed at problems with 
funders, DHBs and contracting processes and the tension between community 
values and management ideology in particular.   
With these initial impressions in mind, I continued re-reading the 
transcripts, noting other features that emerged.  It was soon apparent that some 
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vocabularies were being used by participants in different ways, and had different 
meanings.  I began to consider the uses of language and how to define linguistic 
boundaries and paraphrase common ideas (Aronson, 1994).  It was clear that the 
major distinctions were not evident between cohorts, as I had anticipated, but 
were very apparent between DHB regions and organisations.   
All of these observations helped to confirm that with such a rich data set, 
I could proceed meaningfully in several directions and that I needed to make 
some selection decisions.  To that end, I then identified the major themes that 
stood out from the data and concentrated my focus on unpacking and analysing 
these across the focus groups and interviews.  
Emergent themes and adjustments of the research questions 
The initial thematic analysis exposed two powerful but somewhat 
surprising features.  First, although I had not previously suspected that there 
would be such a remarkable distinction between “models of madness” (Read et 
al., 2004) and a reified construct of “mental illness”, this was clearly well known 
and taken for granted by participants with their own experiences of serious 
psychological distress.  They talked about “madness” in very different terms from 
other participants.  The second outstanding feature of the initial analysis was 
that when participants were asked directly to describe the medical model and its 
influence in mental health services, they seemed a bit non-plussed.  
Nevertheless, they continually referred to the impacts of “clinical” approaches as 
dominant, negative, controlling and “other” to what they were trying to achieve 
in their own organisations.   
Therefore, it was apparent biomedicine, as an institution, was still 
prevalent in mental health services despite a national policy of recovery and a 
common assumption of “deinstitutionalisation” as historical fact.  This drew my 
attention to the way participants and others conceptualised the institutions and 
most pertinently deinstitutionalisation.  It became clear that participants 
perceived that institutions were merely physical buildings and locations, and, 
most importantly, that institutionalisation was a thing of the past (Warriner, 
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2010).  This meant that some emerging themes were as interesting for what was 
not said as much as for what was.   
The next stage of the analysis examined participants’ use of language and 
metaphors such as “ordinary life”, “people like us” and “clinical is different”.  The 
choice and variety of vocabulary, the frequency of word use, the intensity of 
delivery, as well as what was missing from the talk, led to tentative identification 
of important meanings and ideas.  However, discursive strategies are broader 
than mere language features and the narratives that arose from the focus groups 
and interviews were inevitably shaped by their interactional features, in which 
contrasting versions of reality could be inferred from challenges and competing 
interpretations of what happened in organisational communication and practice.  
Collating and exploring these narrative fragments, within their context 
and across transcripts exposed patterns of tacit discourse and hinted at 
subliminal assumptions and values sometimes at odds with the intent and overall 
sense of what was said consciously.  It was also apparent that participant 
responses could be triggered by stimuli that elicited particular responses.  For 
example, when asked to define recovery, many participants responded with 
stock phrases from The Blueprint (Mental Health Commission, 1998) such as 
recovery being a “journey” and the importance of “walking alongside people” 
which have almost become clichéd.   
What was also striking was how people used the same vocabularies, 
especially around notions of recovery, but clearly meant different things.  I then 
examined the data more closely in terms of how participants used language and 
it quickly revealed that not only did participants used language in multiple, 
ambiguous ways but that these usages were not of equal power.  The literature 
on translation helped to explain how these discourses could co-exist and yet be 
so disparate.   
As the complexity of the analysis grew, it became necessary to develop 
protocols that made decisions clear and consistent but which also set limits on, 
and prioritised the material included in the analysis.  In particular, the strengths 
of the emerging themes and the content of the data eventually over-rode many 
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of the interactive aspects within focus groups.  Therefore, for each developing 
theme I concentrated on making sense of the data as a set of coherent narratives 
that moved between description and analytic abstraction including a kind of 
triangulation that aimed to ensure credibility and rigour by continuous 
movement between participant talk and examples of current themes and issues 
evident in organisational and national documents and policy statements.   
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Appendix 9: Glossary of terms, abbreviations and acronyms  
AR   Action Research 
The Blueprint The blueprint for mental health services in 
Aotearoa\New Zealand: The way things need to be 
(Mental Health Commission, 1998) 
CAI   Critical Appreciative Inquiry  
CHE   Crown Health Enterprise 
DHB   District health Board  
H&D   Health and Disability  
HFA   Health Funding Authority 
Kaupapa Māori Organisations that operate from an explicitly 
Māori worldview and cultural approaches 
MHAC   Mental health Advocacy Coalition  
MHC    Mental Health Commission 
MH (CA&T) Act Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment& 
Treatment) Act 1992 
MoH   Ministry of Health 
NGO   Non-government organisation   
Peer Support worker A worker who identifies as having their own 
experiences of serious psychological distress and 
who is in a designated support role based on their 
shared experiences with service users 
RHA   Regional Health Authority 
WSF   World Schizophrenia Fellowship 
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